Advisory: capacity building at strategic level

Table of Contents

Introduction

1. Capacity Building within the defence sector

1.1 From “train-and-equip” to strategic advising

2. Strategic Advising: Definition and Doctrinal Framework

2.1 Advising in UN doctrine

2.2 Advising in NATO doctrine

2.3 Advising in the EU doctrine

2.4 Key findings: commonalities and discrepancies between doctrines

3. Equipping Advisors to carry out capacity building at strategic level

3.1 Methodological note

3.2 Skill set of an effective advisor

3.3 Roles: What does an advisor do?

3.4 Learning and Training: Preparing for strategic advising

3.5 What Challenges?

Conclusion

Bibliography

Executive Summary

In the context of international interventions, both civil and military, the advisory function has progressively become one of the most important frontiers for understanding the effectiveness of capacity building. With an analysis approach oriented at the strategic level, the paper argues that the advisory function is more effective and sustainable for security sector reform, and for capacity building in general terms, than technical assistance (to be understood as the train-and-equip paradigm). To understand what is meant by advisory, the article compares the doctrinal approach of the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the United Nations, organisations that orient capacity building towards similar principles. Although the three doctrines present important elements of convergence, there is a lack of standardisation, which is an obstacle to defining the advisory function in general. Furthermore, when examining the skills, roles and backgrounds of strategic-level advisors, critical issues emerged related to the lack of specific pre-deployment training, coordination between advisors and handover/turnover processes. However, it should be emphasised that conflict contexts are complex and involve many variables. Therefore, even the most competent advisor may only be able to realise part of the objectives. 

Keywords: strategic advising; capacity building; role; skills; training. 

Introduction

Humanitarian interventions imply the progressive involvement of external actors, both military and civilian, in internal crisis with the aim of promoting democracy and good governance. This idea is closely linked to the one of development. In the pragmatic dimension, these objectives are translated into the implementation of capacity building, defined as: 

"The process by which individuals, organisations and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over a period of time". 1

Initially, it retained a top-down approach, in which donors and organisations intervened through the provision of capital and trained personnel (technical assistance). In particular, the security-development nexus ensured that Security Sector Reform (SSR) was introduced as a key aspect. This finds legitimacy in the idea that the monopoly of the use of force constitutes the foundation of the State, in the Weberian sense. Capacity building in this field was initially linked to the technical assistance dimension, embodied in the "train-and-equip" paradigm, however, the questioning of this approach led to the emergence of a new tool: strategic advising, specifically framed to achieve enhanced capacity. This article aims to fill this research gap by answering the following research question: What are the benefits of the strategic advisory function in capacity building?

The paper is divided into three sections. The first is concerned with providing a brief overview of capacity building and security sector reform, with the aim of explaining the reasons for the use of strategic advising as a tool in international interventions. 

The second section is devoted to a doctrinal framing of the advisory function. After providing a brief conceptual reconstruction regarding the major definitions of strategic advisory and advisor, the paper focuses on a comparative analysis of the function under consideration in the doctrines adopted by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU). The last section describes the potential limitations and contradictions inherent in the text of the doctrines. 

The third section is devoted to the presentation of the research findings, drawn from the official documents available and three semi-structured interviews with key figures of international missions involved in various capacities in the implementation of the advisory function (Head of Mission/HoM, training managers, former advisors). 

Finally, the conclusions synthesize the initial theoretical reflections, existing positions in the literature, and the results of the analyzed data, highlighting, without claiming to be exhaustive, a number of critical issues considered a sensitive data to a better or more complete implementation of doctrines dedicated to the advisory function at the strategic level.

1. Capacity Building within the defence sector

1.1 From “train-and-equip” to strategic advising

When referring to capacity building in relation to the security sector, it enters the concept of security sector reform (SSR). It has become part of the standard toolbox of interventions within conflict-affected states and those seeking to stabilize or avoid fractures.2 Although there is no agreed definition, SSR typically refers to the reform, construction or reconstruction of security and justice sector institutions, including oversight and management bodies3. SSR is usually undertaken by a state together with national and international partners, with the ostensible aim of improving the provision of safety, security and justice to its citizens, recognizing that security is a precursor to long-term peace. 4Thus, the primary task of SSR is to reinstall states' monopoly on violence and populations' trust in security forces.5 According to the OECD Handbook on SSR, there are four key objectives at the heart of these: the establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system; the improvement of security and justice service delivery; the development of local leadership and ownership of the process; and the sustainability of justice and security delivery.6 SSR is a political process, not a technical one. As such, all aspects of it must be treated as political, rather than technical. For this reason, resistance to SSR is not surprising, as these elements go to the very core of what states are and what power means within the state. Indeed, any SSR program has a substantial impact on local power relations and, moreover, decisions made in the heat of the moment on SSR in the stabilization phase can have unforeseen long-term implications.7 For this reason, in some contexts the implementation of SSR has met with resistance resulting in the more classic and traditional training and equipping approach, which has seen the success of some armed forces reforms not accompanied by a parallel development of the justice sector (shelved at times).8 This application model focuses more on tactical and operational capacity building in terms of train and equip, the aim of which is to improve the skill level of security forces, leaving limited space for the component of policy change and reform.9 This approach can bring benefits, as security forces must be able to perform their tasks effectively and professionally, as developing democratic governance of the security sector does not in itself guarantee security. However, the provision of weapons, materials and other equipment may improve operational effectiveness but does not constitute SSR.10 Therefore, train-and-equip is an integral part of SSR but does not exhaust it. In relation to the concept of capacity-building, this assumes that equipping individuals with the adequate skills will be enough to ensure that a given capacity is effectively acquired at the individual, project, and organizational level. However, Jackson in 201111, also proposes another, more extreme view, arguing that 

"the lack of policy implications in technical capacity-building and training means that there is little resistance from national actors, while at the same time making it easier for donors to get quick and quantitative results”. 

Nonetheless, in the definitions given in the previous paragraph, capacity-building is seen as a process that develops on three levels: individuals, organizations, and society. Therefore, qualified individuals, trained in train-and-equip, are only one of the necessary elements for this purpose. Indeed, improving one aspect (e.g., human and material resources) through training and equipping does not necessarily strengthen key components at the other two levels.12 Capacity development gaps might also lie at the organizational level: if individuals have the knowledge and motivation, but a change is not materializing, then an assessment may reveal that the blockage lies in the organization or system in which the individuals operate. Thus, capacity building would focus on strengthening institutional capacities (e.g., policies, procedures, decision-making, resource allocation). One of the reasons for which training is still often used, even though it is not always an appropriate capacity-building intervention, is that it is relatively easy to undertake. More complex capacity development and change processes, involving different dimensions and levels of capacity development, are more challenging to undertake and therefore require a higher level of support, more time, and resources.13

Between 2006 and 2008, the OECD, the World Bank and UNDP raised the argument that this approach, while having positive effects, also had serious shortcomings. These included, for example, sometimes a lack of relevance of general skills and information to specific contexts, the ad hoc nature of trainings (as opposed to a long-term capacity development process), and a lack of cultural sensitivity.14 The 2016 European Peacebuilding Liaison Office15 report highlighted some of the critical issues and risks related to the train-and-equip formula in relation to SSR. The first relates to the lack of a definition of what train-and-equip entails. The second is the dilemma that the equipment could be misused or fall into the hands of non-state actors. The third criticism concerns isolated training-and-equipping exercises, which cannot replace broader reform processes, but can become an obstacle to reform, unless their design is accompanied by a clear design of future reforms that also affect the justice sector. Finally, such activity must always be supported by an intensive monitoring mechanism. Moreover, one of the challenges related to training missions concerns the control of civilian political forces over the armed forces. Indeed, the main risk with a lack of civilian oversight as well as a proper chain of command is that trainees may at a later point in time participate in a future military coup.16 

In conclusion, short-term initiatives must be designed to achieve longer-term goals. Long-term change comes from a change of mindset. The complexity of reform processes and often the resistance to reform mean that SSR is not a quick fix but a rather long process. The World Bank has indicated that such complicated reform processes can take up to a generation to conclude. As this analysis has shown, this is hardly achieved through the train-and-equip dichotomy. In this respect, what could be an important resource is strategic advising. Change the mindset by changing the brain.17 In this regard, an advisor must therefore adopt a time perspective that goes far beyond the duration of the employment of a single advisor. 

2. Strategic Advising: Definition and Doctrinal Framework

The framework outlined in the previous chapter, in relation to capacity-building and SSR, finds a pragmatic configuration and a leading role in advising, reconfigured as a means to achieve enhanced capacity. Before turning to the practical dimension of the roles and training of advisors deployed in operational theatres, it is necessary to include these activities in a conceptual and doctrinal framework. This is an attempt to systematise one of the most debated issues within the international community, which in fact does not have an unambiguous and universally accepted definition of what is meant by advising and advisor respectively. 

The most prominent definition of Advising in Capacity-building context has been provided by Gerspacher, in 2016. In her book she defines advising as 

“a tool used by the international community to build the capacity of governments to govern societies emerging from conflict or transitioning from authoritarian to democratic regimes.”18 

Thus, the advising function is implemented during the post-conflict and peacebuilding phase, and it can be assumed that the long-term goal described by the definition often depends on choosing the right person. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, it is useful to compare the most relevant advisor definitions to outline and define who is a strategic advisor. 

In general, the term Advisor refers to an expert whose job is to give advice to another person or to a group of people. Although this definition could also fit the capacity-building context, the focus is too broad; therefore, a normative shift to the military application domain is necessary. As an example, consider the definition contained in US military doctrine; an advisor is identified as a Subject Matter Expert (SME) << who serves with foreign security forces, or their ministerial-level security institutions, to advise, counsel, and assist their partner nation counterparts >>.19

Considering specifically the figure of an advisor employed in the capacity-building context, the most important and detailed definition identifies him/her as:

an experienced practitioner who is sent by a foreign country or international organization to help build capacity of institutions in transitional societies. The adviser has no executive function. His role is limited to sharing advice, often in the form of recommendations for reforming or transforming an organization. An adviser typically works alongside a counterpart who is a high-ranking official within a ministry or agency. 20

From the definitions taken into consideration, common elements can be inferred. First and foremost, the advisor needs to be an expert, SME or experienced practitioner; in essence an individual from the civilian or military world (as the case may be) who, by virtue of position, education, training or experience, is endowed with greater than normal competence or insight into a particular discipline. Common to the last two definitions, with reference to capacity-building, is the outcome, i.e., reforming and transforming the institutions of the host country, which is at the political-strategic level. Thus, the activity of sharing advice by the experience practitioner is implemented precisely at this level, having as counterpart a high-ranking official (i.e., ministerial-level).

The elements highlighted by the previous definitions converge, from a functional point of view to a framing of the Strategic Advisor of last resort, in which he/she is identified as the experienced professional who performs the function of coordinator and collector of ideas, projects, actions and activities all combined to correspond to the objectives established in the mandate21. 

This last definition introduces a central element: the objectives set by the mandate. As advising is embedded in the broader context of the international community's intervention in conflict areas, it is essential to outline the main differences and similarities in the approaches of the major actors involved. Indeed, each organisation may have a different mandate, hence a different approach. To outline these differences, this analysis reviews the doctrines of UN, NATO and EU, identified as key players in peacebuilding and post-conflict interventions. The resulting doctrinal scenario refers to the identification of the advisor to be deployed in civil, military, police or integrated operations.

2.1 Advising in UN doctrine

In the context of post-conflict societies, UN peacekeeping operations are often tasked with assisting in the reform, restructuring and reconstruction of law enforcement agencies22. A substantial part of this process is, inter alia, the interaction between the UN police and the host country police, in order to achieve defined objectives. Under a mandate from the Security Council and at the request of the host state police, UN police co-locates with its national counterpart. Co-location enhances the ability of UN police officers to provide advice and knowledge transfer. 23In the UN framework, the advising function is detailed in the UN Peace Operations Manual Police Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising in Peace Operations24, where advising is a key tool in capacity building and the broader police development process, and it is fundamental to the ability of the UN police to anchor police development truly within national ownership. Furthermore, it should be underlined that the advisor addresses the whole organisation, usually interacting with different individuals within it, so that the aim is not to enable a specific person, but the organisation. 

Within the UN doctrine, advising ranks among the operational activities related to Police Capacity Building and Development. UN mandated advisers work at a strategic level.25 In particular, they work at a strategic, medium to high management level. The basic aim can be identified as to establish a partnership with their local counterpart to achieve the goal of building (reforming or transforming) the institution. Advising is thus framed as a process, composed of sequential phases.26

It is crucial to highlight from the very first phase defined as initial meetings with the counterpart how the matrix of activities is locally owned (at any stage). In addition, it is important to make it clear that the advisor is there to share ideas and expertise that the counterpart may find useful. The substantial purpose of this first phase is to make it clear that the advisor is there not as a visitor, but as a professional and experienced colleague who may have faced a similar challenge in the past. 

The second phase relies heavily on dialogue between the parties. In fact, according to the UN Doctrine, the identification and definition of the problem must be the result of a shared awareness between the advisor and the advisee. In addition, particular attention must be paid to the personal element of the advisee, who may feel uncomfortable identifying weaknesses and critical issues in his or her organisation. The third step is identifying a solution. It is always necessary that the idea for solving the problem is locally owned, so the UNPOL advisor may stimulate the solution search (e.g., by organising brainstorming). The UNPOL advisor needs to be part of the process but not the solution, in fact the fourth phase of development of a plan to address the problem" requires highly structured work on the part of the advisor (i.e., sophisticated plans), but the plan must be understood and owned by the host-State counterpart. “Implementation of the plan, the fifth stage, does not involve the advisor's function being exhausted. Thus, the advisor must be available and ready to address any type of problem that the counterpart may encounter in the implementation of the previously elaborated solution.

Furthermore, strategic advising in relation to the UN must include compliance with a number of guiding principles outlined in the DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Police Capacity-Building and Development27:

• Multi-party, cross-societal consensus on police reform and broad engagement of relevant stakeholders through the reform process: The rationale is that police reform is as much a political as a technical matter. For this reason, to achieve police reform, the consensus of all key stakeholders is necessary to make the process nationally owned.

• Leadership role and engagement of the host-state institution: any substantial reform or transformation, to be effective and efficient, needs to be owned by the host-state. To this end, the active involvement of host-state institutions is essential, but (most importantly) they need to take the lead in these processes. 

• Building a culture of accountability in the host-state institution: Substantial changes do not (only) depend on a formal reorganisation. What is necessary is to induce a behavioural change within the profession. The UN doctrine refers to << building a culture of accountability >>, which is done through the inclusion of UN values in training and the construction of a disciplinary system. 

• Encouraging improvements in the broader criminal justice system of the host State: Efforts towards the police reform alone would have little effect without parallel growth in both the judicial and correctional systems. Therefore, the UN identifies as a guideline the expansion of reforms to include the justice system.

• Insistence on international human rights and criminal justice standards, including comprehensive integration of women’s rights and gender equality commitments: UN advising must ensure that it always includes an underlying effort to advance human rights standards. Moreover, this effort must extend to inclusive integration from a gender mainstreaming perspective.

2.2 Advising in NATO doctrine

NATO's strategic concept describes the requirement for the Allies to << develop the capability to train and develop local forces [police forces included] in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance >>28. In this context, the advisory function is widely placed, but the doctrines in which it is expressed in material terms are those related to the concepts of Security Force Assistance (SFA) and Stability Policing (SP). Both are placed in the frame of the broader Nation Building and Defence Capacity Building initiatives29. This initiative, which was institutionalised at the 2014 Summit in Wales, has the aim to be an essential pillar of the Alliance's broader Stability Projection Initiative. The focus is on strategic advising on defence and related security reform and institution-building, and on defence capabilities and force development. However, to give the most complete picture possible, a digression must be made as to what is meant specifically by SFA and SP.

According to NATO doctrine30, SFA encompasses all activities that develop and enhance, or directly support, the development of local forces and their associated institutions in crisis areas. They are clearly part of the broader spectrum of NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach. SFA activities are applicable at all levels of operations: military strategic, operational, and tactical. The acronym GOTEAM (Generate, Organise, Train, Enable, Advise, Mentor) summarises the spectrum of SFA operations. In particular, advisory is part of the Military Assistance (MA) activities, materially implemented by the Special Operation Forces. MA is a broad category of measures and activities that support and influence critical friendly assets; it is implemented not only through advisory activity but includes (but is not limited to) capability building of friendly security forces, engagement with local, regional and national leadership organisations and civic actions that support and influence the local population. Within MA, advising is defined as follows:

"These are activities that enhance the performance of designated actors by providing active participation and expertise to achieve strategic or operational objectives".

NATO's SFA concept, however, leaves the need to address local police forces open. NATO has recognised this policing gap stating that << there may be a need to fully support security sector reform by training and mentoring police forces and advising local government officials in the areas of law and order and the rule of law when other actors are hampered and unable to do so >> 31. Essentially, while the SFA focuses on the development, improvement and support of non-NATO military security forces, the strengthening of the SP focuses primarily on police reform and secondarily on other related institutions, including the judiciary, corrections, and national government.32

This policing gap can be bridged through a combination of different approaches: through the temporary replacement of the Host Nation police force and/or by intervening on their capacity, by raising their performance to acceptable levels.33 For the purposes of placing the advisory activity in the doctrine, only the type of reinforcement mission will be dealt with. It is necessary when the indigenous police exist and have a fair degree of accountability but have limited effectiveness such that advice (among other functions) is needed. NATO SP resources will not be entitled to executive policing powers, as these are maintained by the indigenous police, and their tasks will consist of aiding.34

Thus, the advising function consists of activities that assist the host nation by providing subject matter expertise and advice to local forces. These activities are applicable from the tactical to the strategic level and in support of individuals or groups. In the NATO SP doctrine, the advising activity finds space in two of the four types of stability activities: Stability Policing in Security Sector Reform and Stability Policing in Support to Governance Tasks. Respectively, in the first type of stability activities, the figure of the advisor finds its place starting from the handover the responsibility from the military component to police leadership (in the ambit, therefore, of the Police Capacity Building), while in the second type, the advisor furnishes his experience with the purpose of allowing the host country to develop a long-term governance.

Here, too, there are fundamental principles that the advisor must follow in the performance of his or her duties. In particular, the principle of local ownership finds ample space in both AJP-3.16 and AJP-3.22. It appears to be the condition sine qua non to obtain a long-term projection of stability. Furthermore, ample attention is dedicated also to the principle of Rule of Law, thus, the policies and practices of security of a country must be founded on the rule of law and connected to the wider sector of justice (in this is found the reference to the SSR). Closely related to the work of an advisor are the imperatives of understanding, strategic communication, trust, legitimacy, and sustainability.

Without going through each of them, it should be noted that they are all related to a fundamental aspect of consultancy activities: establishing a relationship based on trust with host nation counterparts. Within this framework, culture, mission, and operating environment largely define the conditions under which an advisor must develop the relationships necessary to achieve mission success. Advisors must use their influence, developed through trust and teamwork, to explain to clients that their advice might be a viable alternative and is worthy of consideration.

2.3 Advising in the EU doctrine

The EU, within the framework of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and its successor the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), has positioned itself as a key actor (in terms of financial resources, personnel support, and political will) in the promotion of SSR activities. CSDP allows EU to deploy civilian, police and military personnel in missions and operations outside the union, they are the key instrument for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), conceived and controlled by EU Member States through the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which exercises political control and strategic direction. Civilian CSDP play a crucial role in the conflict cycle, empowering partners to provide security and apply the rule of law on their own territory. The SSR missions are increasingly ascending in importance within missions conducted under the framework of the CSDP, helping achieve goals of establishing secure environments where the rule of law and human rights are respected.35

The EU's approach is to make extensive use of the advisory function within the framework outlined above. However, it should be noted that it is also carried out at a political-strategic level by the EU Delegations, which are provided by the political mandate. In fact, while Capacity-building Missions are provided by a political part it presents a different aim and a more focused mandate on SSR. So, in the case of EU Delegations, the function we are referring to is precisely that of political advisory, while in the case of CSDPs advising ranges from the strategic to the operational level. It can be said, therefore, that for the EU, advising is one of the best tools for promoting SSR. 

Although advising cuts across the various levels of EU international engagement, doctrinal systematisation is only found in the Civilian CSDP missions. This is evident in the publication CivOpsCdr Operational Guidelines for Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising in Civilian CSDP Missions36 of 2014, which defines (among others) the advising function. Indeed, prior to the release of these guidelines, staff involved in advising activities << mostly rely on learning by doing and lessons learned in the past >> 37. The advisor, for EU doctrine, provides expertise to institutions or organisations on operational issues, in order to develop their performance or strengthen their capacity to fulfil specialised task. Advisors usually do not work in a one-to-one relationship with an individual: advising can concentrate either on a solution to an individual problem (usually short-term) or on a long-term relationship with an organisation.

The EU also identifies several key principles that the Advisor (applicable at any level) is required to respect and implement within its function. Advising is to be conducted with respect for the culture of the host country, but without compromising core European values drawing on international law and standards, reassumed by article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). The EU intervenes with a civilian CSDP strengthening mission only when the host country has made its own decision to move towards reform and/or state and capacity building. 

The most relevant principle for CSDP missions (the why38) is local ownership, that can be identified as the local solution for a local problem, but constant reference must be made to international law and standards (including human rights and equal rights principles) in the implementation process. Furthermore, the element of sustainability is crucial to produce long-term effects; It refers to the capacity to ensure that the benefit is enduring. To achieve sustainability, it is important that advisors, the international community, the local authorities and the advisees share the same vision. The aim of Civilian CSDP is not to impose a western system on the host country but, to give the host country/representatives the tools needed to develop a system that fits for this individual country. This falls under the element of flexibility. The second block of principles to be found in the EU doctrine refers to the personal implementation sphere of the advisor. First, if we want to follow a temporal order of implementation, Awareness of the political, legal and administrative environment and Cultural Awareness are two of the basic principles that should be accompanied by a pre-deployment preparation. Thus, in order to avoid friction and to achieve the highest possible level of effectiveness, a preliminary study of the context in which the advisor will be immersed is necessary. The principles of Patience, Respect, Trust and Confidence all fall under the advisor's personal capacities. In fact, in order to be effective in terms of capacity-building, the primary objective of the advisor must be to build a relationship that is functional to achieving the mission statement. EU doctrine establishes the need to structure the transfer of knowledge on the part of the advisor; in fact, it is useful for the purposes of success to divide objectives and activities in relation to the roadmap and the type of counterpart. 

The last principle seeks to guide the advisor with respect to its place among several other actors, so Cooperation with other actors is central. In fact, the civilian CSDP mission will not be the only international actor providing assistance in a given host country, for this reason it is necessary to act in terms of cooperation with other actors, in order to avoid friction and maximise activities to achieve its mandate.

2.4 Key findings: commonalities and discrepancies between doctrines

Looking at the above doctrines from a comparative perspective, there are elements of similarity to other elements of inequality that are worth characterising and arguing. 

The UN has the most structured doctrine when it comes to advising at the strategic level. The other doctrines also provide for advising at the strategic level but do not have an ad hoc doctrinal standardisation. The NATO concept of advising is built on two doctrines, which are certainly complementary, but which contribute to the creation of a complex and non-linear framework. However, NATO's willingness to standardise the advising function (with reference to training) can be deduced from the 2018 initiative, carried out by the NATO SFA Center of Excellence consisting of a Workshop on Advising as Capability for SFA, held in Rome. The aim of that initiative was to address the strategic advisor profile in the NATO SFA environment from a multidisciplinary perspective and to have an arena of discussion on issues regarding training and education and lessons identified39. Furthermore, the willingness to integrate the advising function in the two contexts of SFA and SP, is evidenced by the Seminar for Institutional Advisors on Stabilisation and Reconstruction (S&R), Security Sector Reform (SSR), Security Force Assistance (SFA) and Stability Policing (SP) co-designed by the NATO SP CoE and the NATO SFA CoE, in 2021. 40 The EU implements advising at various levels, political with EU Special Representatives and EU Delegations and at strategic-operational levels with CSDP. However, the lack of a linear and comprehensive doctrinal framework creates several problems when looking at the material implementation of activities. Indeed, if the head of the political section in the EU delegation is not assertive, and there is an assertive strategic adviser in the mission, this may create overlaps/attrition. This is important and the leadership level must consider it in order to deconflict. For example, sometimes advisors are provided with fragmented information, while the EU delegation has comprehensive information: they need to share and deconflict.41

As far as common elements are concerned, the concept of local ownership finds ample scope in all the doctrines outlined above. One can highlight the centrality of this concept in theorising; nevertheless, it is considered more controversial in implementation, as it will be highlighted in chapter three. The fundamental characteristics of the relationship to be built between the advisor and the advisee are exhaustively outlined across (homogeneously) the three doctrines. However, the practical side requires that the person playing the role of advisor can implement them. 

This introduces two issues that need to be addressed: pre-deployment training and recruitment process. The former constitutes one of the most relevant issues currently in the strategic advising debate, as training methods to transform the experienced practitioner into an advisor are often controversial and not standardised. This issue will be defined and characterised within the next chapter, in fact, intentionally the roles of advisors relative to each doctrine have been bypassed and not included within this chapter. The second is an issue with a very important practical implication, as advisors are often seconded by the member states of the international organisation, the recruitment process being attributed to the state of origin. This creates, first, a lack of homogeneity as each state has its own method of selection and creates a very practical problem when the person appointed as an advisor may not be suitable for any reason whatsoever either for life in the field or for the mission in general.

3. Equipping Advisors to carry out capacity building at strategic level

By focusing on the professional profile of those in the strategic advisory function, it is possible to deepen the concept of advising itself, considering its individual level. It should be stressed that in missions, advisors are an integral part of the operation. Typically, in such missions, a small team of political advisers or officers is assembled to provide support to a counterpart. An adviser will not necessarily have only one interlocutor but there may be an entire institution. The transformation of a subject matter expert into a strategic advisor follows a very precise procedure. First, the expert needs to be equipped with a set of skills that need to be enhanced through a pre-deployment learning and training process. In addition, the mandate of a strategic advisor, containing his or her roles, needs to be as well defined as possible. These steps imply the emergence of a series of critical issues and challenges that will be analysed and discussed below.

3.1 Methodological note

This section will present the methodological premises necessary for the critical analysis of the interviews and documents examined below.

First, it is appropriate to emphasize the difficulty encountered in finding documentation functional to the analysis. The scarcity of unclassified material attesting to the best practices and lessons identified of the strategic advisory function within operations and missions is noted. For this reason, it was necessary to resort to interviews in order to find the necessary information. In addition, it is crucial to highlight that the people interviewed were three men.

Secondly, for reasons of confidentiality and since the precise identification of the interviewees was not necessary for the purposes of the analysis, it was decided to maintain a regime of anonymity, referring to the contributions as interview no. 1, 2, and 3.

3.2 Skill set of an effective advisor

International organisations recruit professionals whose experience is relevant to the mission end state. This approach sees professional expertise as an essential element, the advisor must identify the options to be considered when developing new procedures and practices. In general, the hard skills dimension is uniformly framed, by doctrines and literature, as sector technical expertise. In the military and police, the hard skill that is the premise of everything is rank.42 In many cases, a sense of offence is triggered in the counterpart when a lower-ranked advisor is sent. It follows that, especially in the military and the police, it is important to avoid a low-level colleague alongside the adviser. The principle should be applied that senior advice requires a senior person. In the ministry it is different because they are area experts and civilians are used to using technical experts.43

Undoubtedly, experience as a professional and technical competence are important, but taken individually they are insufficient and porous.44 For this reason, it needs to be complemented by a range of additional knowledge and skills aimed at capacity building. These fall into the domain of soft skills, understood as the skills of a knowledge broker. Essentially, being an effective advisor boils down to a certain set of personal skills and qualities. However, it is almost impossible to draw up an exhaustive list of these, as each situation may require an ad hoc additional skill. The analysis below aims to demonstrate the complexity underlying the role of an advisor. The advisor, like any expert, has to identify gaps and needs and then sift through his or her experiences for practices that could fit the context and contribute to systematic capacity building efforts. These skills can be traced back to macro-categories, namely: the ability to adapt to an unfamiliar cultural and institutional environment, develop a relationship of trust, solicit information, diagnose problems and find solutions.45

For the first category, the advisor must be culturally aware, in the sense of being provided with the knowledge that the cultural differences between the adviser and others and that culture affects the way advice is given and received.46 In the case of a complex theatre of operations such as Somalia, for example, it is necessary to be aware of clan dynamics and the centrality of the family element; it is relevant for the advisor to know that power in such a context is divided among the clans.47 This awareness contributes to the creation of the so-called flexible approach, which is goal-oriented.48 Not only professional and cultural awareness but also a political awareness is necessary; it is to be understood as the understanding of power dynamics and politics on the ground.49 

One of the main preconditions for being a strategic advisor is the ability to develop a relationship of trust with the counterpart. Without trust, the advisor will almost certainly not be able to gain access to the principal, other relevant actors, or information. Nor will the advisor be listened to. However, gaining trust depends to a large extent on how the advisor interacts with the principal and how he or she is perceived.50 The advisor, in fact, provides tools that the advisee uses, in which context trust is to be considered a crucial element. For this reason, empathy, respect, humility, and the ability to build relationships are fundamental characteristics, among others, of an advisor profile and cannot be excluded from his curriculum.51 The objective of the advisor is to penetrate the other's way of thinking in order to enhance capacities. End state must be seen as the goal not the methodologies to be used. The alternative method should never be imposed, it should be offered as a valid alternative.52 Furthermore, technical experts are used to exercising authority and taking the lead in their professional life, but to be effective as consultants, they must demonstrate technical competence while behaving not as leaders but as supporters. This also brings out leadership and ownership. The latter means not forcing anyone. One of the mistakes that is often made is to force the action of influence in order to implement the mandate. But it is necessary for the advisor to understand that ownership in these contexts means compromise. However, the advisor must be clear about what is negotiable and what is not (e.g. human rights are never negotiable).53

For what concerns communication, the advisor's skills could be divided into active and passive communication. The former is understood as both verbal and non-verbal communication. A communicator with the ability to transmit advice in an easily understandable way.54 It means listening for specific information rather than listening to what the interlocutor wishes to share. To persuade, the advisor has to appeal to every artifice of language, in fact non-verbal communication becomes particularly relevant when an interpreter is needed.55 The second is framed as active (patient) listening, understood as the ability to pay attention to the needs of the counterpart.56 In conclusion, it is crucial that the advisor is self-critical. He is deployed carrying his own set of values and principles, but he must be prepared to question some of them to understand that in some cases his priorities will not be the right ones for the host nation. 57

3.3 Roles: What does an advisor do?

It is not possible to draw an all-encompassing picture of what roles a strategic advisor can play. The different roles of being an advisor require different ways in which advice is delivered. Depending on whether the main objective is capacity building or results, the advisor will have different roles; this is determined by the mission statement. As this is mainly a policy-driven activity, the political role of the mission, as well as its internal organisation and the timeframe that is dictated, must be examined when defining the roles of the expert. An advisor will have to assume different roles depending on the situation. The role of reflective observer will almost certainly be the starting point, as a counsellor will have to learn to understand both the context and the counsellor. The practical expert, on the other hand, is a role that a counsellor should try to avoid as this means leaving the role of counsellor and just being an implementer. Although these roles may vary, some are common to any strategic advisor. According to Wesslau58, the core functions of advisory are: upwards, downwards, inwards and outwards. In general, for an in-mission advisor, the upward function involves advising the mission leadership. The downward function implies that the advisor puts his expertise at the service of the whole mission, especially in the field of operational planning. The inward function represents the interaction with headquarters and its experts. The outward function consists of engaging with external stakeholders, such as the partner country and actors in the international community. This last function is the most relevant and widespread in strategic advising. In fact, many strategic advisors are not in-mission advisors but assigned to the outward function. In this context, the role is essentially to interact with the local counterpart in the partner country structure, probably in a government ministry or department. The other three functions can be traced back to this. In fact, having a principal belonging to a ministry as advisor means performing an upward function, not with respect to the mission, but to the local principal. The downward function is expressed in the performance of the advising function also with respect to other actors of the principal structure other than the principal. The inward function would be the interaction with the employer, to be identified in the mission or in the team of advisors, depending on the specific case. Within the mission or as part of a team, this would include co-ordination and co-operation with other representatives of the mission. 

The strategic advisor is an advisor who understands and can give advice on political aspects of the reforms that the mission and the country concerned propose to implement. Therefore, he or she must be aware of the consequences that some advice might have on the rest of the mission. To understand what they really need, and thus what the direction of good advice might be, a necessary step is observation, through which one can understand what type of support the other party needs.59 Moreover, this process can also take place by talking to people other than your counterpart. Indeed, in case the counterpart is reluctant to change the status quo, the advisor can try to identify change agents (e.g. if the counterpart is the minister on his staff, one can try to engage someone else to get information).60

3.4 Learning and Training: Preparing for strategic advising

Once recruited, advisors need preparation before being deployed. As a prerequisite for this, the subject matter expert needs to take on the mindset of an advisor. The fundamental change is in the mindset of the practitioner, who must understand that his or her experience and skills are not aimed at performing the tasks themselves, but rather at serving the advisor.61 Advisors generally lack authority, so the practitioner's necessary shift is to be able to pursue goals through creative means that do not involve projections of authority. Since one of the main guiding principles highlighted by all the doctrines examined is that of ownership, the advisor should always bear in mind the need to compare himself as much as possible with his local counterpart. Hence the need to question the assumptions of one's own background in favour of a more flexible approach. As pointed out, one of the roles of the advisor is to build a peer-to-peer relationship with his counterpart, establishing a relationship based on trust and confidence.62 As a function of this, he/she should always seek the cooperation and collaboration of the counterpart.

Speaking of learning and training, at this point of the analysis, we refer to pre-deployment training. It should be emphasised that this is certainly not exhaustive, but it is important for the development of the soft skills identified above.63 Eyre in 201964 identifies the need to move from training and skills development to more integrated training, consisting of the intersection of two elements: training and learning. The traditional performance focusses of training, embodied in training, remains almost exclusively on developing the technical skills of staff in isolation. The real need is in recognising that it is no longer sufficient to train only for the transfer of knowledge or skills. From the outset, we must seek an approach that proactively considers soft skills and interactive behavioural learning in tandem.65

In other words, the DCAF (ISSAT), stressed the importance of continuing to design specific training in the following four key areas, including66:

1. Capability – Capacity / Proficiency / Skill / Aptitude / Intelligence / Potential / Experience (Organisationally, Operationally, Technically and Individually);

2. Knowledge (transfer) – Products / Services lessons / Good practice / Case studies / Networks (partners / associations/ institutions);

3. Tools for Advising – Scoping / Analysis / Development / Delivery / Monitoring / Evaluation;

4. Process (Programmes) – Inception / Design / Implementation / Consolidation.

In this context, scenario-based exercises, the use of role-plays and work in small groups are of fundamental importance. This practice should reflect the real-life challenges and opportunities of counselling missions and offer trainees time to integrate the various tools provided to them during training.67 Lecture-based sessions are essential for teaching content, but they should be kept keying concrete messages and the instruction should incorporate most of the instructional time to experiential learning. The advantages of bringing together a wide range of nationalities, work experience and genders is also crucial. 68Methodology is one of the key elements in the learning and training of an effective advisor. Interactive training provides the opportunity for practitioners to practice the skills they have learnt, to know when to use a specific tool and how to combine skills and knowledge to arrive at the fluid and personalised approach that is needed for effective counselling. Several sources support the importance of a scenario-based exercise, the use of role-players and working in small groups. This practice relates to the projection of in-mission challenges into the training environment, to make the examples discussed as realistic as possible. The advantages of bringing together a wide range of nationalities, work experience and genders were also part of the discussion. A heterogeneous group creates the environment for stimulating ideas, concepts and discussions. Counselling can also consist of introducing new concepts on fundamental rights and principles which are usually not on the other side's horizon.69 

3.5 What challenges?

This analysis reveals several challenges in various areas of the strategic advising function. There is a lack of standards in both recruitment and training. Standardisation is a key and necessary component as it avoids discrepancies. It would also foster cooperation and continuity between consultants, especially during rotation periods or handovers. What is missing is standardised curriculum of recruitment and training among NATO, UN and EU and the contributing countries for advising at strategic level.

Some of the failures were caused by the wrong selection of the advisor. The complexity of the advisory mission environment requires selecting the right person with specific characteristics and personality. However, the question at hand is according to which criteria the right advisor should be selected. The lack of common standards among contributing countries (as in the case of the EU) means that (in some cases) a bias is placed in the selection of the right person.70 The International Community must establish consistent staffing requirements, advisor standards and performance metrics, and clearly defined advisor objective. This would help to solve the problem of the number of available strategic advisors. Often, those that are available are vital for internal tasks within the armed forces in the home country.71 Coalition advisors must be staffed and trained for their specific advisory position and must have the necessary subject matter expertise and experience. However, training at the strategic level is complicated to provide, which is why we refer to the concept of learning by doing;72 it consists of the experience accumulated through various missions and positions held concurrently. By doing so, the problem created is a lengthening of the phase of understanding the operational environment. In fact, the deployed expert possesses the basic hard skills that he develops during the mission and not before.73

If the duration of the deployment ranges from six months to a year in general, standardising training in the pre-deployment phase could contribute to mission success. Another issue at stake is precisely the duration of deployments. The task of influencing and advising a foreign counterpart implies building a personal relationship. So, what is the ideal duration of such a mandate is a debatable issue; however, some agree that six months is insufficient. The ideal duration could be one year, considering the psychological implications, rotating shifts could be organised.74 Ideally, after returning home, qualified officers with international experience are facilitated to occupy national posts from which they could be easily disengaged. This would facilitate their ready availability for the next international posting.75

Looking at the challenges created within operational theatres, all steps affecting the advisor's tasks must be assessed. The closely intertwined processes of handover and turnover create practical challenges. Handover is a necessary step to ensure that the handover from one advisor to another is as smooth as possible. However, it should be emphasised that this process should not interfere with the handover process, which is a priority for those about to leave the operational theatre.76 The (often strictly necessary) use of an interpreter between the advisor and the advisee creates problems. In this case, the advisor only does fifty percent of the work, the other half is left to the interpreter. That is why there is a need for a specially trained interpreter.77 However, there is a shortage of trained interpreters and sometimes local interpreters are used although they are inadequate due to fear of reverence or simply their inability to render the message as intended by the advisor.78

In contexts, characterised by the presence of numerous international actors, coordination becomes a relevant issue. There will be many people seeking to give advice and this needs to be coordinated.79 Even within the same organisation, it may happen that the different bodies required to coordinate in the field answer to different chains of command, which makes the synergy that should be there a human question (friction may arise).80

At the political/strategic level, within the EU, there is sometimes no clear division between the role of the EU Delegation and that of the CSDP mission, as they respond to two different hierarchical chains. On the other hand, within the UN this problem is not found, there is a much clearer organisation.81 If this cooperation, both within the organisation itself and with the rest of the mission, is not achieved, what could happen is the so-called advisor fratricide, i.e. advisors or teams of advisors competing with each other.82 Advisors with the same objectives, poorly coordinated and with no exclusive advisory principle contribute to the creation of this problem. For example, in the Afghan context there is an almost total lack of coordination at the strategic/political level. In that case, it was the prerogative of the advisors concerned to reach an agreement among themselves.83

Looking at operational theatres, the question of coordination triggers an upstream reflection: the lack of useful, common, and shared monitoring tools on advice between NATO, the UN or the EU and contributing countries. This generates a waste of resources by duplicating programmes and efforts. 84 The process should translate the identified lessons from the reports and direct experiences of former strategic advisers into lessons learned. These lessons learned are particularly relevant in fragile areas. There is less capacity to absorb mistakes in fragile states. In conclusion, this challenge is the lack of well-defined evaluation processes.85

Conclusion

Interventions by the international community since the 1990s can be analysed through the lens of the security-development nexus. As such, the international community has developed the concept of capacity building, seen as the process of transforming a nation's ability to effectively implement policies and programmes for sustainable development. However, this process brings several issues along, both from a lexical point of view (in relation to the wording building or development) and from the point of view of practical implementation. 

At the basis of international interventions there is the will to stabilise states recently affected by conflict, and the first requirement for a state to be such, in the Weberian sense, is the monopoly of the use of force. Capacity building in this sense is expressed through SSR, a concept that is just as problematic in the literature as it is in the international political debate (in terms of approach). Initially, it retained a top-down approach, in which donors and organisations intervened through the provision of capital and trained personnel (technical assistance). It was then realised that the necessary approach involved the application of two principles: local leadership and ownership. They translated into a bottom-up approach, putting the host state's will, ideas, and projects at the heart of assistance. Although this principle was recognised, capacity building in this field was initially still linked to the technical assistance dimension, embodied in the train-and-equip paradigm. However, the structural limitations and problems raised by this paradigm led to the diffusion and use of the strategic advisory function. Specifically framed to achieve enhanced capacity with a bottom-up approach.

The comparative analysis of doctrines is relevant for understanding military change. Although the UN, NATO and EU doctrines have many elements of convergence, the substantial differences mean that there is no standardisation. This creates an obstacle to a general definition of who a strategic advisor is and what their functions are. In addition, the doctrines highlight numerous principles that are not, however, deepened and reflected in a defined process of lessons identified and learned. Consequently, there is a need for standardisation and updating of the doctrine itself, in the light of experience in the field.

This analysis has reviewed the skills, roles, and training of strategic advisors, highlighting the myriad challenges that these issues raise. The expertise and experience of advisors is crucial to ensuring a certain level of success. However, it should be emphasised that conflict-affected environments are complex and involve many variables. The most competent advisor may only be able to accomplish part of what needs to be done. 

In conclusion, the advisory function must always be placed in the broader context of the mission. Thus, it relies heavily on the political mandate of the mission and the (equally political) willingness of the host country. Reconciling these two elements implies an absolute respect and continuous pursuit of the elements and objectives of local leadership and ownership.

Bibliography 

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Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing (AJP-3.22) Edited A Version July 2016.

Andersen, L.R. (2011) Security Sector Reform and the Dilemmas of Liberal Peacebuilding, Working Paper. Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Studies.

Ball, N. (2004) Response to "Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries. Dialogue Series No.2. Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.

Bergonzini, S. (2019) MMA&T In Peacekeeping Operations, CoESPU MAGAZINE nr. 4. 

Centre For Army Lessons Learned's (2019) Advising at the Senior Level – Lessons and Best Practice.

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Dursun-Ozkanca, O.Vandemoortele, A. (2012) The European Union and Security Sector Reform: current practices and challenges of implementation, European Security, 21(2), 139-160. 

EPLO (2016) The Impact of Train and Equip initiatives on Security Sector Reform: A Brief Literature Review, November.

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NATO (2010) Strategic Concept. 

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OECD DAC (2007) OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector System Reform. 

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Sedra, M. (2010) The future of Security Sector Reform, The Centre for International Governance Innovation.

Skeppström, E., (2016) The SSR adviser’s handbook, Folke Bernadotte Academy.

Skeppström, E., Wiklund, C. H., Jonsson, M. (2015) European Union Training Missions: security sector reform or counter-insurgency by proxy?” European Security, 24(2). 

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Wesslau, F., (2013) The political adviser’s handbook, Folke Bernadotte Academy.

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Sitography

https://www.nspcoe.org/seminar-for-institutional-advisors/

Interviews/Courses

EU MMA&T Course, CoESPU, 2021. 

Interview n. 1, November 2021.

Interview n. 2, December 2021.

Interview n. 3, January 2022.

1 UNDP (2008). Practice note: Capacity development.

2 OECD DAC (2007) OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector System Reform.

3 DCAF (2015) The Security Sector: Roles and Responsibilities in Security Provision, Management and Oversight.

4 Andersen, L.R. (2011) Security Sector Reform and the Dilemmas of Liberal Peacebuilding, Working Paper. Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Studies.

5 Jackson, P (2011). Security Sector Reform and State Building. Third World Quarterly.

6 OECD DAC (2007) OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector System Reform.

7 Jackson, P. Albrecht, P. (2016) Securing Sierra Leone, 1997–2013: Defence, Diplomacy and Development in Action. Royal United Services Institute Whitehall Papers No. 82., London.

8 Sedra, M. (2010) The future of Security Sector Reform, The Centre for International Governance Innovation.

9 Schroeder, U. C., Chappuis, F., Kocak, D. (2014) Security Sector Reform and the Governance-The Emergence of Hybrid Security, International Peacekeeping 21 (2).

10 Ball, N. (2004) Response to "Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries, Dialogue Series No.2. Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 

11 Jackson, P. (2011) Security Sector Reform and State Building. Third World Quarterly.

12 Zapf, M., Refaeil, N., Arevalo de Leon, B. (2019) Comprehensive Capacity Development: Moving Beyond Training as the Default, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 1-5.

13 Ibidem. 

14 Ibidem. 

15 EPLO (2016) The Impact of Train and Equip initiatives on Security Sector Reform: A Brief Literature Review, November.

16 Skeppström, E., Wiklund, C. H., Jonsson, M. (2015) European Union Training Missions: security sector reform or counter-insurgency by proxy? European Security, 24:2.

17 Interview no.3 , January 2022.

18 Gerspacher, N. (2016) Strategic Advising in Foreign Assistance, Kumarian Press.

19 Centre For Army Lessons Learned's (2019) Advising at the Senior Level – Lessons and Best Practice.

20 Gerspacher, N (2016) Strategic Advising in Foreign Assistance, Kumarian Press.

21 CoESPU (2019) Strategic Advising Conference booklet.

22 UN DPKO (2015) Mentoring and Advising Training.

23 UN DPKO (2016) Guidelines Police Administration in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions.

24 UN Peace Operations (2017) Manual “Police Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising in Peace Operations".

25 Ibidem.

26 Ibidem.

27 UNDPKO (2015) Guidelines “Police Capacity Building and Development”.

28 NATO (2010) Strategic Concept. 

29 Martnho, L. (2020) NATO’s defence and related security capacity building (dcb) initiative. 

30 Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (AJP-3.16) Edited A Version 1 May 2016.

31 Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing (AJP-3.22) Edited A Version July 2016.

32 Bergonzini, S. (2019) MMA&T In Peacekeeping Operations, CoESPU MAGAZINE nr. 4.

33 Ibidem.

34 Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing (AJP-3.22) Edited A Version July 2016.

35 Dursun-Ozkanca, O.Vandemoortele, A. (2012) The European Union and Security Sector Reform: current practices and challenges of implementation, European Security, 21:2, 139-160. 

36 EU-EEAS (2014) CivOpsCdr Operational Guidelines for Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising in Civilian CSDP Missions, 4077896 CPCC.

37 Ibidem.

38 Ibidem.

39 Glorioso,L., Gerspacher, N. (2018) Report - workshop advising as a capability for SFA: challenges and opportunities in recruitment, selection and training. 

40 https://www.nspcoe.org/seminar-for-institutional-advisors/

41 EU MMA&T Course, CoESPU, 2021.

42 Interview no. 3, January 2022.

43 Interview no. 2, December 2021.

44 Skeppström, E., (2016) The SSR adviser’s handbook, Folke Bernadotte Academy.

45 Ibidem.

46 Gerspacher, N (2016) Strategic Advising in Foreign Assistance, Kumarian Press.

47 Romano, G., De Angelis, L.,(2021) Carabinieri Abroad: Lessons from experience (Part II), CoESPU.

48 Interview no. 1, November 2021. 

49 Interview no. 3, January 2022.

50 EU MMA&T Course, CoESPU, September 2021.

51 CoESPU (2019) Strategic Advising Conference booklet.

52 Interview no, 2, December 2021. 

53 Interview no. 3, January 2022. 

54 Skeppström, E., (2016) The SSR adviser’s handbook, Folke Bernadotte Academy.

55 Interview no. 2, December 2021.

56 CoESPU (2019) Strategic Advising Conference booklet.

57 Interview no. 3, January 2022. 

58 Wesslau, F., (2013) The political adviser’s handbook, Folke Bernadotte Academy.

59 EU MMA&T Course, CoESPU, 2021.

60 Ibidem.

61 Gerspacher, N (2016) Strategic Advising in Foreign Assistance, Kumarian Press.

62 Ibidem. 

63 Interview no.1, November 2021. 

64 CoESPU (2019) Strategic Advising Conference booklet.

65 Glorioso,L., Gerspacher, N. (2018) Report - workshop advising as a capability for SFA: challenges and opportunities in recruitment, selection and training.

66 CoESPU (2019) Strategic Advising Conference booklet.

67 Glorioso,L., Gerspacher, N. (2018) Report - workshop advising as a capability for SFA: challenges and opportunities in recruitment, selection and training.

68 Ibidem.

69 CoESPU (2019) Strategic Advising Conference booklet.

70 Interview no.3, January 2022. 

71 Ibidem.

72 Interview no.1, November 2021. 

73 Ibidem.

74 Interview no.2, December 2021.

75 Romano, G., De Angelis, L., (2021) Carabinieri Abroad: Lessons from experience (Part II), CoESPU.

76 Interview no.2, December 2021. 

77 CoESPU (2019) Strategic Advising Conference booklet.

78 Ibidem. 

79 Wesslau, F., (2013) The political adviser’s handbook, Folke Bernadotte Academy.

80 Interview no.1, November 2021.

81 Interview no.3, January 2022. 

82 Helmus, T. C., (2015) Advising the Command: Best Practices from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan, RAND Corporation.

83 Interview no.2, December 2021. 

84 CoESPU (2019) Strategic Advising Conference booklet.

85 Interview no.1, November 2021. Interview no.2, December 2021. Interview no. 3, January 2022.