ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA TO RUSSIA: AN ANALYSIS OF GEOPOLITICAL EVENTS FOR DIDACTIC USE

By Emanuele Poli & Anna Rosa Candura

From "The CoESPU MAGAZINE - the online quarterly Journal of Stability Policing" no. 3-4 - 2023

Section: " Rule of Law (RoL) in Peace Operations: Coordination among Judiciary, correctional and Police components, lessons learned and future strategies ", page 24

DOI Code: 10.32048/Coespumagazine3.23.3

ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

AN ANALYSIS OF GEOPOLITICAL EVENTS FOR DIDACTIC USE[1]

 

Emanuele Poli

University of Modena and Reggio-Emilia

Military Academy of Modena

 

 

Anna Rosa Candura

The University of Pavia

Humanities studies Department

 

Abstract

 

With the referendum held on March 16, 2014, Crimea decided to separate from Ukraine and to join the Russian Federation; the RF, after a few days, formally accepted the request by annexing the Crimea. This event, which gave rise to divergent positions among the governments, generated a serious international crisis, the effects of which are still in full manifestation. This contribution intends to highlight the facts that led to this crisis, examining the different points of view: the one against the Russian annexation (Ukraine, European Union, USA and its allies) and the one in favor of the annexation (Russian speakers of Crimea and obviously Russian Federation). The intent is to dwell on the comparison between the case of Crimea and that of Kosovo, to underline how international law is interpreted and used differently, depending on the circumstances, to support what is most convenient. This exploitation disqualifies the entire supranational juridical complex and the positions based on it. In the end, what really counts in the interpretation of geopolitical events is the analysis of political, economic and military interests. The Russian Federation, after the Ukrainian government’s rapprochement with NATO (which emerged from the Euromaidan demonstrations) cannot afford to lose a territory that plays a strategic role of fundamental importance and which has belonged to its sphere of influence for hundreds of years. Added to these reasons is the desire of Russian-speaking Crimeans to have guarantees about their future, threatened by the anti-Russian policy of the new government in Kiev. The analysis of current geopolitical events plays a decidedly educational role, fundamental for developing, in learners, the critical capacity, now atrophied by the continuous media bombardment and by information that tends to a single point of view.

 

 

  1. The events between 2013 and 2014: background of the crisis.

The events that started the secessionist movement in Crimea are to be found in the crisis affecting the whole of Ukraine at the end of 2013. On November 21, 2013, in Kiev (capital of Ukraine - 50° 27′ N; 30° 31′ 25″ E) a series of demonstrations began, which took the name of Euromaidan[2]. The name consists of two parts: “Euro” (short for Europa) and “Maidan” (from Majdan Nezaleznosti, майдан незалежності, Independence Square, the main square of Kiev). The demonstrations take place after the suspension, by Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, of an association and free trade agreement with the European Union, in order to resume closer economic relations with Russia. The protests last about 3 months, despite the presence of the police, freezing temperatures and snow. 

Since January 2014, the protests have changed in nature; from an initial pro-European demonstration, we moved on to the request for the resignation of President Viktor Yanukovych and his government, accused of corruption, abuse of power and violation of human rights. Violent clashes took place from 19 to 25 January 2014, in response to police repression attempts and the approval (on 16 January) of laws against freedom of demonstration. Since January 23, in various western provinces of Ukraine, government and regional council buildings have been occupied by protesters. The European Union and the United States begin to threaten harsh sanctions against the Ukrainian President, held responsible for street violence and fierce repression. Only Russia backs the government in Ukraine and speaks of undue foreign pressure and coup attempts. 

On 18 February the violence caused 28 deaths (including 7 policemen) and 335 injured. On February 20, demonstrators try to storm the government and parliament building and the police fire on the crowd causing over 100 deaths and 700 injured. Following these terrible violence, Yanukovych and the leaders of the opposition agree to call early elections and a government of national unity, returning to the 2004 constitution, with a significant limitation on presidential power,

On February 22, 2014, Yanukovych (now surrounded) fled the capital, losing track of himself. Meanwhile, parliament votes on the impeachment request presented by the opposition (approved with 328 votes in favor out of 340) and determines the immediate forfeiture of Yanukovych from the office of President of the  Republic (st.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2014-02-22/). Oleksandr Turcinov was appointed in his place, with a new Prime Minister, Arsenij Yatsenyuk, both men of the more nationalist wing of the Pan-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland" party. On 24 February 2014, Interior Minister Arsen Avakov announced that Yanukovych was wanted (along with others) on charges of massacre. On February 25, the new government repeals the law (of July 3, 2012) concerning language policy; this law, which provided for official bilingualism in areas where the entity of linguistic minorities exceeds 10% of the population, is repealed with the vote of 232 deputies, liminating Russian as an official language. [3]

At the same time, various government officials declare that they intend to review the administrative status of Ukraine, to reduce the autonomy of some regions, including Crimea.

 

FIG. 1

Territory of Ukraine, in a cartogram from the World Factbook (Source: cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ukraine/map    Public Domain 2023

 

 

 

2.In medias res: the highlights of 2014

The local authorities of Crimea do not accept the new Ukrainian government (following the Euromaidan demonstrations) because they claim it was generated by a coup d'état, as the procedures followed to oust and replace the President did not follow the rules of the Constitution; for this reason, the local government declares its willingness to separate from Ukraine. On 27 February 2014, some armed men (dressed in camouflage overalls and without belonging badges) began to guard the local administration offices in Simferòpoli (Simferòpoli – Simferòpol; 44° 57′ N; 34° 06′) and hoisted the Russian flag, on the roof of buildings. These men possess Russian vehicles (and rifles), but the Kremlin claims they are "local self-defense militias". The following day, more armed and unmarked men occupy Crimean airports; also on February 28, the former president Yanukovych spoke from his refuge in Rostov-on-Don (Russia), accusing the Kiev government of a “coup d’état”.

On March 1, the Russian parliament approves President Vladimir Putin's request for the use of military force in Ukraine, with the aim of protecting the population of Russian nationality.

Russian troops were already on the Ukrainian border, officially carrying out a military exercise, interpreted by many as an attempt to intimidate the new power in Kiev.

 

By deploying its warships, the Russian navy blocks the port of Sevastopol (Sevastopol'-  Sevastopil' - 44° 36′ N; 33° 31′ E) and prevents the movements of Ukrainian ships. The government in Kiev accuses the military occupation of the peninsula by the Russian army and is mobilizing its armed forces.

The United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom and the European Union accuse Russia of violating international law and destabilizing Ukrainian sovereignty.

Pro-Russian demonstrations take place on March 2 in many Ukrainian cities, including Kharkiv (Kharkiv, 49° 59′ 33′′ N; 36° 13′ 52′′ E; second largest city in Ukraine, by population, after Kiev)[4].New paramilitary troops occupy the coast guard command in Balaklava and surround the Ukrainian military base in Perevalne (44° 50′ 34″ N; 34° 19′ 21″ E), which is located about 23 kilometers from Simferopol. The Ukrainian soldiers refuse to surrender their weapons and for days the two sides face each other, without shooting. Ukrainian soldiers are being held captive inside their base and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yatsenyuk claims it is a declaration of war by Russia. 

On March 3 and 4, more and more paramilitary troops take control of the border points between Crimea and Ukraine. 

On March 6, the Russians sink a disarmed Ukrainian anti-submarine cruiser, the Ochakov, at the entrance to the port of Donuzlav (naval base and headquarters of the Ukrainian navy for the southern area; 45° 20′ 2′′ N; 33° 00 ′ 3′′ E), pinning down, five Ukrainian war units.

Il 6 marzo, i Russi affondano un incrociatore antisommergibili ucraino in disarmo, lo Ochakov, all’imbocco del porto di Donuzlav (base navale e quartier generale della marina ucraina per la zona sud; 45° 20′ 2′′ N; 33° 00′ 3′′ E), bloccandovi cinque unità da guerra ucraine. Belbek military airfield (village near Sevastopol - 44°41′ N; 33°35′ E) is occupied by Russian military who oust Ukrainian soldiers. The Ukrainian interior minister, Arsen Avakov, declares (through his Facebook page) that he considers this action as an armed invasion and occupation. 

Also on 6 March, the Supreme Council of Crimea, sent the request for annexation to Russia to Russian President Vladimir Putin and set a referendum for 16 March to confirm this decision (Kobzev, 2014). Deputy Prime Minister of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea Rustam Temirgaliev says that the Ukrainian forces still present on the territory must surrender or leave and that the only legal armed forces on the territory of Crimea are the Russian armed f On March 11, the Crimean Parliament votes for the exit of Crimea from Ukraine, with 78 votes in favor out of 81 voters (Chamber of Deputies, 2014, p.1).

On March 15, a resolution of the United Nations Security Council (which aims to stop the referendum on the self-determination of Crimea), requested by the United States, gets 13 votes (out of 15) in favor and China abstain, but is blocked by Russia's veto right, which, of course, it votes against.

On 16 March 2014, the referendum was held, proposing two questions (written in the three co-official languages ​​of Crimea: Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar in the Cyrillic alphabet). The first question asks: "Are you in favor of the reunification of Crimea with Russia, as a federal subject of the Russian Federation?". The second: “You are in favor of restoring the 1992 Constitution and the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine?” (Kobzev, 2014). 1,274,096 people participate in the referendum, equal to 83.1% of those entitled to vote; of these, 97.47% are in favor of reunification with Russia (Chamber of Deputies, 2014, p. 3).

On 17 March, the Crimean Parliament approved, in an extraordinary session, the results of the consultation, proclaiming the Republic of Crimea as an independent sovereign state. Still in the same session, Parliament asked the Kremlin to accept, in the Russian Federation, the Republic which had become independent from Ukraine.

 

On March 18, a treaty was signed in Moscow between representatives of Crimea and Russian President Vladimir Putin, to establish the rules regarding the annexation of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation. 

The document establishes, among other points: that Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar are the official languages ​​of Crimea; Russian citizens will do military service until 2016; elections in the Republic of Crimea and in the Autonomous City of Sevastopol will be held on the second Sunday of September 2015, until then, the current government authorities will perform administrative functions; the border between the Republic of Crimea and Ukraine will be an international border between Russia and Ukraine; maritime borders in the Black and Azov seas, are based on international treaties concluded by the Russian Federation. The annexation takes place very quickly: the treaty, presented by Putin to the State Duma of Russia, is ratified on March 20, with the only vote against the deputy Il'ya Vladimirovich Ponomarëv, of the Just Russia party.

On the same day, the Duma approves the federal constitutional law on the acceptance, in the Russian Federation, of the Republic of Crimea and on the formation, within the Federation, of new political subjects: the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol. The Russian conquest of the Ukrainian bases in the Black Sea peninsula continues. Many soldiers enter the Russian army, encouraged by the maintenance of their rank and by a considerably higher economic treatment.

On 24 March, Ukraine takes note of the military situation in Crimea: the National Security Council, in agreement with the defense ministry of Kiev, announced the withdrawal of its remaining troops stationed on the peninsula.

A few hours earlier, about two hundred Russian soldiers, attacked and conquered the naval base of Feodosia (Caffa - 45° 02′ 56′′ N; 35° 22′ 45′′ E), it and causing the wounding of some soldiers from Kiev. On the same day, Russian Defense Minister Shoigu, the first government official to travel to Crimea after the annexation, appointed Denis Valentinovič Berezovsky (former Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian Navy, one of the first to swear allegiance to the new authorities of the pro-Russian Crimea), Deputy Commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

 

FIG. 2

The Crimean peninsula

(Source: Maximilian Dörrbecker, or “Chumwa”

– usingOpenStreetMap Open Database License - 2023)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3. International reactions

 

During and after the events in Crimea, the United States, many states of the European Union and many states of the Atlantic Pact declared themselves strongly against Russian annexation.

On March 27, 2014, the United Nations General Assembly approved a declaration establishing the invalidity of the Russian annexation of Crimea: : «The General Assembly today affirmed its commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, underscoring the invalidity of the 16 March referendum held in autonomous Crimea. By a recorded vote of 100 in favour to 11 against, with 58 abstentions, the Assembly adopted a resolution titled “Territorial integrity of Ukraine”, calling on States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any change in the status of Crimea or the Black Sea port city of Sevastopol, and to refrain from actions or dealings that might be interpreted as such. Also by the text, the Assembly called on States to “desist and refrain” from actions aimed at disrupting Ukraine’s national unity and territorial integrity, including by modifying its borders through the threat or use of force. It urged all parties immediately to pursue a peaceful resolution of the situation through direct political dialogue, to exercise restraint, and to refrain from unilateral actions and inflammatory rhetoric that could raise tensions […]» (General Assembly, 27 March 2014).

The involvement of the United Nations General Assembly, was necessary after the failure of attempts to get the United Nations Security Council to express itself on the Ukraine crisis; the Security Council convened seven sessions (on the situation in Ukraine) and, at the eighth session, Russia, one of the permanent members, vetoed, blocking a draft resolution that would have urged countries not to recognize the results of the Crimean referendum. Vitaly Churkin, (Russian representative to the UN) underlines how the outcome of the vote demonstrates that Russia is not alone on the international scene. The states that, together with Russia, reject the text approved by the General Assembly are: Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

The reactions to the annexation are not limited to protest: the USA, the European Union, Japan and Canada are applying a first tranche of sanctions against Moscow. Washington imposes visa freezes and asset freezes on seven Russian officials and four Ukrainian separatist leaders.

Brussels announces the same sanctions against 21 officials, including 13 Russians and 8 Ukrainians from Crimea. The United States applies a second measure of measures against 20 Russian officials and the Russian banking institution Bank Rossija. Moscow responds by banning nine US officials from entering Russia; among these are former Republican presidential candidate John McCain and House Speaker John Boehner.

On March 21, the European Union also imposed more sanctions against 12 high-level Russian and Ukrainian officials. The list includes names already included in the US ones, such as Vladislav Surkov, adviser to President Putin.

Despite the forecasts and the sanctions, there seems to be a strengthening of consensus in Russia towards Putin, whose popularity, according to some polls, is growing rapidly.

 

4. The different points of view

 

The referendum in Crimea and the subsequent annexation to the Russian Federation have raised a strong debate in the international community, with differing positions.

Voices against Russia's annexation of Crimea appeal to international law, deeming this act illegitimate because it is based on a military occupation. They are based on the principle of territorial integrity, established by the United Nations: : «All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.» (United Nations Charter, 24 October 1945, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 2, paragraph 4).

Various international agreements, signed first by the Soviet Union and then by Russia, corroborate the arguments of those opposed to annexation.

In 1975, the Soviet Union signs the Helsinki agreements, which include various principles for the recognition of the inviolability of national borders and respect for territorial integrity; the Helsinki Accords are required by the Soviet state, eager to assert its territorial acquisitions in Eastern Europe, after the end of the Second World War.

The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states is also included, but, according to many opinions, Russia did not respect this principle during the Crimea crisis (CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, 1975).

In 1991, with the Alma-Ata Protocols, Russia accepted the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, as well as the possession of Crimea (International Observatory, 2009).

On December 5, 1994, Russia signed the Budapest Memorandum, together with the United States, the United Kingdom and the Ukraine; the Memorandum, which provided for the Ukrainian commitment to dismantle nuclear weapons, sanctions the inviolability of Ukrainian sovereignty and prohibits any action of economic and military influence by the signatories (treaties.un.org/doc/ December 5, 1994).

In the agreement between Russia and Ukraine for the concession of the Sevastopol base of 1997, extended in 2010, the Russian Federation recognizes full Ukrainian sovereignty of Crimea.

Always from the point of view of international law, to counter these positions, Moscow maintains that its military intervention, made official on March 1 by the Duma, took place only to protect the Russians of Crimea and to allow the regularity of the referendum self-determination. Those who support the Russian position on the legitimacy of the annexation cite the principle. Also in the agreement between Russia and Ukraine for the concession of the Sevastopol base of 1997, extended in 2010, the Russian Federation recognizes the full Ukrainian sovereignty of Crimea.

Again from the point of view of international law, to counter these positions, Moscow maintains that its military intervention, made official on March 1 by the Duma, took place only to protect the Russians of Crimea and to allow the regularity of the referendum self-determination. Those who support the Russian position on the legitimacy of the annexation, mentions the principle of self-determination of peoples: : «To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace» (United Nations Charter, 24 October 1945, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 1, paragraph 2). This principle is reaffirmed and defined in the Helsinki Accords of 1975: By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.» (CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE. FINAL ACT, Helsinki 1975, Chapter I Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, paragraph VIII Equal rights and self-determination of peoples, p. 7).

It is clear that if a community belonging to a State unilaterally declares its secession (that is, the separation of its territory from the State), this involves a modification of the borders of the State concerned, without the consent of the State itself; this would be contrary to the principle of territorial integrity. It should also be specified that, in article 73, the Ukrainian Constitution reads: «Issues of altering the territory of Ukraine are resolved exclusively by an All-Ukrainian referendum» (rada.gov.ua/en).[5] ​​It is therefore not possible that the decision to detach a part of the territory takes place through a local referendum.

 

5. The principle of self-determination of peoples and its relationship with territorial integrity.

 

There are only three cases[6] in which the self-determination of a people can give rise to a secession,    without the consent of the central state: if that people is subjected to military occupation, to a colonial regime or to serious discrimination for political or racial reasons. In the latter case

The right to self-determination can be recognized only in the presence of serious human rights violations which also involve exclusion from the economic, political and social life of the country of origin.The question to ask is whether or not discriminatory acts against Russian speakers[7] have taken place in Crimea.

The supporters of the legitimacy of Crimea's secession respond positively and believe that the referendum (and the transfer of sovereignty of this Black Sea peninsula) served to prevent the outbreak of inter-ethnic violence (stimulated by the first moves of the new illegitimate government of Ukraine ) such as the elimination of Russian as a co-official language. In the days of the crisis, the Ukrainian transitional government revoked this repeal law, which gave Russians an argument to assert discrimination in Crimea. It is equally true that, in Ukraine, nationalist movements are growing which intend to restrict the rights of the Russian-speaking population. In the light of the concrete situation, it therefore becomes very difficult to affirm or exclude that there are or will be conditions of oppression or discrimination in Crimea.Vladimir Putin, the Russian Presidente, in a conference of March 18, 2014,[8] underlined the sacredness of Crimea for Russians. Putin argued that the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was the result of gross violations and was decided behind the scenes in a totalitarian state, presenting the people with a fait accompli, and there is no longer a legitimate power and the Russians do not know who to talk to. Therefore, not helping the Russians in Crimea would have been a betrayal. Also according to Putin, a coup d'état by extremist, ultranationalist and anti-Semitic forces took place in Kiev and the current authorities are not legitimate.Russian President Putin criticizes the behavior of the West, which, in his opinion, behaved irresponsibly in Ukraine, knowing that there were millions of Russians. The population of Crimea behaved according to the rule of self-determination of peoples, using the same rule used by Ukraine when it left the USSR.The other previous fact, mentioned by Putin, is the recognition by the West of the legitimacy of the detachment of Kosovo from Serbia; on that occasion, no permission from the central power was requested (from the West). Putin and many supporters of the Russian position often refer to Kosovo to corroborate their point of view. In that circumstance, in fact, the International Court of Justice, the highest judicial organ of the United Nations, in an opinion issued on 22 July 2010, established the conformity with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo from Serbia, dated 17 February 2008.The International Court of Justice considered that there were many precedents in this sense and argued that the author of the declaration of independence was the Kosovar people and not the interim administration, which governed the region at that time on the basis to Security Council Resolution 1244.[9] Another voice, which underlined the comparison with Kosovo, comes from the President of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Milorad Dodik[10] , who, in 2014, argued that the holding of the referendum in Crimea confirmed the principle of self-determination, established in the basic documents of the UN (and, often, violated).According to Dodik, the international community, if territorial integrity is useful, asks for the observance of this principle, but, when the principle of self-determination is needed, it says that the independence of Kosovo is a normal fact; the President of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina believes that, in the case of Crimea, the international community insists on respect for the principle of territorial integrity, but everything depends on the geostrategic interests of Europe and the USA. In international politics, it has long been known that Crimea is a sore point but everything depends on the geostrategic interests of Europe and the USA. In international politics, it has long been known that Crimea is a sore point.

Everyone knew that Crimea aspired to more integration with Russia, or even wanted to be a part of it. When riots started in Ukraine, this problem came to light.

The case of Crimea creates a new, increasingly legitimate practice. Dodik thinks that the events in Crimea are being taken into consideration by the Serbian Republic, for a long-term strategy to obtain independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina.[11]This example shows how easily the principles of international law can be exploited: they are interpreted differently according to the circumstances, to support what is more convenient.

6. The justifications for the Russian annexation of Crimea

 

In his March 18, 2014 speech, Putin argued that the Crimean peninsula is considered a territory belonging to Russia for historical and cultural reasons. Another justification for annexation is the responsibility to protect Russians living across national borders. In reality, the essential strategic role that Crimea plays for the Russian Federation must be considered.

Crimea has been a peninsula linked to Russia for hundreds of years (see, in this regard, the paragraph 9). In 1783, the Crimean Khanate, controlled by the Ottoman Empire, was occupied by the Russian Empire.

In the 19th century, following confiscations and persecutions, the Crimean Tatars began to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire; at the same time, many Russian colonists arrived, who became the majority of the region. There was with the deportation of the Tatars by Stalin, in 1944. After 1917, the Crimea followed the events of the Soviet Union: in 1921, the Republic was established Autonomous Soviet Socialist Crimea; in 1945 it was transformed into a province (Riasanovsky, 1989, pp. 268-270; p. 532, passim).

In 1954, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, of Ukrainian origin, transferred Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.[12] The act, officially, was done in recognition to commemorate the three hundredth anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav (between the Ukrainian Cossacks and Russia). In reality, the gift (Stalin used, in 1944, ruthless methods to punish the Ukrainians who had welcomed the German occupation) was a gesture of conciliation, to demonstrate the importance that Russia attributed to Ukraine, for its own security and integrity. The cession of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 took place in a very different context from today's one, since Russia and Ukraine were part of the Soviet Union.It was an internal administrative change, without repercussions on the population of the Crimea, because within the USSR, linguistic uniformity was guaranteed by the obligatory nature of the Russian language; the ruble was the common currency and the economic system was integrated. That act went almost unnoticed, but is now seen as a serious "historical error";  the Nobel Prize winner (last president of the Soviet Union) Gorbachev, has made this relevant statement, to the Interfax agency : «Crimea had become part of Ukraine on the basis of Soviet laws, i.e. the laws of the communist party, without ask the people. Now the people have decided on their own to correct that mistake. This decision should be celebrated, not sanctioned [...]» (tempi.it/ March 18, 2014).

F the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments, ratified a new agreement in Kharkiv which extended the permanence of the fleet for another 25 years, until 2042. of a 30% discount on Russian gas supplies, for a total value of 40 billion dollars.

Ukraine's rapprochement with NATO would have led to a certain loss of Russian military bases on the peninsula. There would have been a consequent downsizing of Russia's geopolitical weight; for this reason, the important questions of international law (on the legitimacy or otherwise of the annexation of Crimea) probably have a marginal role in the affair. As we have seen in the previous paragraphs, the reference they make to international law is almost always instrumental and subjective; what matters most are political, military and economic interests. 

There are two opposing blocs, eager to expand or maintain their zone of influence. It seems that the US and the European Union are not particularly interested in respecting the territorial integrity of Ukraine; rather, it is a matter of military and economic alliances

On the other hand, the Russian Federation has exploited the requests for help from Russian-speaking Crimeans, intervening immediately, not so much to safeguard their security or to guarantee their self-determination, but rather to preserve at least part of its strategic position.

One of the main problems that arise is, of course, understanding the possible ulterior motives in the presentation of data and opinions[13].

7. Reflections (and materials) for the planning of a Didactic Learning Unit

 

In the Italian didactic literature, coexist reflections and protocols on “Didactic Units”, “Learning Units” and “Didactic Learning Units”, accompanied by regulations and laws that do not make the teacher's job easy. In presenting the following considerations, this specific topic will not be dealt with[14], but we will try to suggest some stages for the construction of interdisciplinary activities, compatible with the three different models.

First of all, it is necessary to frame the connection between History, Geography and Cartography, obviously using the case study of Crimea[15]; to do this, it will be useful to start from the “LOCATION” theme, distinguishing the two concepts of “absolute location” and “relative location”. It is therefore necessary to recall the FIVE THEMES of Geography: LOCATION, HUMAN-ENVIRONMENT INTERACTION, REGIONS, PLACE, MOVEMENT[16].

Furthermore, given the difficulty of finding detailed and complete cartographic materials (to illustrate the Crimean dispute), in the descriptions, latitude and longitude of some places will be added, in order to allow the answer to the question: “where is this place?” (absolute location); thus, it is highlighted the importance of the continuous reference to geographical coordinates, therefore, precisely, to the theme “LOCATION”. Within this theme, obviously, a reflection on the geopolitical meaning of time zones should be inserted, not only citing the fundamental and unknown contribution of Quirico Filopanti (1860), but also showing the concrete change brought about by the modification of the time zones to life of people[17].

Moreover, a reflection on the relationship between the availability of cartographic materials and the desire to illustrate, with intellectual honesty, a thorny geopolitical issue (which has become a humanitarian tragedy, one of too many in the history of humanity) would be needed. 

This specific reflection would require too much space and will not be analysed, but we could not fail to mention it.

 

 

8. Outline of four introductory lessons 

 

The events concerning the Crimean crisis lend themselves to a didactic application: the contents related to current events should always be present in the academic and school programs, to arouse the students' curiosity, and to achieve the fundamental educational objectives.

In planning a "debate space", a container is built for the transmission of knowledge, above all, for the analysis of facts through comparison with the ideas of others.

 The training objectives are: to interpret, memorize and re-process information from different media; develop one's own critical capacity, which avoids being subjected to the instrumental interpretation of the various events; respect ideas different from your own.

The objectives related to knowledge, which represent fundamental prerequisites for a careful analysis of geopolitical facts, are not secondary: knowing how to compare various territories from a socio-cultural and political point of view; understand the processes and dynamics that regulate historical and geographical facts, grasping the relationships of cause and effect, establishing comparisons and making comparisons between the present and the past; know the main geopolitical changes after World War II. The analysis of multiple sources is essential for the achievement of the educational objective concerning the development of critical capacity in students.

This competence is fundamental, even if information today tends to a single point of view. An emblematic example are precisely the events in Ukraine, from the Euromaidan demonstrations to the crisis in Crimea, analyzed by the media, without taking into account the Russian point of view. Learners are not familiar with some basic historical and geographical information, which can be transmitted effectively, through the use of geographical maps and some historical maps.

The first lesson will therefore be a geographical, historical and cartographic orientation.

The second lesson will concern the actual debate, resulting from the different positions of the major world leaders. The teacher will read the statements of the American President, who supports the illegitimacy of the annexation of Crimea and Russia's failure to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine

Subsequently, the teacher will read Putin's statements, which justifies the annexation of Crimea to Russia, in respect of the self-determination of peoples (citing the precedent of Kosovo). At this point, the teacher will open the debate aimed at the students, inviting them to express their opinions, always being careful to pursue one of the pre-established educational objectives: respect for different ideas.

The third lesson is aimed at group work of students, with training and evaluation purposes. The teacher will divide the class into groups of three or four students, then he will assign each group the task of relating, in written form, a specific fact about the Crimean crisis. This lesson uses Internet research, and each group will use a computer aid with Internet connection.

Cooperative learning in small groups, in which pupils are encouraged to help each other and to feel co-responsible; it is a very effective teaching method, through which students learn important social skills and competences.

The fourth and last lesson includes the final evaluation: each group is asked to read their report in front of the class and to express their point of view. The teacher will evaluate each student on the basis of both group work and an individual question, which will verify the acquisition of the contents proposed during the lessons.

 

 

 

 

 

9. “Affective Geo-history” of the territory: the Italian presence in Crimea (an in-depth lesson)

 

«Cartographic representation seems to be the only instrument able to revive the moribund Italian geography. Like a poor and pretty girl, geography needs to marry with other disciplines in order to gain adequate social position. Here, then, medical geography, urban geography, social geography, political geography and the like, all famous names acquired. From the beginning, cartography plays the role of matchmaker.» (Candura, 2010, p. 215). Starting from these considerations, dated but not aged (so to speak), a reflection was articulated to suggest a sort of rebirth of Italian Geography, through the aid of Cartography. Again with regard to the role of nuptial mediator, played by the cartographic tool, the case study of the Crimea can be posed, as a geohistorical exercise that answers the question: “where does History end and where does Geography begin?”.

A cartographic illustration describing the expansion of the Republic of Genoa is brought to the attention of the students. 

FIG. 3

The expansion of the Republic of Genoa in the Mediterranean Sea

(Source: reddit.com Public Domain 2023)

 

 

 

The cartogram at FIG. 3 can be found in many versions, variously modified, where, moreover, the same italian translation error is almost always reproduced: “banking penetration” translated into Italian with “penetrazione bancaria”[18] (which means “penetration of banks”, in the sense of “penetration of credit institutions”), while, obviously, it is “penetration of the coasts” (it would have been, perhaps, better, in the original, to write “shore penetration”[19]). We should always linger over the attention to be paid to translations, in any teaching, but particularly in History, Geography and Cartography[20], since, when speaking of the relationship between Man and Planet, the precision of the concepts is fundamental, particularly for the purposes of a correct understanding of the tragedy currently unfolding.

Regardless of errors and inaccuracies, the cartogram referred to in the FIG. 3 offers three preliminary suggestions for reflection.

First of all, there is an opportunity to reflect on the Italian phrase “perdere la Trebisonda” (“losing the Trebizond”, used to mean “losing one’s bearings”) as a significant example of the presence of terminology of historical-cartographic derivation in common parlance[21].

Secondly, it is possible to recall the meaning of the naval flag of the Italian Navy, as described by the official source of knowledge of the regulations in force in Italy: «It is established, for the Navy and the Merchant Navy, a naval flag conforming to the models resulting from the table annexed to this decree, signed by the Ministers of Defense and the Merchant Navy. For the Navy, the naval flag consists of the Italian tricolor, loaded, in the center of the white band, by the heraldic emblem of the Navy, representing in four parts the coats of arms of the Maritime Republics (Venice-Pisa-Genoa-Amalfi), and surmounted by a turreted and rostral crown. [...]» (freely translated, from the official text, from: Gazzetta Ufficiale, 1947, art. 1, p. 3520)[22]. The importance of the Republic of Genoa is thus highlighted (as is the sense of using the cartogram referred to in the FIG. 3). So, what is the cartographic drawing that describes the expansion of the Republic of Genoa (FIG. 3) In order not to commit inaccuracies, it must be included in the geographical theme “MOVEMENT”, since it narrates the Geo-History of the Genoese movement, told through Cartography[23].

Finally, we note how the age-old and close relationship between Cartography and Technology is well symbolized and summarized by satellite images (which, moreover, always exert an undisputed fascination on learners).

 

FIG. 4

The Crimean peninsula, in a satellite image

(Source: Google Earth; image capture date: December 14, 2015 - Public Domain) 

 

 

 

 

In order to relate the history of the unification and geopolitical dismemberment of the Crimea with the Italian presence in the territory, it is advisable to use sources of different nature and origin[24].

A synthesis is offered by Amico (2023),  who excellently condenses the narrative, starting from the XIII century. The Italian presence in Crimea has  been attested since 1204, when Venice took advantage of the conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders to occupy the ports in the southern part of the peninsula. In 1261 the Venetians were replaced by the Genoese thanks to an agreement with the Byzantine Emperor who granted them the exclusive right to trade in the Black Sea.

After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, these colonies became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1475. But the Genoese presence did not disappear. A part of the population found refuge with the Tartars of the hinterland. A century later, in 1574, Martin Broniewski, Polish ambassador in Crimea, reported the existence of descendants of the Genoese (Kizilov, 2015) who had maintained the use of the language and their own religious traditions.

Presence confirmed again in a book, published in 1834, which documented how in the language of the Tartars, along the entire coastal strip, a large number of Genoese words were found. The reflections can be accompanied by the observation of a nautical chart, taken from Andrea Bianco’s Atlas of 1436, where Ligurian allocations are recognizable, indicated by Genoese flags. 

 

FIG. 5

Marine chart, from Andrea Bianco’s Atlas of 1436 (Marciana, ms 4783).

(Source: wikimedia.org/ Public Domain 2023)

 

 

 

In the eighteenth century, especially during the reign of Catherine II, the Russian authorities developed campaigns to populate the areas of the Volga, the Black Sea and the Crimea. This led to a wave of migration from Western Europe and also from Italy. Between 1782 and 1783, a thousand colonists arrived from Livorno (Ligurian, Corsican, Sardinian and Tuscan); they settled in the region of Cherson (46° 38′ N; 32° 35′ E). A second, much more numerous, wave of Italian migration followed at the beginning of the 19th century. 

In fact, between 1820 and 1870, emigrants arrived in the area of Kerč' (45° 20′ 19′′ N; 36° 28′ 05′′ E), mainly from the Apulian towns of Trani (41° 16′ N; 16° 25′ E), Bisceglie (41° 14′ 27′′ N; 16° 30′ 07′′ E) and Molfetta (41° 12′ N; 16° 36′ E). To these was added, again from Puglia, a more restricted but more qualified migration, made up of architects, notaries, doctors, engineers and artists, but also of anti-Bourbon activists, who concentrated in the city of Odessa (46° 29′ N; 30° 44′ E)[25].

This new migratory wave had been encouraged by the tsarist authorities to develop various agricultural activities (especially the cultivation of vines and the production of wine) and regulated by diplomatic agreements with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. According to official data, in 1897 Italians accounted for 1.8% of the population of the province of Kerč', a percentage which rose to 2% in 1921; some sources speak specifically of a minority ranging from three thousand to five thousand people. The October revolution, the civil war and the construction of socialism also involved the Italian minority. As part of the forced collectivization of the countryside, the Italians, mostly very small landowners, were forced to create the “Sacco and Vanzetti” kolkhoz. At the same time, a “socialist re-education” campaign began, using communist militants who had taken refuge in the Soviet Union and of sure Stalinist faith. Among these Paolo Robotti, who talks about it in the book La prova (Robotti, 1965) and Giuliano Pajetta who briefly talks about his stay in Kerč' in the book Russia 1932-34. (Pajetta, 1985) Tragic years: during the “purges” of 1933-37 many Italians, accused of being fascist spies, were arrested and disappeared into the hell of the gulag.

But it will be the war that irreversibly seals the fate of the Italians of Crimea. In 1942, after the reconquest of the peninsula by the Red Army, various national minorities present in the area were deported on charges of having collaborated with the Nazi occupiers. The deportation of the Italian minority began on 29 January 1942: the entire community, including the anti-fascist refugees who had settled in Kerč', was rounded up and sent in cattle cars to the Siberian gulag. Each person was allowed to take no more than 8 kilograms of baggage with them. The journey lasted almost two months (from 29 January to the last days of March). An 8.000 km odyssey in terrible conditions, with temperatures of over 30 degrees below zero, during which the majority of children and the elderly died of disease, hunger and cold.

Chruščëv, in his report to the XX Congress of the P.C.U.S., called this deportation a brutal, monstrous genocide of peoples and added that the Ukrainians had escaped this fate only because they were too many (about 40 million) and there was no place to deport them. Nevertheless, only on November 14, 1989, the Supreme Soviet will declare the deportation illegal. Dante Corneli, who spent many years in Siberia and, returning to Italy, denounced in his books[26] the crimes of Stalin and the Italian communist leadership who were accomplices (Massari, Nobile, 2023), talks about the drama of over two thousand Italians of the Agricultural Colony of Kerč'.

A testimony confirmed by the Soviet authorities themselves according to which, during the journey and the first year of deportation, one in five deportees died. In the deportation camps, the Italian community was almost annihilated from hunger, cold, disease and the harshness of forced labour. Overall, it is estimated that the total survivors were no more than 10 percent of the deportees. After 1956 (with the beginning of the “thaw” and the closure of most of the deportation camps) the Italian survivors of Crimea returned home. In 1957, it appeared that 460 exiles had returned; reduced, in 1989, to 316, mostly residing in a Kerč'. Here, in 2008, was formed the association “C.E.R.K.I.O.” (Comunità degli Emigrati in Regione di Crimea – Italiani di Origine; Community of Emigrants in the Crimean Region – Italians of Origin) which hands down the use of the Italian language. (Amico, 2023; freely translated).

For further study, it is appropriate to cite the volume by Rojas Gomez (2021). The Author narrates that, having arrived on the shores of the Black Sea in the 19th century to colonize extremely fertile lands, to exploit the abundance of fish from the seas and to join the commercial routes already traced four centuries earlier by the maritime republics of Genoa and Venice, the Italians of Crimea became soon the symbol of a successful emigration. In a few decades they freed themselves from the poverty that had driven them to leave Puglia, finding their new homeland in the city of Kerch, but without ever forgetting their Italian origins, preserving the language, religious and even culinary traditions.

 

A dream shattered by the advent of communism: first the collectivization of goods, then the Stalinist purges and finally the tragic epilogue of January 29, 1942, with the house-by-house roundup and mass deportation of the entire Italian community to the Kazakhstan (Kazakistan) Gulag, in retaliation against the Italian invasion of the USSR. Decimated by cold, hunger, disease and forced works, the Italians of Crimea are almost extinct and the few who remain are fighting today against oblivion and to keep the flame of  “Italianness” alive. The Author narrates this obscure and little-known part of contemporary history, combining the rigor of archival research with the testimonies of the last survivors; through the synthesis of this volume (Rojas Gomez, 2021); the emotional involvement of the learners lays an important ethical basis for the study of the territory.

Also on the basis of this last analysis, it can be seen that dispute over the Crimean peninsula is, ultimately, a dilated example of how, in the theme “HUMAN-ENVIRONMENT INTERACTION”, take place most of the connections between History, Geography and Cartography; thus, a true applied Geo-History can be constructed, made up of concrete (and dramatically visible) realities, instead of theories.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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[1] The work is the result of close collaboration between the authors; however: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 can be attributed to Emanuele Poli; paragraphs 7 and 9 can be attributed to Anna Rosa Candura. [1] The problem of maintaining neutrality, even in the definition of a word, perfectly introduces the difficult articulation of this geopolitical theme; consulting, for example, a classic source to which one turns in search of impartiality (the Treccani Encyclopedia) one notices that, in this case, it struggles to remain impartial:

[2] “Euromaidan - Term used to indicate the vast protest movement that developed in Ukraine in November 2013 following the decision of the incumbent president V. Yanukovych not to sign the treaty of political and economic association with the European Union, orienting the country in a distinctly pro-Russian sense. Despite the harsh crackdown by Kremlin-backed government forces, the protests, which lasted for over three months and concentrated in the Maidan square in Kiev (hence the hashtag used on the net that gave the movement its name) led to the deposition in February 2014 of President Yanukovych, replaced ad interim bya pro-Western provisional government, until the election in May 2014 of P. Porošenko. The formation of a government linked to the United States and Europe has provoked a harsh reaction from Moscow, which has accepted the request for annexation of Crimea, The formation of a government linked to the United States and Europe has provoked a harsh reaction from Moscow, which has accepted the request for the annexation of Crimea and supported the pro-Russian groups present in the eastern regions of Ukraine, especially in the self-proclaimed people's republics of Donetsk and of Lugansk in the Donbass, inducing the European Union and the USA to adopt economic sanctions against the Russian Federation and exacerbating the country's internal contradictions, not sedated despite the signing of the agreements known as the Minsk Protocol (September 2014) and Minsk II Protocol (February 2015).' (treccani.it/enciclopedia/euromaidan/ 2023). Note, however, how, in the explanation, the etymology is not reported. The real problem, on the other hand, is that, in the case of the conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the very will to be (or try to be) impartial is considered a partisan attitude

[3]«Language policy (LP) in Ukraine has a political and historical context of unique complexity. […] Within the past 30 years we can identify different directions in state LP reflecting the complex linguistic situation and its fragile balance in the country. Such a complex linguistic situation served as a starting point of any LP activities maintained by the two great - almost equally supported - Ukrainophile and Russophile political camps. But during the nation state building process (after Ukraine gained independence in 1991), the LP and legislation aimed to regulate language use became more and more a target associated with the Russophile political regime, 

 

 

and consequently their da ys were numbered. After the Euromaidan revolution, Ukraine adopted several policies and laws in support of the Ukrainian language. The most important of them is the recent law “On ensuring the functioning of Ukrainian as the state language”, which greatly expands protection for Ukrainian throughout the territory. This law has been defined by its detractors as a “draconian law” which introduces the “total forced ukrainization”. But beyond legal disputes, the purpose of the law, even if not the only one, is to reverse centuries of Russification, which led to what some term the “linguicide” of the Ukrainian language. In addition to this, in the circumstances of conflict still ongoing between Russia and Ukraine, the support for the Ukrainian language is viewed by many as a national security issue. The article is enriched by sociological surveys conducted in the country over time showing how Ukrainians have supported recent changes in LP and language legislation» (Carpinelli, 2019, p. 61; see, also, pp. 88-89, passim).

 

[4]1.433.886 inhabitants for Kharkiv and 2.950.702 for Kiev (est. 2021; source: Calendario Atlante de Agostini 2023, p. 1107). For educational purposes (see paragraphs 8 and 9), this aspect will be very important for an in-depth analysis of the use of sources; in particular, to distinguish censuses and estimates

[5].See also D’Angelo (2015), pp. 1151-1552, passim.

[6]. See the exceptions to the principle of territorial integrity: «[...] in conclusion there are three types of "people", with respect to which the principle of self-determination generates a legitimate claim to secession (external self-determination): the (former) colonies, the peoples oppressed by foreign occupation and infra-state groups, clearly identifiable with respect to the rest of the population of the State, which are precluded from any form of participation in government in order to pursue their political, economic and social development". (Lanciatti, Tanzi, 2012, p. 261)

[7]. See Carpinelli (2019): pp. 63, 68, 83 and 87, passim.

8.tempi.it/putin-firma-l-accordo-per-l-annessione-della-crimea-gorbaciov-corretto-un-errore-storico-del-partito-comunista/  March 18, 2014

 

 

 

[9]. peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/990610_SCR1244%281999%29.pdf  June 10, 1999.

10. adnkronos.com/Archivio/AdnAgenzia/2014/03/18/Esteri/Ucraina-Milorad-Dodik-appoggia-integrazione-Crimea-in-Russia_173339.php March 18, 2014.

11. The President of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik has a great interest in exalting the principle of self-determination, to validate his point of view; so did the countries of the Atlantic Pact, at the time of Kosovo. On a proposal from Serbia, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, on 8 October 2008, a resolution asking for an opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legitimacy, according to international law, of the Kosovar proclamation of independence.The opinion of 22 July 2010 is not an example of legal clarity. The Court affirmed that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate international law since the practice of states, even apart from decolonization, is full of precedents in this regard. He answered the question formally; he asked if the proclamation of independence was contrary to the resolution 1244 of the security council; Kosovo was placed under provisional administration by the United Nations, and a constitutional path was outlined which gave autonomy to the region, but not independence.

The Constitutional Court, to avoid the obstacle, affirmed that the author of the declaration of independence was the Kosovar people and not the provisional administration, which governed the region at that time [...]" (Ronzitti, 2013, pp. 48-49, passim)

 

 

 

 

12.For further information, see: Magocsi (2010).

[13]. See, for example, a classic source for didactic use, which, however, tries not to take sides: «Shortly after YANUKOVYCH’s departure in late February 2014, Russian President PUTIN ordered the invasion of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula falsely claiming the action was to protect ethnic Russians living there. Two weeks later, a “referendum” was held regarding the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation. The “referendum” was condemned as illegitimate by the Ukrainian Government, the EU, the US, and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, 100 members of the UN passed UNGA resolution 68/262, rejecting the “referendum” as baseless and invalid and confirming the sovereignty, political independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. In mid-2014, Russia began supplying proxies in two of Ukraine’s eastern provinces with manpower, funding, and materiel beginning an armed conflict with the Ukrainian Government. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the unrecognized Russian proxy republics signed the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum in September 2014 with the aim of ending the conflict. However, this agreement failed to stop the fighting or find a political solution. In a renewed attempt to alleviate ongoing clashes, leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany negotiated a follow-on Package of Measures in February 2015 to implement the Minsk agreements, but this effort failed as well. By early 2022, more than 14.000 civilians were killed or wounded as a result of the Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine.On 24 February 2022, Russia escalated its conflict with Ukraine by launching a full-scale invasion of the country on several fronts in what has become the largest conventional military attack on a sovereign state in Europe since World War II. The invasion has received near universal international condemnation, and many countries have imposed sanctions on Russia and supplied humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. Russia made substantial gains in the early weeks of the invasion but underestimated Ukrainian resolve and combat capabilities. By the end of 2022, Ukrainian forces had regained all territories in the north and northeast and made some advances in the east and south. Nonetheless, Russia in late September 2022 unilaterally declared its annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts - Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia - even though none was fully under Russian control. The annexations remain unrecognized by the international community. The invasion has also created Europe’s largest refugee crisis since World War II. As of 26 June 2023, there were 6.3 million Ukrainian refugees recorded globally, and 5.09 million people were internally displaced as of May 2023. Almost 24.900 civilian casualties had been reported, as of 18 June 2023. The invasion of Ukraine remains one of the two largest displacement crises worldwide (the other is the conflict in Syria).» (cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ukraine/ 2023)

[14] For further information, see: icscroci.edu.it/materiali-uda-unita-didattica-di-apprendimento/ 2020; wauniversity.it/differenza-tra-unita-didattica-e-unita-apprendimento/ 2021; unidprofessional.com/unita-didattica-unita-di-apprendimento/ 2022.

[15] The importance of this link can obviously be found in many historical, geographical and cartographic studies; to give just one example, think of the analysis of “marginalia”: «The Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment brought a strong scientific component into maps, […]. The ideal of spreading information to large numbers of people led to the expansion of printed material - including maps - that incorporated the latest scientific information. The demand for cartographic material increased, and mapmakers emphasized scientific (or pseudo-scientific) information, particularly in the borders, as a marketing tool to attract customers interested in wall maps for display as well as functional items. Moreover, the important role cartography had in the formation of modern States, as a way of controlling the territory, as a strategic tool for war, and as a symbolic element to boast the power of a nation, is reflected in the titles, which many times announce that the map is the “newest and most accurate.” Not only were the erudite and political interests of cartography compatible with the artistic beauty of illustrations, they also had a strong influence on the subjects chosen for marginalia […]» (Sáenz, Perez, 2014, p. 22).

[16] See thoughtco.com/five-themes-of-geography-1435624 (July 13, 2019) and genip.us/about-genip; for further reflections, see also: Candura (2018); Candura (2022); Fouberg, Murphy (2020); Fouberg, Murphy (2022).

[17] liberoquotidiano.it/news/esteri/   March 30, 2014

[18] See: odysseytraveller.com/articles/history-of-genoa-rival-to-venice/; it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonie_genovesi#; memorients.com/articles/genoa-in-the-mediterranean-and-the-black-sea-sakrān-a-genoese-at-the-mamluk-court; sakeritalia.it/europa/italia/tracce-genovesi-nella-storia-della-crima/; limesonline.com/lespansione-di-genova-nel-mediterraneo/111529; archeome.it/ucraina-quando-la-crimea-era-una-colonia-della-repubblica-di-genova/

[19] Probably, the Anglo-Saxon use “bank penetration” derives from “West Bank Wall”, now synonymous with “the Israeli Wall in the West Bank (Cisgiordania)”; for this reason, it is also advisable to reflect on the correctness of the translations (see, for example, the suggestions on the website: linguee.it/ west bank wall; linguee.it/ cisgiordania).

[20] In this regard, see the paragraph “Indossi le scarpe invece di calzarle? Sei stato tradotto” (Candura, 2018, pp. 100-102). The sentence cannot be translated from Italian to English (“Do you wear shoes instead of wearing them? You have been translated”), since the Italian verb “calzare” (which means “to put on the shoe”) has no equivalent in English, so it is translated with the verb “to wear”, which, however, when it is re-translated into Italian, it is almost always rendered with “indossare” (which, however, precisely means “putting on the dress” not “putting on the shoe”); translators often tend to simplify, but sometimes simplifying becomes impoverishing thereby subtracting many important nuances.

[21] Trebizond is a city (of today’s Turkey), overlooking the Black Sea, of great importance as a safe point of reference for all the boats that crossed the waters of the sea in front. In ancient times it was extremely important to have not only cartographic, but also visual references, since the risk of being shipwrecked or colliding with other ships was very high and the city of Trebizond was located in a visible and easily recognizable point (see FIG. 3).

[22] The Italian text is: «È istituita per la Marina militare e per la Marina mercantile una bandiera navale conforme ai modelli risultanti dalla tavola annessa al presente decreto, firmata dai Ministri per la difesa e per la marina mercantile. Per la Marina militare, la bandiera navale è costituita dal tricolore italiano, caricato, al centro della banda bianca, dall’emblema araldico della Marina militare, rappresentante in quattro parti gli stemmi delle Repubbliche marinare (Venezia-Pisa-Genova-Amalfi), e sormontata da una corona turrita e rostrata. [...]» (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 1947, articolo 1, p. 3520).

[23] See, again, thoughtco.com (July 13, 2019, cit.).

[24] See, for example: Ferrari, Pupulin (2017); Fisher (1970 and 1978); Magocsi (2010 and 2014).

[25] Among the events of the nineteenth century, one cannot fail to mention the “Crimean War” (“Guerra di Crimea” 1854-1856) - in which the Carabinieri’s “Sardinian Expeditionary Corps in the East” (“Corpo di Spedizione Sardo in Oriente”) took part in 1855. This war had as its main cause the so-called “Eastern question”, determined by Russia’s age-old aspiration to have an outlet in the Mediterranean. See the detailed history in: carabinieri.it/arma/curiosita/non-tutti-sanno-che/c/crimea

[26] …of which an edition, edited with scientific criteria, exists today, thanks to Massari Editore (see Massari, Nobile, 2023).

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