FROM PEACEKEEPING TO NATION BUILDING
- Nation building through institution building

THE CONTINUING DEBATE ABOUT CREDIBLE MANDATES AND EFFECTIVE TROOPS
- UNIFIL: evolution of a peacekeeping mandate

HUMAN, TACTICAL OR TECHNICAL: THE NATURE OF MODERN PEACEKEEPERS
- Human rights: a focus on torture prohibition
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THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE OPERATIONS MANDATES
- Building a CPC in Timor-Leste

How UN Ops continued despite the pandemic

Can Coronaviruses produce psychiatric syndromes?
THE CoESPU COMPOUND MEMORIAL
Dear CoESPU Magazine readers, the Coronavirus is still heavily influencing our lives globally, and we all hope that, all together, we will succeed in defeating this invisible and terrible enemy in the near future. Indeed, the cost we have paid and we are still paying so far in terms of human lives is excruciating. In this context, my deepest and sincere hope is always that you and your dear ones are fine, healthy and safe!

As we all experienced, the pandemic has significantly affected our way of living, making us reconsider our priorities in every aspect of our daily life and routine. As I have already mentioned, here at CoESPU we were – and still are – directly involved in the front line to support the local Authorities and colleagues to contribute to helping alleviate the suffering of the distressed population, especially during the trying time of the lockdown of the entire Country. As an obvious consequence, we had to rearrange our course calendar, but what has not changed is our motivation to move forward. During the last 90 days we did a lot in terms of providing assistance and tutoring to our former students, giving them advice and follow up formation. In fact, our Alumni represent the backbone of our community, constituting the “CoESPU family”, no matter where they are located in the world.

As for our regular activities, we have made a great effort in taking the necessary measures so we can return to run our residential courses as soon and as safely as possible.

Of course, another big effort has been made to publish this brand new number of the Magazine, rich with food for thought concerning the evolution of Peace Operations mandates. In particular, this 2020’s second edition offers a wide range of contributions from various qualified academics and practitioners in the field of Nation and Capacity Building processes, as well as of Peacekeeping and Mandate analysis.

Among other contributors, Andrea Fabi provides a meticulously researched history of UNIFIL, highlighting the mandate activities of this paramount UN mission. João Duque Martinho give us the point of view of Guarda Nacional Republicana, which deployed one FPU within the UN mission in Timor-Leste, highlighting all the challenges they have been facing. Nicola Carrera makes a thorough analysis of the nation building process, considering its key elements, focusing in particular on the consensus. Furthermore, Giuseppe De Magistris and Stefano Bergonzini elaborate on the importance of the Stability Policing and its role in the broad framework of the Nation Building. Moving towards another subject, Marco Sutto, after clarifying the essential elements of torture and cruel treatments, in order to implement at state level their prohibition, analyses the development of a national strategy. The “Health and well-being” section features an extremely topical article, where the author, Davide Perego, describes how the Coronavirus can cause psychiatric syndromes. Also related to the pandemic, in the “In Depth” section, Caterina Pino explains how the Coronavirus has been affecting the various UN missions.

Finally, in the “Alumni” section, Colonel Haddou Zamani illustrates his experience at COESPU first as a student and then as a facilitator. While Colonel Julio Giménez Sisnández provides an article concerning the improvements among the UN components that should be accomplished to improve the effectiveness of Peace Operations, complemented by a reportage of his experience at the Center of Excellence.

Wishing you all a pleasant reading, my hope is, once again, that the whole world will soon be able to emerge from this nightmare that has chained us for so long.

BG Giovanni Pietro BARBANO
CoESPU Director
The CoESPU Magazine is devoted to the publication of professional concepts and issues, research and doctrinal products developed by the Carabinieri Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, in collaboration with other international research Centers. The Magazine addresses topics of professional, technical, operational and juridical nature in the field of Stability Policing within Peace Operations. Based on the core values of ethics, integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity, harmonically reflected and informed by the traditions of over two hundred years of Carabinieri history, the Magazine fosters Human Rights and gender mainstreaming, while seeking to enhance current police peacekeeping doctrine and promoting international police peacekeeping interoperability, cognizant of Lessons Learned and best practices. The CoESPU Magazine is constantly committed to upholding UN standards, norms, procedures and curricula, while endorsing self-sufficiency of the participating Police Contributing Countries. Consequently, its editorial policy promotes the principles of representativeness, responsiveness, and accountability, as well as effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and accessibility, to provide the highest professional standards to build trust and legitimacy of beneficiary Law Enforcement Institutions.

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THE CONTINUING DEBATE ABOUT CREDIBLE MANDATES AND EFFECTIVE TROOPS

HUMAN, TACTICAL OR TECHNICAL: THE NATURE OF MODERN PEACEKEEPERS

FROM PEACEKEEPING TO NATION BUILDING

THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE OPERATIONS MANDATES
The theme we are dealing with in this analysis is absolutely ambitious and at the same time very interesting especially for those who, like me, have had the privilege of taking part in international missions since a decade ago, starting from a single operation and then expanding their experience to what I would like to consider more than an international mission as an international cooperation activity in the broadest imaginable sense. The first consideration, therefore, matures precisely as a result of the vision that one can have and that every peacekeeper must have when he fits into a new context (Host Nation) with a very precise task and a broad and inclusive mandate. For this reason, I consider the subject of this article strong and stimulating.

In the meantime let’s start by defining peacekeeping and let’s frame it also graphically to place it in the right context considering the two universally known patterns: time and situation. It is immediate to see with a quick look in the graph, the life cycle of a conflict. Peacekeeping is in the post-conflict phase where the situation on the ground, in the State in crisis, has deteriorated because of the conflict, violence and citizens’ rights are precarious and vulnerabilities are numerous both from a human and legal point of view. In practice, the international mission deployed in an HN, through its personnel, has to guarantee Peace & Security in order to allow the social fabric to resume the reconstruction of the state and regain its ownership. This is the fundamental step from peacekeeping to the Nation Building, a “work of art”, carried out from peacekeepers in their multidimensional body mission, starting from the strategic level through the operational level to the tactical level.

The concept of peacekeeping was born in the universe of the United Nations. In its original meaning it indicates “military actions in support of populations affected by armed conflict, conducted with the objective of maintaining a sustainable peace”. Peacekeeping activities are not expressly men-
tioned in the Charter of the United Nations, however, numerous resolutions of the Security Council adopted since the early years of the Organization, have validated a practice finally formalized in 1956, on the occasion of the Suez crisis. Over the time, PKOs have evolved and changed their skin. It started in the years 1960-70 with the performance of a limited number of civilian tasks carried out at a very low level, and in any case, always functional to the activities of the armed forces. It was essentially the control of the respect of agreements for the ceasefire or other peace commitments made by the belligerent parties (such as the withdrawal of troops, the exchange of prisoners, etc.), necessary to give time and space to the conduct of diplomatic efforts through which the mediation between the parties was managed. In fact, to start a peacemaking mission, at that time, the following conditions were required: 

- formal request for intervention by the State on whose territory the UN mission (the blue helmets) is hosted;
- presence of a truce agreement between the parties to the conflict;
- neutrality with regard to the belligerent parties;
- use of armed force limited to personal defense tasks.

We then move on to a rougher definition offered by the United Nations: “Peacekeeping is a way to help countries torn by conflict to create conditions for sustainable peace. UN peacekeepers, soldiers and military officers, police and civilian personnel from many countries, monitor and observe peace processes that emerge in post-conflict situations and assist conflicting parties to implement the peace agreement they have signed. Such assistance comes in many forms, including promoting human security, confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and economic and social development”, to a more inclusive definition of peacekeeping which widens the spectrum of the activities devolved to the Missions, giving more and more tasks and leaving the space for intervention also to the civilian component employed alongside the more connoted military and police ones. The equality of the role of the military/police, with that of the civilian component, was already taken up and reaffirmed by Boutros Gha-li in the document “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace” back in 1995. Leaving aside all the evolution of peacekeeping from the 90’s onwards, we arrive at the most recent definition of the present day according to the UN: “United Nations Peacekeeping helps countries torn by conflict create conditions for lasting peace. Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the UN...
to assist host countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. Peacekeeping has unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandates. UN Peacekeeping is guided by three basic principles:

• Consent of the parties;
• Impartiality;
• Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.

Work underway, at this time, to continue to update and make more effective the interventions of the components of the UN missions through the **A4P** (action for peacekeeping) initiative. Eight areas of Improvement, the **A4P** initiative aims to strengthen peacekeeping by spurring collective action by all peacekeeping stakeholders, including all Member States, the Security Council, the General Assembly, financial contributors, troop and police contributing countries, host countries, intergovernmental and regional organizations and the UN Secretariat. We will achieve these goals through the implementation of a set of 45

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mutually-agreed commitments that were endorsed by more than 150 Member States across 8 areas. The above allows us to observe and metabolize the evolution of doctrinal concepts related to Peacekeeping. It leads us to establish and qualify its importance and scope as it constitutes the fertile ground on which we can emphasize the efforts in the direction of peace between the parties in conflict rediscovering social condition of unity, sentiment sharing and common feeling of belonging to the same homeland of the country. Only in this way the country who is coming from a crisis will regain credibility with its citizens also obtaining the respect for the rules, laws, customs and habits codified in a Constitutional Chart. The term “nation” is deeply rooted in peoples’ culture and history and incorporates fundamental elements of their identity. In some Council of Europe meetings for instance, member states, passed the concept of nation linked to the citizenship, which is a legal link (relation) between a state and an individual, irrespective of the latter’s ethno-cultural origin, while in some other member states the same term is used in order to indicate citizenship and national (ethno-cultural) origin respectively. To this end, the term “nation” is sometimes used with a double meaning and at other times two different words are used to express each of those meanings. It is not impossible to rebuild a State as a complex organization made up of institutions, offices and structures/procedures. Much more difficult, I believe, is to form consciences, homeland love, national solidarity and the ethical and moral unity that allows people to unite around common principles and values. To be precise, therefore, I can affirm in my view that Nation-building is not exactly equivalent to Institutions-building, rather the two concepts appear complementary. In fact, nation-building refers more to the philosophical part and sociological dimension of the social fabric among the compatriots who are part of it, to the sense of belonging and solidarity that is created in inter-generational relations, to mutual recognition as part of the whole without basic differences, to the awareness that one is part of a complex country system that works if all the small cogs move in the same direction. What is above stated is not so easy to set up. I affirm it having had direct experience of it firstly in Africa and in the Middle East as well as in the Balkans. After the conflicts end, allied nations must undertake military, political, humanitarian, and economic activities to enable states to prosper, but these activities do not always succeed. It is helpful to consider how institution-building is defined, in the context of the United Nations. Most academic literature concludes that the usage of the term is too wide and diverse to be properly defined. The concept is applied somewhat differently in the areas of development, peacebuilding, rule of law, public administration and governance. The Secretary-General’s Report on Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict stated: “We must build on existing institutions to ensure that they are democratic, accountable and professional; allow those institutions to develop at their own pace and with a certain level of experimentation; and sustain institution-building efforts over decades.” Institutions defined broadly as the rules of the game and the organizations that frame and enforce them provide the incentives and constraints that shape political, economic and social interaction. […]” The Civilian Capacities Review (2012) notes that “supporting institution-building involves an inclusive process to determine priorities for the functions that build confidence between States and citizens and help to ensure sustainable peace.” At the moment I find in the CSDP missions of the European Union as a considerable contribution both
in the Institutional building part (through the mechanism of Advising and more generally of Capacity Building Development) and in the National building part (through cooperation with all the local and international civil organizations present and operating on site). Eliminating inter-ethnic conflicts, working alongside local authorities at all levels, cooperating and supporting social and institutional projects, guaranteeing and ensuring the recognition of human rights, protecting the environment, recognizing and treasuring the history of that people and the State; all that precedes are the basic foundations on which it is possible to restart with a country emerging from a conflict. 

Capacity building (defined as the “process of developing and strengthening the skills, instincts, abilities, processes and resources that organizations and communities need to survive, adapt, and thrive in a fast-changing world.” An essential ingredient in capacity-building is transformation that is generated and sustained over time from within; transformation of this kind goes beyond performing tasks to changing mindsets and attitudes) or also the capacity development (defined as the process whereby people, organizations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time) are just a few useful tools in the hands of the international community that intervenes in support of a state in crisis. The protection of civilians alongside the pillars of stability and development, are the common factor we always find in the UN Security Council resolutions such as the ones are cited in the footnotes. The nation-building alongside the institution-building is a medium-long term process that often clashes with the economic-financial dynamics of the budgets and human resources spent on operations. At this point, the analysis addressed in the article from the point of view of the sustained or sustainable efforts of the international community leads us to think that there is still a long way to go to achieve a result of efficiency and effectiveness acceptable in terms of nation building. The criticalities, that can be detected on the basis of the experiences made, drive us to admit that UN, for example, is continually squeezed between limited economic resources and human ones. This because the countries contributing to the PKOs are often reluctant to provide well equipped (professionally) men, not only considering materials and means. On the other hand, even with limited resources, many human lives have been saved by cleaning some countries from wars and oppression. In any case this is a compensation for the job done! Considering the UN General Assembly as a laboratory for peace planning, it follows that there is a great and wide consensus that the international community expresses supporting the blue helmets for the
intervention and, consequently, a strong adherence in the HN of the peacekeepers intervention. In conclusion, it is necessary to agree on one thing: with a solid peacekeeping mission we can reach a nation-building result with consensus.

The more the consensus will be wide and real, the easiest will be the implementation of the measures undertaken and the tangible results in the eyes of the local population and the international community. The importance of the consensus, in my view, derives from the fact that this should not only be understood as a formal element with which the national authority of the crisis-torn country invites/send a request to the international community (request for help) for a peacekeeping or a capacity building mission. The emphasis I want to put in this article, with the experience lived in crisis areas, is directed to have real and not only formal (legal) consent. In fact having the formal/legal consent signed by the parties (i.e. National Political Authority of the country in crisis and UN/EU/NATO/AU), it is possible to deploy an armed/unarmed intervention conducted by foreign armed/police forces in an HN(using weapons, uniforms and means, etc.). What I would like to point out in the back of the article is that the real consensus exists and permeates down to the lowest levels of local authorities (political and police) arriving to the ordinary citizen. If there is no real conviction (alias consensus latu sensu) on the part of individuals belonging to the country in crisis, whether they are political officials, public officials or even ordinary citizens, to open up and accept, acquire, learn, share, collaborate, implement, improve the various procedures, systems and ways of acting, not much can be done to really help that country out of the crisis. Where is the consensus or how much is that consensus effective if I have, on the one hand, a mission foreseen by a mandate countersigned by the beneficiary country in crisis and on the other hand, on the ground, I clash with the local authorities at a lower level?

1. A concept introduced by and adapted from Michael S. Lund (Curve of conflict)
8. https://academicimpact.un.org/content/ capacity-building

PICTURES: UN.org

Capt. Nicola Carrera
CoESPU Training Department
Since its foundation during WWII, Lebanon has been affected by instability and conflicts, experiencing, over the last decades, civil war and several invasions from its neighbors, which prompted the United Nations Security Council to deploy there, since the late 70s of the past century, a multinational peacekeeping force, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). UNIFIL’s mandated had to be adjusted twice due to the developments in 1982 and 2000. Then, following the July/August 2006 crisis, the Council enhanced the Force and decided that in addition to the original mandate, it would, among other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities, accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the south of Lebanon and extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons. 318 peacekeepers have given their lives in the line of duty serving within UNIFIL. An international effort: 45 nations together for peace Nowadays, UNIFIL is composed of more than 10,000 military personnel from 45 troop contributing countries, supported by more than 800 international and Lebanese civilian staff. The Area of Operations extends from the so-called Blue Line in the south to the Litani river in the north and is divided in two sectors, east and west, at Brigade level; Five battalions are deployed in Sector West, while four in Sector East. A “Force Commander Reserve”, at Regimental level, is to support both sectors as needed. UNIFIL representative is also present in Beirut, as well as at Beirut airport and seaport, to facilitate military rotations and shipments. A Maritime Task Force (MTF), currently composed of six vessels (one frigate and five corvettes), has also been deployed since October 2006 within the 1701 mandate, at the request of the Lebanese Government, aimed to prompt Israel to lift its naval blockade on Lebanon. MTF is the first and only such maritime entity in a United Nations pe...
peacekeeping mission. It supports the Lebanese Navy in monitoring Lebanese territorial waters, securing maritime borders and entry points and preventing unauthorized entry of arms by sea into Lebanon. This task is now accomplished reporting suspicious ships to Lebanese authorities for further inspections, whose results are reported back to UNIFIL. MTF also assists Lebanese Navy in enhancing its capabilities by trainings and joint exercises, with a view for Lebanese Navy to assume all duties required for maritime interdiction operations. The Area of Maritime Operations (AMO), which is about 5,000 nautical miles, stretches along the Lebanese coast into international waters. Maritime boundaries between Lebanon and Israel are however not agreed upon: after its withdrawal in 2000, Israel unilaterally installed a line of buoys off Ras Naqoura to the sea as the extension of the Blue Line, but this is not recognized by the UN and UNIFIL does not have a mandate to monitor it and focuses to prevent hostile activities.

42 years of morphing
UNIFIL’s establishment on 19 March 1978 through UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 was triggered by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Its original mandate was to confirm Israeli withdrawal and restore International peace and security, assisting the Government of Lebanon. In June 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon for the second time, establishing a security buffer zone inside the country. In 1985 Israel partially withdrew its forces from Lebanon but retained control of an area in southern Lebanon by Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the so-called “South Lebanon Army” (SLA). In April 2000 Israel notified the UN Secretary-General that it would withdraw its forces from Lebanon by July 2000. On 25 May 2000 the Government of Israel notified that the redeployment of its forces had been completed. Following the IDF withdrawal, the UN identified the “Line of Withdrawal”, or so-called “Blue Line”, largely conforming to the
previous internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon. The Blue Line had the sole purpose of confirming IDF full withdrawal from Lebanese territory: it does not represent in any way an international border and is without prejudice to future border arrangements between Lebanon and Israel. On 12 July 2006, war broke out again after Hizbullah attacked an IDF patrol killing three soldiers and kidnapping two. Therefore, on 11 August 2006, the Security Council adopted resolution 1701, which ended the war and in which the Council expanded UNIFIL strength from 2,000 to up to 15,000 troops and enhanced its mandate. The Security Council decision followed the Lebanese commitment that it would deploy up to 15,000 troops in southern Lebanon. It is to be noticed that, to this extent, after 2006 war no ceasefire has been formally signed between Lebanon and Israel, therefore they can be still considered formally at war. Last ceasefire understanding – but not a formal ceasefire – between Lebanon and Israel goes back to 1996. UN Security Council decisions Originally, Resolutions 425 and 426 mandated UNIFIL to:
- Confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon.
- Restore International peace and security.
- Assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.

During 1982 Israeli invasion in the so-called “Operation Peace for Galilee”, the Security Council recognized that UNIFIL was unable to fulfill its mandate under resolutions 425/426 and, on 18 June 1982, adopted resolution 511, authorizing UNIFIL to carry out additional tasks: in addition to manning their positions, would possibly extend their protection and humanitarian assistance to the population in the Area of Operations. In three years, UNIFIL remained behind the Israeli lines, with its role limited to providing protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population. Following the withdrawal of the Israeli forces in May 2000, the 22 January 2001 Secretary-General’s report on UNIFIL wrote that: “Of the three parts of its mandate, UNIFIL has essentially completed two. It has confirmed the withdrawal of Israeli forces and assisted, to the extent it could, the Lebanese authorities as they returned to the area vacated by Israel”. Consequently, UNIFIL’s main focus from then on was restoring international peace and security, operating as an observing and monitoring mission. As a response to 2006 July/August crisis, Security Council Resolution 1701, significantly enhanced UNIFIL’s strength and mandate. Indeed, in addition to the original mandate, UNIFIL shall:
- Monitor the cessation of hostilities.
- Accompany and support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they deploy throughout the south of Lebanon, including along the Blue Line.
- Extend its assistance to ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons.
- Assist the LAF in establishing between the Blue Line and the Litani river an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons except those of Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL.
- Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the illegal entry of arms or related materials into Lebanon. The UN Security Council also authorized UNIFIL to take all necessary actions in its Area of Operations and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that area is not used for any hostile activities. It should also resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the UN mandate. And it should
UNIFIL mandate has then been renewed every year by Security Council resolutions. In Resolution 2373 (2017), which extended UNIFIL mandate until August 2018, the Security Council commended UNIFIL for the operational changes undertaken and calls for continued enhanced operational activities. **Fulfilling the mandate**

In 2010, a UNIFIL-DPKO review recommended to formalize a regular strategic dialogue mechanism between UNIFIL and LAF. It aims to assist LAF in establishing appropriate operational capabilities to implement tasks mandated in Resolution 1701. Overall, it is intended to facilitate LAF’s gradual assumption of security responsibility in the UNIFIL Area of Operations and Lebanese territorial waters. A joint Strategic Dialogue plan between UNIFIL and LAF was signed in 2013: UNIFIL established a coordination mechanism, comprised of LAF, Government representatives and supporting members of the international community in assisting, equipping and training LAF, in order to develop appropriate operational capabilities for implementing tasks mandated under Resolution 1701. UNIFIL continues to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in order to deny possible unauthorized armed personnel between the Blue Line and the Litani River, except for those belonging to the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL. Therefore, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL maintains permanent and temporary checkpoints and conducts hundreds of counter-rocket-launching operations each month. UNIFIL vehicle, foot and air patrols maintain an operational footprint in all municipalities and villages inside the area of operations. Around 450 operational activities are currently performed 24/7, which almost 20% are carried out in close coordination with LAF: mostly focused on monitoring the Blue Line, the UNSCR 1701 center of gravity. Moreover, air reconnaissance patrols continue to be concentrated over areas to which ground patrols had limited access because of rugged terrain or land contaminated EODs or anti-personnel mines. Furthermore, supporting the Government of Lebanon in implementing its effective authority is granted ensuring the development of the Lebanese Armed Forces, in line with the priorities outlined during the Rome II ministerial meeting, held in March 2018. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UN-SCOL) and UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander intensified their engagement with the Lebanese authorities to encourage a coordinated approach to increase the presence of LAF in the area and the development of its maritime component growing LAF operational capabilities through performing joint training exercises as well as joint patrols and other operational activities. Indeed, within the framework of the strategic dialogue mechanism, advanced discussions in a joint working group established to develop a strategy for a phased transition of the responsibilities of the MTF to the Lebanese Armed Forces, jointly identifying key capabilities for the Lebanese Navy essential for handling over those responsibilities. Likewise, UNIFIL carries out additional tasks, which include mine protection United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.
clearance activities performed with the support of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), as part of UNIFIL’s mandate to restore international peace and security and to assist the Government of Lebanon in restoring its authority in southern Lebanon. Moreover, UNIFIL attaches great importance to relations with local population, interacting with local communities at every level, mainly relying on UNIFIL Civil Affairs branch (civilian) and CIMIC (Civil-Military Coordination, military). While UNIFIL is not a humanitarian or development agency, from early years of its deployment it has had a strong humanitarian approach towards local communities, providing a range of basic services (e.g.: medical, veterinary and dental assistance) and assisting local population through training programs and quick impact projects in addressing pressing needs. Special efforts are additionally focused on capacity building for Lebanese Civil Defense. Furthermore, to fulfil its mandate, UNIFIL engages both parties bilaterally on various levels, as well as through the Tripartite forum. Communication with both parties takes place in the framework of an agreed Liaison and Coordination mechanism. UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander (HoM/FC) has direct communication, including a hotline, with designated LAF and IDF generals. This is complemented, at working level, with regular meetings and contacts carried out by Liaison Branch and Political staff, as well as on as-needed basis. Contacts are also aimed to reduce the tension across the Blue Line and recurring violations, such as arrangements to enable Lebanese farmers to harvest in the field located close to or south of Blue Line. Additionally, UNIFIL and LAF coordinate operational matters. The above mentioned Tripartite forum has proven to be a real effective tool, calling both parties together in order to coordinate IDF withdrawal in 2006, then it expanded to deal with violations of Resolution 1701, as well as to identify and address key security and military operational issues. Led by UNIFIL HoM/FC and attended by senior representative both from IDF and LAF, Tripartite forum is an essential conflict management and confidence-building mechanism between the parties, contributing to de-escalate tensions. Parties committed themselves to provide information on their activities and to marking the Blue Line on the ground, which is made building pillars, the so-called “Blue Barrels”.

A challenging future

Despite the efforts and the successes achieved since Resolution 1701, which has ensured an unprecedented period of calm in southern Lebanon since 1982, lasting 14 years, many issues are still to be solved: boundaries between Lebanon and Israel have not been agreed upon and there are many disputed areas across the Blue Line, which Lebanon claims being part of its territory, as Ghajar village in South-East, which is divided in two parts by the Blue Line and still completely controlled by Israel, and Shebaa Farms area in Golan Heights, that Lebanon claims. Even the maritime boundary, whose discussion is outside the remit of UNIFIL’s mandate, is pending on an agreement, which is as more sensitive as it is to be considered that it will establish jurisdiction on underwater gas and oil fields to be exploited. Current 2020 COVID-19 pandemic added further strains to fulfilling UNIFIL mandate. Precautionary measures adopted to reduce the risk of spreading the virus has led to a dramatic change in work procedures – albeit temporarily, increasing the use of IT tools, such as teleconferencing, and, for civilian staff, largely working from home. Operational activities have also been remodeled, avoiding unnecessary contacts between military and civilians and adopting strict protocols and safety measures. However, UNIFIL is still maintaining its 24/7 presence in the area of operations: its mandate has not changed and is always mainly focused on monitoring the Blue Line, who-
ly September 2019, UNIFIL, together with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), worked effectively towards preventing conflict and de-escalating tensions. Nevertheless, looking forward to the future and bearing also in mind the need to evolve in accordance with current and future challenges, it could be taken into consideration to move the approach in maintaining peace and stability in southern Lebanon from a more military oriented peacekeeping mission, to a so-called peace stability operation (PSO). The latter seems to be more fitting the UNIFIL’s approach in providing, in addition to military presence, humanitarian and civic assistance, supporting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the re-establishing of its effective authority: indeed, stability operations are sometimes referred to as “Phase IV” or “post-conflict” operations, although reoccurrences of conflict are often possible. In this view, it should be advisable to smoothly change the mission’s footprint from a pure military approach, implementing the mission with gendarme-type peacekeepers, specialized in managing the transition from a post-crisis situation to a more stable context for reconstruction. This is why the professional background heavily influences the peacekeepers approach and behavior: while conventional military operations are guided by tactical manuals that provide detailed behavioral prescriptions, there is more room for interpretation in peace and stability operations, which seems more close to a gendarme-type peacekeeper culture and professional background.

4. Hizbullah, literally “Party of Allah”, is a Shia Islamist political party and militant group founded in the early 1980s. It is a proxy to Iran and waged a guerilla campaign in South Lebanon, and as a result Israel withdrew from Lebanon on 2000. Hizbullah and its military wing are considered as a terrorist organization by Israel, some western countries (e.g.: USA, UK, France, Germany), Saudi Arabia and other Arabic Sunni countries.

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Security Sector Reform and Human Rights: a focus on torture prohibition and prevention

by Marco Sutto

In modern peace operations, capacity building activities represent the main and long-lasting effort from which the overall mission success often depends. Assisting societies in post conflict environments, usually characterized by ineffective Law Enforcement institutions, to come to terms with a legacy of past abuses and promote justice and reconciliation through a proper Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a fundamental objective of capacity building activities. Security institutions themselves have often been directly involved in hostilities and associated with gross human rights violations, thus undermining the confidence of the population in the State. Only an effective and human rights compliant law enforcement restores public law and order and also contributes in reestablishing the confidence of the population in the capacity of the State to govern and to provide for their individual safety and security. The latter constitute a necessary precondition to create the necessary fertile ground for the desired social and economic development in the recipient State. Reforming, restructuring, rebuilding State institutions consistently with the international Human Rights standards has proved to be the only way to achieve a long-lasting and self-sustainable peace, therefore protection and promotion of human rights require to be integrated in the full spectrum of mission activities as essential elements. A State capable of exploiting effectively its coercive powers, without abusing of them, to protect individual’s human rights represents the ultimate success for every SSR program. In this field the compliance the prohibition of torture and similar treatments often represents a sensitive issue. Torture is one of the most horrendous violations of a person’s human rights. It is an attack on the very essence of a person’s dignity and, unfortunately, the natio-
nal institutions attitude towards it is often far from being consistent with the spirit of its prohibition and demonstrates to be based on misconception and prejudice. In fact, although recipient States have a clear and undebated duty to prevent torture, and declare themselves fully committed in it, it is often not applied in practice. The political, social and cultural environment frequently characterized by lack of respect for the rule of law, high levels of corruption and a culture of violence increases the difficulties in implementing effective reforms against torture. Challenging torture therefore requires a comprehensive strategy with the active involvement of many actors. To some extent, it is correct to point out that, at an international level, the practical application of the prohibition of torture represents one sensitive topic in the field of human rights. Even the most important police and troops contributing countries, despite the implementation of many legal and practical preventive tools, are still facing the problem of rendering it effective. What emerges is that, despite the clear international legal framework, outside the circle of specialized practitioners, there is a common lack of understanding about torture and its prevention. The intention of the following analysis is to sum up the key concepts about the prohibition and prevention of torture in order to untangle the most common mistakes and misconceptions and outline possible approaches to the issue.

It is first necessary to stress that part of the misunderstanding about torture is caused by the difference between the legal definition of torture and the way the term is commonly used in the media or in general conversation, which often emphasizes the intensity of pain and suffering inflicted. Article 1 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) provides the internationally agreed legal definition of torture: “Torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.”

The definition contains three cumulative elements, which must occur to have torture: (a) intentional infliction of severe mental or physical suffering; (b) by a public official, who is directly or indirectly involved; (c) for a specific purpose. Any act that falls short of the definition of torture because it lacks one or more of the criteria may still be covered under article 16 of the Convention against Torture that outlines the prohibition of “…other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” It is relevant to emphasize that any pain or suffering arising “only from, inherent in or incidental to” lawful sanctions is explicitly not considered as torture. Nevertheless, this clause cannot be used to justify the use of corporal punishments under domestic law. Despite the issue of “legalized” corporal punishments has been raised by some States under the so-called “lawful sanctions” clause, it has been firmly established that they are prohibited under international law. The lawfulness of the sanction should be determined by international standards, including the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners’, which was specifically referred to in the 1975 United Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture."

Secondly, it is important to clarify that the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment has a special status in the international protection of human rights. It is included in a number of internatio-"
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Treaties and national and regional treaties and forms part of customary international law, binding all States. Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) the prohibition of torture has been universally understood to mean that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. The prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is absolute and can never be justified under any circumstance. This prohibition is also non-derogable, which means a State is not permitted to temporarily limit the prohibition on torture under any circumstance whatsoever, be it a state of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency. The prohibition of torture is also recognized as a peremptory norm of international law, or jus cogens'. In other words, it overrides any inconsistent provision in another treaty or customary law. Despite the above-mentioned strict legal provisions, the absolute prohibition of torture is regularly questioned by people on the grounds of security or counter-terrorism, often using a hypothetical “ticking bomb” scenario. This scenario involves the police capturing a terrorist whom they suspect has placed a bomb that is about to explode in the middle of a large city. Many assert that only torture will make the suspect disclose the required information to prevent the deaths of thousands of people. Actually, accepting the “ticking bomb” argument could dangerously, by extension, be used to try and justify torture in a wider range of situations. Additionally, professional interrogators have repeatedly emphasized the point that interrogation can be conducted much more effectively without the use of torture and relying on it renders investigators less active in exploiting other investigative opportunities. Thirdly, considering the particular importance placed on the prohibition of torture, the traditional obligations of States to respect, to protect and to fulfill human rights are complemented by a further obligation to prevent torture and other forms of ill-treatment. The United Nations Convention against Torture expands the provisions around torture placing an explicit obligation on States parties to prevent torture and other forms of ill-treatment. According to article 2.1, “each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction”, while article 16 requires that “each State Party shall undertake to prevent (...) other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”. Article 4 of the Convention requires specifically to ensure that torture is included as a specific crime in the national criminal law. Some States argue that this is unnecessary, as acts of torture would already be covered by existing offences in their criminal codes. However, this provision is essential because torture is not just a form of violent assault, it is an exercise of power over a victim, by a state agent abusing his position, that does not correspond to any other criminal offence. Defining torture as a crime underlines the specific nature and gravity of the offence providing a clear warning to officials that the practice is punishable in accordance with its seriousness. The Convention establishes a universal jurisdiction over the crime of torture and, when it is perpetrated in a widespread or systematic manner, or takes place in an armed conflict, the International Criminal Court might try those responsible, as it is regarded as a crime against humanity and a war crime. Article 10 of the Convention requi-
res States parties to take steps to ensure that all law enforcement personnel, medical personnel, public officials and others involved in the deprivation of liberty receive education and information on the prohibition and prevention of torture. What is more, to discourage the recourse to torture, article 15 of the Convention entails that “any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made”.

In conclusion, once clarified the essential elements of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments or punishments, in order to implement at State level their absolute prohibition, it is mandatory the development of a national strategy. It is required an integrated approach composed of three interrelated elements: a legal framework that prohibits torture, effective implementation of this legal framework, a mechanisms to monitor it and its implementation. Undeniably, a strong legal framework to prohibit torture is a critical component of any torture prevention strategy. The legal framework should reflect relevant international human rights standards and include specific provisions to prohibit and prevent torture. However, the mere existence of laws and regulations is not sufficient to prevent torture, they also need to be properly understood and rigorously applied and must be complemented by other approaches to effectively address the root causes of torture. Effective implementation requires practical measures to be taken on a range of levels to ensure that national laws regarding torture and ill-treatment are respected in practice. The different actors involved in implementing the legal framework, and in particular those who operate within the criminal justice system (such as law enforcement officials, judges and detaining authorities), will require proper training – both initial and ongoing – regarding the normative framework and the development of operational practices that respect these norms. Procedural safeguards should be put in place and operate as intended, in particular for persons deprived of their liberty. This could include ensuring that all registers in places of detention are properly maintained and that there is a regular review of police codes of conducts. Allegations of torture must be promptly, impartially and effectively investigated, even in the absence of a formal complaint. Any breach of the law must be appropriately sanctioned. Last, victims of torture and ill-treatment should be provided with full and effective reparation, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and a guarantee of non-repetition. When this does not occur, a culture of impunity develops which can undermine both the force of the law and its implementation thus determining, on the long term, the failure of any building block and stabilization purpose of the peace mission.

PICTURES:
http://mulerasfireplace.com/3486-2/
http://humanrightscommission.house.gov


2. The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, originally adopted by the First UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1955, revised and updated in 2015 when they were also named “the Nelson Mandela Rules”, constitute the universally acknowledged minimum standards for the management of prison facilities and the treatment of prisoners, and have been of tremendous value and influence in the development of prison laws, policies and practices in Member States all over the world.


4. Jus cogens (or ius cogens) is a Latin phrase that literally means “compelling law.” It designates norms from which no derogation is permitted by way of particular agreements. It stems from the idea already known in Roman law that certain legal rules cannot be contracted out, given the fundamental values they uphold. Jus cogens is now referred to in several legal instruments within and beyond the law of treaties. The 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties stipulate that a treaty is void if it conflicts with jus cogens (Art. 53 and 64).

5. To read more see: “Defusing the Ticking Bomb Scenario: Why we must say No to torture, always” - The Association for the Prevention of Torture 2007.

6. See the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005).

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a politico-military international organization, which has constantly applied innovation and transformation to stay fit for purpose. This is a fundamental aspect of “the most successful alliance in history because through the decades its members kept the commitment to protect and defend each other and adapted as the world around them changed”. Security challenges such as hybrid threats, the crime-war overlap as well as terrorism and insurgency (the so-called irregular activities), threats to human security and cultural property are currently significant and likely to become more relevant in the future. This can be said also for the “gray zone challenges, which are unique defense-relevant issues sharing three common characteristics — hybridity, menace to defense and military convention, and profound and paralyzing risk-confusion”. These challenges require innovative approaches and Stability Policing (SP) represents one of NATO’s cutting-edge capabilities, constituting a flexible and adaptive tool, overcoming a rigid combat-only approach and offering innovative and scalable responses by expanding the reach of the military instrument into the remit of policing and actively contributing to a comprehensive approach.

The “policing gap” and the origins of SP

SP ante litteram was born with the deployment of the first Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) to Bosnia in August 1998 as part of the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR). At that time, the Alliance realized that neither its military might, nor the local police or the United Nations (UN) civilian police force were able to respond adequately to the security and policing-related needs of the local population. The MSU, envisioned, designed and led by the Italian Carabinieri with the support of other three Nations, represented the only policing tool within SFOR’s military instrument of power, which was flexible and robust enough to fill the law enforcement vacuum in a hostile environment [i.e. the capability/
capacity void between the populace’s security needs and the inability or unwillingness of the indigenous police forces (IPF - if present), other relevant actors (UN, EU, NATO and others) and NATO conventional, combat and warfighting means to properly address these challenges. Both authors take pride in having served also as MP Officers and it is an uncontested fact that Military Police had already been in existence within NATO and the United Nations. Anyhow, both International Organizations (IO), the latter through the renowned “Brahimi report” in 2000, did not pursue an increase, expansion and/or improvement of their MP capabilities to bridge the policing gap. In fact, they sought a more poignant, inclusive instrument, a tool inspired by a new vision, namely Stability Policing. After 18 years, in 2016, NATO promulgated the “Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing” (AJP-3.22), at present the operational level and sole Allied publication on the matter. It states that SP can bridge the policing gap through one or a combination of its two missions. The reinforcement of the IPF entails intervening on their capabilities and capacity to raise overall performance to acceptable levels and encompasses monitoring, mentoring, advising, reforming, training and partnering with (MMARTP). The temporary replacement of the IPF is the second SP mission and may be required if they are missing or unwilling to carry out their duties. Normally a UN mandate initiates a NAC decision to deploy personnel under an executive policing mandate. This might be necessary when other actors are not able, willing or ready to intervene. In fact, when a rapid policing intervention is required, especially in a non-permissive environment, NATO SP could be the most suitable or actually the only viable solution until other actors from the International Community can intervene, support and/or take over as a follow-on force, depending on a UNSCR or Host Nation (HN) request. SP can create new avenues of approach to address traditional and emerging military problems with different, policing means. Lethal/kinetic tools and procedures are supported, where appropriate, by policing, non-kinetic and non-/less than lethal ones. They are aimed at war, organized and transnational criminals, terrorists and insurgents, and violators of host-nation and international laws. This “Legal targeting” creates effects on adversaries by enforcing international and applicable HN law through investigation or arrest, limiting/restricting their mobility and liberty of action, seizing their assets and financial means and dismantling their networks and structures. Dedicated SP Lines of Operation (LoO) or SP elements within established LoOs, can concur to deter, identify, locate, target and engage adversaries or spoilers, disrupt their networks and help attain objectives at tactical, operational and strategic levels in a military campaign. The added benefit of this approach lies, among others, in furthering the reduction in the use of force and decreasing collateral damage besides responding to the security needs of the population. Therefore, it contributes to improved acceptability and legitimacy within audiences from the local to the international level and enhancing mission sustainability. SP furthermore identifies, collects and analyses police and crime-related information, disseminates intelligence and feeds the force’s intelligence cycle, hence improving the understanding of the operating environment. A number of factors can weaken the performance of the IPF in fragile states, including past, present and developing conflicts, and manmade or natural disasters. A weak or missing Rule of Law (ROL) system in which individuals, public and private entities, and the state are not accountable to the law, combined with a frail Justice Sector (Police, Judiciary and Corrections) are likely to undermine each other and result in a reduced efficiency and efficacy of local police forces. Such a situation is likely to hamper governance and generate power and enforcement vacuums, which might be exploited by irregular actors such as (war/organized/trans-national) criminals, terrorists and insurgents as well as spoilers and produce considerable levels of insecurity and instability. As a military capability that embodies and particularly emphasises a civilian- and populace-oriented approach, SP is a key contributor and natural actor striving for a comprehensive approach. In fact, it fosters and seeks the best possible level of interaction with other (civilian- and/or military) IOs, the Host Nation and especially the IPF (regardless of their military or civilian status) and the populace as well as other actors including NGOs. SP: when, where, how and who? Does SP contribute to projecting stability? It has been argued that SP cannot contribute to all the three NATO core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security because it is framed solely within stability operations to bridge the policing gap, while the avail-
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The evolving doctrinal framework and particularly the current review of the 3.2 Series contemplates that offensive, defensive and stability operations all encompass stability, enabling, defensive and offensive activities, which could arguably be extended to SP, although by limiting them to the policing remit. Indeed, history shows that SP can and should be conducted throughout the full spectrum of conflict and crisis in all operations themes (from peacetime military engagement to warfighting), before, during and after (armed) conflicts and manmade and natural disasters, because the (fragile) HN and its populace may require help whenever and wherever there are policing gaps. SP contributes to win the war, by creating effects on adversaries and enemies, but also to build the peace, an aspect of fundamental importance and relevance especially in a connected, globalized world. Projecting stability is key to prevent and deter crises, including armed conflict and cannot prescind from addressing policing requirements. To this aim, SP is credible, instrumental and complementary to other actor’s efforts; this reasoning has been demonstrated oftentimes also in NATO operations and missions. Although “land heavy”, SP is not limited to a specific domain, in the same way criminals, terrorists and insurgents are active on land and sea as well as in the air, in cyberspace and in the information environment. Urban and littoral settings are where most people live and where they will increasingly live. Since conflicts break out amongst people, and police are often the first responders to these crises, acquiring and using their experience and expertise is and will be more and more significant. This implies that urban challenges may progressively blur police and military functions as these areas of responsibility overlap. In turn, conducting military operations among dense civilian populations will require military personnel to have policing-like skills. In general, a successful interaction between conventional military and policing components will require an appropriate level of interoperability to ensure that they can be ready, available and jointly deployable to both permissive and non-permissive environments. An essential principle about SP states, “all” can contribute to SP, but not everyone can do everything. Policing is indeed very different from soldiering and reinforcing IPF or temporarily replacing them, especially in a fragile state, while conducting a military campaign, is even more demanding. Basic SP activities and tasks (for instance, presence patrols, critical site security, election security) can be conducted by any trained, equipped and tasked unit or asset. Higher level SP such as investigating organised crimes, disrupting international terrorist networks or mentoring HN senior leaders require a considerable level of specific expertise, experience and set of skills. In reality, a vast array of forces can and should contribute to SP, including Gendarmerie-type forces, which are the first choice, MP and other military forces. Under a comprehensive approach, non-military actors may also collaborate in stability policing activities such as: police forces with civilian status, IOs, NGOs, and contractors. This inclusiveness fosters interoperability, aims at enabling the Alliance to select the most suitable asset and avoids missing opportunities. The “missing” capability – Why does NATO need an SP Concept? NATO lacks a capability that precisely defines the sets of requirements for SP across the Doctrine, Organization, Materiel, Personnel, Leadership, Facilities and Interoperability (DOTMPLFI) framework. This entails that during a force generation process Nations can provide the Alliance with SP contributions that lack police expertise and that SP is not properly acknowledged as capability within the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). History shows that SP should be included in the planning process from the very beginning and that lack of expertise and experienced policing personnel in reinforcement or temporary replacement of the IPF can have disastrous consequences. Considering dedicated Stability Policing Unit (SPU) requirements during the next NDPP cycle and targeting them to Nations would ensure these capabilities will be available and readily usable during any force generation process. In NATO a concept is an instrument to coherently fill a capability gap, but one has yet to be adopted on SP. There are some inherent difficulties on the path towards an approved SP concept, not lastly because of the differences between NATO Nation’s police forces (military/civilian status, military police, powers, jurisdictions, legal
frameworks and national caveats etc.). The guiding principle should always be that the Alliance’s strength lies in its cohesion and in the sum and diversity of the contributions of all its members, which as a whole is vastly greater than the sum of the single capabilities. It has been argued that the existence of AJP-3.22 suffices and a dedicated SP Concept is not needed, but Doctrine is only one of the seven DOTMLPFI aspects of a capability.

The NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence (NSPCoE)

The NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence (NSPCoE) is a think-tank that encompasses a Directorate and three pillars, namely the Doctrine and Standardization Branch, which develops concepts and contributes to improving the NATO doctrinal corpus with SP inputs and considerations, including developing the SP concept, reviewing AJP-3.22 and drafting ATP-103; the Education and Training Branch designs training curricula and hosts courses about SP and the Lesson Learned (LL) Branch, that gathers best practises and works the LL cycle to feed experiences garnered in operations and training into a database and ultimately into doctrine. The NSPCoE is indeed the NATO hub of expertise for SP and strives to be the Alliance’s interface with IOs and non-NATO institutions in the SP arena. The Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain, The Netherlands and Turkey contribute to the Centre.

What can SP do for NATO?

SP has been conducted under different names for more than two decades in NATO-led operations, often in a very hostile setting. Other IOs, such as the UN, the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU), all possible partners for NATO SP, performed and still perform SP operations, albeit under different names and perspectives. Despite this, SP is not yet sufficiently known, understood and adopted even across NATO. Policing the local population or re-/building IPF have not been hitherto an immediate concern of NATO decision makers/commanders. In some instances, they are considered the exclusive remit of other, civilian, organizations and actors; an erroneous belief, especially considering that the latter cannot be deployed in non-permissive environments, which de facto could generate/deteriorate the policing gap. This attitude is gradually changing but too slowly. Lessons learned have shown that overlooking or delaying coordinated actions to address the policing gap inevitably affects the mission, delays or hinders the attainment of the desired NATO end-state and may prevent NATO forces from disengaging.

THE ADDED BENEFIT OF THIS APPROACH LIES, AMONG OTHERS, IN FURTHERING THE REDUCTION IN THE USE OF FORCE AND DECREASING COLLATERAL DAMAGE BESIDES RESPONDING TO THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE POPULATION.

In the long term the Alliance as a whole (its individuals as well as the structure, institution and processes) would profit from a positive transformation by acquiring a more police-like mind-set. The desired NATO end-state might indeed be better attained by focusing less on the sole conventional defeat of the adversary but by integrating more non-combat-oriented approaches, similarly to what a policing counterpart would do. This is particularly true in heavily populated environments such as in urban and littoral settings, where the attitude of the vast populace is to be taken the law and to respond to people’s requests for assistance on a variety of issues. The lack of an effective, capable and trustworthy police force undermines the credibility of the government, with detrimental effects on its legitimacy and overall stability. This applies especially to fragile states and in crisis or conflict areas, where consequently the International Community, including NATO, may be called to intervene to prevent crisis escalation and/or support peace restoration.

NATO military operations benefit from the inclusion of SP as a substantial contribution focusing on the IPF and the local populace. The aim of SP is to support the re-/establishment of a safe and secure environment (SASE), restoring public order and security, and contribute to create the conditions for meeting longer term needs with respect to governance and development (especially through the Security Sector Reform - SSR). 15 In the long term the Alliance as a whole (its individuals as well as the structure, institution and processes) would profit from a positive transformation by acquiring a more police-like mind-set. The desired NATO end-state might indeed be better attained by focusing less on the sole conventional defeat of the adversary but by integrating more non-combat-oriented approaches, similarly to what a policing counterpart would do. This is particularly true in heavily populated environments such as in urban and littoral settings, where the attitude of the vast populace is to be taken
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To protect civilians, as identified by the Policy on the Protection of Civilians (PoC), which “includes a Stability policing dimension,” all feasible measures must be taken to avoid, minimize and mitigate harm to civilians and SP can significantly contribute to this purpose. Moreover, Cultural Property Protection is one crosscutting topic within PoC and a remit in which a policing approach is critical to prevent and deter relevant illicit activities. SP investigates related crimes, apprehends the perpetrators and recovers the cultural property and the illicitly accrued wealth for their restitution. Therefore, SP not only deprives the criminals of their funding, but also restores these funds back to the HN economy, supporting overall development. Other significant niche areas in which SP can contribute to PoC are combatting the trafficking in human beings, narcotics and weapons, enforcing anti-pollution and environmental protection laws and countering labour exploitation to mention but a few.

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14. Spends NATO mission in Iraq after US air-strike calls it ‘tactical pause’

PICTURES:

2. A type of threat that combines conventional, irregular and asymmetric activities in time and space. NATO Agreed Term
3. The use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to affect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. NATO Agreed Term
4. Nathan P Freier et al., Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2016
5. Stability Policing “Police related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace the indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights.” NATO Agreed term
6. Stability Policing “Police related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace the indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights.” NATO Agreed term
7. Stability Policing “Police related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace the indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights.” NATO Agreed term
8. For this paper, the terms “local police”, “Indigenous Police Forces (IPF)”, “Host Nation Police Forces (HNPF)” and “Law Enforcement Agency (LEA)” are understood as having the same meaning
9. Argentina, the Netherlands and the United States of America
11. ATP-103 “Replacement and Reinforcement of Host Nation Police Forces” is currently under development
12. “Capability, the ability to create an effect through employment of an integrated set of aspects categorized as doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership development, personnel, facilities, and interoperability” NATO Agreed Term
13. Capacity, for this paper intended as a capability expressed in quantitative terms
14. As mentioned in AJP-3.22 “Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing”; ATP-103 (see footnote 13) seeks to change the framework to (monitoring) generating, organizing, training, enabling, advising, mentoring – (M)GOTEAM in an effort to harmonise non-executive activities the framework established in AJP-3.16 “Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance”
15. UNSCR 1244 Kosovo and UNSCR 1272 East Timor
16. “Legal targeting, enforce international and applicable HN law to create effect on the adversary” is not a NATO Agreed term
18. “LoE, A path linking decisive conditions to achieve an objective” NATO Agreed Term
19. The rule of law refers to “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards” UN Security Council, S/2004/616, para 6
20. AJP-3.2, ATP-3.2.1 and ATP-3.2.1.1
21. NDC Research Paper 1 Dec 2018 “Projecting Stability: Elixir or Snake Oil?”
22. “There is no doubt we need Stability Policing.” “For too long the Police and Army have been seen as the Security Forces. It is time to separate the two.” Maj Gen. Harrison Adv, MOIA, LL Conference at the NATO SP CoE 08.10.2019
24. Forces, services, assets, subject matter experts (SME) etc.
25. AJP-3.21 “Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police” para 2.6.3
26. “on the basis of the mandate and the environment being permissive” (AJP-3.22)
27. NATO Agreed Term
28. The current SPU capability code represents just a so-called Reporting Code that lists a number of abilities but does not establish a capability
30. https://www.nspcoe.org/about-us/history/nato-sp-coe. The Centre is based in Vicenza, a northern Italian city
31. The Writing Team for ATP-103 is led by the Doctrine and Standardization Branch of the NATO SP COE
32. 6 in-house courses and 3 online, see www.nspcoe.org
33. UN Formed Police Units (FPU)
34. EU and EGF Integrated Police Units (IPU)
35. See the above-mentioned SIGAR and SIGIR reports
36. See AJP-3.22 as above
37. See MCM-0053-2019 Capstone Concept – Joint Military Operations in Urban Environment for further details
39. NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians, endorsed at the NATO Warsaw Summit 8-9 July 2016, paragraph 16
40. Lawfare is the use of law to wage war

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Building a close protection capacity in Timor-Leste. The MMA-T process implemented by the Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR)

By João Duque Martinho

The context of a successful capacity building project Timor-Leste (TL) was a former Portuguese colony until 28 November 1975, when the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretelin) declared the territory’s independence. Few days after TL was invaded and occupied by the Indonesian military. In 1999, after nearly 24 years of maubere resistance and with the support of the international community, Indonesia was forced to accept an independence referendum and to relinquish control of the territory. TL became the first new sovereign state of the 21st century on 20 May 2002. The country is composed by the eastern part and the Oe-Cusse enclave of the island of Timor, the island of Atauro, in the north of Dili (capital) and the islet of Jaco, in the eastern tip of the territory. The country’s population is around 1.3 million (2017) and the official languages are Tetum and Portuguese. To support the successful act of self-determination the United Nations (UN) launch the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), providing an interim civil administration and a peacekeeping mission in the territory of TL, from its establishment on 25 October 1999, until its independence on 20 May 2002. It’s in this context that Portugal deployed a new UN police capacity. The first UN Police (UNPOL) Formed Police Units (FPUs) were created by the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1999, when the UN assumed full
responsibility for enforcing the law both in Kosovo (Jordanian FPU) and in TL (Portuguese FPU at that time called Rapid Response Unit - RRU), a task that required a capacity and capability distinct from general policing. FPUs are defined by UNPOL as specialized, cohesive, armed mobile police units, providing security support to UN operations by ensuring the safety and security of UN personnel and assets; contributing to the protection of civilians; and supporting police operations that require a formed response. From the years 2000 to 2002, Portugal through the Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR) deployed to TL four RRU contingents, a self-sustained company level unit with a core operational capability of three anti-riot Platoons, supported by a Special Operations team and an Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) team. The RRU was the most critical UN tool to ensure the public order at Dili (TL Capital) and it was often deployed throughout TL territory to face of rational outcomes under UNTAET umbrella created solid basis for a long relation of bilateral police cooperation with TL that still endures. In mid-2006, the country was immersed in a major crisis due to claims made by Army “petitioners” on wages and conditions. The flared up violence lead to 37 people dead and approximately 150,000 (15% of the population) displaced. A highly complex situation which involved a deep rift within the political leadership and the military, opposing the Army (F-FDTL) and the Police (PNTL). On 26 May 2006 the Timorese authorities requested urgent police and military assistance from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal, which was promptly addressed by these countries. Merely seven days after a GNR Company was landing in TL, achieving Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 12 June 2006. Once again the GNR was responsible to ensure public order at the capital, facing violent demonstrations and intense cla-
shes between conflicting groups. The high level of threats and risks faced during the police operations can be perceived through the sized weapons and equipment.

On August 26, through the UN Security Council resolution 1704, the GNR Company move from bilateral support to integrate the United Nation Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). It became the Portuguese FPU (PORFPU) under the UNPOL structure. It was composed of 140 officers organized in three Public Order Platoons, a Support Platoon, a Special Operations Section, an EOD Team and a Training Team.

Not under the UNPOL structure but integrated within the PORFPU, the GNR counted with the support of a Role 2 Medical team from the Portuguese Instituto Nacional de Emergência Médica (INEM).

By 11 February 2008, when the country was reaching nearly two years of progressive internal peace and development, an armed group led by the former Military Police (MP) Commander of the F-FDTL, carried out separate armed attacks against the President of Timor-Leste (PTL) and the Prime Minister, resulting in the nearly fatal injury of the PTL and the death of MP Commander. The PORFPU immediately response, managed to secure the site and provided on spot medical support to the PTL, which enabled a subsequent evacuation to a Hospital in Australia. Brief moments after, the PORFPU proceeded to clear the mountain area where the motorcade of the Prime-Minister was attacked and extracted his family safely to the capital.

On the aftermath of these events, following the PTL’s guidance, the UNMIT tasked the PORFPU to ensure his permanent Close Protection (CP), under a complex framework integrating the UNPOL/PNTL (territorial police stations),
the F-FDTL (responsible to secure the area of the PTL´s residence) and PNTL (former PTL´s CP). “Unidade Especial de Policia” – the development of a PNTL´s capacity. From 2006 to 2012 the PORFPU conducted a permanent adaptation to the country situation adjusting its modular and flexible organization to transport the operational effort to increase the capacity building of PNTL´s strongest unit – the Unidade Especial de Policia (Special Police Unit – SPU). The SPU had as main capabilities the Public Order Battalion (POB), a Special Operations Company (SOC), a Close Protection Company (CPC) and an EOD Section. In the sequence of an innovating and remarkable political decision, TL decided to build the SPU with the training support of UNMIT, but exclusively executed by the PORFPU. With this decision TL´s authorities were seeking to create their own police identity, taking as reference one country and one of its institution, the GNR. The rational was easy to identify, the training provided by the training unit of UNMIT was implemented by multinational teams of individual police officers lacking of cohesive, common and mature training performance and identity. For this purpose the PORFPU assigned a Specialized Team (ST) exclusively dedicated to Monitor, Mentor, Advise or Train (MMA-T) the PNTL´s SPU. During the six years of the PORFPU deployment in TL, several courses were implemented, complemented with Train of Trainers (ToT) courses in Portugal, and consolidated with frequent joint operations, patrols and exercises. Seeking to illustrate the significant training effort developed by the PORFPU ST, we can identify the twelve Public Order Courses, nine CP Courses, one CP Course in Portugal, one Special Operations Course, one Special Operations Stage in Portugal and one EOD Stage in TL. To ensure the continuity of the capacity building process, GNR ST´s were continuously engaged on mentoring and advising the SPU subunits. The results were outstanding and totally met the expectation of all the parties involved. In fact, still nowadays, fourteen years after the first PORFPU course in TL, a GNR ST is deployed in TL to continue the capacity building process. Under a bilateral agreement, after the closing of UNMIT, the GNR already trained more than 700 PNTL officers in different types of police skills resulting on noteworthy empowerment of Timor-Leste Police. The President of Timor-Leste (PTL) Close Protection Team – a case study As referred above, the SPU´s Close Protection Company (CPC) was responsible to conduct the PTL´s CP before his attempt of assassination. After this tragic event, the PORFPU was tasked to assume this responsibility. For this purpose, a PORFPU Special Operations Team (SOT) was exclusively dedicated to the PTL´s CP and another SOT to set up a static post at PTL´s residence, on a 24/7 operation. To launch this complex operation, joint coordination at operational level were implemented with the F-FDTL, the UNPOL and the PNTL, and it was decided to integrate in the PORFPU SOT one PNTL CP Officer, who was already working closely with the PTL for long time. The PTL´s CP operation started smoothly without major step backs which provided an opportunity to start assessing and recruiting the best PNTL CP Officers to
integrate the future team responsible for the PTL’s CP. At this level, it’s relevant to highlight that the selection process comprised an exhaustive set of medical and physical exams, implemented by the PORFPU’s SOT and Medical Team, and a screening process established by the PNTL’s SPU. At the same time, a comprehensive approach to the PNTL’s capacity building was implemented by using the already trained SPU’s Public Orders platoons to conduct joint operations with the PORFPU’s platoons, especially by providing area security to the movements and destinations of the PTL. The second step of the operation was to implement a CP course in TL, with the selected PNTL officers. The course was exclusively designed and implemented by the PORFPU SOT in close coordination with PNTL SPU. This first CP course sought to select the best officers to integrate the future PTL’s CP Team and those to be send to Portugal to participate in a GNR CP course. The latter, after returning from Portugal, were assigned to jointly prepare the second CP course in TL. With this approach the PORFPU was not only training the PNTL how to conduct a CP operation but also how to prepare and implement a CP course. After the end of the first CP course the PORFPU SOT started to integrate the trained PNTL CP Officers in a joint CP operation, which led to a gradual downsize of the PORFPU SOT officers. At the same time, the second course was prepared and implemented with engagement of the CP Officers returned from Portugal. In a period of time of around four months it was possible to implement two CP courses in TL and to send three PNTL CP officers to Portugal for a CP Train of Trainers (ToT) course. From this moment onwards the PTL’s CP operation and the CPC MMA-T process steadily progressed. The logistic effort made to make available proper clothes, vests, communications, weaponry and hard skin vehicles to equip the SPU’s CP Team should be also mentioned. With enough certified PNTL CP Officers and PNTL CP Trainers it was time to start the third step of the operation and to proceed with the handover takeover (HOTO) process between the PORFPU SOT and the PNTL CP Team. Another important and essential measure implemented within the HOTO process was the appointment of a PNTL’s Officer responsible to coordinate the PTL’s security at operation level. This officer was posted at the Presidential Palace and was permanently advised by the PORFPU SOT leader. With this on job training and advising approach it was aimed to build skills on preparing a CP operation and to establish the adequate coordination measurements with all the actors involved. In line with the positive mentoring reports regarding the proficiency of the technical and tactical CP work developed by the PTL’s CP officers and following the already started gradual downsize of the PORFPU SOT officers, it was decided to convert positions. For a period of time, before the formal handover of the executive responsibility to conduct the PTL’s CP, the security of the PTL was ensured by a PNTL CP Team partnered by a small PORFPU SOT. The latter mainly observed the CP operation, not interfering unless absolutely necessary. After this period, the PNTL CP Team assumed the executive responsibility to conduct the PTL’s CP operation, with total withdraw of the PORFPU SOT. At the Presidential Palace, the PORFPU SOT Leader continued to advise the PTL’s security officer on the preparation and implementation of CP operations. The PORFPU CP courses continued to be implemented until all the SPU’s CPC officers were certified to conduct CP operations. When the POFPU was redeployed from UNMIT, a GNR ST continued to support the PNTL with advising and training activities under bi-
lateral agreement, until present.

Conclusions

Standard UN FPU doctrinal tasks don’t comprise the executive CP duties substituting the Host Nation Police. However, the historical background between Portugal and Timor-Leste and operational efficiency demonstrated by the GNR during past crisis situations and especially during the President’s attempted of assassination created the conditions for this exceptional CP operation. From there to the decision to assign to the GNR the building of a CP capacity within the PNTL´s SPU was a natural step. The rationale of this decision laid on the political choice to adopt a single policing model as reference. To reform or rebuild the security sector of a country the selection of particular police organization from one single country, or a multinational organization but with strong common identity and standardize procedures like EUROGENDFOR, appears to be a coherent and productive decision. Moreover, the use of Specialized Teams, constituted by cohesive and experienced subject matter experts, exclusively dedicated to their tasks, has proven to be a powerful and efficient tool. From the beginning, the GNR desired end-state was to build a PNTL Presidential CP Team forged within the highest standards and to proceed with the executive mandate handover as soon as possible. For this purpose the GNR Specialised Team was exclusively dedicated to two main tasks: to temporarily execute the Presidential CP; and to, build a CP capacity within the PNTL´s SPU. The multidimensional approach set on the two lines of action should drive towards a comprehensive and structured transfer of knowledge, skills and capacities to reach the identified end-state. The GNR challenge was to become a sustainable agent of change in complex environment, where the operational threats was real and concomitantly the PNTL identified shortfalls in organisation, experience and administrative framework required and superior effort for the capacity building goal. The success of the operation it was due to a constant adjustment of the ways to attain the ends we set ourselves to achieve in order to permanently meet the expectations of the Timorese authorities. The flexibility to coexist the technical and tactical training demands with the PNTL culture, police posture and behavioural habits, was vital for building trust among partners. A truthful PNTL’s ownership empowerment project was designed, implemented and concluded in a permanent and close harmony between leadership, trainers and trainees. The main take way for a capacity building process is to find the strategic balance between what both parties wish to achieve and to create conditions for a win-win paradigm.

FROM 2006 TO 2012 THE PORFPU CONDUCTED A PERMANENT ADAPTATION TO THE COUNTRY SITUATION ADJUSTING ITS MODULAR AND FLEXIBLE ORGANIZATION TO TRANSPORT THE OPERATIONAL EFFORT TO INCREASE THE CAPACITY BUILDING OF PNTL´S STRONGEST UNIT – THE UNIDADE ESPECIAL DE POLÍCIA (SPECIAL POLICE UNIT – SPU).

2. The Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR) is a gendarmerie type force, legally define as security force composed of military personnel, organised into a special corps of troops with administrative autonomy. In normal circumstances the GNR fundamentally exercises typical policing missions although, within the scope of the execution of national defence policy and in cooperation with the Armed Forces, military missions may be commissioned from it.
3. FALINTIL – Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL)
4. Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL)
DISTRIBUTION OF ETHNIC GROUPS

1. KORI: 34%
2. TATSI: 17%

ALUMNI
This publication marks 17 weeks since CoESPU began our response to prevent the spread of COVID 19. The Civilian, Police, and Military Course (CPM 26) attendees completed their coursework and graduated early to ensure everyone was able to travel home safely and with minimal delays. Additionally, that same week, CoESPU postponed all future classes. Since this time in early March, the CoESPU campus has been very quiet, and we have missed seeing the many faces of the members of the stability policing family.

Even though the campus was quiet there were a lot of activities going on behind-the-scenes. The CoESPU staff worked diligently to update current courses, build new courses for 2021, and to collect input on the impact of the pandemic to current Peace Operations, which you have read about throughout this issue.

Another very important ongoing operation was the continued efforts of the Alumni outreach working group. The positive response from our Alumni community, to the request for articles to publish in the Alumni section, was wonderful. I want to personally thank all of the Alumni who responded to us and took your personal time to contribute to this important part of our publication. I also apricate the kind notes from those who wish to contribute in the future, I understand many of you, especially currently on a mission, are very busy during this time. I look forward to hearing from you in the future.

This month we highlight two unique stories that illustrate Alumni efforts to make an impact on the stability policing community:

1. Colonel Haddou Zamani provides us insight on his experience as a course attendee who returned to serve as a guest tutor. The personal knowledge and experience shared by a guest tutor is priceless to an adult learning environment.

2. Colonel Julio M. Giménez Sisnández sets the stage for fruitful discussion of ‘a group’ versus ‘a team’ and what elements are necessary to strengthen the relations between components during Peace Operations. These types of discussions are important as we continue to improve peace operations.

I hope you enjoy these articles as much as I did and I look forward to hearing about your experiences and achievements. Please continue to send your articles and highlights or photos of your accomplishments us at: coespurivista@carabinieri.it

For our friends currently supporting a mission away from home, please know you are in our daily thoughts and conversations, we value your continued efforts. For everyone, I hope you and your loved ones remain well during this difficult time.
INTRODUCTION
Since the first Peace Operation was established in the Middle East in 1948, this type of operation has dramatically changed, particularly in the last two decades, forcing the United Nations to create and readapt the system to be more efficient in the accomplishment of various challenges in the new operational theatres. During more than 70 years of strong commitment to world peace, one of the prevalent, complex and sensitive aspects of the Peace Operations System is the interaction between the civilian, military and police components of United Nations, with a direct impact (positive or negative) on the achievement of the organization’s objective at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN THE FIELD, MANY DIFFERENT MEASURES WERE TAKEN BY REMARKABLE U.N. ACTORS AND ORGANIZATIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR STABILITY POLICE UNITS (COESPU), BASED IN VICENZA, ITALY, IS LEADING THE TRAINING OF CIVILIAN, POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD, IN A TRAINING COURSE CALLED “CIVIL-POLICE-MILITARY RELATIONS”
Throughout the daily work it is frequently witnessed how different concepts and definitions regarding the processes and means to achieve the organization’s objectives are commonly mistaken. A typical misinterpretation is when we refer to the term group and team work. To clarify the idea, we have to define the following concepts:

1. **Group:**
   “A number of people or things that are located close together or are considered or classed together”

2. **Team:**
   “A number of persons associated together in work or activity to reach a common goal”

Based on the definitions, we can conclude that there is no doubt about the way in which we can reach U.N. objectives; therefore teamwork is not an option, it is the only way to succeed in the fight for world peace.

Taking into account the clarification and importance of such concepts, we would like to point out that the reality indicates that in many occasions U.N. components work hard, as a group and not as a team, particularly among the different components (Civilian, Police and Military), affecting the effectiveness of the organization.

To understand the complexity of the problem, it is necessary to have a clear vision of how the U.N. components work to achieve the organization’s objectives and aims. Initially, and once the organization’s objective is established in a specific mission, the components, as a basic and fundamental support of the main objective, proceed to establish their goals to support and contribute to the achievement of that main objective. During the process, as reflected in figure No. 1, even though in the organization the main objective is common and well known by the components, the intermediate goals (objectives of the components) may be different, moving toward the direction of the organization’s objective, but in parallel, affecting the organization’s objectives, in the following ways:

1. Difficulties in achieving the objectives at all levels.
2. Decrease in the organization’s effectiveness.
3. Delaying the completion of tasks.
4. Duplicating efforts.
5. Creating or increasing friction among staff, especially at management levels.

Such limitations (in many cases) are the result of the following factors:

1. Lack of knowledge of the other components (objectives, organization, tasks and procedures).
2. The characteristics and particularities of the components.
3. Rigid structures/no flexibility.
4. Weak or non-existent coordination systems.
5. Lack or deficient links between organizations.
7. Influence of leaders, due to the following aspects:  
   a. Personality/Ego/Character.  
   b. Personal ambitions.  
   c. Experience.  
   d. Knowledge.  
   e. Intellectual level.  
   f. Commitment.  
   g. Professionalism.  
To eliminate or minimize the negative effects of these types of organizational difficulties, which are not easy to deal with and are time-consuming, it is necessary and mandatory to adopt firm measures and regulations, such as:  
1. Unification of organization’s objectives.  
2. Simplification of organizational structures.  
3. Creating an environment of teamwork and teambuilding.  
4. Reduce bureaucracy.  
5. Generate the conditions to facilitate the interaction between the different components.  
6. Staff training and development at all levels.  

CoESPU contributes to improving UN component’s relationships  
In order to improve the operational effectiveness in the field, many different measures were taken by remarkable U.N. actors and organizations. In this context, the Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), based in Vicenza, Italy, is leading the training of civilian, police and military personnel from different countries around the world, in a training course called “Civil-Police-Military Relations”. As part of the CoESPU’s annual training plan, the 26th Civil, Police and Military Relations course (26 C.P.M.) was held from 11th February to 5th March this year, with the participation of 33 students from 21 different countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, South America, and Oceania. The objective of the course is to create better and more effective collaboration between the different components of the mission, which will be deployed in non-stabilized areas, in the context of peace operations. The course is organized in two main phases:  
Phase 1:  
This part of the course is theoretical, where students get all the information, knowledge and experiences related to the subject, giving them the tools to understand the environment and the needs for strong connections between the civil, police and military components, to achieve the strategic objectives of the organization.  
Phase 2:  
At the end of the course and during one week, the students, as part of the United Nations staff, integrate a team in which all three components are present in order to engage in the study of realistic scenarios (in a specific and high technology area, called “MaGISTrA”/Model and Game Information Simulation Training Area) where through the planning process, they have to solve different situations and should end their task with a presentation to...
Undoubtedly, the course represents a fundamental milestone in the training of peacekeepers and peacemakers to ensure a cooperative environment toward success of U.N. missions, particularly considering the following sensitive and essential aspects:

1. Political stability.
2. Security environment.
3. Permanent peace.
4. Protection of civilians.

However, given the vital importance of the above-mentioned aspects, it is essential (among U.N. staff) to add two of the most important elements for success, professional attitude and unwavering commitment to peace. Every peacemaker (civilian, police and military) must internalize that peace is not an option, it is a right and we cannot fail to see that we are not a simple element in this complicated, essential and fundamental aspect of Humanity, we are responsible for taking action to make our world a peaceful place, where people, without any exclusion, can live and improve their lives.

A noted Irish thinker and philosopher, Edmund Burke, expressed, this quote, has to be the framework and the lighthouse that guides every action in the way of creating and ensuring world peace.

PICTURES:
-CoESPU Sezione Rivista
Dear Ma’am

First of all, let me reiterate my appreciation to Coespu Director, Brigadier General Giovanni Pietro BARBANO, from Italian Carabinieri, and to his deputy Colonel Rebecca HAZELETT from the United States Military Police for having granted me the privilege and the honor to be the first Moroccan Law Enforcement Officer, from the Coespu community, as an alumni and a facilitator, to write this article in the section dedicated to Coespu alumni in its magazine. In this regard, I would also and above all extend my deep gratitude and respectful regards the Moroccan Royal Gendarmerie Commander, Lieutenant General Mohammed HARAMOU, for having allowed me to contribute to Coespu training curriculum, and his support to write this article in Coespu Magazine. Therefore, and before going forward with my article, I’d like to express my deepest and sincere condolences to all the persons’ families who have lost their beloved ones since the Covid-19 outbreak in Italy, in Morocco, all the alumni’s countries and around all over the world. Meanwhile, I would like also to address my sincere greetings to all the Coespu personnel and all the alumni and say to them to be safe and always stick to the health authorities recommendations in order to prevent any second wave of the pandemic. Since my graduation from the Royal Moroccan Air Academy in 1991, as an engineer in aeronautics till late 2017 - where I’d been working in the Royal Gendarmerie’s Air component for 25 years in Rabat, I only heard about the CoESPU but I did not know it as a whole. However, during my second assignment, as the Studies Director of the Officers’ Royal Gendarmerie School in 2017, I’ve got the opportunity to be selected in order to take part to the 8th session of the Training Building Course in Coespu (Vicenza, Italy). It was indeed the starting point of an amazing and benificial story with this great Center of excellence. So, If I should define my experience at Coespu, the right word should be « challenging ». At the initial stage I was selected only to attend the TB course in March 2018. But, after the course, I went back again to Vicenza as « facilitator », once for CPM 24 training course in October 2018, and another time for CPM 25 course in October 2019. In other words, after being a student I have been selected like a

By Haddou Zamani
"trainer" thanks to a particular approach at Coespu; students who gain the best scores and have been distinguished for their academic skills and professional competencies are invited to come back to the Center as "facilitators" or "trainers" for the following new courses. The result is twofold: reinforce the liaison between the center and former students; and helps to establish a lasting networking between former students, the new ones and the Center.

I - The first journey as a trainee (TB08)

I attended this course for almost three weeks, from February 27th to March 21, 2018. Dedicated exclusively to the persons engaged in training or called upon to participate in FPU's deployment (Formed Police Units), this training course was attended by 26 police officers and officers from gendarmeries, belonging to 16 nationalities representing mainly the countries of Africa, Middle East, Asia and Eastern Europe. Once at the airport (Venice or Verona), the trainees are picked up and taken to the center where they have lunch/dinner before being installed in individual rooms. The next day, a dedicated warrant officer, as the assistant of the course supervisor, supports in depth all the trainees in all kind of aspects - from administrative processing to logistics needs, acting as the point of contact for any need of the class. He is in fact the point of contact of all the trainees for any advice, orientation or support which helps them a lot to easily integrate the Coespu environment. The curriculum of this course is organized in modules combining theory and practice, and it is mainly focused on the field of training management, dedicated to FPU training leaders. It's very important inasmuch it aims to improve the skills and capabilities of participants in the planning, conduct and evaluation of training courses for the FPUs. At the end of the course, all the participants are able to design, implement and evaluate an FPU training course, in accordance with United Nations standards and regulations. In this regard, several theoretical modules were taught. I could cite for instance, the international standards on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, the social, cultural and historical aspects of operations' theaters, the UN standards on policing, the FPU’s doctrine and operational procedures such as Crowd Riot Control, protection of UN personnel and facilities, Interim Operational Support to Host Country Police Services, FPU’s Logistics and Equipment Requirements.

Besides this, we’ve got some practical modules such as the use of firearms in the simulator in the morning and at the shooting range in the afternoon. Furthermore, the communication module was very beneficial to the extent that it allowed the trainees to prepare presentations while respecting the basic principles of communication, public speaking techniques and teamwork. In this context, the trainees develop, plan and brief the prepared specific training program to all their colleagues under the Coespu staff oversight. Finally, the most part I liked a lot was the Simulation Center named Magistra which is very appropriate and equipped for this type of exercise that could be used to an early advance planning, or an emergency one, or for any kind of incident in peace support operations theaters. We were so lucky because we had the chance to visit Magistra and enjoyed the excellent and relevant explanations of the former head of the Operational Planning Department and the one who has set up the Magistra simulation Center. The closing ceremony, is not only the site where students receive their certificates of participation but is also an occasion for a speech by the Director of this center, the Brigadier General Barbano, Director of Coespu, who congratulated the
whole for the efforts made while calling for the development of a police culture in harmony with the United Nations requirements. Therefore, after these three weeks, I was able to know more about Coespu and the beautiful City of Vicenza, where all the trainees had the opportunity to benefit of an optional visit, organized by Coespu, to Venice (or Verone) depending on the weather. 

Coespu Courses curriculum

Given in several languages, several types of courses are taught in this center, both by internal speakers from the Italian Carabinieri and by other external professors or lecturers, in accordance with the “training of trainers” approach advocated by the UN. Training programs are provided in English, French and Arabic when necessary. The decision to choose a specific language depends on the number of trainees whose countries of origin have requested internships exclusively in that language. This was the case, for example, for the 7th session of development of FPU programs made in French because intended exclusively by the Francophone community. In addition, the courses are conducted with the contribution of Carabinieri officers and external lecturers, such as experienced academics and representatives of Italian, European or American universities. The pedagogical approach used is generally interactive where trainees are asked to participate with their own conferences and to facilitate discussions as facilitators, highlight their personal experiences and expectations related to the topics covered. So, I will seize this opportunity to inform Coespu alumni fellows, through this article, about some interesting training courses depending on their specific operational needs. Open to civilians, Police and Military officers who will be deployed in PSO or are working in training departments, Coespu offers several courses for the benefit of all these components around the world. This includes: Asymmetric Threat Course; Civilian, Police and Military Relations Course (CPM); FPU Commanding Officers Course; PSO Gender
Protection Course (GP), High Risk Operations Course (HRO); International Military Police Course; the Protection of Civilians Course, the Stability Police Unit Course (SPU)...

II - The second opportunity as a facilitator for CPM 24 Course

As I stated before, this role is usually granted to the officers who have demonstrated, during their journey in Coespu, specific outstanding performance and behavior through an important and consistent background and knowledge in PSO on one hand; and a great spirit of teamwork and assistance towards the other trainees during the course, on the other hand (one of the main pillars of Coespu mission). It was precisely my case in so far as I have been selected to participate, as a facilitator, in the exercise planned from 18 to October 30th, 2018 in favor of the 24th class dedicated to the coordination between the Civilian, Military and Police components including the Gendarmeries (CPM24) working together in Peace Support Operations (PSO). 43 people participated including 02 civilian women, 21 police officers, 12 military officers including 01 Moroccan from the Army, 02 officers of the National Guard and 06 officers of the Gendarmerie, representing 23 nationalities from all over the world. The CPM Course curriculum

The Course deliberately focuses on the relationship between the three components: Civilians, police/Gendarmeries and military personnel. Therefore, the focus is on the interaction between these three components, taking into account the hostility of the environment, in order to show areas where coordination, cooperation or collaboration might be beneficial and to point out the ways in which such interaction might be profitably pursued in order to foster the security in the host country. Furthermore, and among other theoretical lessons scheduled in CPM training program, I’ve been assigned to teach the following lesson and a top table exercise:

- Working with mission partners,
- and a teamwork coordination exercise on the Ebola outbreak in a fictitious host country where a PSO mandate has been already issued by the UN in order to restore peace and security.
This exercise allows the all UN components (CPM) and other organizations such as OCHA – WHO & NGOs to brainstorm about the most big challenges they could meet. This critical thinking from each component specific perspective, aims to better know each other, therefore to enhance the coordination between them and with other external stakeholders. The issues could be related to an appropriate environment assessment, through the mapping tool, in order to identify all actors in the field (local and international) taking in account the priorities in accordance with the IHL and UN regulations. Therefore, each actor (CPM, GO/NGOs) has to come up with a draft of its specific courses of action to contain violence and the Ebola disease outbreak along with the main actors with whom it will closely cooperate in an effective way. Then, and along with these theoretical lessons, I also participated as a facilitator in the simulation center «Magistra» where I took benefit through the cooperation with former EXE & Planning Chair a very experienced officer. So, in order to better explain to the trainees the added value of coordination among the three components of a UN Mission, a huge complete scenario was implemented in Magistra and executed by the trainees at tactic level, while Trainers and « facilitator » played the operational and strategic levels (DIREX). Thus, in order to better understand the Command Post Exercise (CPX) that concludes the CPM course, it would be interesting to present how Magistra is organized.

Magistra Organization

The Simulation Center is organized into cells dedicated to the PSO-specific staff work. Indeed, the exercise was led by the Staff whose role was to represent both strategic level and operational levels directly receiving the strategic directives of the UN (DPO: Department of Peace Operations), and forward them to the tactical level, and where I was deeply involved as a facilitator. Finally, the tactical level is represented by a tactical staff whose role is assigned to the trainee personnel. This staff is commanded by the relevant Area Chief and is composed of the following cells: Area Chief of Staff, Staff Secretariat, Legal Counsel Cell, Public Information Officer and Environment and Logistics Cells. In this framework, several computers are dedicated to each component including the different cells related to it. For examples, we can mention the cells represented in the military component, namely J1 (personnel), J2 (intelligence), J3 (ops), J4 (logistics), ... and J9 (CIMIC). Also, it is worth noting to evoke that there are four additional positions composed of 03 cells dedicated to the FPUs and their Commanders. In this way, inside the same room, it is possible to control, coordinate and intervene to amend wrong actions taken both at Mission/ Sector staff level as well as at FPUs tactical actions spread out on the (simulated) terrain.

So, the planning Department, Coespù has developed many scenarios with different objectives depending on the training program course. For CPM 24 course, and in order to better understand the working environment at Magistra, I think that it’s timely to present you an extract from the “CARANA Scenario” where CARANA is a fictive country which aims to train Civilian, Military and Police components. It is based on a number of situations at tactical/operational level requesting the students to answer properly. It is important to underline « the third way » exploited by EXE & Planning Chair: CARANA is indeed the framework, however situations simulated into the original scenario were too generic and useless for the number of situations actually occurring on the terrain. Therefore, without exiting from the framework of expected scenario, coespù’s EXE & Planning Chair developed additional situations up to and including intelligence, planning activities as well as introducing conflict analysis and mapping tools for improving students comprehension on local actors (who’s who, link among them, political maps and orientations, in other words, all relevant info staff officers in a Mission should process to know the situation). Last but not least, logistics activities and operational activities are part of the core effort to give the students (particularly the « new entry » in UN Misison) a clear overview

THE COURSES ARE CONDUCTED WITH THE CONTRIBUTION OF CARABINIERI OFFICERS AND EXTERNAL LECTURERS, SUCH AS EXPERIENCED ACADEMICS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF ITALIAN, EUROPEAN OR AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES.
on their tasks once in the theater. **Short extract of CARANA Scenario**

Against a backdrop of almost chronic political and security instability since the end of the civil war, the Democratic Republic of Carana (DRC), a fictitious country, remains a politically unstable country despite the peace agreement signed with representatives of the main influential ethnic actors in the country, and it is experiencing a very precarious socio-economic situation that compromises peace and security in the region. As a result of this chaotic situation, the UN Security Council established a UN mission of Assistance to Carana (UNAC), in order to restore peace and security in the country and in the region.

**III - The third experience as a facilitator for CPM 25 Course**

As for the CPM 24 course, I had also been invited as a facilitator for CPM 25 course. During these two weeks, we had perfectly worked together in class and had enjoyed running again the Carana scenario Exercise at Magistra, scheduled from September 25th to October 22th, 2019. I am actually very fortunate to have closely worked with this staff thanks to his high professionalism and competences that Coespu should be proud of. Furthermore, and in addition to all the activities I carried out during the CPM 24, I had been given four more hours dedicated to tactical leadership in complex environment especially in PSO. The first lesson was about the Mapping stakeholders’ tool, and the second was about the self-assessment of a leader in a complex environment such as a PSO. These lessons are very important to better enhance human security which depends on fruitful civil-military-police understanding and coordination leadership skills. In fact, new generations of security sector leaders recognize that civil society is an important stakeholder for sustainable security. At the same time, many in civil society recognize the need to engage with the security sector as key stakeholders necessary for sustainable peace through a shared set of terms, concepts, through assessment, planning and monitoring all the challenges in the field.

**Conclusion**

To conclude, the main purpose of this center of excellence is to foster the standardization of common perceptions and operational skills and procedures in order to put into practice the unified intention of the stability police family worldwide. As a doctrinal hub, its ultimate objective is to develop standards derived from policing activities in order to promote interoperability and a comprehensive approach to Peace Support Operations (PSO) including the development of new FPU policy and training programs. In this regard, General Barbano, Coespu Director, has always highlighted, during the closing ceremonies (CPM 24 and 25), that the CPM personnel have to better develop their coordination in PSO in order to save resources, time and, above all, avoid duplication of efforts not only at the strategic level but also at the operational and tactical levels, especially in VUCA environment that characterizes the postcurrent and future conflict. Besides this, I’d like to thank the Coespu Director, with the collaboration of the deputy, all the personnel of Coespu that are working selflessly to support all kind of training courses; the italian and carabinieri lecturers and the foreign professors for their great commitment and professionalism. Finally, I am so proud of being an alumni of Coespu and I’m looking forward to keeping touch with this glorious institution in order to contribute to the achievement of the expected objectives and therefore for the improvement of human security all over the world. And from this alumni magazine section, I hope that all the international fellows of Coespu are safe as far as their families and advice them to seize the opportunity offered by Coespu in order to write articles related to their background in PSO or about other topics which could improve and nurture the working mission environment with all the partners involved in UN PSO theaters in order to maintain international peace and security.

**PICTURES:**
- CoESPU Sezione Rivista

1. 11 of them were women;
2. Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cameroon, Chad, Fiji, Ghana, Giordania, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Togo, Ukraine, Uruguay, Eurogendfor (Poland).
Since SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, named COVID-19, was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) on 11 March 2020, United Nations Peacekeeping and Special Political missions were forced to reassess how they do business and adapt their operations to this new reality. As UN Secretary-General António Guterres recently told the Security Council, “the brutal statistics of COVID-19 do not just reflect a global health crisis but signal a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security”. Since the pandemic could aggravate tensions, cause social unrest and a lapse in state authority in fragile states, now more than ever it is crucial to avoid reverting Blue Helmets’ hard won security gains and, ensure they stay wherever they are needed the most. UN peacekeeping missions were able to draw on their experience with managing Ebola outbreaks in West Africa in 2014 and in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2019. From the earliest manifestation of the outbreak, mitigating measures have been put in place across all UN offices to protect personnel, ensure they are not contagion vectors and, enable them to continue critical operations. And while the UN is not new to managing crisis, the pace at which these had to be implemented is unprecedented. Because of the fluidity of the situation, such measures are being adapted over time, based on the epidemiological situation on the ground and, local governments’...
response. In countries with a low infection rate, lockdowns are gradually being lifted and life is slowly returning to normal. However, while many countries around the world are still grappling with the virus, the African continent - where most UN peace operations are deployed - is still on the periphery of the pandemic, raising fears that the nightmare is yet to start.

Protect, Help, Explain

The UN faced some vehement attacks on social media following fears that its personnel could be carriers of COVID-19 and spread it to the local population, as it happened with the cholera outbreak in Haiti in 2010. In Somalia for example, Al-Shabaab has summoned African Union troops of bringing the virus in the country. In response to these concerns, UN Peace Operations have adapted all their activities and limited any close contact with the population. In South Sudan, government forces have set-up checkpoints outside some UN compounds to reduce staff movement. UN police have limited patrols and suspended all training for local partners that required physical proximity. During activities that entail contacts with the population, UN staff is keeping two meters apart. The COVID-19 pandemic has added another layer of complexity to the already challenging security situation in Mali and the Sahel Region, which sees terrorist groups allied with Al-Qaida and Islamic State proliferating in Ménako and Gao, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) regularly injuring Blue Helmets. There was the risk that MINUSMA could lose some critical resources due to the COVID-19 outbreak, something the mission could not afford. To address this challenge a plan was developed to establish a mobile task force, which enhances MINUSMA’s ability to implement its mandate, making it more agile and flexible and, augmenting its capabilities with tailored units and air assets. Most UN Peace Operations have reallocated programme funding to support local institutions efforts and communities. For example, the UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) carried out a sensitization campaign in IDP camps at high risk of infection. MINUSMA supported the reinforcement of the national COVID-19 response through the provision of medical equipment and infrastructure. In Gao, through the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Section, hygienic and sanitary products were handed out to communities benefiting from projects to reduce community violence. Further, the Mission also managed biomedical waste related to COVID-19 to avoid environmental contamination. The UN Mission in Somalia (UNISOM) supported the national government to draft provisional measures to respond to the outbreak. For its part, Radio Miraya, operated by the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) relays elementary school lessons to compensate for the classes that children are missing since the lockdown. Among other COVID-related measures, the Justice and Correction Service has developed operational tools to help prison administrators mitigate the spreading of COVID-19 in prisons. Similarly, the UN Police (UNPOL) has drafted guidelines on the conduct of day-to-day operations during this emergency, which are being shared with local police forces. Also, the Gender Unit of the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) has collected best practices of how missions are re-orienting the implementation of the Women in Peace and Security (WPS) mandate in light of the pandemic.


BLURB: “COVID-19 is the greatest test that we have faced together since the formation of the United Nations,” UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres

Business Goes On (almost) As Usual

For the past three months the Department of Operational Support (DOS) has explored measures to prevent and control risks associated with the pandemic, including psychosocial, ergonomic, and other work-related safety and health issues. In a message to all UN staff, the Secretary-General António Guterres, emphasized that the Organization “remains open for business”, but “our work will
be done from different locations, using different technologies”. The extraordinary measures enacted across all 13 UN Peacekeeping Missions include a mandatory 14-day quarantine period for all incoming personnel (civilian, military and police), suspension of UN passenger flights, regular disinfection of facilities, installing of hand-washing devices, closure of places of mass gatherings (gym, canteen etc.) and dining facilities only used as takeaways. Further, in order to reduce personnel’s exposure to the risk of contagion, civilian staff members – both in Missions and Headquarters - have been required to work remotely, unless their physical presence in UN premises was required to carry out essential work. Staff with medical conditions was given the option to leave the mission area. However, once borders have closed, all home leave and rest and recuperation time has been cancelled and personnel were forced to remain in the duty station. Concretely, this has meant that functions are discharged generally from home, either in the duty station or - as MINUSMA staff – also outside of mission area (non-location-based). For example, in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) non-critical staff has been moved out of Mogadishu and essential staff work mainly from their accommodations. However, for many – and particularly national staff – remote working solutions imply electricity cuts and having to rely on poor Internet connection. In addition, as most of the work is done electronically, some investments have been made to provide secure access solutions and strengthen authentication protocols to prevent breaches of sensitive information.

Rotations Freeze

In the early days of the Coronavirus Outbreak, governments of some countries hosting peace missions have requested the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) not to rotate new troops from high-risk nations such as China, Italy, Spain and Korea. To reduce risks of contagion, the Secretary-General directed the suspension of all rotations, repatriations and deployments of uniformed personnel until 30 June. This suspension – enacted in April 2020 - applies to formed units, individual uniformed personnel, national support elements and any other national uniformed personnel. The only exception to this directive was granted to the mission in Mali, driven by the need to execute critical operational capabilities. Transitional measures to enable the partial resumption of rotation are yet to be issued and missions will adapt them based on the trajectory of the pandemic and local governments response. However, the UN Department of Peace Operations has agreed with governments of troop contributing countries upon a 28-day quarantine period – 14 days before departing the home country and 14-
uniformed personnel (projections announced by Under Secretary General of the UN Department of Operational Support, Mr. Atul Khare, at UN media briefing of 29 May, 2020) between July and August, will likely overburden airlift capacity and logistical personnel.

High Stakes for Occupational Health and Safety

Faced with practical challenges spanning from the disruptions to global supply chains, borders closure, the grounding of commercial flights and, trade restrictions, UN logistics experts have developed business continuity plans to support the provision of services critical for the implementation of peace mandates. Such plans cater for life-support needs for 90 days (e.g. fuel, food, water and medical supplies) in case of the breakdown of supply systems and restrictions affecting cargo flows.

In terms of provision of medical equipment to field missions, DOS has centralized the stocking and management of personal-protective equipment (PPE) and 130 respiratory ventilators. Other critical supplies are made available in all missions to ensure that the capacity of intensive care units and supplies is sufficient and, not to strain the already stretched local resources. As an immediate step, more than 50,000 antibody tests have been shipped to field missions with additional batches to follow. The procurement of anti-gen testing kits for diagnosis is also being considered. UN reports indicate that the existing backbone of medical facilities in field operations has the capacity to respond to all but the very worst of cases requiring advanced treatment. For personnel who may contract COVID-19 and require hospitalization where Level 3 ICU facilities are available, patients will receive in-country treatment and follow-up care.

All missions have updated their contingency plans foreseeing the need for large-scale evacuations, but in the words of Under Secretary General Khare “in a global emergency, where will it be safer to go and who would be willing to accept several hundred if not thousand evacuees from UN field Missions?” Meanwhile, standing capacities for Medical Evacuations were expanded through additional arrangements with air ambulance providers and the establishment of an UN-system wide MedEvac Task Force. This Task Force is the primary means for the UN system to coordinate the medical evacuation of all personnel on the frontline.

DOS is also exploring the establishment of a dedicated facility open to all UN system personnel, and are calling on member states to express their willingness to host such a facility. Stress and mental-health related disorders associated with COVID-19 have been recognized as a global issue by the World Health Organization (WHO) and are high on UN’s agenda. Thus, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the general understanding of how prolonged crisis can create challenges for both individuals’ mental health as well
as maintaining the social fabric of communities’. The post-COVID-19 world is one where the UN recognizes that millions of people, including its staff are experiencing the psychological challenges of dealing with the pandemic, and we must do something about it. Early in the response, the Secretary-General sent a message to all UN personnel, emphasizing his focus on the mental health and wellbeing of staff. In addition, the UN System Workplace Mental Health and Wellbeing Strategy, which was launched in 2018, has been modified taking into consideration the wellbeing and health needs of personnel during the COVID-19 pandemic. The UN has also developed a dedicated webpage for staff care measures and resources across a broad range of health and wellbeing topics, such as dealing with uncertainty, loss and grief, working remotely, as well as advice and training for managers. The organization also has internal staff/stress counsellors with teams in the majority of peacekeeping missions and has scaled up on external mental health partners in each region. Further, insurance plans are currently covering for additional psychosocial support, meaning that whenever staff need it, they are now able to reach a professional counsellor using tele-health services. The actions in place will assist not only during this unprecedented time, but are designed to ensure that they are sustainable and will help lead to improved health and well-being of personnel well into the future – UN sources say.

What Next for UN Peace Operations?
The economic, security and social effects of COVID-19 might last for months if not years to come and it is possible that they cause further instability in conflict-prone countries. While so far no UN Peace Operation has faced political turbulences that could be linked to the pandemic, there could be a greater need for UN Missions in the future and that existing ones will have to step in more prominently to help maintaining public order and support governments with COVID-19-induced political pressures. According to Richard Gowan and Louise Riis Andersen, the Blue Helmets may be expected to take on additional tasks, that would include facilitating the delivery of food supplies, medical and public-health initiatives led by humanitarian actors and mediation support for any political turbulence linked to COVID-19. Against this backdrop, the overall future of peace operations is under scrutiny and depends on many complex aspects. The first one is potential budget cuts, about which the 5th Committee will deliberate on 30 June, 2020. Thus, as a result of the global economic recession and criticism on performance of peace operations - that started long before COVID-19 - UN experts fear that current peacekeeping budget could be slashed down to 50%. While this may not mean the closure of missions overnight, spending might be cut gradually and there
could be reluctance to mandate new operations. Secondly, if key troop-contributing countries were to recall contingents to support domestic affairs – as done by South Korea in March (while not a major TCC) - the overall ability of UN Missions to fulfill their mandates would be heavily compromised. As a result, Blue Helmets’ capacity to assist host countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace, could be greatly compromised. As suggested by Dr. Charles Hunt\textsuperscript{14}, Non-Resident Fellow with United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, the financial pressures resulting from the economic recession caused by COVID-19 may present the UN with an opportunity to experiment diverse forms of crisis management. This could include looking into smaller-and more affordable mechanisms such as light-weight Observer Missions and civilian Special Political Missions, as in Guinea-Bissau and Haiti. Following the Secretary-General’s call to think about crisis management more holistically, in the aftermath of COVID, peace and security actors (peacemakers, peace builders and peacekeepers) will need to align their programming and, by combining political and technical expertise, build on each other’s strength. Both Hunt and Gowan\textsuperscript{15} agree that UN Peace Operations need to become exceptionally flexible and adaptable in future. And this flexibility should include a closer cooperation with the private sector, civilian-led protection, human rights monitoring actors and the broader UN Agencies and Funds. As financial resources become scarcer, such partnerships - which peacekeeping is not new to - would have to move away from being only anecdotal and ad hoc, but rather become the new normal.

1. Definition provided by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) 2020
6. UN Media Briefing of 22 May 2020
10. Richard Gowan & Louise Riis Andersen, What next for UN peace operations? Danish Institute for International Studies, June 2020
12. Richard Gowan & Louise Riis Andersen, What next for UN peace operations? Danish Institute for International Studies, June 2020
15. Richard Gowan & Louise Riis Andersen, What next for UN peace operations? Danish Institute for International Studies, June 2020

PICTURES: MINUSCA MONUSCO UNAMID UNFICYD UNFICYP

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On 8 October 2019, in Vicenza (Italy), the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence (NATO SP CoE), organized an international conference on the evaluation of the so-called “spoilers”, that are, according to the definition given by the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, those individuals or groups of individuals who believe that a peace process could threaten their power and interests, and therefore will try to sabotage it.

The conference was attended, among others, by the four major international organizations NATO, the United Nations, the European Union and the African Union, represented by their interlocutors, together with the NATO SP CoE’s Sponsoring Nations, the representatives of Italy, which is the Framework Nation of the Centre, and prestigious organizations such as the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). The purpose of the conference was to identify whether or not there is a common approach in evaluating the spoilers and possibly analyse its contents in order to propose a shared methodology useful to prevent their actions and thus to make the peace missions more effective. The latter was the subject of a dedicated two-day workshop that followed the conference. SUMMARY: 1. Introduction: what are the so-called “spoilers”? - 2. First session: opening speeches and definition of the problem. - 3. Second session: lessons learned from previous NATO missions. - 4. Third session: the evaluation of the spoilers by NATO, the United Nations and the African Union. - 5. Conclusions: the proposal for an effective methodology to be adopted within NATO.

1. Introduction: what are the so-called “spoilers”?
Stephen Stedman first defined the concept of “spoilers” in 1996, based on the experience gained...
by the United Nations in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique and Rwanda. He defined the spoilers as “leaders and groups of individuals who believe that the peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, their worldview and their interests, and, to avoid this, they use violence to undermine the processes that try to reach it”. The definition subordinates the concept of “spoilers” to the presence or absence of a peace agreement, and not to activities that are carried out in a period prior to the agreement. Subsequently, in 2008, the United Nations incorporated the concept of “spoiler” into their peacekeeping doctrine, which defines “spoilers” as individuals or groups of individuals who believe that a peace process could threaten their power and interests, therefore they will try to sabotage it. This definition omits the use of violence as an essential element of the spoiler, therefore in 2015 a report by the High Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations defined the “spoilers” as those who stand outside the peace process and try to sabotage it, even by adopting violent methods.

By specifying that “also” violent methods exist, the Panel actually stated that the adoption of non-violent methods can also constitute a spoiler behavior. A more pragmatic view on the “spoilers” is provided by Jock Covey, who concluded that “belligerent parties generally enter the peacekeeping phase while keeping their grievances and war goals intact. Each one of them tries to achieve in the shadow of the peace process what it failed to achieve in the phase of armed conflict. (...) For them peace is nothing more than the continuation of the war carried out by other means”. Being war conducted by definition by violent means, and being spoilers often non-violent, the central question is whether the definition of “spoilers” can explicitly recognize and include non-violent behavior: indeed, if there is a general consensus on the definition that identifies “spoilers” as leaders, individuals or groups of individuals who believe that peace threatens their power and interest and therefore act to sabotage it, the use or not of violent behavior is the subject of a heated debate among the parties. For example, Stedman recognizes the importance of non-violent behavior by “spoilers”, like in Afghanistan and Iraq, where corruption and misappropriation of funds by corrupt public officials has undermined the confidence in the government and has helped to plunge these areas back into chaos and conflict; however, he says that premeditated inaction and malicious slowness in carrying out the commitments taken in the peace agreements, are often nothing more than a way of doing politics. As a result, including non-violent behavior in the definition of “spoilers” would widen the scope of the definition to such an extent as to include all subjects who behave in a certain manner for political convenience. In addition to this, legitimate disputes on points reached in the course of a peace processes do not constitute a behavior of “spoilers” but may simply represent the pursuit of a legitimate interest. In order to finance so-called “violent” behaviors, like insurrections, protests, terrorist attacks, etc. “spoilers” often have to fund themselves by using non-violent behaviors, such as the misappropriation of public economic resources by unfaithful officials, emphasizing once again that in the areas of conflict the boundary between violent and non-violent behaviors remains very blurred and subjective.

IN ORDER TO FINANCE SO-CALLED “VIOLENT” BEHAVIORS, LIKE INSURRECTIONS, PROTESTS, TERRORIST ATTACKS, ETC. “SPOILERS” OFTEN HAVE TO FINANCE THEMSELVES BY USING NON-VIOLENT BEHAVIORS, SUCH AS THE MISAPPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC RESOURCES BY UNFAITHFUL OFFICIALS, EMPHASIZING ONCE AGAIN THAT IN THE AREAS OF CONFLICT THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT BEHAVIORS REMAINS VERY BLURRED AND SUBJECTIVE.
IN DEPTH

ring theme. This was discussed in detail during the two-day workshop that followed the conference, which results have been summarized in a Report published on the NATO SP CoE website. The conference was structured in three sessions and, at the end of each, there was an interactive discussion between the speakers and the participants. The outcomes of the speeches and the conclusions are presented below.

2. First session: opening speeches and scoping the problem.
The agenda of the event was characterized by the variety of speeches both in terms of provenance and content. In advance, participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire on the subject to have a view on their knowledge of the problem. The results of the questionnaire were used both to guide the work and as a starting point for the workshop itself. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that about 75% of respondents adopted the definition of “spoilers” provided by the United Nations, which appears wider than the one provided by Stedman or others, recognizing also the possibility for non-violent behaviors. The percentage drops to 50% when requested on the existence of some form of methodology to identify and evaluate the “spoilers”, and only two respondents (25%) reported the existence of a specific and well-defined methodology adopted during the planning phase. The audience unanimously shared the opinion to integrate the results of the evaluations of the “spoilers” formulated by several international organizations by combining them, and about 90% of respondents highlighted that the lack of a designed methodology to identify and evaluate the “spoilers” can cause the failure of a peace mission.

The conference was introduced by the at the time Director of the NATO SP CoE, Col. Andrea Paris, who welcomed the guests with a brief overview on the conference and the post-event workshop, and LTC Alessandro Di Stefano, representative of the NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), in place of Major General Sefik Atak (NATO ACT Deputy Chief of Staff Resource and Management). The latter highlighted that 80% of the 25 internal conflicts in which the United Nations has intervened since 1980 have been severely afflicted by “spoilers” in the form of Criminalized Power Structures (CPS). When NATO was directly involved, for example in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, the percentage dramatically rose to 100%, leading the Atlantic Alliance to consider “spoilers” as a serious risk for the immediate future of peace missions.

Dr. Michael Dziedzic, a professor at George Mason University in the United States, and a researcher of the subject, then provided the participants with a set of basic notions about “spoilers” for the work that would follow during the conference, fully in line with the previous Chapter 1.

Dr. Sarah Chayes, former special adviser to two ISAF commanders, focused her speech on corruption, a behavior often used by “spoilers” with deleterious effects on the peace process, because of its impact on the credibility of the legitimate government and, consequently, mission. As a concrete example, Dr. Chayes talked about the corruption of former President Karzai’s regime in Afghanistan, which - she claimed - brought the country back into the hands of the Taliban. Corruption, in fact, despite common thought, does not belong to any culture and therefore it is not socially accepted by people, who consider it unacceptable and are often led to empathize more willingly with “rebel” movements rather than with the legitimate government. Examples of kleptocracy given by Dr. Chayes also highlighted how corruption often embraces not only state structures (politics, judiciary, police forces, etc.) but also private organizations, such as banks, which obviously may play a...
key role in money-laundering, and private security firms, which may become the operational branch of corrupt officials. All this needs to be studied as a part of the modus operandi of the “spoilers”, ensuring that the international community, in supporting certain factions, at the end will not sponsor de facto groups that are interested in keeping the chaos alive for utilitarian purposes. In some cases even the so-called “non-profit” organizations have been mentioned as a part of the problem, as they may be involved in frauds aimed at obtaining funds for projects financed by the international community. For these reasons, Dr. Chayes concluded her speech emphasizing the importance of strategic analysis, which is necessary in order to identify the contacts among the key figures in the operational scenario and their influences and implications: indeed only through a detailed picture of the situation, measures to mitigate the negative effect of “spoilers” can be put in place. Dr. Gene Aloise, Deputy Inspector General of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), an independent agency created in 2008 by the United States Congress to monitor the reconstruction of Afghanistan, opened his speech with a brief overview of his organization, consisting of more than 200 investigators and auditors. Similarly to Dr. Chayes, he pointed out that for 71% of Afghans corruption is a big problem, a risk for the success of a future peace process, even larger than the one represented by the Taliban. Corruption as a risk factor has been underestimated and it hasn’t been strongly fought, as efforts have been mostly focused on Al Qaeda’s defeat. The funds invested in Afghanistan to date amount to USD 132 billion, it is therefore easy to understand the importance of this phenomenon. Since 2014, the funds have been allocated in a “conditional” manner, differently from what happened before, and this has been a useful tool to fight corruption, despite the fact that many billions have already been lost. A report published by Asia Foundation showed that 39% of Afghans had to give money to the police: Afghan anti-corruption units are undersized and underpaid, and government benchmarks are not a measure of the effectiveness of the fight against corruption. The SIGAR is going to publish a report on corruption in Afghanistan, and it will soon be available on the agency’s website. Dr. Aloise then highlighted the possible role of gendarmerie type forces in the theater, to train Afghan police forces and to support them in building their integrity. He concluded by inviting the audience to read the reports published by the SIGAR, downloadable from the website www.sigar.mil.

4. Third session: the evaluation of “spoilers” by NATO, the United Nations and the African Union.

Major General Andrew Harrison, a British Royal Marines officer and Deputy Adviser to the Afghan Interior Minister, opened his speech by providing an overview of the situation in Afghanistan, a country in the midst of a civil war which, however, is slowly on the way of reaching a peace agreement. This clearly implies that there is a need to put in place a strategy for the future of the country, which otherwise would immediately return to chaos. To give a dimension of the problems and extreme differences in theater, Maj. Gen. Harrison gave the example of a checkpoint in a rural area, which operates isolated without the necessary logistical support and has great difficulties even to communicate with its department, in contrast to the special forces operating in Kabul, which are fully qualified and equipped to carry out their duties. If one day the Atlantic Alliance should leave the country without fully completing its mission, the situation could dangerously resemble what hap-
IN DEPTH

pened in Iraq and revert to chaos. Fortunately, 18 years of international support have created a new generation of young and motivated Afghan leaders, who are working with NATO to reform the country. Within the Ministry of Interior there are numerous reforms in place ranging from the competencies of the police and its leadership, to the development of special forces, gender and logistics. Progress is, however, very fragmented and characterized by a rapid turnover of staff in top positions. As an example, the 14 Interior Ministers the country had over the past 18 years: this clearly has an impact on the continuity of the work done. The NATO mission in Afghanistan, called “Resolve Support”, is dealing currently with two projects, Future Force, funded by the United States for the next 5 years, and Post Peace Policing, which aims to design a stable and lasting police force which could be operational after a possible peace agreement. The Afghan Government, NATO and the international community have to work together for this second project, which must surely provide a broad vision to the future of the country and its police. Brigadier General Robert Gichangi Kabage, Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Officer at the African Union Peacekeeping Operations Division, opened his presentation illustrating the African Union’s experience in Somalia. Support has been developed on five pillars: the Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning System, the Committee of Wise Men, the Peace Fund and the African Reserve Force. The latter includes Members of Parliament and citizens, and the police component deployed in Somalia is part of it. The problem of the “spoilers” was analyzed by BG Kabage, highlighting the importance of understanding their capabilities and their possible impact on police operations. The definition of “spoilers” adopted by the African Union follows the one previously provided by the United Nations and includes terrorist groups and so-called “warlords”. The analysis methodology of “spoilers” takes into account information obtained from police investigations, intelligence services and open sources such as social media, and also deals with the means used by “spoilers” to negatively affect peace processes, such as the internal dynamics of the various clans on the territory, the fear of being persecuted, ideological fundamentalism, corruption, the use of asymmetrical war and contacts to international terrorist networks. BG Kabage also highlighted the key role played by corruption, which in fact encourages all the parts involved in the peace process to maintain the status quo instead of working to create a secure environment. Moreover the “spoilers” often enjoy a close contact with the population because they provide that safety function that the State has not been able to supply in the course of the years, and therefore the analysis cannot avoid examining this aspect. Instead, with regard to the management of the “spoilers”, the importance of the possible use of force to target top elements of criminal and terrorist organizations has been highlighted, but also the use of dialogue and deradicalization programmes, and, where appropriate, amnesties. Analyzing the “spoilers” therefore becomes not only a collective responsibility of all those organizations that participate in the missions of peace, but also an essential requirement for their success: it certainly cannot be the result of the effort of a single organization. Chief Superintendent Jaime Cuenca, Senior Police Officer of the United Nations and Team Leader within the UN Standing Police Capacity, highlighted the importance of conflict prevention, a concept also underlined by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It is part of prevention to create incentives to encourage a peaceful resolution of disputes. The problem is particularly important, given that more countries had conflicts during 2016 than in the last 30 years. This has affected not only developing countries, but also countries with an intermediate economy and developed institutions. It is estimated that by 2030 half of the world’s population will live in countries afflicted by violence, highlighting the key role played by prevention. The latter, which is still difficult to quantify and measure, should be developed with particular emphasis on the structural causes of conflicts such as governance,
the rule of law and security sector reforms: police forces can play a leading role in all these activities. Fair societies, which provide opportunities for their young people, tend to be less violent, so do those ones which guarantee universal access to basic goods and services. Chief Superintendent Cuenca then pointed to a number of risk factors for the emergence of conflicts, such as sudden demographic growth, with its impact on the labour market, climate change, with the desertification of large areas historically dedicated to agriculture, corruption and conflicts related to gender inequalities: all these factors should be clearly taken into account for the analysis of the “spoilers”. The United Nations Security Council has so far been concerned about conflicts and not about prevention. The latter requires a long-term strategic vision and a careful look at the possible causes, already included in the planning stages of a possible peacekeeping mission.

5. Conclusions: the proposal for an effective methodology to be adopted within NATO.

At the end of the conference, four conclusions, which resulted from the speeches and the following discussions, were formulated, which were subsequently used as a starting point for the post-event workshop, namely: the importance of the identification and evaluation of “spoilers” in the planning phase of international missions, the importance of having a common and shared methodology to assess their threat, the central role of local and international police forces in this evaluation process and finally the possibility of bringing together in a single approach the different methodologies that existed and were presented at the conference.

NATO plays a central role in the global geostrategic scenario with the declared aim of “projecting stability”: in this context, the document produced by the NATO SP CoE at the end of the post-conference workshop will lay the doctrinal foundations for dealing with it in a more structured, coherent and systematic way, as well as in a holistic way, the planning of peace missions. With this perspective in mind, it is of utmost importance to highlight the operational dimension of “Stability Policing”, which has the NATO SP CoE as its main Ambassador.

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2. Agenzia creata dal Congresso degli Stati Uniti per avere una visione obiettiva ed indipendente sull’impiego dei fondi destinati all’Afghanistan (https://www.sigar.mil/)
4. Principal deputy special representative of the UN secretary-general for the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and senior deputy high representative in Bosnia.
5. Criminalized power structures (CPS) are illicit networks that profit from transactions in black markets and from criminalized state institutions while perpetuating a culture of impunity.
7. During the NATO summit, held in Warsaw on 8 and 9 July 2016, the project called “Projecting Stability” was approved, as a tool to increase global security also through the protection of civilian populations, with a clear reference to the concept of Stability Policing.
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PICTURES:
NATO SP COE

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The idea of what constitutes a nation has drawn diverse definitions by academics and historians. Some commentators limit the meaning to ethnic considerations, describing a nation as an ethnic group that has mobilised and institutionalised itself. Others take a broader view, stating there must be a common identifier that denotes nationhood, for example, language, territory or culture. Professor Anthony D. Smith defines a nation as a ‘cultural-political community that has become conscious of its autonomy, unity and particular interests’. Smith’s definition that a nation is ‘cultural-political’ probably fits in most easily with most modern-day State-building contexts, although it falls short of implying a sense of permanence or institutionalism. This then leads us to ask: what is it that transforms a ‘community’ into a nation? What is nation-building, and why is it important for peacekeeping? Peacekeeping is ordinarily envisioned as being the first step in a journey whereby a country re-stabilises and re-builds itself. The obvious long-term hope is that the host country, with the help of donor entities, strengthens its core infrastructure so it can be resilient, democratic, and eventually function without the need for outside assistance. These core infrastructures are the pillars of what makes a nation, and include (but are limited to), the existence of a Constitution, elections, a civilian police force, an independent judiciary, a corpus of laws in line with international standards, a competent civil service, and a clear separation of State powers. The UN has advocated these principles for decades, reflected through its rule of law and governance programmes in many countries. Critical to the democratic functioning of these core pillars is a strong sense of values that cut across all components, transforming these separate columns into a joined and coherent structure. These values include: principles of
integrity and transparency for those engaged in public service positions, openness to cross-jurisdictional cooperation, and intolerance to discrimination and proliferation of crime. These values are in turn enshrined in primary and secondary legislation (e.g. anti-corruption measures), and enforced through accountability bodies such as a Judicial Council or police misconduct panel. Without the existence of these core pillar institutions and corresponding cross-cutting values, the ‘house’ of a nation will not be built, and a country and its citizens will remain disparate and structure-less, vulnerable to insecurity and exploitation. Within this context, peacekeepers are sometimes mistakenly seen as the short-term fix, disassociated from the longer-term vision; a stop-gap whose only function is to halt violence until there is a permanent cessation of hostilities. This is, however, a blinkered view of the role and contribution of peacekeepers to nation-building efforts. Peacekeepers create and facilitate the much-needed space in which the foundations for pillar institutions can be shaped and built, and they also contribute expertise to the process. Examples of this include AMISOM troops in Somalia, whose presence helps enable complicated federalisation processes to be consulted upon, and whose technical advice has contributed to the same. Similarly, UN DDR programmes in many peacekeeping contexts have contributed to a reduction in the use of small arms, and the sustainable reintegration into society of those who previously destabilised the country.

Despite the obvious input that peacekeepers play in the nation-building process, it is important they should remember the necessity of adopting a strategic and coordinated approach; something that missions have sometimes failed to do. It is unwise for missions to place an over-emphasis on one of the nation-building pillars to the detriment of the others, e.g. elections. As the saying goes, Rome was not built in a day, and as a country’s infrastructure grows, each component becomes intertwined with, and reliant on, the others in order that it can remain functional. For example, without a Constitution (or related legislation) there may be no fair and free elections; without DDR there can be no political stability within which political parties can govern; without a separation of State powers there can be no independent judiciary; without a functional police force there will be fewer offenders brought before judges; without accountability of public officials there is a lack of citizen-State trust etc. This is a complicated and organic matrix that needs nurturing from its inception. Taking a macro view of the contribution of peacekeeping efforts to State-hood, it therefore becomes apparent that a broader understanding and appreciation is needed of the nation-building process and the role that peacekeepers play in it. Given the word ‘nation’ comes from the French and Latin words for ‘birth’, it is entirely fitting that the presence and contribution of peacekeepers to nation-building efforts should be duly recognised.

PEACEKEEPING IS ORDINARILY ENVISIONED AS BEING THE FIRST STEP IN A JOURNEY WHEREBY A COUNTRY RE-STABILISES AND RE-BUILDS ITSELF. THE OBVIOUS LONG-TERM HOPE IS THAT THE HOST COUNTRY, WITH THE HELP OF DONOR ENTITIES, STRENGTHENS ITS CORE INFRASTRUCTURE SO IT CAN BE RESILIENT, DEMOCRATIC, AND EVENTUALLY FUNCTION WITHOUT THE NEED FOR OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE.
HEALTH AND WELL-BEING
Coronaviruses and other similar infections in our brain: they can produce psychiatric syndromes?

By Davide Perego

Coronaviruses are single-stranded RNA viruses. They belong to a large family of respiratory viruses that can cause mild to moderate illnesses from the common cold disease to respiratory syndromes. In the past we known the effects of this type of viruses with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), starting in 2002, and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), starting in 2012. On Dec 31, 2019, WHO was made aware of several cases of atypical pneumonia in Wuhan, China, which were subsequently identified as being caused by a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). There is the common idea that the first target of these viruses is the respiratory tract, although COVID-19 showed pleiotropic effects, example dermatologic and vascular damages. It is interesting take into consideration also, eventually psychiatric and neuropsychiatric effects of SARS, MERS, and COVID-19.

Coronaviruses have also been detected in both the brain and the cerebrospinal fluid of individuals with seizures, encephalitis, and encephalomyelitis. In general viral infections are known to infect CNS, causing neuropsychiatric syndromes affecting cognitive, affective, behavioral, and perceptual domains. As the pandemic of the disease has spread, there has been a growing recognition of the psychiatric implications of the disease. In the meantime the wider social impact of the pandemic and the governmental response, including physical distancing measures and quarantine, has interested all the people independent of the age and the status. Both the infected and non-infected population might be susceptible as a result of pandemic period, such as widespread anxiety, social isolation, stress in health-care workers and other essential workers, and unemployment and financial difficulties. But over general effects, expe-
Experiences might be specific to individuals who are infected with the virus, such as concern about the outcome of their illness, stigma, and amnesia or traumatic memories of severe illness.

Neuropsychiatric consequences as mental disorders that are the sequelae of brain damage or disease, can arise either through direct effects of infection of the CNS or indirectly via an immune response or medical therapy. A case series from Wuhan found that among patients admitted to hospital for infection with SARS-CoV-2, 36% had neurological features, mostly consisting of mild symptoms such as dizziness and headache, although these symptoms might be manifestations more of systemic illness than a specific neurological syndrome (Mao L Jin H Wang M et al. Neurologic manifestations of hospitalized patients with coronavirus disease 2019 in Wuhan, China. JAMA Neurol. 2020; (published online April 10.). A study by University of Cincinnati researchers and University of Brescia (Brescia), University of Eastern Piedmont (Novara), and University of Sassari, Sassari, have taken consideration images from 725 hospitalized patients with confirmed COVID-19 infection between February 29 and April 4. Of these, 108 (15%) had serious neurological symptoms and underwent brain or spine imaging. Most patients had brain CT scans, while others had head and neck CT imaging and brain MRI. Investigators found that 59% of patients reported an altered
mental state and 31% experienced stroke, which were the most common neurological symptoms. Patients also experienced headache (12%), seizure (9%) and dizziness (4%), among other symptoms.

SARS-CoV-2 invades human host cells by the angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 receptor (ACE2r), which has little expression in the brain. There has been hypothesis that other routes of CNS infiltration might account for the respiratory failure caused by infection with SARS-CoV-2, although there isn’t, actually, evidence. There is preliminary in-vitro evidence that SARS-CoV-2 can replicate in neuronal cells, but the translation of this finding to in-vivo settings remains unclear. Previous influenza pandemics have been associated with long-lasting neuropsychiatric consequences, so it is possible that other viral infections on a large scale could cause sustained mental morbidity.

From a systematic review and meta-analysis of the psychiatric consequences of coronavirus infection published by “The Lancet” in May 2020, were identified 72 independent studies that provided data on both the acute and post-illness psychiatric and neuropsychiatric features of coronavirus infection, including seven medRxiv preprints (medRxiv is an Internet site distributing unpublished manuscripts about health sciences). The scientific literature predominantly consists of data on patients with SARS and MERS treated in hospital, so there should be caution to extend any findings to COVID-19, particularly for patients who have mild symptoms. The main findings are that:

• signs suggestive of delirium are common in the acute stage of SARS, MERS, and COVID-19;
• there is evidence of depression, anxiety, fatigue, and post-traumatic stress disorder in the post-illness stage of previous coronavirus epidemics, but there are few data yet on COVID-19.

In SARS and MERS in the acute stage, using data from two studies, the most important finding was that confusion occurred in 27.9% of pa-
tients, suggesting that delirium was common. Other common psychiatric findings were depression, anxiety, and insomnia. Diagnoses of mania and psychosis did occur in a small minority (0.7%), but in a small sample this diagnosis appeared to be almost entirely related to use of exogenous corticosteroids, which are rarely prescribed to treat SARS-CoV-2 infection. Notably, insomnia, emotional lability, irritability, pressured speech, and euphoria were relatively common, suggesting that although a full syndrome of mania was uncommon, not detectable symptoms might be present. In SARS and MERS, after recovery from the infection, sleep disorder, frequent recall of traumatic memories, emotional lability, impaired concentration, fatigue, and impaired memory were reported in more than 15% of patients at a follow-up period ranging between 6 weeks and 39 months. Emotional lability, pressured speech, and euphoria were only reported by patients and relatives after a short follow-up in one studying which corticosteroids had frequently been prescribed at high doses and symptoms; therefore, it might be of limited relevance to the COVID-19 pandemic. The point prevalences of anxiety disorders, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder were high, although the lack of adequate comparison groups or assessment of previous psychiatric disorder means that it is hard to separate the effects of the infection from the impact of an epidemic on the population. In terms of severity, mean scores for depression and anxiety on standard scales were below clinical cutoffs. Measures of health-related quality of life were considerably lower in patients with SARS than in control groups. However, the impairment in social functioning was greater than the effects on mental health, suggesting that the effect of coronaviruses is broad and not specific to mental health. In terms of applicability to COVID-19, conclusions must be cautious because data on the acute effects of the illness are limited and no data exist on the post-illness...
phase, and the higher mortality of SARS and MERS might be correlated with poorer psychiatric outcomes. The information available suggests that in the acute stage (as in SARS and MERS) confusion is a common feature, so delirium is probably a significant clinical problem. In the longer term, the data from SARS and MERS suggest that the prevalence of depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and fatigue might be high, but as yet data on these diagnoses in patients with COVID-19 are preliminary or unpublished. In patients with severe illness requiring ICU admission, neurocognitive impairment might be a feature. The researchers found only three cases of SARS-CoV-2-related psychiatric symptoms that were explicitly linked to hypoxic or encephalitic brain injury; this finding is consistent with the rarity of case reports that have associated detection of coronaviruses in the CNS with acute encephalitis or encephalomyelitis (mainly in immunocompromised or immunodeficient children).

The aetiology of the psychiatric consequences of infection with coronavirus is likely to be multifactorial and might include the direct effects of viral infection, including brain infection, cerebrovascular disease (including in the context of a procoagulant state), the degree of physiological compromise (eg, hypoxia), the immunological response, medical interventions, social isolation, the psychological impact of a novel severe and potentially fatal illness, concerns about infecting others, and stigma.
The immune response in SARS-CoV-2 infection is of interest and there might be a hyper inflammatory state similar to that seen in hemophagocytic lymphohistiocytosis in which there are increased concentrations of C-reactive protein, ferritin, and interleukin-6, although this state is likely to be short lived. The link between inflammation and depression is well described in the literature, and might explain some of the psychiatric morbidity. Survivors of critical illness are at risk of persistent psychiatric impairment after discharge from hospital. At 1 year, the pooled prevalences of clinically relevant depressive was 29%, anxiety 34%, and post-traumatic symptoms 34%. The majority of patients with severe acute respiratory distress syndrome, a key feature of severe COVID-19 illness, show impairments of memory, attention, concentration, or mental processing speed. None of the studies included in the review completed systematic neuropsychological assessments apart from one report of severe SARS-CoV-2 cases, which described a dysexecutive syndrome in a third of survivors. Acute respiratory distress syndrome and prolonged mechanical ventilation are also associated with greater reductions in quality of life than ICU admissions for other reasons. However, although the frequencies of ICU admission and ventilation were similar for patients admitted to hospital with SARS-CoV infection (13% ICU admission and 7% ventilation) and SARS-CoV-2 (18% and 6%), they were considerably higher in patients with MERS (60% and 51%).

Conclusion
Given that a very large number of individuals will be infected with SARS-CoV-2, the immediate impact on mental health could be considerable. An acute rise in cases of delirium will probably prolong hospital stay; there is also some preliminary evidence that delirium was associated with raised mortality in MERS. There is a risk of common mental illnesses in patients with disease that require hospital admission, which might be compounded by the effects of social isolation. Given this psychiatric morbidity and high frequency of persistent fatigue, some patients might have difficulty in returning to their previous employment, at least in the short term, although physical (as well as mental) recovery is intrinsic to such a broad functional outcome. In conclusion, although there are many ways in which mental health might be adversely affected by a pandemic, my opinions are, that most people do not suffer from a psychiatric disorder following coronavirus infection, and second, that so far there is little to suggest that common neuropsychiatric complications beyond short-term delirium are a feature. It is clear that a long hospitalization and to stay in ICU could be arise psychological and neuropsychological consequences, and that is very important to assist the patients also in this domains.

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