By Laris Gaiser
From "The CoESPU MAGAZINE - the online Journal of Stability Policing – Advanced Studies" Vol. I – Issue 1 – Year 2022
Page 21
DOI Code: 10.32048/Coespumagazine4.22.8
abstract
The 21st of March 2022, the EU Council adopted the Strategic Compass. In June, at the Madrid NATO Summit, the leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization sanctioned the new NATO Strategic Concept. The aim of this article is to briefly analyze the state of the relations between the two organizations in a time of heightened international tension and deep strategic review, their reaction to emerging threats and subsequent potential implications for global security. The paper will then try to shed some light on possible future developments and main challenges for the Transatlantic security, concluding with some thoughts on the need for more coordination, consistency, and unity to gain a more effective and credible international stance to face the menaces of tomorrow.
Key Words: Nato, EU, strategy, collective defense
Il 21 marzo 2022 il Consiglio dell'UE ha adottato la Bussola Strategica. A giugno, al vertice della NATO di Madrid, i leader dell'Organizzazione del Trattato del Nord Atlantico hanno approvato il nuovo Concetto Strategico. Lo scopo di questo articolo è analizzare brevemente lo stato delle relazioni tra le due organizzazioni in un momento di accresciuta tensione internazionale e profonda revisione strategica, la loro reazione alle minacce emergenti e le conseguenti potenziali implicazioni per la sicurezza globale. Il documento cercherà di fare luce sui possibili sviluppi futuri e sulle principali sfide per la sicurezza transatlantica, approfondendo la riflessione sulla necessità di maggiore coordinamento, coerenza e unità per poter acquisire una posizione internazionale più efficace e credibile dinnanzi alle minacce future.
Parole Chiave: Nato, Ue, strategia, difesa collettiva
- Introduction
In times of great uncertainty and power clashes, the global order suffers from the most acute destabilization in many a year. From the pandemic to the conflict in Ukraine, disarray and disorder seem to have become almost systemic, permanent features rather than contingent crises. A change that imposes brand-new ways of tackling international security problems, making clear that hybrid threats will require an ever more hybrid response1. In fact, both the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are already particularly well positioned to advance such “multidimensional” approach, having experimented in the recent past a relatively extended set of instruments to manage crises and uphold their values, interests and security2. Especially the EU, which can rely on an extraordinarily wide and influent collection of economic, normative, and political measures – not least by deploying fully-fledged military missions, on the basis of the provisions of art. 42 of the Treaty on European Union - TEU, since 20033. However, also NATO is fast moving towards a more political and global posture, having become aware of the shifting geopolitical balances and the increased need for strong security alliances4.
Such eventful developments highlight how important it is, nowadays, for the two organizations to rethink their strategic priorities and adapt to an utterly changed international environment. An environment characterized by a dangerous resurgence of ruthless geopolitical confrontation, transactional international relations, power politics, spheres of influence, militarism, the emergence of new hybrid threats, and authoritarian leaderships throughout the world. In such a worrying landscape, not only the security of their Member States, but the very preservation of global order and peace are at stake. As clearly stated in the new NATO Strategic Concept, << the euro-Atlantic area is not at peace >> .5 A challenge so momentous that will require the best efforts of both of the shores of the Atlantic and the full military and political cooperation between NATO and EU countries, making common cause and sharing the burden of the responsibility for the defence and security of their citizens, the protection of their interests, and the upholding of their core, shared values.
- The Cooperative Framework
In this venue, the EU has developed and approved its most advanced and far-reaching strategic document: the Strategic Compass6. An eventful moment, since it marks the first concrete step towards the ambition of posing the ground for really effective and efficient common foreign, security, and defence policies, without rejecting the fundamental importance of the transatlantic relationship. With the outbreak of a major conflict at the borders of Europe, the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has gained back both the legitimacy and the urgency it had at its very beginning, having found once again its founding purpose: the defence of the North Atlantic Alliance from an actual military menace. The Strategic Compass leaves no space for doubts: the so-called strategic autonomy – which the EU aims to reach in the near future to emancipate itself from excessive dependence in strategic domains from abroad (e.g., energy supply, rare materials, IT industry, etc.) and gain more leverage on the international stage – should and indeed aims to be fully consistent and complementary with NATO, which remains an untradeable pillar for the collective security of all its members and partners.
The Alliance is also moving in this direction, having more than once confirmed its support for a stronger and more capable EU in foreign policy and military affairs, which would act as the European pillar of the wider collective defence organization7. Notwithstanding the risks synthetized in the old and well-known three Ds acronym – namely: no Duplication; no Decoupling; no Discrimination – the project of a European Defence, not to mention the ambition of realizing what may become in the future a true European Army, could well pose (once again) a unique opportunity to strengthen both NATO and the EU, while making the latter more autonomous and politically integrated – and therefore responsible – for the defence and security of its citizens, values, and interests8. Within such scenario, art. 24 of TUE stating that << the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions >>, could represents the formal link between the EU and NATO common efforts9.
The new NATO Strategic Concept has been approved in June, at the Madrid Summit10. NATO ostensibly confirms and advances the above-described view, strengthening the strategic partnership between the two shores of the Atlantic and therefore between the two organizations. Accordingly, the entire paragraph 43 of the document is devoted to clarifying the fact that << the European Union is a unique and essential partner for NATO >>.11
- NATO-EU in the Strategic Compass
Approved in march 2022, the Strategic Compass looks towards << a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security >> 12. In fact, such goals are already sanctioned by the very EU Treaties. Article 2, TUE13, in particular: << The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities >>. To that end, the same Treaty (art. 24, par. 1), defines the EU’s competence over the common security and defence policy, within which it opens also to the possibility to progressively create a common defence14. However, it is plain that in this effort the transatlantic relationship, and in particular the NATO membership of many EU countries, has played – still plays, and hopefully will continue to play in the near future – a pivotal role. The Strategic Compass fully acknowledges this reality and necessity, by directly addressing the issue of how to manage the complex balance between strategic autonomy and the contextual belonging to a military and political alliance such as the North Atlantic Alliance.
The word NATO is indeed mentioned in the document at least 28 times, frequently together with the word EU. In the very first page of the Annex to the EU Council document that contains the text of the Strategic Compass, before even mentioning any other international organization or partnership, it is stated that << A stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members >>. Moreover, it is significantly cleared from the very beginning that << the transatlantic relationship and EU-NATO cooperation, in full respect of the principles set out in the Treaties and those agreed by the European Council, including the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity and decision-making autonomy of the EU, are key to our overall security >>. The frame is clear, and so are the main principles sustaining it, as inclusiveness, reciprocity and decision-making autonomy.
The problem of the relation between NATO and EU is, in fact, not a new one. Without going through the (brief) history of the first attempt to build a common European defence, that ended in the failure of the European Defence Community project in 1954, it is worth going rapidly back to the Nineties. Indeed, as it has been extensively written about, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the West had to utterly rethink its military posture towards the East and its broader security and political priorities. Moreover, the almost contextual outbreak of conflicts and the resurgence of violence in Africa and in the Balkans made evident that history was far from ending, and therefore NATO and the EU had to go through a complex process of internal reform to adapt to the new international situation, also spurred by the tragic failures to protect the people of Rwanda and Srebrenica. In particular, the war in Kosovo saw NATO intervene where other organizations could not, even if the lack of a Security Council authorization gave rise to a complex debate, somewhat still ongoing, making also the EU aware of the need to develop the necessary capabilities to ensure the security of its borders and intervene to bring peace and stability when needed. The discussions involved also the one about how to discipline the relationship between the two organizations, which ultimately led to the aforementioned 3Ds formula.
- NATO-EU in the Strategic Concept
The new NATO Strategic Concept is returning to the past organization’s mission clarifying that its core tasks are deterrence and defence, cooperative security and crisis prevention and management.15 The complementarity between the European and the North-Atlantic vision is a pillar of the new Concept. It is no coincidence that both the Strategic Compass and the Strategic Concept are the result of a parallel reflection that saw governments approve them just a few weeks apart. If NATO is named 28 times in the Compass, an entire paragraph is dedicated to EU in the Concept and the inevitable collaboration between the two organizations is based on the premise of sharing the same principles and values. << NATO and the EU play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security >>, consequently based on a longstanding cooperation NATO-EU strategic partnership will be enhanced, strengthened the political cooperation and increased the cooperation on issues of common interest. However, the Strategic Concept goes further stressing that NATO recognizes the value of a << stronger and more capable European defence that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security >> supporting, as essential, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in EU defence efforts.
All this, however, is noted once again in an official document, shall be accomplished avoiding unnecessary duplications in order to give the possibility to NATO effectively defend, always, << every inch of Allied territory, preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Allies and prevail against any aggressor >> 16.
- Conclusions
The European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization need now, maybe more than ever, to proceed – and to be perceived to proceed – hand in hand in the struggle for security, in order to efficiently protect their citizens, credibly stand on the international stage, and uphold their values in front of rising, complex and unpredictable threats and challenges. The invasion of Ukraine << led to the emergence of a unified transatlantic front, with Washington taking the lead in the response and Brussels assuming an equally active posture, despite different sensibilities at the national level. Sustaining this momentum will be one of the challenges for the Concept. If the invasion of Ukraine contributed to strengthening the transatlantic relationship and restoring NATO’s sense of purpose >>.17
The drafting and approval of the analyzed strategic documents is only one step more towards the building of a true political and military partnership between the two organizations, members of which are in many cases juxtapositionable. NATO, also due to the menace posed by the growingly aggressive Russian posture towards the West and its neighborhood, has found new life and purpose while, at the same time, the EU has finally recognized the need to shoulder its share of responsibility in the maintenance of global security.
Collective defence, international security, global rules-based order are just some of the key pillars that will guide the EU-NATO partnership in the upcoming years, with the higher aim to protect their members – but also the international community as a whole – from a wide range of conventional, hybrid, and still unforeseeable threats to their security and stability. The EU is now finally building the capability to act as a true security provider, keeping the pace with a world ever more competitive and challenging, where malicious actors and hostile states are trying to substitute power politics, spheres of influence, and military might to diplomacy, multilateralism, and international cooperation. The goal is set, whether it will be fully reached or not is now up to the capacity to keep the common commitment alive and actively sustain the necessary political willingness of NATO and EU Member States to collaborate in security and defence issues – and Italy is particularly well positioned to do both.
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1 Cinciripini, L. The hybrid response of the EU and NATO to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Sicurezza, Terrorismo, Società, 1 - 15/2022, 69 e ss. In particular paragraph n. 4, “Future developments”, where the Author well describes the response of the EU and NATO as “the exercise of a sort of hybrid power”, 74-75.
2 Ibid.
3 Petrangeli, F. (June 2020) Le missioni militari dell’Unione europea, Servizio studi del Senato - Servizio delle Commissioni permanenti e speciali, dossier europei, n. 84, 8.
4 Independent Expert Group, NATO 2030 Report, November 2020 & Secretary General J. Stoltenberg, NATO 2030 speech in June 2020 ( https://www.nato.int/cps/kz/natohq/opinions_176197.htm?selectedLocale=en )
5 NATO (2022) Strategic Concept, p. 3 ( https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf )
6 EU Council, Strategic Compass, last accessed: 12/05/2022 (https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7371-2022-INIT/en/pdf).
7 Gaiser, L. (2010) Geopolitika, Didakta, Radovljica
8 See also Colamedici, J. (2020) La difesa comune. Prospettive di integrazione europea, Jura Gentium. Rivista di filosofia del diritto internazionale e della politica globale, XVII, 2, 26-52.
9 European Union (1992) Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), art. 24, ( https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF )
10 NATO, Strategic Concepts, last updated: 29/11/2021, last accessed: 12/05/2022 (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm#:~:text=The%20Strategic%20Concept%20sets%20the%20Alliance%E2%80%99s%20strategy.%20It,provides%20guidelines%20for%20its%20political%20and%20military%20adaptation.).
11 NATO (2022) Strategic Concept, p. 10 ( https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf )
12 EU Council, Strategic Compass, last updated: 2022 ( https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf )
13 Treaty on European Union (TEU) (26/10/2012), Consolidated version, Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea, , art. 2 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0017.02/DOC_1&format=PDF).
14 Treaty on European Union (TEU), Consolidated version, art. 24, par. 1: "The Union‘s competence in the field of the common foreign and security policy covers all areas of foreign policy and all matters relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy which may lead to a common defence"
15 For an historical overview, see: De Leonardis, M. (2011). L'evoluzione storica dei Concetti Strategici della NATO. QUADERNI DEL DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE POLITICHE, 2011, 47-64.
16 NATO (2022) Strategic Concept, p. 6 ( https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf )
17 Pastori, G. (2022) The EU, America and NATO's new strategic concept: Not just "back to the past". ISPI. ( https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/eu-america-and-natos-new-strategic-concept-not-just-back-past-35578 )