Considerations on Battlefield Evidence Collection and Crime Scene Investigation

Abstract

The collection of evidence in the battlefield, represent an intersection of military operations and judicial systems, which has created new challenges to be faced.

With the aims to share the authors' perspectives on this topic, this manuscript examines through a comparative analysis of existing protocols and best practices, the similarities and differences between Battlefield Evidence Collection and Crime Scene Investigation, viewed through the lens of utilizing collected evidence in criminal proceedings,.

Key findings are convergences between the two disciplines that include documentation procedures, chain of custody requirements and evidence handling protocols, and divergences that involve time constraints and security measures.

Rather than claiming to be exhaustive, this manuscript seeks to foster dialogue among stakeholders involved in battlefield evidence collection, motivated by the significant benefits that would result from the development of additional regulatory frameworks, the dissemination through training programs integrating military, judicial and forensic expertise and the creation of new, more tailored, technological innovations.

Keywords: Battlefield Evidence, Crime Scene Investigation, Military Operations, Counterterrorism.

Limitations

This analysis is primarily based on theoretical frameworks and published protocols, rather than empirical data collection. Field validation of proposed solutions requires further research.

Additionally, the legal admissibility standards vary significantly across jurisdictions, limiting the universal applicability of specific recommendations.

Acknowledgements

The authors express their gratitude for the valuable advice regarding this manuscript to Lt. Col. Alberto Marino, Lt. Col. Nicola Staiti, and Lt. Col. Christian Faccinetto.

Author Contributions

Fabiano Gentile: conceptualization; resources; analysis; original draft of chapters 1–4, 6; review & editing of chapter 5; supervision. Corresponding author: fabiano.gentile@carabinieri.it

Paolo Martini: resources; original draft of chapter 5; review & editing of chapters 1–4, 6.

Disclaimer: This manuscript is a translated and updated version of an article originally published in Italian in 2023[1]. To ensure better accessibility of the content, the English translation was carried out with the support of artificial intelligence.
 

1. Introduction

The procedural use of evidence collected by military personnel in an operational area – commonly referred to as a battlefield evidence has become an increasingly relevant topic, particularly in recent years, among various stakeholders[2]. The goal is to find solutions that facilitate the admissibility in criminal proceedings without compromising authenticity, while acknowledging its unique nature[3].

This evolution reflects one aspect of a changing landscape of modern warfare, where military operations increasingly intersect with civilian judicial systems, creating unprecedented challenges for both military commanders and legal practitioners.

The intrinsic dual nature of battlefield evidence creates tension between the need for operational security and the transparency requirements of fair legal processes. 

The significance of this type of evidence extends beyond its immediate tactical value, as it often represents the only tangible link between terrorist activities and their perpetrators in regions where traditional law enforcement capabilities are limited or non-existent.

Among the complexities that may arise at different stages, some appear not immediately resolvable, such as managing the declassification of classified information and establishing shared legal basis in accordance with the jurisdictional frameworks of host nations. Others, particularly those involving applied science, tend to reach consensus through widely accepted protocols and best practices within the scientific community.

There is certainly convergence on the principle of fair trial[4], aimed at generating effective and equitable adversarial proceedings that lead to judicial truth.

However, the definitional challenges extend to fundamental questions about what constitutes admissible evidence when collected under combat conditions. 

Traditional forensic standards, developed for law enforcement contexts, sometimes may prove inadequate or impractical when applied to active combat zones where personnel safety and mission success take precedence. 

This demands the development of modified standards that attempt to balance forensic integrity with operational realities.

Within this framework, the identification, collection, and preservation of evidence collected on the "battlefield" is considered a critical step. 

Training on core crime scene investigation principles—such as chain of custody, among others—which are also highlighted throughout the Non-Binding Guiding Principles on Use of Battlefield Evidence in Civilian Criminal Proceedings, could serve as a crucial element enabling more battlefield-collected evidence to contribute effectively to criminal proceedings, while not compromising the primary objectives of, among others, Force Protection, Intelligence, and Targeting.

Another consideration is that while law enforcement objectives may be subsidiary in battlefield contexts, this should not automatically justify complete disregard for forensic standards where operationally feasible. 

As a matter of fact, where conditions allow, adherence to forensic protocols can significantly enhance the reliability of collected data, benefiting both ongoing operations and future investigations.

Conversely, improper collection and discontinuity in the chain of custody would compromise the evidentiary value in criminal proceedings and undermining the operational efforts undertaken to secure such materials. Errors in collection or preservation may even result in acquittals, potentially conflicting with some of the principles established by UNSCR 1373 of 2001[5].

Therefore, taking a practical approach to the collection and management of battlefield evidence, far from being contrary to the aspirations of the aforementioned non-binding principles, could help better integrate certain regulatory aspects while enhancing their content, particularly in scenarios where operators' available time is severely compressed due to precarious security conditions.

Given these considerations, the following analysis examines three critical operational challenges: time management, operational safety and contamination control, with an insight on some operational structure. 
 

2. Time as a resource in evidence collection

Time, often a limiting factor in some contexts, must be considered a crucial resource that fundamentally shapes the entire battlefield evidence collection process, not only because prolonged exposure increases risk factors for operating personnel, but also because if limited available time leads to collection methods that introduce predictable inadmissibility issues, this could conflict with one of the principles of risk management[6], which emphasizes the unacceptability of exposure to unnecessary risk.

On the other hand, proper time management enables the evolution of findings from mere information to evidence.

Figure 1: The introduction of protocols and standards may involve not only more training for operators, but also formal steps that may be more time-consuming.

The challenge becomes even more complex when considering that modern operational environments often involve multiple layers of evidence - from digital footprints that may be compromised over time, to physical materials that require specific preservation conditions. The intersection of time pressure and evidence integrity creates a dilemma where operators must balance the immediate tactical need for rapid site exploitation against the long-term strategic requirement for legally admissible evidence.

Certainly, finding a balanced compromise that organizes the maximum amount of information for use in judicial proceedings is not easy. 

However, it seems reasonable that such a compromise, in this historical period, should be sought by starting with crime scene investigation and collection techniques learned by law enforcement —no longer mere mechanical operations but expressions of scientific knowledge[7]—then moving toward solutions that ensure evidence integrity with the declared objective of reducing acquisition time[8].

This approach suggests an evolutionary methodology where proven field techniques serve as the foundation for developing more sophisticated, time-efficient protocols.

Moreover, high-value, time-sensitive evidence should receives priority attention, while materials of uncertain value are handled according to rapid documentation protocols that preserve their potential utility without consuming excessive operational time.

Furthermore, the rapid pace of scientific and technological evolution in forensic sciences is an aspect not to be underestimated, as it can increase the amount of information obtainable from findings that previously lacked such potential.

For example, consider DNA analysis, which at the current state of the art can provide not only a comparable profile from genetic material present in just a few cells on site, but also phenotypic information about the subject[9], age[10], and certain behavioral habits[11], as well as distant familial relationships (e.g., third-degree cousins) through genetic genealogy databases.

Moreover, the integration of advanced technologies such as portable analytical equipment, enhanced documentation systems, and real-time communication with forensic experts can potentially compress the time required for evidence processing without compromising quality.

These technological solutions, however, must be balanced against the additional logistical burden they may impose on units on the ground, but it is evident that the greater the quantity and quality of information collected, the higher the probability of fostering a virtuous cycle that will enable the planning of future operations, which in turn will generate additional information.

3. Operator safety: a priority aspect

In crime scene investigations, operator safety is of paramount importance, both for first responders[12] and for technical personnel, and consequently this aspect is emphasized in manuals[13].

For instance, Henry Lee's Crime Scene Manual (2001) stresses that first responders must always prioritize the safety of operators and civilians upon arrival at a crime scene. Similarly, Practical Crime Scene Processing and Investigation (2019) dedicates an entire appendix to risk management, further reinforcing the importance of operator safety and identifying potential risk factors.

In battlefield evidence collection, operator safety is also identified as a fundamental aspect, as reiterated in Tactical Site Exploitation and Cache Search Operations (2007) and Site Exploitation (2015), which outline key parameters such as exposing the minimum number of people necessary to achieve the objective and minimizing exposure time in the target area[14], in relation to the associated risk, taking into consideration that the battlefield context introduces additional complexity layers, including active threats, unexploded ordnance, structural damage, and potential chemical or biological contamination that may not be present in traditional crime scenes. 

It is true that reducing military personnel's exposure to the typical risks of operational areas, with a view to maximizing their safety, certainly represents an effective and widely used strategy for the aforementioned purpose. 

However, the implementation of risk reduction strategies can limits the time available for evidence collection, with the risk of compressing the evidence source from potential evidence[15] to a questionable information source.

This degradation of evidential value can represents a critical failure mode that can undermine the entire purpose of evidence collection, where the resulting materials may fail to meet the standards required for judicial proceedings, essentially rendering the operational risks taken to collect them meaningless.

Moreover in the context of battlefield, the challenge is compounded by the fact that these decisions often must be made under pressure, with incomplete information, and by personnel who may not have extensive forensic training[16].

Finding the right balance between these aspects, without prejudice to the safety of the operator, that is always a priority over preservation of evidence, is not simple. 

Some recent publications, such as the OSAC 2023-N-0002[17] Standard for Scene Documentation Procedures, emphasize the necessity of structured documentation protocols to maintain evidence integrity while optimizing safety measures. 

Technologies such as drone-based photography represent a paradigm shift, due to the possibility to capture detailed information while keeping personnel at safe distances from threats.

In this context, the development of technologies for evidence collection specifically designed for battlefield applications represents a promising area for future development.

Hopefully, the investment in such technologies, that provide real-time analysis capabilities with military-grade robustness, can enhance both personnel safety and operational effectiveness.

4. On the phenomenon of contamination

Another event that can occur in both crime scene investigation and battlefield evidence collection is contamination.

Let us start from a premise: contamination cannot be completely eliminated as it is a corollary of Locard's exchange principle[18] simplified as “every contact leaves a trace”. If it is true that "every contact leaves a trace," even the operator accessing a crime scene will inevitably leave traces of their passage while simultaneously removing components present at the scene itself.

Accepting Locard's principle as valid, it is necessary to admit the inevitable modification of the crime scene by personnel operating in such contexts. In this framework, their aim should not be to avoid introducing alterations to the scene, but rather to avoid introducing unnecessary alterations. For established purposes, the generic requirement not to modify the crime scene is therefore utopian, as the scene undergoes a natural and inevitable modification process from the very moment it is created.

Obviously, the identification of contamination is strictly correlated to which elements are, based on scientific and technological development, useful for providing investigative contribution, since other types of contamination that do not involve elements of interest will not be detected because they are not sought. In other words, the more these elements are used in investigations, (e.g. DNA, GSR etc.), the more likely contamination involving those elements will be detected.

One of the strategy in contamination management, not only in the context of DNA analysis, is the use of comparison samples from individuals who accessed the scene, even if those samples are not associated, for security reasons, with personal details of subjects[19].

This approach give the possibility to exclude misleading information preventing erroneous investigative conclusions.

The data coming from the comparison samples can also be organized into exclusion databases[20], in order to have an immediate verification and therefore eliminate the misleading information produced in the early stages of the investigation.

Another phenomenon that can generate unreliable information is the secondary transfer of biological material[21]. As example, we can hypothesize a scenario on the transfer[22] of biological material, in which a genetic profile is extrapolated on an IED which, rather than deriving from the assembler of the device, derives from a third party with whom the assembler had had social contact shortly before[23].

This underscores the dual risk of contamination: it can lead to acquittals when genetic contributions cannot be definitively linked to a suspect, but it can also result in wrongful convictions if contamination is not identified as such[24].
 

5. Objectives and overview of some operational structure

Beyond the identification of perpetrators for judicial proceedings, battlefield evidence collection serves also a strategic intelligence function, like the understanding of the enemy, their weapon systems, tactics, and intentions in order to counter future threats and reduce risks for troops deployed in operations.

For instance, in counterterrorism operations, we are not limited exclusively to the collection of elements aimed at identifying those responsible for the attack, but also to the collection of information aimed at dismantling the organizational networks (Attack the Network[25]).

Such information, to be effectively extracted from elements collected at the scene, requires a system capable of organizing and managing resources and expertise, such as Weapons Technical Intelligence and the Joint Deployable Exploitation & Analysis Laboratory.

Both adopt NATO standards, doctrines, and procedures to ensure the broadest interoperability[26] and are generally organized into three levels, with the first two active in operational areas.

• First Level. Personnel belonging to the first level have competencies in research, documentation, collection, and preservation of evidence, with preparation of the consequent report on operations performed. In this framework, similarities with the crime scene investigation units of law enforcements are evident.
• Second Level. The second level, also in the operational areas, appears as a structure with analogies with forensic laboratories. However, modularity, which characterizes laboratories deployable in operational theaters, represents one of the main peculiarities, which is fundamental for logistical aspects related to transportation. Generally, such operational units are structured with modules dedicated to command and control, production of reports containing analytical results, specimen storage, triage, and specific disciplines (e.g., Forex, Elex, Chemex, etc.), based on pressing needs.
• Third Level. For evaluations requiring a higher degree of complexity, or where required disciplines are not available, analyses are conducted by laboratories located outside the operational area. These facilities can provide a comprehensive analytical capabilities including, but not limited to, advanced DNA analysis and digital forensics.
   

6. Concluding remarks

The convergences between battlefield evidence collection and crime scene investigation lead these two disciplines to share numerous analogies that facilitate dialogue between the green component (military) and blue component (police forces), also supported by specific projects such as Mi-LEx[27].

Generally speaking, the most evident similarities include the necessary initial access to the scene, documentation activities structured through multiple approaches[28] and incorporating, nowadays, the deployment of drones and the application of search patterns. In particular this last method aims to maximize evidence identification while reducing the risk of bias stemming from the presumption that professional experience serves as an adequate substitute for methodical site inspection; and the procedures for evidence collection, packaging, and management (particularly when intended for courtroom proceedings).

Once evidence are collected, both disciplines identify a collection area that, in case of battlefield evidence collection, should be positioned near the exfiltration route in order to be able to abandon the site by recovering the material found where safety conditions change rapidly. This tactical consideration reflects the unique security challenges faced in battlefield environments, where the ability to rapidly evacuate collected materials may be critical for both evidence preservation and personnel safety.

Among the primary divergences, one cannot overlook the generally expeditious nature of battlefield evidence collection which, while occasionally applicable to crime scene investigation, is certainly not its defining characteristic.

Moreover, the risk persists beyond the collection phase, as operators remain vulnerable during exfiltration, while in crime scene investigation, the risk associated with such events is negligible.

It should also be noted that the development of new technologies and the increased sensitivity of existing ones has expanded the range of specimens capable of providing information and, as an indirect consequence, has altered the time requirements for their management.

The opportunity to implement specific standards that structure these operations within a Quality Management System (e.g., ISO/IEC 17020) represents, in the authors' opinion, an objective to pursue in the future battlefield evidence collection as well, as is occurring nowadays in crime scene investigation[29].

However, the increased time requirement could also affect observation, given the expanded landscape of extractable information. Citing one of Karl Popper's proposed criteria—that observation can only arise from a hypothesis[30]—it is reasonable to assert that hypothesis generation will be more contextually appropriate and rewarding, in terms of identifying evidence in the shortest possible time, when operators possess specialized training.

The concept of hypothesis-driven observation has particular relevance in time-constrained battlefield areas, where investigators cannot afford to conduct exhaustive searches without strategic focus.

Continuous education and training are essential, given the rapid evolution of forensic technologies that allowed to executing correct operations in minimal time.

These considerations regarding training and preparation are deliberately emphasized in this work, seeking necessary periodicity also in consideration of the rapid and continuous evolution of technologies and knowledge related to evidence collection which, expressing forms of scientific knowledge, may also be subject to paradigm shifts[31].

Having established the evolutionary process that enables extraction of greater amount of information from crime scenes, compared to the past - and interpretation even at sophisticated levels of complexity - it is useful to conclude this analysis by focusing on the positive effect, in terms of battlefield evidence collection discipline development, resulting from proposed training events involving both green (military) and blue (police) components[32].

In this context, Gendarmerie Type Forces[33], that have a military status and carry out police functions, represent an asset of absolute centrality, given their experience in evidence collection both in operational areas and domestically, as well as their participation as expert witnesses, consultants, and expert witnesses in criminal proceedings.
 

Reference

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• Bayesian Networks for Probabilistic Inference and Decision Analysis in Forensic Science. Taroni F., Biedermann A, Bozza S, Garbolino P, Aitken C. (2014) 
• Best Practice Manual for Scene of Crime Examination – BPM – SoC – 01 Version 02 – February 2022
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[1]Gentile F., Martini P.Considerazioni sul battlefield evidence collection e sul crime scene investigation Rassegna dell’Arma dei Carabinieri, (2023), n. 3 Anno LXX – luglio / Settembre pg 39-49 ISSN 2533-3070 (online).

[2] Stakeholders include, in accordance with "Guidelines to facilitate the use and admissibility as evidence in national criminal courts of information collected, handled, preserved and shared by the military to prosecute terrorist offences," military personnel, police forces, prosecutors, international judges, and national policy officials.

[3] This uniqueness, also highlighted in the Non-Binding Guiding Principles on Use of Battlefield Evidence in Civilian Criminal Proceedings, concerns two closely related aspects: security conditions and available time. The interaction between these two elements is evident in risk management principles, where the duration of exposure to a risk directly impacts the probability that the anticipated scenario will occur.

[4]The right to a fair trial is enshrined in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states: "All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law". More recently the principle is evident in “Abuja Recommendations on the collection, use and sharing of evidence for purposes of criminal prosecution of terrorist suspects (2018)“

[5] I.e. to ensure that anyone involved in the financing, planning, preparation or execution of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice

[6] Risk Management, ATP 5-19.

[7] Curtotti D., Saravo L. (2012) The technical-scientific error at the crime scene: the inevitable mistake and the responsibilities of the scientist, the jurist, and the legislator.

[8] Both of Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE) and Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE)

[9] Chaitanya et al. (2018)

[10] Horvath (2013)

[11] Alghanim et al. (2018)

[12] First Responders at the crime scene are generally police officers/operators, paramedics and fire department personnel.

[13] ENFSI Best Practive Manual for Scene of Crime Examination (2022); Practical Crime Scene Processing and Investigation (2019).

[14] Tactical Site Exploitation and Cache Search Operations," p. 6 (2007)

[15] Guidelines to facilitate the use and admissibility as evidence in national criminal courts of information collected, handled, preserved and shared by the military to prosecute terrorist offences.

[16]Training programs should include: basic forensic awareness, evidence handling procedures, safety protocol integration, equipment operation, and decision-making under pressure scenarios

[17]While OSAC standards provide valuable guidance for civilian applications, their adaptation to battlefield conditions requires modification to address active threat environments, compressed timeframes, limited resources, and military command structures

[18] “La vérité est que nul ne peut agir avec l’intensité que suppose l’action criminelle sans laisser des marques multiples de son passage.” Locard's principle as found in Edmond Locard's book, L'enquete criminelle et les Méthodes scientifiques (1920) pg 139 E. Flammarion Ed.

[19] Protecting the identity of personnel in operational area may represent a security-related necessity

[20] Recommendation reiterated in "GE.F.I. Recommendations in personal identification investigations" (2018).

[21] A hypothetical secondary transfer scenario could involve DNA from a third party with whom the Person of Interest (POI) had social contact being transferred from the POI to the evidence source (e.g., IED components) through handling. 

[22] Fonneløp et al 2015, Roland et al. 2019.

[23] Awareness of current analytical sensitivity in DNA analysis therefore suggests developing competencies to address inherently probabilistic questions where profile attribution is not in dispute, but rather the activity that justifies its presence on the specimen. Bayesian networks have proven capable of providing such support to achieve balanced, transparent, and robust evidence evaluation (for further details: Taroni et al. 2014, "Bayesian Networks for Probabilistic Inference and Decision Analysis in Forensic Science").

[24] The Innocence Project, which from 1992 to today has contributed to the exoneration, through DNA analysis, of 375 people, 21 of whom were sentenced to capital punishment. On average, each person was deprived of personal freedom for 14 years (https://innocenceproject.org/exonerate/).

[25] For further information, see "Commander's Handbook for Attack the Network" (2011).

[26] The capacity to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives

[27] Mi-LEx was proposed by Interpol in 2005 with the Vennlig project in Iraq and Syria, subsequently replicated with Project Hamah in Afghanistan, both developed to counter foreign terrorist fighters (FTF).

[28] Descriptive, planimetric, photographic, and video documentation. The latter is particularly valued in battlefield evidence collection as it simultaneously enables space documentation and voice commentary recording.

[29] As an example, reference is made to manual ENFSI-SOC-BPM-02 Version 01, published in December 2022 "Best Practice Manual for the Implementation of a Quality Management System and Accreditation Model for Crime Scene Investigation," whose purpose is to facilitate the implementation of a Quality Management System in CSI processes.

[30] Popper, "Logic of Scientific Discovery and Open Society" (1989).

[31] Paradigm shift describes a fundamental change in the basic assumptions within a dominant scientific theory. This expression was coined by T.S. Kuhn in "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (1962).

[32] An example of training opportunities is the “Battlefield Evidence Institutional Level Course” held at the NATO SP CoE in Vicenza (Italy)

[33] With particular reference to Gendarmerie-Type Forces such as, for example, the Italian Carabinieri, French National Gendarmerie, Spanish Guardia Civil, Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana, Dutch Marechaussee, Romanian Gendarmerie, Polish Military Gendarmerie, and Turkish Gendarmerie.