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- Agenda 2030: Secretary-General Calls for ‘All Hands on Deck’
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- Community engagement and SA: the gender perspective
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- SA in Police Capacity Building
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Human trafficking in the Horn of Africa
Introducing the new section “Alumni”
An insight on the Civilian, Police and Military Relations Course (CPM26)
Dear CoESPU Magazine readers, indeed we are now experiencing very challenging times, since the COVID 19 outbreak has significantly shaken our societies and influenced our lifestyle.

In this worrying situation, I do hope that you and your dear ones are fine. My first thought goes to the ones who are unfortunately, directly or indirectly affected by this heinous disease, as well as to those who are operating in frontline to tackle this emergency, to whom I express my deepest sympathy and encouragement, including the CoESPU staff, who, since the very beginning of this pandemic, have been actively engaged in supporting the National Authorities to assist the students still present in our premises and the distressed population.

Of course, considering the particular context, also our activities have been reshaped accordingly. In fact, our residential educational activities have been suspended, even though we keep tutoring our students remotely, through the CoESPU’s e-learning platform.

However, in the year of our 15th anniversary, we gathered all our strengths to keep our engine running, also to offer you this rich issue of the Magazine, which I hope it might - at least - ease a bit these tough moments.

In particular, this 2020’s first edition covers a wide range of Police Strategic Advising’s issues, collecting features from various qualified academics and practitioners. Stemming from their experience and relevant lessons learnt, the different authors elaborate on the role of the Advisers operating at the strategic level, defining possible procedures and operational models, as well as providing a set of handy tools and best practices in order to deal effectively with the key decision makers, mainly under the Police perspective.

Among the other contributions, Karla Pinhel Ribeiro and Marcia Andrade Braga introduce the concept of Strategic Advising based on their different professional experiences, gained respectively as researcher – the first – and Gender Advisor within the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) the latter. In addition to that, Roberto Gonella emphasizes the qualities that Strategic Advisors intrinsically ought to possess, focusing on the communication and relational skills. Moving towards another subject, Marco Maiolino and Daniele Plebani provide a thorough analysis of the different forms of conflict that characterised the world stage since the World War II, investigating in particular the so-called Hybrid warfare and the relevant UN policies to contrast asymmetric threats at global level.

Furthermore, the “In-depth” section features an article by Etienne Antheunissen, Charaf Moulali and Laurent Grosbois, elaborating on the trafficking of human beings in the Horn of Africa and the related possible counter-strategies to fight this hideous phenomenon.

Finally, I would like to draw your attention to the brand new section of the Magazine titled “Alumni”, where you will find the experiences shared by our former students from around the world.

I wish you all a pleasant reading, but, more than everything, I wish you a safe and speedy path through this difficult period of our lives.

BG Giovanni Pietro BARBANO
CoESPU Director
The CoESPU Magazine is devoted to the publication of professional concepts and issues, research and doctrinal products developed by the Carabinieri Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, in collaboration with other international research Centers. The Magazine addresses topics of professional, technical, operational and juridical nature in the field of Stability Policing within Peace Operations. Based on the core values of ethics, integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity, harmonically inflected and informed by the traditions of over two hundred years of Carabinieri history, the Magazine fosters Human Rights and gender mainstreaming, while seeking to enhance current police peacekeeping doctrine and promoting international police peacekeeping interoperability, cognizant of Lessons Learned and best practises. The CoESPU Magazine is constantly committed to upholding UN standards, norms, procedures and curricula, while endorsing self-sufficiency of the participating Police Contributing Countries. Consequently, its editorial policy promotes the principles of representativeness, responsiveness, and accountability, as well as effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and accessibility, to provide the highest professional standards to build trust and legitimacy of beneficiary Law Enforcement Institutions.

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AGENDA 2030: SECRETARY-GENERAL CALLS FOR ‘ALL HANDS ON DECK’, REINVIGORATED EFFORTS TO ENSURE SUCCESS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
NEW YORK, 24 SEPTEMBER 2019

“High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development”

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. We started this journey together in 2015 and we know our destination: an end to extreme poverty and hunger; equality for women and girls and empowered young people; a low carbon, climate-smart economy with decent jobs, inclusive growth and shared prosperity; peaceful and just societies, human rights for all, and respect for the rule of law; [and] opportunity for all on a healthy planet.

In short, we have set our sights on a fair globalization. The good news is that the 2030 Agenda is coming to life. Governments, north and south, have begun integrating the Goals into national plans and strategies. The private sector is coming to understand that green business is good business. Cities, businesses, the international financial sector, civil society, young people and more are stepping up and taking action.

And we are making progress. Extreme poverty and child mortality rates are falling. Access to energy and to decent work is rising. The commitment to the 2030 Agenda is an unmistakable commitment. But, let us be clear: we are far from where we need to be. We are off track. Deadly conflicts, the climate crisis, gender-based violence, and persistent inequalities are undermining efforts to achieve the Goals. Indeed, half the wealth around the world is held by people who could fit around a conference table.

Uneven growth, rising debt levels, heightened global trade tensions are creating new obstacles to implementation. Youth unemployment remains at alarming levels. Global hunger is unfortunately on the rise. No country is on track to meeting the goal of gender equality — without which none of the others will be met, and in fact, the gap in several [of them] is growing. One million species are in danger of extinction. And at the current pace, almost 500 million people could remain in extreme poverty by 2030.

We must step up our efforts. And we must do it now. We must regain the trust of the people and respond to perceptions and experiences of alienation and instability generated by the current model of globalization. We have the best solution in the 2030 Agenda, our blueprint for a fair globalization. We must transition our economies towards net zero emissions by 2050. We must boost the develop-
ment prospects of the world’s most vulnerable countries and most marginalized people. And we must look at the 2030 Agenda not through the prism of the economy of the last decade, but the economy of the next decade, seizing the potential of the fourth Industrial Revolution and safeguarding against its dangers. That is why today, as requested by your Political Declaration, I am issuing a global call for a decade of action to deliver the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. Three essential areas drive my call. First, global action. Now is the time for bold leadership, both individual and collective. We need to end today’s conflicts and prevent further violence. We need a major surge in financing with Member States meeting their official development assistance commitments; fully replenishing Global Funds on Climate and Health; boosting funding for education and other Sustainable Development Goals; supporting innovative forms of financing like Social Impact Bonds; and increasing access to technologies and concessional and green finance for countries most at risk.

At the same time, we need to scale up long-term private investment for sustainable development and make meaningful progress in fighting illicit flows of capital, money laundering and tax evasion to better support developing countries pursuing political and economic reform. And we need to focus on solutions that will make greatest impact across the entire Agenda, such as gender equality, a just and inclusive economy; energy and food systems, sustainable cities and taking on the climate crisis.
Second, local action. We need to step up domestic responses to make a difference where it matters — in people’s lives. This includes more deeply orienting domestic policies and action with the 2030 Agenda — developing integrated national financing frameworks; empowering sustainable development governance mechanisms; creating insightful and inclusive data systems; and delivering ambitious climate plans in 2020.

It also includes the creation of an enabling environment that maximizes the potential of cities and local authorities, protects human rights and civic space, fosters private sector development and attracts foreign direct investment.

Third, people action. I am calling on civil society, grass roots organizations, media, private sector, unions, academia and others to mobilize partnerships like never before. I appeal to innovators and disruptors in the private sector to embrace new business models that match the demands of the 2030 Agenda.

I call on the world of science, research and technology to ensure that new technologies narrow the digital and broader technological divide and are geared towards the common good, in line with the recommendations of my High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation. I urge young people and civil society to hold leaders to account.

As we look forward, we know the great task before us. We need all hands on deck. We need to move together, leaving no one behind. Let us move faster and farther to reach our destination for people and planet.

Mr Antonio Guterres
UN Secretary-General
The Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units is not just globally known for its world-class educational offer – aiming at training Police Peacekeepers in compliance with the most cutting-edge international standards and best practices, preparing them through the Carabinieri-like approach – but, consistently with its mission, it is also renowned for its vibrant activity as a centre for advanced studies, think tank and doctrinal hub in the broader “stability policing” field. In this capacity, CoESPU is active within a worldwide research and doctrinal network, interacting with various International Organizations, Academic Institutes and peer Research Centres to conduct forward-looking scientific studies and elaborate trailblazing operational procedures, also benefiting from the bicentennial Carabinieri’s international experience and specific capabilities, such as in the field of the protection of cultural heritage and environment. To this aim, in addition to the aforementioned counterparts, the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units is eager to involve in its research undertaking also its Alumni and privileged individual partners, among whom are prominent international scholars and Subject Matter Experts, encouraging them to share their insights and join in this ambitious enterprise.

COESPU’S 2020 RESEARCH PLAN: AN OVERARCHING GUIDANCE FOR IN-DEPTH SCIENTIFIC STUDY AND DOCTRINAL IMPROVEMENT FOR SUSTAINING POLICE PEACE OPERATIONS.
Ultimately, the research outcomes are intended to contribute to enhancing the current Police Peacekeeping doctrine and related best practices, to be eventually integrated in the relevant training architecture. On the international stage, this endeavour has materialized through the on-going, direct involvement of various CoESPU’s Subject Matter Experts in the different UN initiatives for both doctrinal and training curriculum development. Against this background, the strategic guidance for the CoESPU’s research approach is provided by a detailed Research Plan which, on a yearly basis, outlines the areas of study of leading interest, stemming from the Center of Excellence’s experiences and vision in light of the most recent issues addressed by the International Community. As for the year 2020 – recognising in the main the considerations included in the UN “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” as an overarching framework for the future analysis, focusing in particular on the goals related to peace, justice and strong institutions, as well as generally connected to the environmental protection and gender parity – the identified areas of research are:

- Stability Policing, with particular regard to the Formed Police Units and similar robust Police assets, Community-oriented Policing, Intelligence-led Policing, Comprehensive Protection of Civilians, Police Prevention Activities in Peace Operations, Cultural Heritage Protection and Environmental Protection;
- Police Capacity Building, mainly expressed in the sub-sectors of Monitoring, Mentoring, Advising and Training;
- Gender Mainstreaming;
- Serious and Transnational Organized Crime, considering the role of the Criminalized Power Structures and the Terrorist Organisations, also in relation to the Trafficking of Human Beings;
- Ethics in Peacekeeping;
- Building Integrity;
- Peacekeeping Leadership.

With explicit – yet not limited – reference to the latter theme, taking into account the September 2018 UN Security Council Resolution 2436 (2018), this year’s research programme also intends to ignite the debate on the “Peacekeeping Performance”, mainly under all the Police perspective’s variations, as a logical following step to the on-going discussions on “Peacekeeping Training” at all levels, in which CoESPU is still actively involved. In conclusion, the beginning of this new decade represents the starting point of a long-term path towards a more effective peacekeeping, in order to achieve long-lasting solutions for a sustainable peace, which requires the active participation of all the possible actors involved, including CoESPU and its partners through their theoretical and practical contribution to the Stability Policing field.
The exclusion of women from peace talks is clearly not a new issue, deriving from mere structural inequalities that lead to a preclusion for women to access the typical dominating roles in peace processes – such as consulting lawyers, diplomats, politicians. From the analysis of several peace processes, it became obvious that most of the negotiating parties did not consider sexual violence – a clear gender issue – as a relevant priority for the talks. To discuss the issue and raise awareness on the lack of attention dedicated to gender-related matters in the discussion of peace agreements, UN-Women organized a High-Level Colloquium on “Conflict-related sexual violence in peace negotiations”, in 2009. In that occasion, many former negotiators to peace processes discussed their approach to conflict-related sexual violence. All the participants admitted that they had never addressed the issue during negotiations. According to them, the problem was the lack of specific guidance and training on the issue. However, involving women as advisors on gender issues to mediators or delegates would be a useful practice. In fact, this has proven to be one of the most efficient ways to guarantee the inclusion of gender-related provisions in the peace agreement. Nonetheless, including officially recognized gender advisers in mediation teams is not a common practice yet, although women have played a de facto gender advisers’ role in peace processes in several occasions. In the occasion of the peace process for the Burundi civil war ended in 2005, UNIFEM (now part of UN-Women), deployed an expert team on gender participating in the peace talks. The team was composed of one man and three women who were former members of liberation movements respectively in Uganda, South Africa, Eritrea and Guatemala. The group of advisors was not part of any ne-
gotiation party. However, the team could seat at the negotiation table and ended up bring valuable and vital expertise to the process. The credibility that was granted them by their outstanding backgrounds, together with the supporting influence of Nelson Mandela – chief mediator in the talks – enabled the gender-advisory team to convince the negotiators to convene an All-Party Women’s Conference. The peace process in Somalia also showed the positive and effective contribution that the participation of gender advisors has on peace talks. In the negotiation process and in the consequent agreements held and signed in the period from 2008 and 2011, there was no representation of women at all. A change came when the gender advisor from the UN Mediation Support’s Unit (UN MSU) Standby Team of Mediation was included in the talks of 2011. The advisor granted participation to a women quota in the following peace talks, playing in important role in the acknowledgement and recognition of the needs of Somali women. Her institutional role in the UN MSU allowed her to interact easily with women from local communities, collecting information and recommendation that were then brought to the negotiation table. Thanks to her strenuous work, a mandatory quota of women in political spheres was included in the provisions for the final agreement. However, it is obviously easy to encounter a fundamental bias: the connection between women’s inclusion and gender-sensitive peace agreements. However, not in all cases women’s inclusion in negotiations eventually guarantees de any reference to women-related or gender-related issues. The new peace accords that came to life in 1996 contained several references to gender-related issues that were the result of the advocacy and participation of one woman, Luz Mendez, together with the influence of civil society’s representatives convened in the Civil Society Assembly, and the legacy of the Fourth World Conference on Women held the previous year. After 36 years of civil war, when the final peace accords were signed in 1996, Luz Mendez was the only female signatory. Mendez, who participated as part of the delegation of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, fiercely advocated for the recognition of women’s rights in the final agreement. Above all, she focused her work on the inclusion of provisions on sexual violence perpetrated during the

INCLUDING OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED GENDER ADVISERS IN MEDIATION TEAMS IS NOT A COMMON PRACTICE YET, ALTHOUGH WOMEN HAVE PLAYED A DE FACTO GENDER ADVISERS’ ROLE IN PEACE PROCESSES IN SEVERAL OCCASIONS
conflict, especially against the indigenous community. Eventually, her demands were rejected, but she continued her career as a women’s rights advocate, serving as an advisor in other international peace processes. A more rampant example of the above-mentioned bias can be found in the Philippines. The peace process that led to the adoption of three agreements saw an unprecedented number of women participants. Despite such great achievement, the three peace agreements signed between 2008 and 2009 made no reference to gender-related issues. We can conclude that women’s inclusion in peace talks is not necessarily a guarantee for gender-sensitive agreements. Nonetheless, there are some best practice standards that have proven to be successful mechanisms for the inclusion of gender-related provisions in final agreements. Above all, having gender advisors participating in peace talks – especially when a gender advisor is assigned to each delegation – is the most effective way to avoid neglecting gender-related provisions that are fundamental to rebuild a healthy and functioning society.

Lidia Marseglia
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PICTURES:
www.africarivista.it
www.ilays.com
UN.org
In October 2014, the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon appointed the Independent High Level Panel on Peacekeeping Operations to examine the current status of UN peacekeeping operations. The Panel was chaired by the former President of Timor-Leste and the Nobel Prize José Ramos-Horta and the report is a continuation of the 2000 Brahimi Report, which called for renewed political commitment on the part of Member States to important institutional changes and greater financial support. The 2000 United Nations Brahimi Report introduced a new generation of international peace operations, offering a more robust and coherent international response to violent conflicts. Although, the concept of some elements of operations was too closely linked to a Western vision of technical strengthening of institutions through the training and restructuring of the local police; Promotion of judicial and penal reform; Providing technical assistance for democratic development, the Report responded to the challenges that the UN faced in the years prior to its publication. The first report in 2010 recognized that some areas have made more progress than others and reinforced the need for the United Nations, Member States and other institutions to work together. In 2012, in the second progress report, the Secretary General reported that there were improvements in: Leadership teams on the ground; Mission evaluation, planning and strategy; The provision of international support and the development of national capacities and called for a more inclusive approach to peace-building that facilitates broad national ownership of a lasting peace. In addition, in 2010, the Secretary-General published a Report on the Participation of Women in Peace-building, containing a Seven-Point Action Plan for Gen-
der-sensitive Peace-building with regard to conflict resolution, Representation of women in post-conflict governance, the rule of law and economic recovery. Finally, during these years, so many lessons were learned and the discourse of cultural relativism gained strength, the 2015 Nyakhat Report was a more people-centered document. It provided a more upward view, inviting the UN to work on conflict prevention and mediation, establishing more comprehensive and inclusive political and diplomatic solutions. This perspective seeks to understand a country’s justice system as part of its culture. According to the Nyakhat report, “Lasting peace is not achieved through military and technical agreements, but through political solutions”. Therefore, “Political solutions must always guide the design and implementation of UN peacekeeping operations”. According to the Report, peacekeeping operations must not only consult local people, but also include them in their work and in the decision-making process. It says that working with local communities allows missions “to monitor how local people experience the impact of peacekeeping operations, to ensure that the mission does no harm and to devise better protection strategies.” This commitment is important during the peace operation, since the mandates of the Security Council must be adapted to the needs of that particular territory. Mandates must be aligned with local capacities and deficits, not the other way around. However, despite the boom in the term “local” at the UN and the speech of many organizations, the Nyakhat Report recognizes “the UN Secretariat is not yet a field-focused or field-enabled entity”. Operations and other actors still act as if post-conflict countries are blank pages and people are projects and are therefore unable to set priorities for themselves and their country. The Report also notes that several actors from the local community and representatives of civil society revealed that: it is difficult to interact with UN personnel who seemed remote and distant; Communication is often frustrated by language barriers; Peacekeeping operations do not take time to understand existing capabilities, “They simply replace local structures with exogenous ones”.

STRATEGIC ADVISING IS A TOOL USED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO BUILD THE CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENTS TO GOVERN SOCIETIES EMERGING FROM CONFLICT OR TRANSITIONING FROM AUTHORITARIAN TO DEMOCRATIC REGIMES

Particularly prior to the release of the Brahimi report in 2000, criticisms of peace-building were growing. Most of the problems addressed are still present today, as demonstrated by the 2015 Nyakhat Report. Among the issues faced by UN peacekeeping operations are developments to cover vast terrain making access to the dispersed population difficult; The challenge of identifying local representatives who actually speak for a particular group and getting involved with a particular network of people who speak English or French; The lack of clarity on how to help the local population and promote truly consultative processes; And the difficulties of executing a transparent process that does not raise concerns with host government. In light of this, the UN peace speech has to be constantly questioned and revised. However, as stated in the Nyakhat Report, the goal of peacekeeping operations should be less prioritized, less tasks and better sequen-
When defining objectives, one thing to consider is the dichotomy of breadth versus depth. In other words, whether the work will be carried out in many communities, spreading resources or in some places in a more impactful way. As stated in the Nyakhat Report, “Throughout their duration, missions must work to avoid creating patterns of dependency or marginalizing national partners. In this regard, the Nyakhat report stresses that United Nations peace operations must work more integrated, supported by mutual respect and mutual responsibility, it is therefore important that the Special Representative of the Secretary General, at national level, invite regional actors, international financial institutions, United Nations staff Nations and Member States around a “big table”.

Although in very broad terms, the Nyakhat Pal Report, led by José Ramos-Horta, presents more decisively the importance of multi-dimensional peace operations in engaging with a country’s local population and ensures that they are the main stakeholders, as well as the beneficiaries of the peace process. A significant sign of this conceptual shift can be seen in the fact that the 2000 Report was nominated with the Chair of the High Level Independent Panel on Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, while the 2015 Report was nominated with a South Sudanese 3 years girl.

Strategic advising: an introduction
By definition, according to Nadia Gerspacher in the introduction of her book “Strategic Advising in Foreign Assistance: a practical guide” strategic advising is a tool used by the international community to build the capacity of governments to govern societies emerging from conflict or transitioning from authoritarian to democratic regimes. For her, a strategic adviser is sent by the international community to work alongside a high-ranking official in a transitional or post-conflict state and offer guidance that can contribute to the development of effective policies and procedures, where transferring knowledge is a key component. According to Nadia Gerspacher, capacity-building endeavors are not new, but the way in which they are conducted is. The building capacity entailed transferring capital and individuals from stable, wealthy countries to unstable, usually poor countries to implement foreign assistance projects is predicted by the old model. This model now has been replaced by a paradigm that emphasizes the transfer of knowledge, skills, and information. Although this efforts, there is no consensus on which knowledge, skills, and information should be shared.

Following Gerspacher in her argument, another problem posed by the current approach to knowledge transfer is that it recruits practitioners who are undoubtedly expert in their subject areas, but who are not trained to import that expertise in a way that local officials will find helpful. The judges, police officers, logistics experts, human resources professionals, and other practitioners who are recruited and deployed know how to manage programs in their own systems, but that expertise is not necessarily relevant to the contexts and cultures in which they find themselves. This point was observed in the section before, the reason why UN needed a more people oriented approach, what affects also in the way strategic advising must be conducted. This approach brings a more effective completion of the mission, as the case study below will show as a role model of good practices and lessons learned from the field.

Case study using a gender perspective with military teams engaged in a UN mission
The situation in the Central Afri-
can Republic, from April 2018 to May 2019, was of great instability, with the presence of armed groups among the population, implying strong interference in the daily routine of the different locations in the country. The number of rapes was too high, especially against women and girls who were largely affected by conflict-related sexual violence, despite efforts to reverse the situation. The population in most agricultural, suffered from the constant need for internal displacement, a situation that resulted in high numbers of women and children on the roads fetching water, wood for the fire, but mainly, by accessing the old plantations. This need for travel increased exposure to threats present on the ground, especially when conflict was established in the area. Thus, in order to fulfill the Mandate of MINUSCA, the United Nations mission in the country, which had as its main objective the protection of civilians, it was vital to use a gender perspective in the activities of its military component, seeking a better understanding how the conflict affected the different groups, men/women/boys/girls, but also understanding the differences in each of them, such as age/social status/religion, studying the routine, as well as its possible changes still in the initial stage. With the expansion of situational awareness about what was happening in the area of responsibility of the mission, it would be possible to use the information obtained in military planning, seeking to prevent violations by the presence of deployed troops, thus achieving greater effectiveness in fulfilling the mandate. In this sense, there are groups of engagement, mixed or composed only of women (Female Engagement Teams - FET), which have been established in different sectors, at the operational and tactical levels. In general, such groups were formed in battalions with a significant number of female soldiers and their main purpose was to meet the special needs of local women, by greater interaction, mainly due to the high number of violations they suffered and the fact that their participation was essential in the peace-building process. At first, only the Zambian battalion had an engagement group working with the population and received training in phase before split, presenting a professional job and facing the area conditions responsibility. Such a group also had a type of patrol made up of women only, called Confidence Patrol, which served mainly the areas with the highest concentration of women and children,
but also local men, who felt confident in talking to the military. As a result of good engagement group of Zambia, rates of violations against women and children showed very low in addition to the improvement of services, such as health and education. Additionally, with the information obtained from the population, the military’s situational awareness of the role of armed groups and the way in which they interacted with the locals was substantially expanded, facilitating the fulfillment of the mandate. The performance of the engagement groups was considered to be a successful model and with the support of gender advisers, they were replicated and consolidated throughout the mission. In the end, all the work much more effective. In the role as Force Headquarters Military Gender Adviser at MINUSCA, during that period, it was part of the action plan to implement the engagement teams throughout the mission something they only had in very few battalions and working fully in the Zambian battalion. The work developed by Zambia was a great inspiration for the development of step 5 present in the plan, which referred to the engagement groups, due to the excellent results they were obtaining in the locality of Birao. At the end of the mission, several of the groups newly formed began to interact with the local population, seeking more information and the development of projects, such as community gardens proximity to the residences, among others, so that they decrease exposure to threats. Importantly, the engagement groups also contribute with the development of locations, such as improvement of markets, schools and health centers, as well as lectures on the importance of schooling for girls and hygiene measures in dealing with food and childcare. In conclusion, the application of engagement groups in peace missions brings effectiveness to the fulfillment of the mandate, through to obtain information, but above all, enables the inclusion of the local community, especially women, as participants in the process of stabilization and consolidation peace in areas affected by conflict, improving the acceptance of the mission and the understanding of its objectives by the population served, allowing the restoration of normal life in the locations where they operate.
References


Strategic Advising in Police Capacity Building & Development Missions

By Roberto Gonella

Introduction

Within the vast international cooperation environment, Strategic Advising holds a prominent position in all capacity building programs. To be successful, even technical projects with limited scope need to be embedded in wider, comprehensive plans, devised and managed in accordance with informed strategic advice provided by selected experts. However, the international community – albeit acknowledging its importance – still has to clearly define what strategic advising is and how it should be implemented. The lack of an agreed-upon policy risks to generate some confusion, often leading to inconsistencies in the actions of advisers deployed by different donor countries. These issues were discussed among experts and stakeholders during the International Conference on Strategic Advising held at CoESPU in November 2019. This short article draws from the outcome of that International Conference. It cannot aim at solving long-standing and unsettled issues, but it will try to clarify some aspects related to advising strategic level actors (Ministers/Under-Secretaries of Interior, Chiefs of Police/Gendarmerie of the host-State and their close aides) in police capacity building and development.

One-size-doesn’t-fit-all: tailored approach

Monitoring, Mentoring, Advising & Training (MMA&T) are normally clustered together when planning and enforcing crisis management operations, but they present distinct peculiarities that need to be appreciated. Monitoring is defined as observation of and reporting on specific activities. Training entails the passing of knowledge to transfer skills to selected personnel depending on the identified need. Both are easy to recognise. Mentoring and Advising, conversely, having some common aspects are sometimes mixed up. Both aim at enhancing the effectiveness and improving the performance of the targeted administration, service
or unit, but while a mentor tries to achieve that objective establishing a long-term one-to-one relationship with a representative of the appropriate level to foster and support his personal and professional skills, the adviser targets the entire organisation, usually interacting with several individuals within it, with a view to enable not a specific person but the organisation or parts thereof to fulfil its tasks. Each of the above professional positions has specificities that should be carefully considered when planning capacity building operations: they are all demanding but not interchangeable, each requiring a different set of personal and professional qualities. The decision on which position to envisage and what expert to select gets even harder when the need arises to provide support at a strategic level: even if not openly expressed anywhere, the concept of monitoring, mentoring or training top political and administrative personalities is not contemplated if not explicitly requested by the host-State. Having a foreign expert in a position of control or ascendancy on its highest national authorities, be them elected or nominated, is not a situation that a sovereign country can easily accept. For that reason, strategic advisors on police issues are not – and should not expected to be – foreign experts provided with a full set of ready-to-use solutions for any possible problem, because that set does not exist. Instead, police strategic advisers must be professionals capable to ascertain the situation, analyse it through their training, knowledge and expertise, then devise and implement, in full cooperation with their host-State counterparts, specific and tailored solutions.

Strategic Adviser: Nature or Nurture?

In order to be successful in his demanding position a police strategic adviser needs to possess a particular combination of qualities. A common notion in training institutions – including military and police ones – is that, with method and dedication, everything can be taught and everything can be learned. This is not completely true for police strategic advisers: together with essential professional qualities they must be endowed with some indispensable personal talents that, being natural, cannot be learned. Either they have them, or they don’t. Training can hone such talents, but cannot create them. As a consequence, strategic advising is not for everybody. One of the needed qualities is a natural disposition to personal interaction. Advisers must connect with their counterparts going beyond a normal professional relationship. In order to totally involve local top officials, to stimulate their passion and enthusiasm, and to make them eager to start reforms and launch new projects, a cold, impersonal and unresponsive approach is not advisable. Knowledge and efficiency must be delivered with the human touch. Another important personal asset is humility. Being the representative of a powerful and rich donor country operating in a troubled nation could bring some advisers to impersonate and replicate such unbalanced conditions while relating with their local counter-
part. Any domineering or patronizing attitude must be avoided as it would irremediably compromise efficient cooperation. The personal quality that strategic advisers need in unlimited quantity is patience. Western people are natural planners, and they are used to set milestones and deadlines in all their projects, expecting them to be respected. The different concept of punctuality of some of the local counterparts, their apparent indifference to time limits and the consequent halting progression of important projects can be a constant source of frustration. The strategic adviser’s patience is tested on a daily basis. But he is aware that other ways exist to reach given objectives, and if they are eventually met with mutual satisfaction, then timeliness is not so important anymore. A quality that links nature with nurture is the ability to give and receive different kinds of information, i.e. communication skills. For sure it is, at least in part, a natural gift: many learned persons not endowed with it manage to transfer to others only a small portion of their vast erudition, despite proper training. On the other hand, even natural communicators need to follow dedicated courses to learn how to master and exalt that talent, indispensable in a successful strategic adviser. Communication skills, complemented with the human touch, allow the adviser to optimise interaction with his counterparts enabling a smooth and profitable exchange of knowledge and expertise. Obviously, a good police strategic adviser cannot rely only on his natural gifts: he must also possess a combination of specific professional qualities not easily found in one person. His deep and wide proficiency in policing is crucial: he is expected to give advice on restoring and maintaining order, preventing and detecting crime, enforcing the laws; on how to build up and run a police force; on how to have it working seamlessly with other national administrations. That is way above the tactical level on which most policemen have been operating for most of their career: the strategic dimension demands a holistic view on the subject, and to get and sustain that view the strategic adviser needs a thorough knowledge of the complete system and all its parts. Professional knowledge in a mission includes full competence on the history, geography, economy, religion and population of the host-State, and as much as possible of its language. The working language of the mission must be known to a level that permits to appreciate its most subtle nuances. The root causes of present tensions and problems must be studied in details, and local peculiarities need to be fully understood to avoid proposing actions that, albeit functional elsewhere, would not be so in that theatre. Knowledge is of paramount importance, but is not enough. In order to find correct solutions, complex situations need to be carefully and competently assessed. Good strategic advisers must then be gifted analysts. As already mentioned, they are not supposed to provide pre-cooked standard countermeasures taken from a catalogue, but they must work with their local counterparts and devise for each problem the right solution. Custom-made, maybe unprecedented, possibly unique. After having identified the problem and a possible solution, the strategic adviser need to work with his counterparts on conceiving the appropriate course of action. To do that, he must be a good planner: any given objective can only be reached through a progression of successive phases that need to
be carefully prearranged and implemented, and kept in track with constant control on and evaluation of the development of the project. Strategic planning cannot be improvised: unlike tactical operations – which are sometimes launched as an immediate reaction to unexpected emergencies, and therefore fast-tracked and roughly planned with little information – strategic planning requires specific expertise and many years of practice. A gifted planner is not the one who can remember a thousand different plans and choose the most suitable among them, but the one who can devise a new plan for each new situation he has to face. In that difficult endeavour, experience plays a decisive role. Experience cannot be taught, it must be made going through many and different situations over a long stretch of time. Strategic advisers must have consolidated international experience, so that even when they are covering that delicate position for the first time they can draw suitable courses of action from situations, practices and decisions occurred in other missions in which they participated.

Lessons-not-Learned: Common mistakes
The set of qualities required in efficient and successful police strategic advisers significantly reduces the pool of applicable candidates for that position. That leads to the first mistake donor countries often make: wrong selection. Selection must start way before training, targeting personnel possessing the natural and professional qualities outlined above. Appropriate courses will then hone and sharpen such qualities, with a view of preparing the prospective strategic adviser for his specific mission. Insufficient training can happen, and it is often due to pressing deadlines for deployment. Rush can be accepted in tactical, but not in strategic situations: it is better to delay the arrival of an efficient, competent, fully trained adviser that sending – within the given deadline – an improvised, unqualified and totally useless one. Motivation plays an important role: personnel that let transpire any hint of egotism, power hunger, neo-colonialist tendencies, complacency, arrogance or greed (overseas missions are usually well paid) must be discarded. Some advisers are disadvantaged by their relatively low rank. Top tier officials can resent being advised by experts they consider of far inferior hierarchical level. A Chief of Police is not always happy to be advised by a Lieutenant-Colonel or by a Police Superintendent, as he has hundreds of them obeying his orders. Sometimes, even if they genuinely appreciate the adviser’s skills and qualities, in order to maintain their dignity in front of their personnel, of their colleagues and political adversaries, and of the whole population they refuse the advisers, making their mission impossible, or even publicly show impatience and irritation towards them. A possible solution could be giving “functional” higher ranks to strategic advisers before deployment and for the mission period only. Lack of coordination within the international community is another common mistake: it can happen that several donor countries send advisers to the same host-State organisation while other national services – possibly perceived as less important – are neglected. Or that advisers deployed by different Police Contributing Countries (PCC) do not coordinate their counsel, providing conflicting advice. In some occasions, donor countries wrongly identify strategic advising with training & equipping. It is not the same thing. Training & equipping can be part of the overall capacity building strategy, be it recommended by advisers or requested by local authorities, but by no means it can substitute strategic advising. Furthermore, in some occasions the equipment provided is outdated or not needed, in some other it is new, extremely sophisticated and so difficult and expensive to operate that it ends up laying unpacked and forgotten in some dusty warehouse. In both cases it would not solve any problem in the host-State, but only ease the donor country’s conscience. Sometimes the discrepancy between local needs and provided equipment is so marked that it gives the impressions that the donor country is exploiting the situation for selling surplus production of some commodities, including weapons, possibly in exchange for local natural resources. In some occasions, strategic advising offered generic solutions for specific situations. Even if normally suggested in good faith, confining that a course of action that proved to be efficient in other theatres can be successfully replicated in the local situation, this can be a mistake. Situations never overlap perfectly, nor they can be perfectly reproduced: many factors contributing to their final outcome do not depend from and can-
not be controlled by the planners. While it is correct to use positive experiences made elsewhere as a rough model for elaborating new strategies, it is wrong to Copy&Paste a solution forcing it upon the present situation without considering all standing differences. Furthermore, the ultimate aim of the missions in which similar situations occurred could have been different, and that makes their replication either useless or even dangerous: all plans must be aimed at reaching the given objective. And objectives must be SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound). Non-SMART objectives (read: fuzzy and indeterminate, hard to evaluate, overly ambitious and optimistic) is another recurrent problem in capacity building missions, including their strategic advising component. Objectives must be discussed with local authorities, balancing their requests – which in some cases can be excessively acquisitive – with actual resources and possibilities. Strategic advisers must be understanding but firm: sometimes no is the answer, and no must be said. Objectives must remain SMART, and it is far better to eventually raise their aim once they have been reached than being forced to give up after having generated false hope. Failure has heavy repercussions on the mission: morale plummets, relationships deteriorate, innocent scapegoats are identified and credibility is gone. Objectives must also be considered in relation with the tour of duty of the strategic adviser. And here lies another frequent mistake: their handover/takeover (HOTO) are too frequent, while strategies look far away embracing long periods of time. It is extremely difficult for advisers to step into strategies planned by someone else, to understand them, implement them, optimise them, reach all set objective and then leave passing the torch to their successors, all of that in the limited space of few months. The ensuing urge of accelerating procedures and forcing ways out of hindering deadlocks to get positive results may jeopardise the mission, generate frustration and affect good cooperation with the local counterparts. The HOTO period itself need to be long enough to allow a complete transfer of responsibilities, including personal introduction with the local representatives with whom the newcomer will work. And among local counterparts also non-state actors must be included. Even if some of them were not included in the processes that brought to the decision of launching the mission, they are local realities to reckon with. They can be either obstacles or facilitators, and much depends on the attitude of the strategic adviser towards them: they should not be neglected.

Main objective: Local Ownership

The importance of involving the whole society is paramount in all capacity building processes. In fact, any country passing through difficulties so severe that they required the intervention of the international community cannot afford to leave behind one or more components of their social fabric. Quite often, when strategic advisers arrive in theatre local hostilities are not completely quenched yet. That makes their task even harder because, besides serious and urgent challenges due to the situation, they also have to deal with personal and ideological prejudices their local counterparts have against some segments of the community. That requires immediate and decisive action: if the root causes of the past conflicts are not completely eradicated peace will not last for long. Past frictions need to be left behind and a common strategy – involving all social, political, ethnic, tribal and religious groups – must be implemented through concurrent projects devised in cooperation with the international community but, after the first phases, managed by the relevant national,
Strategic advisers are aware of that, and they must address their action towards that objective. Excessively stern, unrelenting attitudes will not pay off: advisers have to come to terms with local standards, and to realise that behaviours they would never condone in their country of origin are the norm in theater. Furthermore, their counterparts are in their position as a result of complex and delicate negotiations between all local factions, and starting a personal crusade against a minister, under-secretary or Chief of Police based on some minor cases of perceived corruption can break that fragile balance, jeopardising the whole mission and even the hardly achieved cease-fire or peace agreement. That is not to say that corruption must be condoned, but that demanding the removal of a top level official expecting that his replacement would be any better is preposterous. As long as their relationship with their counterparts is positive and the ongoing projects are proceeding, even if not as fast as anticipated, strategic advisers must try their best to give continuity to the capacity building process, aiming at the big objective (local ownership), never forgetting that they work for the good of the host-State, not for that of their own. It often happens that local authorities are reluctant to take full responsibility of long-term projects. That can be due to a number of factors: the understandable concern of not being yet ready to “take the helm”, despite the more or less extended period of co-management with their international partners; the related perception that without international support – both professional and financial – all ongoing projects will fail; fear of becoming targets of historical tensions, pressures and influences, from which the international presence had temporarily sheltered them; on a more prosaic level, even the knowledge that, gone the active and dynamic foreigners, the time has come to work hard and take risks. In light of the above and in view of achieving local ownership, strategic advisers must project all activities to the moment in which their counterparts will be called to fully manage them, with no external support. Such transition should be prepared well in advance, and eased by constantly increasing local responsibilities and self-sufficiency, in order to enhance specific competence and build confidence. Strategic advisers can only claim to have completely fulfilled their mandate when they have finalised the transfer of their analytical and planning capacity to their local partners, so to put them in the best possible position to efficiently identify and assess any new challenge, then planning all necessary countermeasures.

Conclusions
Strategic advising in police capacity building is a complex and very difficult activity, as it deals with re-organising composite central structures of a sovereign country and with long-term planning in difficult times with multiple, ever-changing, unpredictable variables. All that having the highest political levels of the host-State as direct counterparts. For that reasons, police strategic advisers must have a set of personal and professional qualities not easily found. However, that is not enough: even the most talented adviser cannot provide his most efficient contribution if he is not properly trained to operate in that specific function and within a holistic and coordinated policy. The Carabinieri Corps has decades of experience in police strategic advising, made in the course of several international missions and operations, in which they acted within both the military and the police components. Along with major international stakeholders, and in order to clarify objectives and procedures, they feel the need of a structured policy regulating police strategic advising in capacity building missions, and related targeted training. The International Conference held at CoESPU last November started that process: the wealth of expertise, information and case-studies contributed in that occasion, combined with significant in-house experience, provide the necessary base for initiating a project aimed at elaborating a model for a policy on police strategic advising, and at creating a course for prospective police strategic advisers to be organised and held at CoESPU.
“Strategic Advising: considerations and thoughts based on experience in a European Union - Common Security and Defense Policy mission”
By Nicola Carrera

Last November 2019, CoE-SPU hosted an important global event on the Strategic Advising. The international conference titled “International Conference on Strategic Advising in police Capacity Building and Development (CB&D). Lessons Learned and Best Practices” has been the ideal opportunity to create the right environment to work on the ideas and deepen the concept of the Strategic Advising. Many representatives of the various international, European and national institutions took part in the conference upon invitation of the CoESPU Director, BG Giovanni Pietro Barbano, as well as distinguished scholars, facilitators, academics and speakers and a group of Carabinieri officers with a specific professional profile. Among the participants, it is worth to mention Ms. Maureen Brown (Former UK Chief Police Officer Strategic Police Advisor at European Union), Mr. Kurt Eyre (Training Coordinator with International Security Sector Advisory Team –ISSAT- DCAF - Geneva), Mrs Karen Finkenbinder (Peace Operations Advisor at Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)), Col. Nicola Conforti (Chief of International Cooperation Office, Carabinieri General Headquarters), Col. Nicola Mangialavori (Chief of Staff of the Carabinieri 2nd Mobile Brigade), Ms Victoria Walker (Assistant Director DCAF and Head of the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance ), Col Franco Merlini (Italian Army, Director of the Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence), Col. Ionel-Cătălin Stegăroiu (Romanian Jandarmerie, Lessons Learned Branch Head - NATO SP COE), Mr. Laurent Grosbois (Civilian Mission Senior Protection Advisor at UNCHR), Mr. Tony Murnay (Former Senior Police Advisor & Deputy Commissioner UN Police Team, Somalia; Former Chief Technical Adviser to Law & Order Trust Fund, Afghanistan) and others. Scientific Coordinator of the event was BG Stefa-
THE SA IS A PERSON WHO PERFORMS THE FUNCTION OF COORDINATOR AND COLLECTOR OF IDEAS, PROJECTS, ACTIONS AND ACTIVITIES, ALL COMBINED AND IN THE DIRECTION OF ONE OR MORE OF THE OBJECTIVES SET OUT IN THE MANDATE

- was the most diversified and qualified. Very important, I think, was also the contribution of those who, like me, came to bring the contribution of their experience from the ground and in particular from a civilian mission of the European Union in Africa: EUCAP SAHEL MALI. Personally, I was able to combine the academic aspects of the conference with their practical side, having had, fortunately for me, a privileged vision of the Strategic Advisor on mission, in the field. Before reporting my view and what I have got from this strong and unique experience such as the Malian one, I cannot skip to present what are the fundamental legal pillars of EUCAP SAHEL MALI mission. EUCAP Sahel Mali is an European Union civilian mission based in Bamako, Mali. It was launched on 15 January 2015, following an official invitation made by the Malian government to assist the internal security forces in restoring the government’s authority over the country, above all in the northern territories where the crisis left large parts of the country under the control of various factions. Being a civilian mission with no executive mandate, EUCAP Sahel Mali is very flexible, light and versatile. Due to that the legal cover changed over the years by emending its first version starting from 2015 and for the duration of 24 months. At this stage, article 2 listed the “Objectives and tasks” of the mission talking about the strategic lines of operation to be implemented as defined in the CONOPS and OPLAN. In particular 3 are the lines of operations of the mission: 1. strategic advising, 2. training, 3. coordination and cooperation. The above lines have operated over the years until the present day. Strategic advising is the first line of operation not by chance but because it is the first approach to be taken to set out the Human Factor in a State institutions affected by a crisis (HR management, decision making process, etc). The role of the strategic advisor is crucial in the in foreign assistance - a practical guide”, Nadia Gerspacher, introduced the concept of SA, stating that (the Strategic Advisor) is a person sent by the international community to work alongside a high-ranking official in a transitional or post conflict state and offer guidance that can contribute to the development of effective policies and procedures. Where envisaged, the Head of the Strategic Advising office, is a person who performs the function of coordinator and collector of ideas, projects, actions and activities, all combined and in the direction of one or more of the objectives set out in the mandate. Reporting to the Head of Operations, the Strategic Advisor is the re-
recipient of a large number of inputs from all directions, which must be collected and processed in order to be measured and translated also into lessons learned and best practices. The SA has the task of directing and managing the objectives and work of the personnel who, in the various sectors in which the mission operates, provide the advising service. The SA, therefore, receiving inputs and needs by Authorities such as Chief of Police, Governors, etc., addresses his expertise to better advice the decision makers.

What precedes has to be done according to the mission mandate. In the context of the EUCAP SAHEL MALI mission, employs a large group (about fifteen) of advisors divided both by sector (training, human resources, logistics, ITC, border management, etc.) and by police force (National Garde, Gendarmerie Nationale, Police Nationale) and, last but not least, also by cross-cutting issues (inter-ministerial advisors, ministerial advisors at the Ministry of Justice, at the Ministry of Defence and ex-combatants, at the Ministry of Security and civilians protection). Furthermore, the SA supervises, implements and updates the Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) in order to measure the achievements of the various projects and objectives.

Another central and intrinsic task in the role of the SA is to ensure the consistency and sustainability over time of the operational activities of the Mission by coordinating the contribution of the advising component to the internal and external reporting component of the Mission with respect to benchmarking. The SA, which depends on the Head of Operations, must work closely with the other Mission Components and ensure that individual advisors can identify, record and codify the best practices. The SA is the natural deputy to the Head of Operations and among other things must take care to integrate human rights and gender aspects into the activities of the strategic component of the mission. The SA must be able to identify, manage and report risks arising from specific processes/systems/projects under its responsibility and perform any other related tasks as required by other line managers. In order to be able to do all this, the SA is required to ensure timely reporting of the activities carried out, in particular on progress and/or lack of progress on the basis of the MIP (Mission Implementation Plan) and benchmarking within the operational line of responsibility provided for in the mandate. It is very important to maintain the
necessary contacts with the various authorities building relations with local and international partners, re-

levant players to the common game ruled overseas in a crisis situation, over an host nation, in order to

In order to run properly its tasks and ensure a good coordination, the SA acts as a collector and sole voice in discussions with external partners and tries to direct all the various interventions of individual advisers in the same direction without neglecting the Civil Society’s part. Beyond the Capacity Building, in which the SA ensures a prominent role, a broader vision of interventions in the Security Sector Reform framework is always guar-

4. Crisis Management Concept approved by the Council on 17 March 2014 and set out in the operational planning documents approved by the Council.
7. The only notable document is “CivOpsCdr Operational Guidelines for Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising in Civilian CSDP Missions”, eeas.cpcc(2014)407896, dated 07/11/2014, which does not focus much on the strategic dimension of advising
8. Nadia Gerspacher “Strategic Advising in foreign assistance - a practical guide”
9. This configuration/structure is related to EUCAP Sahel Mali mission
11. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquar-
ters-homepage_en
The United Nations (UN) concept on “Sustaining Peace” is a comprehensive and innovative approach. It was outlined into three primary documents – the UNSC Resolution S/RES/2282 (2016), the UNGA Resolution A/RES/70/262 (2016) and the UN Secretary-General Report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace (2018).

Going through the mentioned sources, two main elements of innovation may be identified in (i) the integration of the preventive lens beyond the usual post-conflict perspective and (ii) the focus on addressing the root causes of conflicts. In relation to the former, the needed role of prevention has been recognised already, however, it brings a number of challenges: for example, the decision on whether, when and how to intervene.

For the latter, a truly comprehensive approach is needed but difficult to operationalise. The identification of root causes of conflicts is not straightforward, they are diversified, cross-cutting and unique at once and the most immediate ones may sometimes not be the most profound.

Within this framework, it is imperative to consider trends in conflict evolution. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program of the Uppsala University in Sweden analyses trends in organised violence and peace agreements with an history of almost 40 years and relying on an outstanding database that covers organised violence since 1946.

Three elements arise as particularly relevant:

1. The fact that, “the world has seen a new peak in the number of conflicts after 2014, matched only by the number of
conflicts in the early 1990s" ;
2. The predominant form of conflict is intrastate rather than interstate, and the level of internationalization is extraordinarily high. Externals actors intervene and their intervention increases both conflict duration and lethality ;
3. State-based violence remains high and “the past six years have all recorded higher levels of non-state violence than any other year since 1989 (…) The better part of this surge in non-state violence is due to the many interethnic conflicts in Syria, intercartel violence in Mexico, and communal conflicts in Nigeria, mainly along farmer–herder lines” .

These trends reflect an underlying and ongoing evolution in the nature of today’s conflicts, in which unconventionality is growing in importance. The international community, through military doctrines as well as academic efforts, is struggling to come up with a common framework of understanding. Although there is no consensus over a shared definition yet, a wide terminology has been developed such as asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, open source warfare and hybrid warfare . The “hybrid” connotation of conflict appears to be particularly suited for reading the above-mentioned changes, because it is intrinsically based on adaptation. In fact, this term, that was initially used to describe innovative strategies and tactics applied by both State and non-State actors (i.e. Russia and Hezbollah) , has been adopted and expanded by NATO and the EU to define “hybrid threats” as adaptive, unconventional and multidimensional . Further analysis allows for the possibility to identify specific features of the “hybrid warfare”:

(i) Pervasive. Contemporary conflicts may impact different dimensions of society (security, economy, politics, culture, etc.) and different actors (i.e. public and private);
(ii) Diffused. They not only blur national boundaries, but also temporal and sociocultural ones;
(iii) De-localised. They take place, at multiple levels, in different areas of the world, and are waged by different actors with different weapons (i.e. hard and soft powers);
(iv) Interconnected. Although an event occurs within a defined context, the effects it produces may have repercussions far beyond the mere boundaries of that context .

As a “new” actor of these “new” conflicts, Daesh has for instance masterfully interpreted the evolving scenario and its experience could offer some lessons to learn from. It is active in several countries of the world from America...
to Oceania, from Africa to Europe; its activities materialise on the physical as well as digital battle-field; it exploits kinetic actions as well as communication, which is pivotal in its strategy. Moreover, one of the greatest strengths of the group is its ability to shift, shape vulnerabilities into opportunities. In order to effectively face the threat, its enemies have been forced to adapt through multidimensional changes as well. For instance, this necessary multidimensionality in the contrast effort is well represented into the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy which, with its four pillars, addresses the phenomenon through comprehensiveness, cooperation and coherence. It combines the preventive approach with the reactive one and encompasses a wide diversity of measures, involving different actors at different levels.

These lessons are coherent with the recent UN sustaining peace approach and the NATO/EU concepts of hybrid threats. An effective preventive approach should then:
- Be integrated into the already existing mechanisms of stability operations;
- Be rooted into the understanding of the different vulnerabilities characterizing the operational contexts within the evolving hybrid conflict scenario;

This preventive approach would be particularly relevant for Strategic Advising in Policing Operations, allowing for the promotion of a holistic and durable approach to security. Conditions mutate constantly, and doctrines and approaches need to change accordingly, adapting to emerging threats: the gendarmerie, already engaged in this kind of stability policing operations in many areas of the world, has proven to be particularly receptive to the evolving scenarios and offer a number of fundamental good practices for future initiatives.
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IN DEPTH

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN

THE HORN OF AFRICA

Human trafficking in the Horn of Africa

By Etienne Antheunissen, Charaf Moulali, Laurent Grosbois

The Horn of Africa serves as a critical hub for mixed migration and is a source, transit and destination area for asylum seekers and socio-economic migrants from throughout the region, as well as middle-east. There is also evidence that region is a source, destination, and transit country for men, women and children who are victims of trafficking.

The Rome Declaration - adopted in November 2014, established the main focus for the groundwork of the “Khartoum Process” in tackling human trafficking and people smuggling. Key priorities of the Dialogue among others were set as follows:
• Establish national strategies to strengthen horizontal coordination among all services involved, including ensuring protection to refugees and asylum seekers and assistance to migrants in vulnerable situations,
• Improving the identification and prosecution of criminal networks,
• Improving or, where appropriate, establishing criminal law frameworks and fostering – where applicable – the ratification and the proper implementation of the Protocols against Smuggling of Migrants and Human Trafficking, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Convention),
• Promoting a victim-centred approach.

From 2016, the European Commission’s Department for International Cooperation has developed a set of initiatives in the framework of the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative or “Khartoum Process”. Two particular projects – namely “Addressing Mixed Migration Flows in East Africa” (AMMI) and the “Better Migration Management” (BMM) – were mandated by the European Commission and aimed at strengthening the public response against smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings of East African countries (i.e. Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, South
Sudan, Sudan and Somalia), including through the capacitation of regional cooperation and strengthening the evidence-based policies and operational management.

Ensure the local and regional ownership in addressing institutional gaps and challenges

The initial step in the process of strengthening country and regional cooperation among the law enforcement system was based in ensuring an appropriate assessment and technical appraisal of gaps and challenges affecting the public response to smuggling of migrants and trafficking in Human beings. In country’s analyses were produced as part of the AMMI project and provided an updated overview of migrant smuggling and human trafficking trends and dynamics with an emphasis to the modus operandi of criminal networks involved in facilitating irregular migration. The reports were strengthened through national consultative sessions involving law enforcement agencies in targeted countries, fostering the identification of areas of improvement and capacity-building needs and highlighting the capacity gaps and challenges faced by governments in the region in responding to these phenomena, informing the identification of capacity-building needs in the areas of data collection, analysis and information sharing. Particular challenges remained in:

• Qualifying the situations where blurring lines existed between smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings and the need to reform legislation and policies to prevent criminalising irregular migrants or victims of trafficking;
• The gaps in the implementation of existing frameworks, limited stakeholder capacity, and a lack of formal mechanisms for collecting, analysing, and sharing information on migrant smuggling and human trafficking within government institutions, between government and non-governmental institutions and across border;
• Lack or no coordination among key services, including with regards to mutual legal agreement between countries in the region;
• Misconception or confusion regarding the status or category of certain group of people (asylum seekers, refugees, internally displaced person, migrants) and the need to educate and familiarise law enforcement officials and the judiciary on the details of the Counter-Trafficking in Persons;
• Restrictive immigration policies; criminalisation of undocumented or irregular migrants, social stigma against certain groups of population or type of practises (being engaged in prostitution activities, undocumented migrants…). The AMMI’s project, in particular, supported the establishment of a peer-to-peer network of Senior Officers from police and the judiciary sector from partner’s countries of the Khartoum Process, including through the mentoring of anti-trafficking Police Officers from the Directorate of International Cooperation of the French Ministry of Interior and Italian Carabinieri Officers from the COESPU together with international protection experts. This network jointly developed a training curriculum based on best practices from police technics and international protection that was then implemented across the region in critical areas where trafficking in human beings was at stake.

Are protection outcomes in criminal investigation against trafficking possible?

Concretely, the role of the network of experts promoted the identification, immediate protection and rehabilitation of victims as equal
priorities in the investigative and prosecution process. In addition to address technical gaps in police technics, this approach ensured that first responders, the judiciary and those ensuring protection, care and reinsertion of victims were well aware of the impact and specific assistance needed. In particular for victims or migrants exposed to trafficking to benefit from protection against traffickers and be able to testify.

A training package was designed by the police experts from the Horn of Africa – under the supervision of French Police and Italian Carabinieri experts - and integrated several module sessions promoting the comprehensive provisions for protection assistance, including an individual and timely assessment of the needs of the victims, gender specific and best interest assessment of children needs and entitlement of victims with regards to consideration related to their psychosocial conditions. Key aspects of training component included:

- Interviewing technics highlighting the common ground and the differences between protection and police objectives and methods
- Border management and control, inclusive of protection risk,
- Victim management, including child safeguards and gender approach,
- Information management, analysis and sharing,
- Coordination and referral pathways with civil society organisations, service providers and referral of victims of trafficking
- Criminal investigation – identification of culprits
- Financial investigation
- Data collection and management (intelligence)
- Crime scene management
- Documents fraud (forgery and look alike)

Way forward and recommendations
This year marks the anniversary of the adoption of the Palermo Protocol and it is an opportunity to take stock of the achievements made in the fight against human trafficking, identify the challenges faced by stakeholders to continue the combat against human trafficking and look further at persuasive strategies that reduce effectively this crime. From our perspective,
to increase the prosecution of criminals and further dismantle organised criminal organisations, one of the focuses should remain in the increase of the identification and protection of victims through the promotion of new approaches in investigating and cooperating across borders. Cross border migration should be regarded in similarity to other form of displacement as common trends lead the most vulnerable to be trafficked. In addition, the Sustainable Development Goals set for 2030 to end human trafficking must be seized to reinforce the international alliance and make it more robust to address collectively this unbearable crime with a preventive and security strategy agreed in a comprehensive cooperation framework. The Global Compacts on Migration and for Refugees give the ground for a more protection centred approach to address mixed migration flows and underscoring trafficking issues. Although, despite investment made by the international community and countries in the Horn of Africa, gaps and priorities remain in:

• Establish clear mechanisms and frameworks for collecting and sharing information across government departments, ministries, and agencies, as well as between local and national authorities, so that information on human trafficking can be easily analysed;
• Establish clear mechanisms and frameworks for collecting and sharing information between government authorities and NGOs, humanitarian organizations, and civil society organizations;
• Further develop and maintain capacity building programs to increase the effectiveness of identification of presumed victims and victims of human trafficking focusing on a victim-centred approach, gender specific and child sensitive procedures;
IN DEPTH

1. Implemented by Expertise France with the support from a multi-stakeholder network including the Italian Carabinieri COESPU and the French International Coopera-
tion Directorate of the French Ministry of Interior.

2. Co-funded by the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Re-
public of Germany and implemented by the GIZ with the support from a multi-stakeholder network including COIIPOL.

• Increase efforts to prosecute, convict, and punish trafficking of-
fenders by strengthening the penal chain, and training everyone along the chain to understand each other’s roles and responsibilities.
• Enhance coordination and cooperation across States members of the Horn of Africa on the anti-traf-
ficking policies and foster inter-agency cooperation to support policy coherence and regional approach;
• Develop standardized and harmonized operating procedu-
res at national and regional le-
v el to reinforce coordination and cooperation mechanisms;
• Increase transnational coo-
pe ration, especially in informa-
tion sharing, joint investigation and agreed minimum stan-
dards for the protection and as-
sistance to victims of trafficking;
• Strengthen victim testimony processes and support vi-
c tims access to national le-
gal support for longer-term in-
tegration including durable solutions framework for victims;
• Foster national referral mecha-
nism (NRM) and transnational re-
ferral mechanism (TRM) referral pathways for additional coheren-
ce, coordination and cooperation at national and regional level;
• Tailor identification and referral pathways to work more effectively with presumed victims and victims to prevent re-victimisation in the cri-
minal justice and asylum systems;
• Invest in future knowledge bu-
ilding at regional level on the rationalisation and harmoni-
sation of legislation, procedu-
res and administrative proces-
ses across the Horn of Africa.

by Charaf Moulali, Etienne Antheu-
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CHARAF MOULALI
Charaf has been working in the humanitarian field for over 20 years, from leading field operations to managing an international child rights based organization covering 12 countries in Africa, Middle East and South East Asia. He has wide-ranging field experience in emergency, post-conflict and development programmes as country director for non-governmental organisations in Iraq, Myanmar, Sudan; head of UN Offices in Libya and Iraq; and as a Senior Protection Advisor with the United Nations in Sudan, Iraq and Central African Republic. Charaf holds a post-graduated diploma in Social Change and Development and a Master’s Degree in Economics and Management.

ETIENNE ANTHEUNISSENS
Etienne AntheunisSENS is Belgian, based in Brussels. He has a legal education and 25 years of multicultural experience in complex environments, in the field of protection of human rights, humanitarian assistance and diplomacy. He worked for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for several years in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Southern Ethiopia, the Gaza Strip, Thailand and Cambodia. He was then assigned to the United Nations’ Inter Agency Protection Capacity Unit (ProCap) as Senior Protection Officer to the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Guinea and Ivory Coast. Since 2008, as an international trainer and coach, Etienne designs training modules and facilitates individual and team’s change management exercises, trainings of trainers and mentoring sessions in protection of civilians, reform of security and justice sectors and fight against human trafficking.

LAURENT GROSBOIS
Laurent has over 19 years of professional experience in the field of international protection and inter-agency coordination in emerging crises and post-conflict situations. He has worked with non-governmental organisations, with the French Government, and within the UN system in Peacekeeping Operations as well as with UN agencies in the field of international protection and inter-agency coordination. He has been based in Ethiopia, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, Cameroon, Haiti and Sudan, and worked extensively across East Africa.
AROUND THE WORLD
The CoESPU Director, Brigadier General Giovanni Pietro Barbano, participated in the First Workshop in Information Technology Needs of United Nations Police, which took place at the UN Information and Communications Technology Facility of Valencia (Spain) on the 20th and the 21st of January 2020.

The event was planned and organized by the Police Division of the Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions in partnership with the Office of Information and Communications Technology.

The workshop focused the attention on the growing use and adoption of existing United Nations tools that can support the effective implementation of UNPOL mandates in diverse operating environments; it increased understanding of how integrated UNPOL data can inform whole-of-mission efforts and, in particular by identifying technology gaps, challenges and potential remedies.

Senior Leadership of various police components, senior managers from OICT as well as participants from OHCHR, ZIF – Centre for International Peace Operations, UNODC, NATO Stability Policing and Spanish National Police took the floor, identifying technological gaps and their impact on field missions, enhancing in-depth discussions and interactions and paving the way for a stronger future cooperation among all the participating Organizations.

Deputy Police Commissioner Ossama El-Moghazy (UN MINUSCA in Central Africa Republic), former CoESPU Student, delivered a detailed speech on Emerging Technology Needs on the field.
FEBRUARY 18, 2020
Capt. David M.V. Fontana Barberis, from the CoESPU Research Office, participated in a Working Group Meeting organized by the European Association of Peace Operations Training Centres (EAPTC). The event took place at the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) in Brussels – Belgium. The main topic of the WG was the reinforcement of the role and relevance of the EAPTC, thus consolidating its “European” dimension and re-establishing its contact with the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC).

The CoESPU Director, Brigadier General Giovanni Pietro Barbano, is the current Police Chair of the IAPTC Executive Committee. In addition to the CoESPU member, the WG was attended by participants from several International Organizations, such as Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP), Austrian International Forces (AUTINT), Conflux Center, École Universitaire Internationale, Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT), Romanian Ministry of Interior, Swedish Police, Berliner Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF) and, of course, IAPTC.
From 2005 until today
CoESPU training
13TH “COUNTER ASYMMETRIC THREAT” COURSE (AT13)

JANUARY 13 – JANUARY 24, 2020

13 students coming from Italy, Senegal and Ukraine attended the 13th edition of the “Counter Asymmetric Threat” Course (AT13), in English language. The main goal of the two-week training Course, emerging on request of the Italian Defense Staff, was to provide the attendees with a comprehensive overview on the most challenging menaces to global security, and to extensively enhance their knowledge about modern, transnational and complex threats against peace and stability, the so called “Asymmetric Threats”. Combining military and police assets to collaborate in multiple ways on the field, it is strictly necessary to master the most advanced doctrines and tactics in order to counteract the Asymmetric Threats, which are increasingly becoming more and more complex and diverse, involving nation-states and non-state actors, conventional and unconventional tactics, and a wide variety of strategies and weapons.

20TH “PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS” COURSE (POC20)

JANUARY 15 – FEBRUARY 4, 2020

20th edition of the “Protection of Civilians” Course, in English language, attended by 28 students coming from 16 different Countries: Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Nepal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Togo and Ukraine.

In accordance with current UN doctrine and guidelines, the main purpose of the three-week training activity was to further sensitize the attendees on all the specific topics related to the Protection of Civilians, which is possibly the most challenging mandate in modern, multi-dimensional UN Peace Operations. A particular attention was given to the protection of children and Cultural and Environmental Heritage and the implementation of the “zero tolerance” policy against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA).

As long as an increasing number of United Nations Security Council Resolutions have explicitly mentioned the PoC as a key point in the modern struggle for peace, the Course sought to provide new professional skillsets in order to deter, prevent, preempt and stop violence against civilians, through coordinated strategies.

Among the several Course Topics, handled by national and international Subject Matter Experts, special importance was given to Psychological Vulnerability, Victimology Referral System, Counter-Trafficking in Human Beings, Mediation & Negotiation, Dealing with NGOs, Cultural Heritage Protection, Women Rights and Gender Equality and Investigative Techniques.

The next edition of the “Protection of Civilians” Course is scheduled on November 2020.
10TH “TRAIN THE TRAINERS” COURSE DEDICATED TO PALESTINIAN SECURITY FORCES (PAL10)

FEBRUARY 10 – FEBRUARY 21, 2020
The Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units hosted the 10th edition of the “Train the Trainers” Course dedicated to Palestinian Security Forces (PAL10), in the framework of the MIADIT (“Missione Addestrativa Italiana”, Italian Training Mission), carried out by the Carabinieri in Gerico, in the West Bank. During two weeks of theoretical and practical activities on different topics, aimed at enhancing their professional skill-set, the 30 students were provided with the necessary professional background, so they can efficiently train other Security Forces Officers in the future. The final goal of the whole project is to contribute to the stabilization of the Palestinian area, through the enhancement of participants skills as future trainers.

26TH “CIVIL, POLICE AND MILITARY RELATIONS” COURSE (CPM26)

FEBRUARY 12 – MARCH 5, 2020
26th edition of the “Civil, Police and Military Relations” Course (CPM26), based on the UN Standard Training Modules and on the UN DPO guidelines: senior personnel from police, military and civilian components, who might take part in Peace Support Operations (PSO), were provided with a full spectrum training aimed at increasing the mutual knowledge, finalizing and sharing co-ordination mechanisms, as well as enhancing the ability of cooperation among the different elements and actors taking part in PSO, with particular regard to deployments in non-stabilised areas.

The students came from different Countries and International Organizations, namely from Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cameroon, Chad, European Gendarmerie Force, Fiji, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Togo, Ukraine and Uruguay.

The following is a list of some of the Course Topics, handled by national and international Subject Matter Experts: the Civilian/Police/Military Component, International Humanitarian Law, Child Protection, Humanitarian Rights Protection, Intelligence and Understanding in Peacekeeping, UN media relations, Stress - fear management and leadership, Geopolitical analysis and Peace Support Operations.

During the Graduation ceremony, the Senior attendee of the Course, Colonel Julio Manuel Giménez Sisnández (Uruguay Army), delivered his farewell speech on behalf of the class and the CoESPU Director presented the certificates of participation to all the Students.
I would like to thank everyone for the warm welcome to COESPU and the Stability Policing Community. It is an honor to have the opportunity to serve as the Deputy Director at COESPU, and I look forward to continuing our efforts to increase interoperability and strengthen capacities that support global peace operations.

It is an exciting time to join COESPU as we enter our 15th year of providing top quality training and training support to the stability police community and Formed Police Units. In our 15 years, COESPU has trained over 12,000 police and law enforcement professionals from 120 countries and 17 international organizations. An amazing achievement!

The training opportunities offered at COESPU continue to grow as this year we will add a course to address an emerging consideration within stability policing, Environmental and Cultural Protection. Our training team is actively working several updates the curriculum in our corps courses based on new guidelines from the United Nations and Lessons Learned in the international community. Most recently we updated the Civil-Police-Military Relations course to reflect the new UN Guidelines published in September 2019.

With over 12,000 Alumni serving in police and peacekeeping operations globally, it is the right time to take our Alumni program to the next level. Many of you joined our program to stay connected to the Center of Excellence and remain current on new stability policing academia works. Your membership gained you access to our quarterly magazine publication and is a starting point to continue to build your professional network.

I enjoy reading and hearing about your experiences and I would like share these experiences with your fellow Alumni. Therefore, in future publications, I am going to use the Deputy Director corner to highlight YOU!

We want to share what you are doing to support stability and peace around the globe.

Please share your input in short summaries or photos that tell your story – tell us about your experience in pre-deployment training, show us how the courses helped you in training or on a mission, share lessons learned, or send us a picture when your path crosses with fellow Alumni or COESPU instructors. Let us know how you are progressing in your career by sending photos of your promotions and personal or unit award ceremonies. You can send your photos and input to: exalumnicoespu@carabinieri.it

Again, it is a great pleasure to join the stability policing community and the team at COESPU as we celebrate 15 years of professional instruction. I look forward to connecting with you as we continue to support peace operations worldwide.

The CoESPU Deputy Director
Col. Rebecca D. Hazelett
An insight on the Civilian, Police and Military Relations Course (CPM26)

By Maurizio Mele
Lucio De Angelis

From 12 February to 5 March 2020, the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units in Vicenza, Italy, held the “26th Police, Civil and Military Relations”, in favor of 34 participants coming from 21 different Countries, aimed at training Military, Police and Civilian personnel to cooperate in multidimensional Peace Operations, by giving them the tools to align their capabilities to UN doctrine and standards. Many aspects of an interdisciplinary nature were addressed during the course and the students attended both theoretical classes and practical exercises, such as the development of case studies, work group discussions and debates, culminated by a command post exercise run inside the CoE-SPU’s specifically designed multimedia room, named “MaGISTrA”. The training activity enabled the attendees, coming from different cultural areas and different professional backgrounds, to increase the dynamic processes of internal cohesion, through the use of integrated operational procedures and joint response mechanisms, to identify and implement correctly the most important basic principles of international humanitarian law and human rights and standards of conduct, which are based on them. The training path went through some paramount specific as well as cross cutting issues, such as gender equality, civil protection and crisis management. During the course, the Coronavirus
The COVID-19 virus spread globally. The CoESPU instructors quickly implemented extra health and hygiene measures and provided the students with frequent updates on the virus situation in Italy and around the world. Additionally, the students were given the opportunity to return home or continue with the course. As the virus continued to spread and began to impact the international travel situation, the tough but right decision was made to end the course early. Thanks to the dedicated hard work of the attendees, the whole program of the course was covered. The CPM 26 ended with a short graduation ceremony observing the protecting health measures and social distancing. The attendees began to depart on 5 March 2020 and they all reached their home countries safe and sound.

We would like to thank the students of the course CPM 26 for their professionalism as we responded to the virus and we look forward to hosting them for future training at CoESPU.

1. 11 of them were women;
2. Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cameroon, Chad, Fiji, Ghana, Giordania, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tajik, Ukraine, Uruguay, Eurogendfor (Poland).
ONSITE VISITS

MR. JOHN CROSBY AND MS. ALESSIA PASTORUTTI

January 16, 2020
Courtesy visit of Mr. John Crosby, Consul for Political and Economic Affairs, and Ms. Alessia Pastorutti, Political Specialist, from the United States Consulate General Milan, to enhance partnership with CoESPU and to explore the chance of future collaboration.

MR. JOHANN SCHMID

January 23, 2020
Mr. Johann Schmid, Director of the COI Strategy and Defence at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki, gave an outstanding lesson on the Hybrid Threats to the attendees of the 13th “Counter Asymmetric Threat” Course. Afterwards Mr. Schmid paid a courtesy visit to the CoESPU Director, in view of possible, future cooperation between the two Centers of Excellence.
COL. MICHELE BIASUTTI

January 24, 2020
Col. (ITA Army) Michele Biasutti, newly appointed Italian Senior Officer at the USA SETAF Headquarters in Vicenza, paid a courtesy visit to the CoESPU Director at the presence of the European Gendarmerie Force PHQ Commander and the NATO Stability Policing CoE Director.

COL. RAIMOND SAUSIN

January 30, 2020
While in Vicenza due to work commitments at the European Gendarmerie Force Permanent Headquarters, Col. Raimond Sausin, Head of the French Gendarmerie International Office and current EGF CIMIN (“Comité InterMinistériel de haut Niveau”) Presidency Chairman, and Col. Francesco Maria Chiaravalloti, Carabinieri Liaison Officer to the French Gendarmerie, paid a courtesy visit to the CoESPU Director, as a further proof of the comradely and historical collaboration between the Carabinieri and his Institution.
NATO ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS (ARRC)

February 12, 2020
In the framework of a wider cooperation project, a delegation of the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), located in the United Kingdom, paid a courtesy visit to the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, aimed at sharing information related to Stabilization Operations.

MR. DENIS TIKHOMIROV

February 24, 2020
Mr. Denis Tikhomirov, Program Officer at the UNPOL Division, paid a courtesy visit to the CoESPU Director. Mr. Tikhomirov is carrying out activities and studies related to the United Nations Police Training Architecture Program’s curriculum development, dealing, among other topics, with Public Order Management and Protection of Civilians.
NEXT CoESPU MAGAZINE ISSUE WILL FOCUS ON: 

“The Evolution of Peace Operations mandates ”
“Human, tactical or technical: the nature of modern peacekeepers”
“From Peacekeeping to Nation Building”
“The continuing debate about credible mandates and effective troops”

Visit: www.coespu.org

Should you wish to contribute to our Magazine please send your articles to coespurivista@carabinieri.it