By Filippo Donadio, Giulia Morandi, Lorenzo Migliorini, and Eskil Solberg
"The CoESPU Magazine - The Online Quarterly Journal of Stability Policing" no. 2, Year 2026, Page: 27
DOI Code: 10.32048/Coespumagazine2.26.4
Introduction
Stability Policing (SP) is defined by NATO as "police related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights”.[1] In the international effort towards Stability Policing, the Italian Arma dei Carabinieri has played and continues to play an essential role. The aim of this article is to share the reflections and experiences of the students from the School of International Studies (SIS) who took part in a three-day intensive program at the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Vicenza.
SP activities are conducted with the aim of establishing a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), restoring public order and security, and establishing the conditions to meet longer-term needs with respect to governance and development. In practice, this means operating across the full spectrum of a conflict to achieve five interconnected goals:
The first priority for Stability Policing Units (SPUs) is the Protection of Civilians (PoC), which consists in protecting civilians from all threats of physical violence. During SP Missions, significant attention is paid to vulnerable subjects (e.g., refugees, Internally Displaced People, women and children). In fulfilling their PoC Mandate, SPUs essentially work as deterrence against violence against civilians, “especially where and when the host government is not able or willing to provide such protection”.[2] Second, SP must allow the Transfer of Authority (ToA), which consists in a structured transition of security responsibilities to the Host Nation. However, this is only possible through two other essential steps: Capacity Building and Development (CBD) and Security Sector Reform (SSR). On one hand, CBD aims at developing self-sufficient, prepared, and trained indigenous police forces through Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (MMA). On the other hand, SSR essentially aims at reforming and rebuilding a country’s security institutions, turning them into effective and accountable bodies, which can be trusted by the local population. Finally, the fifth goal of SP is to facilitate the Reinstitution of the Rule of Law, meaning a country’s legal infrastructure and judicial sector.
These five essential goals aim to tackle and possibly solve one structural problem that has defined peace operations since the mid-1990s: the Security Gap. Broadly defined, the Security Gap is the void that opens after hostilities cease and before civilian law enforcement can be effectively deployed to restore public order.[3] It is not a single failure, but it consists in three distinct and compounding dimensions: Deployment Gap, Enforcement/Capacity Gap and Institution Gap. The first relates to time; the second defines the inability of deployed police to carry out functions in hostile environments, criminal investigations, and intelligence-gathering to deal with organized crime and spoilers; and, finally, the third, relates to the absence of functioning local security institutions.
These goals, however, are never pursued in ideal conditions. SP missions operate in non-permissive environments where resources are always scarce: limited time, limited troops and logistical assets, and limited knowledge of a complex, unstable and volatile operational environment. These are not exceptional circumstances, but rather the everyday reality for SPUs on the ground. The students who actively took part in scenario-based exercises in the Modelling and Gaming Information Simulation Training Area (MaGISTrA), quickly understood that a varied and constantly changing set of challenges must be addressed on a daily basis. As explained by LTC Criscitiello, these challenges can range from the most practical realm, to potential communication issues with the local communities and police forces, until having to face systemic scarcity. This is the essential reality of Stability Policing on the ground.
Nonetheless, what counters scarcity is structure: a proven methodology built on disciplined planning, systematic risk analysis, and structured decision-making. This paper explores both sides of this equation. First, the three dimensions of the structural resources defining SP missions: limited resources, limited time, and limited knowledge of the operational environment; second, the Decision-Making Process (DMP) as the crucial response to uncertainty.
The Multiple Dimensions of Scarcity in a Non-Permissive Environment
The First Dimension of Scarcity: Limited Resources
Scarcity is an economic concept: a gap between limited resources and theoretically limitless wants. Similarly, in Stability Policing missions, resources are necessarily limited, and accordingly, SPUs must prioritize. The first and the most immediately visible dimension of scarcity in SP missions is limited resources, pertaining to the concrete material assets available on the ground: personnel, equipment, and logistical support.
Stability Policing missions are never conducted in ideal conditions. This is the operational baseline. Available resources are often insufficient relative to a UN mandate; threats often exceed the personnel assigned to counter them, and information is less complete than planners require. Resources scarcity calls for prioritization, and prioritization without a structured methodology can lead to mistakes.
The Carana scenario-based exercise worked through in CoESPU’s MaGISTrA makes this even more explicit. The documents of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Carana (UNAC) identify four critical resource constraints undermining the PoC mission: a shortfall in deployed troops due to an ongoing yet stagnating force generation process; insufficient logistical assets to transport and support personnel on the ground; restrictions of movement of civilian staff outside UNAC bases; and limited time available for patrols due to a limited availability of air assets.[4] Each of these constraints carries operational consequences.
In this environment, each resource decision is simultaneously a priority decision: deploying Formed Police Units (FPUs) to a location means not deploying them to another one. This is the operational meaning of scarcity.
The Second Dimension of Scarcity: Limited Time
Unlike material assets, which can in principle be supplemented or redistributed, time lost in the aftermath of conflict cannot be recovered.
The dimension of time scarcity originates at the highest level: the strategic one. As a matter of fact, mandates through UN Resolutions generally last up to 12 months. This means that the mission’s goals and budget are essentially tailored for a period of one year. This strategic reality may not allow for a long-term approach based on enduring objectives. The study of the UNAC mandate in the MaGISTrA offers a direct illustration of this issue: the UN Security Council (UNSC) established the UNAC for an initial period of 12 months, with troop levels, goals, and budgets all calibrated to that annual cycle.[5] This structural reality limits what the mission can realistically accomplish.
On the other hand, at the operational level, this second dimension is captured by the concept of Golden Hour. The Golden Hour consists in “the short time of several weeks to several months after combat operations when external intervention may enjoy both popular support and legitimacy, and the opposition has not had the time to organize”.[6] This is the exact moment when the establishment of a Security Policing Mission is generally most effective and may lead to the highest probability of success. In fact, it is precisely during this window that the Security Gap is widest and the consequences of delayed or inadequate deployment are most severe. The ‘Brahimi Report’ of August 2000 already identified the lack of qualified and rapidly deployable police capacities as a serious deficiency across multiple peacekeeping missions. More than two decades later, this structural diagnosis remains valid.
Even at the tactical level, time scarcity must be taken into consideration. In unstable and volatile environments, the reality on the ground evolves rapidly, decisions are constantly being taken, and SPUs must respond rapidly.
The Third Dimension of Scarcity: Limited Knowledge
The third dimension of scarcity is perhaps the least visible, yet equally important: limited knowledge of the operational environment. Deployed forces often bring with them a bias that could complicate stabilization efforts. As military forces often lack adequate policing experience, mindset, and training, personnel training requires experience as a civilian law enforcement officer. Planners must understand that military forces are unfamiliar with rule of law concepts and do not possess sufficient expertise to administer justice in a non-functioning judicial system and to conduct most law enforcement tasks.[7] Furthermore, they may not grasp or appreciate the cultural sensitivity of the law in relation to the country or region of deployment. Stationed forces often bring with them an ethnocentric bias - “the tendency [...] to base perceptions and understandings of other groups or cultures on one’s own”[8] - that could complicate the stabilization efforts.
The Carana-scenario perfectly reflects the reality of this third dimension. The scenario requires the students to build situational awareness before any meaningful decisions can be made. One concern relates to the competing and clashing interest among the National Reconciliation (GNR), Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC), and Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) faction. Moreover, the layered humanitarian emergency and the multi-ethnic composition of Carana further complicate SPUs’ ability to successfully assess risks and design proper responses.
For this reason, awareness of the mission environment can be considered as one of the primary success factors for SP operations, covering five dimensions: political, legal, economic, administrative, and cultural. This awareness is an operational requirement pursued through the MMA approach, built on respect, patience, and flexibility toward the host nation context.
Taken together, these three dimensions are not isolated variables. They interact and compound each other. What counters this compound scarcity is structure: a proven methodology that allows SP units to prioritize effectively and minimize the possibility of error, even when operating far below ideal conditions. That methodology is the subject of the next section.
A structured methodology: the Decision-Making Processes (DMP) in military/police environments
Why does methodology matter in crisis environments
If scarcity defines the operational reality of SP, then methodology is what allows practitioners to operate effectively within it. Limited time, resources, and knowledge not only constrain action, but they also increase the risk of misjudgement. In such environments, intuitive or improvised decision-making can easily lead to fragmented or ineffective responses.
Crisis environments are characterised by incomplete and often contradictory information, rapidly evolving dynamics, and constant pressure to act. Decision-makers must balance competing priorities while anticipating second- and third-order effects. Without structure, this complexity can quickly lead to cognitive overload and inconsistent outcomes.
The CoESPU experience in Vicenza, particularly through the MaGISTrA scenario-based exercise, demonstrated that effective decision-making depends less on having complete information and more on how information is processed. Methodology provides this structure. It enables practitioners to break down complexity, prioritise effectively, and move from uncertainty to action in a controlled and transparent way. In this sense, structured working methods are not a formality, but a practical necessity in non-permissive environments.
The Decision-Making Process (DMP) as a framework
The structured approach to decision-making introduced during the CoESPU module is captured in the DMP - a widely used framework in military and policing contexts that guides action in complex environments.
At its core, the DMP translates analysis into action through a progressive and structured flow, as illustrated in the diagram:
After an analysis of the operational environment, the DMP begins with Courses of Actions (CoAs): an outline of different operational responses to the identified challenges. These alternatives are then evaluated, and the most suitable option is selected and formalised into an order. Finally, this decision is translated into an operational plan, ensuring that it can be implemented through coordinated actions on the ground.
Instead of encouraging immediate reactions, the DMP ensures that decisions are grounded in a systematic evaluation of the environment and available options. In doing so, it reduces the risk of premature conclusions and supports more coherent and coordinated action.
Importantly, the process does not eliminate uncertainty. Instead, it provides a structured way to manage it, allowing decision-makers to move from incomplete information to informed operational choices.
Courses of Actions (CoA) and decision-making under constraints
The first stage of the so-called DMP is represented by the intended CoAs. “A CoA is a plan describing the selected strategies and operational actions designed to accomplish the mission according to the commander’s intent”[9]. In essence, it corresponds to the most suitable and likely actions needed to close the so-called “security gap”.
The staff mission, on the basis of a detailed analysis, develops recommended CoA(s) for the mission leader. Once analyzed and compared, the CoA that best accomplishes the assigned mission is selected and becomes an integral part of the plan or order. Consequently, as the final stage of the DMP, such a plan or order is operationalized through an OPORD (Operations Order) to the personnel conducting ground operations.
Tracing back to the Carana scenario-based exercise, an important step towards CoA development was the analysis of the threats hindering the PoC - the mission assigned. Once identified, threats were assessed according to their level of risk and eventually addressed through a summary of intended CoAs on the basis of a threat’s timing (i.e., prevention, preemption, response, and consolidation).
The Computer Assisted eXercise (CAX): Planning under time pressure
Gen. George S. Patton once said, “A good plan executed now is better than a perfect plan next week”. Time is limited and crises emerge unexpectedly, especially with today’s security challenges. This underscores the importance of a comprehensive approach in crisis management, involving both military and civilian actors holistically planning, training, and acting together.[10]
To this regard, technologies such as the Computer Assisted eXercise (CAX) assist in achieving such an approach. The CoESPU’s MaGISTrA, completed in 2017, is a paramount tool to perform field training and exercises at relatively lower costs and risks. A CAX avoids the need of setting up scenarios in real environments, often considered too complex and economically burdensome.[11] Moreover, it is estimated that performing CAXs saves up to 60% of the time needed to acquire knowledge and training skills, also offering opportunities to reiterate operations and to improve their quality.[12]
The DMP applied to the Carana scenario
The practical value of the DMP became evident through its application to the Carana scenario, a fictional yet realistic post-conflict environment. Initially, the scenario presented a high level of ambiguity, with multiple actors, fragile institutions, and competing sources of instability.
Through an Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE) and a Mission Analysis, participants structured this complexity and clarified key objectives, such as the PoC and the stabilisation of public security.
Within these phases, threat analysis and risk assessment played a central role. These are not separate steps of the DMP, but analytical tools embedded within it. Participants identified potential threats, such as armed groups or criminal networks, and then assessed their likelihood and impact.
This process allowed for the prioritisation of risks and ensured that attention was directed towards the most critical challenges. By distinguishing between different types of threats and their timing, participants could also consider appropriate responses, ranging from prevention to reaction and longer-term stabilisation.
What initially appeared fragmented and complex became progressively more intelligible. As such, the Carana exercise demonstrated how methodology bridges the gap between analysis and action. In complex crisis environments, the quality of decisions depends on the structure of the process behind them. The DMP, supported by threat analysis and risk assessment, enables practitioners to navigate uncertainty and translate limited information into coherent operational choices.
Conclusion
Through the Stability Policing Module at CoESPU, University of Trento students understood that in a world characterized by limited resources, time and knowledge, structure is essential. This experience demonstrates the importance for upcoming police units to undergo and be exposed to the essential training offered at CoESPU, and more specifically through real-life scenarios within the MaGISTrA.
As military uncertainty characterizes peacetime,[13] the CoESPU operates to bridge the gap between peacekeeping doctrine and operations through training, yet often constrained by time and limited resources. In order to do that, the Center continuously works to enhance the global capability of the Peace Operations (POs) through up-to-date yet well-established structures and processes. It develops and transforms new doctrine into operational procedures, ultimately waning uncertainty thanks to paramount learning and training modules.[14]
Reference List:
References
- American Psychological Association. (2018, April 19). APA Dictionary of Psychology. Dictionary.apa.org. https://dictionary.apa.org/ethnocentrism. [first described by U.S. sociologist William G. Sumner (1840–1910)].
- CoESPU - Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units. (2024). Mission and Vision, CoESPU - Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units. Coespu.org. https://www.coespu.org/aboutus/missionandvision
- Comprehensive Protection of Civilians for UN Police United Nations Security Council Resolution UN Peacekeeping Training Material CARANA Scenario Base Exercise, (2002). https://peacekeepingresourcehub.un.org/en/training/resources. (para. 4)
- Comprehensive Protection of Civilians for UN Police United Nations Security Council Resolution UN Peacekeeping Training Material CARANA Scenario Base Exercise, (2002). https://peacekeepingresourcehub.un.org/en/training/resources. (para. 13)
- Comprehensive Protection of Civilians for UN Police United Nations Security Council Resolution UN Peacekeeping Training Material CARANA Scenario Base Exercise, (2002). https://peacekeepingresourcehub.un.org/en/training/resources. (para 26).
- den Heyer, G. (2011). Filling the security gap: military or police. Police Practice and Research, 12(6), 460–473. https://doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2011.596715.
- Hussey, J. F. (2024). The Need for U.S. Stability Policing. Digital Commons @ NDU. https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/joint-force-quarterly/vol115/iss3/12. (p. 87).
- NATO. (2013). The 2010 NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (revised 2013). Retrieved from https://www.cmdrcoe.org/download.cgf.php?id=9.
- Nato Stability Policing - Centre of Excellence. (2026). About Stability Policing – NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence. Nspcoe.org. https://www.nspcoe.org/about-us/about-stability-policing/.
- Nikolova, I. (2011). Computer Assisted Exercises Management Environment for Civil Security. Information & Security: An International Journal, 27, 147–159. https://doi.org/10.11610/isij.2714.
- Posen, B. R. (2015). Foreword: Military doctrine and the management of uncertainty. Journal of Strategic Studies, 39(2), 159–173. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1115042.
- Vraikov, N., & Naidenov, A. (1999). The Computer Aided Exercise – An Alternative of the Conventional Exercises in the Armed Forces. Information & Security: An International Journal, 3, 119–131. https://doi.org/10.11610/isij.0308.
[1] Nato Stability Policing - Centre of Excellence. (2026). About Stability Policing – NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence. Nspcoe.org. https://www.nspcoe.org/about-us/about-stability-policing/
[2] Comprehensive Protection of Civilians for UN Police United Nations Security Council Resolution UN Peacekeeping Training Material CARANA Scenario Base Exercise, (2002). https://peacekeepingresourcehub.un.org/en/training/resources. (para. 13)
[3] den Heyer, G. (2011). Filling the security gap: military or police. Police Practice and Research, 12(6), 460–473. https://doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2011.596715
[4] Comprehensive Protection of Civilians for UN Police United Nations Security Council Resolution UN Peacekeeping Training Material CARANA Scenario Base Exercise, (2002). https://peacekeepingresourcehub.un.org/en/training/resources. (para 26).
[5] Comprehensive Protection of Civilians for UN Police United Nations Security Council Resolution UN Peacekeeping Training Material CARANA Scenario Base Exercise, (2002). https://peacekeepingresourcehub.un.org/en/training/resources. (para. 4)
[6] Hussey, J. F. (2024). The Need for U.S. Stability Policing. Digital Commons @ NDU. https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/joint-force-quarterly/vol115/iss3/12. (p. 87).
[7] Hussey, J. F. (2024). The Need for U.S. Stability Policing. Digital Commons @ NDU. https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/joint-force-quarterly/vol115/iss3/12. (p. 87).
[8] American Psychological Association. (2018, April 19). APA Dictionary of Psychology. Dictionary.apa.org. https://dictionary.apa.org/ethnocentrism. [first described by U.S. sociologist William G. Sumner (1840–1910)]
[9] NATO. (2013). The 2010 NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (revised 2013). Retrieved from https://www.cmdrcoe.org/download.cgf.php?id=9
[10] Nikolova, I. (2011). Computer Assisted Exercises Management Environment for Civil Security. Information & Security: An International Journal, 27, 147–159. https://doi.org/10.11610/isij.2714
[11] Ibid
[12] Vraikov, N., & Naidenov, A. (1999). The Computer Aided Exercise – An Alternative of the Conventional Exercises in the Armed Forces. Information & Security: An International Journal, 3, 119–131. https://doi.org/10.11610/isij.0308
[13] Posen, B. R. (2015). Foreword: Military doctrine and the management of uncertainty. Journal of Strategic Studies, 39(2), 159–173. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1115042
[14] CoESPU - Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units. (2024). Mission and Vision | CoESPU - Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units. Coespu.org. https://www.coespu.org/aboutus/missionandvision