NEW CHALLENGES & SECURITY RISKS IN CURRENT AND FUTURE MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS

Remarks to Security Council by SG Gutierrez on Peacekeeping

Training and Capacity Building

Interview of UN Police Adviser, CS Luis Carrilho

The world mobilization for protecting our Heritage

THE USE OF FORCE IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS

The challenge of improvised Explosive Devices

Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration (DDR) and POs

Social Reintegration of female ex combatants
UN Peace Operations have proven to be one of the most productive tools of international crisis response, and an irreplaceable instrument to support world peace and security. Since 1948, when the first mission was established in the Middle East by the Security Council, more than 70 peace operations have been deployed, involving thousands of Police Officers, military Personnel and civilians coming from more than 120 countries. Unfortunately, about 3,000 of those peace operators died in the line of duty.

Many years have passed, and lessons learned from the field guided several reforms, helping the international community to ameliorate the organization and the sustainability of field missions, lowering their side-impacts in crisis areas and empowering the respect of Human Rights. In 2018 Secretary-General Gutiérres launched his “Action for Peacekeeping” Initiative. The “A4P” aims at enhancing peace missions in all their aspects, investing in new technologies (as we displayed in our Magazine nr. 3-2018), in political support, enhanced training, stronger discipline and safety and security of blue helmets to ensure that peacekeepers are able to perform their tasks in situations which are increasingly marked by complex old and new dangers, such as the modern asymmetric threats.

The challenge requires a great effort coming from all stakeholders, but the outcome could be rewarding. CoESPU, on its side, continues to focus on the implementation of UN modern standards within its Courses curricula and in its capacity of think tank, as a center for advanced studies and doctrinal hub, contributes to shape new trends and doctrine development. A brand new challenge was launched by the UN Security Council Resolution nr 2436 (2018), focusing on the now widely recognized need to develop a comprehensive and integrated performance policy framework, in order to identify performance standards for evaluating all UN Peace personnel, both civilian and uniformed, facilitating the full implementation of mandates. CoESPU, devoted to its commitment, gathered that mandate and, alongside with the UN Police Division and the Integrated Training Service, has already undertaken this new route partaking in the “Training Architecture Workshop” in Brindisi on June 2019, and providing to latest Course attendees documents containing the new UN Standard Operating Procedures for the Assessment and Evaluation of FPU Performance.

In this second issue of 2019 of the CoESPU Magazine, we provide an overview on new challenges in modern Peace Operations. First and foremost, the UN Police Adviser Luis Carrilho grants an exclusive interview on the matter, talking about efficiency of UN Police activity, the role of contributing Countries etcetera. Among the others eminent contributions, Maj. Marina Bizzotto and Mr. Alessio Re provide studies on new challenges such as Environmental and Cultural Heritage Protections. Gian Luca Beruto, on his side, gives a detailed analysis on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes in post-conflict environments. Maj. Sutto, CoESPU HR Chair, offers an overview on the many aspects related the Use of Force in current UN Peace Operations and the relevant role of UN Police.

Wishing you a pleasant reading, please let my invite you all to interact with CoESPU Social Media and to get in touch with the Magazine editorial staff to explore the chance, if you wish, to offer written contributions to next numbers, becoming active members of our Stability Policing Community.

Giovanni Pietro BARBANO
Brigadier General
CoESPU Director
The CoESPU Magazine is devoted to the publication of professional concepts and issues, research and doctrinal products developed by the Carabinieri Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, in collaboration with other international research Centers. The Magazine addresses topics of professional, technical, operational and juridical nature in the field of Stability Policing within Peace Operations. Based on the core values of ethics, integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity, harmonically inflected and informed by the traditions of over two hundred years of Carabinieri history, the Magazine fosters Human Rights and gender mainstreaming, while seeking to enhance current police peacekeeping doctrine and promoting international police peacekeeping interoperability, cognizant of Lessons Learned and best practises. The CoESPU Magazine is constantly committed to upholding UN standards, norms, procedures and curricula, while endorsing self-sufficiency of the participating Police Contributing Countries. Consequently, its editorial policy promotes the principles of representativeness, responsiveness, and accountability, as well as effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and accessibility, to provide the highest professional standards to build trust and legitimacy of beneficiary Law Enforcement Institutions.

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Thank you for convening this important debate on peacekeeping training and capacity building. It reflects Indonesia’s strong engagement in peacekeeping – here in New York as well as in the field. I salute the more than 3,000 uniformed personnel from Indonesia that currently serve in eight of our operations, and I pay tribute to the 37 Indonesian peacekeepers who have made the ultimate sacrifice under the UN flag.

Improving training is a major shared commitment of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative.

Training saves lives.

Our peacekeepers are deployed to increasingly complex and often hostile environments. Training prepares them for their vital peacekeeping tasks and improves their performance. And as we know, improved performance reduces fatalities.

As such, training is a necessary and strategic investment in peacekeeping – and is a shared responsibility between Member States and the Secretariat.

A system of collaboration was recognized in 1995. The General Assembly confirmed Member State responsibility for pre-deployment training of uniformed personnel, while the Secretariat assists Member States by establishing training standards and providing training materials. The Secretariat is also responsible for training civilian personnel.

We need to build on this approach of shared responsibility and deepen our collaboration.

I thank the 151 Member States and four international and regional organizations that have supported the Action for Peacekeeping initiative by endorsing the Declaration of Shared Commitments.

In doing so you have reconfirmed the shared responsibility for peacekeeping performance and stated your commitment to providing well-trained uniformed personnel.

Today, I would like to update you on the Secretariat’s progress in fulfilling our commitment to training and capacity building. On safety and security, we continue to take forward the Action Plan to Improve the Security of UN Peacekeepers. This is supported by the roll-out of a comprehensive Training Plan.

In the five high-risk missions – MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNMISS, MINUSCA and MINUSMA – we have conducted training support and assessment visits.

We are also instituting casualty evacuation training, stress testing and crisis management exercises in these five missions. Strengthening medical training is another key component.
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And, to help address the threat of improvised explosive devices and other dangers, we are working with Troop and Police-Contributing Countries to ensure that units joining our missions meet our operational readiness standards before deployment, and that they have undergone pre-deployment training in accordance with UN standards.

We are also placing a renewed emphasis on in-mission training to ensure that our peacekeepers benefit from the necessary support in the field.

We are particularly keen to develop the use of mobile training teams, and we are encouraging Member States to send such teams to provide targeted, flexible support to our missions.

We have established a framework of performance standards and assessments based on continuous evaluations of military units, including command and control, protection of civilians, and conduct and discipline.

And we have strengthened peacekeeping leadership training for civilians, military and police, including through scenario-based exercises.

We are also working to increase the number of women in our peacekeeping operations.

A talent pipeline specifically for senior women military officers is under development, and we are looking at how we can make mission environments more conducive to women.

To enhance these efforts, your continued support will be essential, through the provision of training programmes, of mobile training teams, of the translation of training material into the six official UN languages, and of funding.

Madam President,

one of our key priorities is strengthening conduct and discipline.

We are encouraged that the number of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping appears to be decreasing.

But we are also mindful that we must be vigilant in our prevention efforts and seek accountability whenever the zero-tolerance policy has been violated.

We must continue to do so in strong partnership with Member States.

Conduct and discipline issues are an essential component of pre-deployment and in-mission induction training, which is mandatory for all civilian, military and police peacekeeping personnel.

The UN Secretariat is helping troop- and police-contributing countries to improve their pre-deployment training on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse by making core training materials available and deploying mobile training teams to troop- and police-contributing countries in response to requests from those countries.

Madam President,

I am pleased that our collective commitment to better train and equip peacekeepers has led to a number of effective triangular partnerships between the Secretariat, Member States that have expertise and resources, and Member States that deploy our uniformed peacekeepers.

We have facilitated and conducted training of 330 uniformed engineers and 2,700 uniformed signals personnel.

Many of the trainees, including 23 female officers, have deployed to missions, including the African Union Mission in Somalia, which we support.

Following the success of engineering training in Kenya, we are launching a field medic assistant course in Uganda this year and will conduct engineering training in Vietnam and Indonesia in 2020.
Madam President,
We have made notable progress but much still needs to be done.
Training gaps remain in critical areas such as weapons handling, first aid, human rights and protection issues.

To ensure the long-term sustainability of triangular and other partnerships and initiatives, I urge Member States to consider increased funding, in-kind contributions of equipment and the provision of trainers.
I must also stress how important it is that we receive far more nominations of women to take part in training.
We are grateful to those Member States that have sponsored 50/50 male/female officer courses, and we ask more Member States to do so.

Madam President,
Improving performance is at the heart of our collective effort.
We look forward to our continued cooperation.

Thank you.
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1. Mr. Carrilho, what are the new challenges and the main security risks for UN Police in future multidimensional peace missions?

The United Nations Police recruit police men and women from about 90 different countries with different policing cultures, traditions and structures. This incredible diversity is our greatest strength, and it is what enables us to make a real impact in the communities we serve. Ensuring the safety and security of these personnel who deploy far from their homes to serve under the UN flag remains one of the greatest challenges. Our missions in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali are among the most dangerous because of the proliferation of armed groups and non-state actors, which are carrying out direct attacks on our peacekeepers. Having our personnel in harm’s way poses a significant security risk not only for our missions, but also for our host communities. Organized crime groups continue to fuel conflict and play a destabilizing role in a number of our mission settings. Additionally, in this increasingly digital age, our police officers are often deployed to remote areas with low technology, connectivity and bandwidth, while cybercrime may expose some vulnerabilities in our information and communications technology capabilities. Addressing these crime phenomena takes specialized skills and resources, and the UN Police continues to adapt and innovate in response to these challenges. Last year, the Secretary-General launched the Action for Peacekeeping initiative in partnership with stakeholders to strengthening peacekeeping and to meet these challenges, including to improve the safety and security of our peacekeepers. The UN is already working with Member States to enhance training, performance and accountability for uniformed police personnel and to source specialized police teams to fill critical and specialized capacity gaps in our missions, such as expertise on serious and organized crime, sexual and gender-based violence and forensics.
2. Do you have the feeling that the efficiency of the UN Police activity is leveling up?
Yes, for example, the UN introduced the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System to establish greater interaction between the UN and Member States for ensuring readiness and the timely deployment of peacekeeping capabilities. Once a pledged unit is determined to be at the Rapid Deployment Level, it is ready for deployment to any UN field mission within 60 days of a formal invitation from the UN. We are also strengthening triangular cooperation with the African Union and European Union, as well as with other partner organizations, to draw on our comparative advantages and maximize efficiencies. In fact, we organized a training workshop with CoESPU earlier this month. And we are making progress developing guidance and training curricula in consultation with partner organizations and Member States to ensure interoperability in policing approaches and practices, especially during transitions and handovers. The UN Standing Police Capacity, our rapidly deployable operational asset is based in Brindisi, Italy, within reach of many of our missions. This enables us to provide expertise and capacity-building in a cost-effective and efficient manner. The UN Secretary-General has repeated his call for the UN Police to act as the service provider and focal point on policing matters, and I think this will make the provision of policing expertise and technical assistance more efficient across the entire system. The UN police are the only UN entity with the word “police” in its name, so we should be the entry point for all such matters.

3. Is the UN investing in new technologies to soften the use of force in modern peace missions?
UN Peacekeeping continues to seek and embrace innovative use of technology responsibly to enhance performance and its ability to fulfill mandates more effectively. This is in line with the Secretary-General’s Strategy on New Technology and initiatives taken by the Department, including the Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in Peacekeeping. We are already expanding...
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the development and use of drone technology to increase our peacekeeping capabilities. Unmanned aerial vehicles were successfully tested in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and have subsequently been deployed to other peacekeeping missions, including in the Central African Republic and in Mali. Information-gathering drones, along with aerostat images and live high-resolution video feeds, have enabled otherwise impossible surveillance capacities directed at armed groups in areas of rugged terrain and thick forestry, and have enhanced civilian protection as a result. Furthermore, the UN’s Situational Awareness technology platform is currently being piloted in the Central African Republic. Through data-mining software, web-based incident tracking systems and cutting-edge data visualization and analysis tools, this program strengthens our knowledge, understanding and anticipation of a situation or event to ensure more informed decision-making and efficient responses. In our police components, we are also working to deploy standardized tools for crime reporting and analysis to increase efficiency and compatibility. It all comes down to smarter policing.

4. In accordance with UN guidelines, a growing number of women has been deployed in peace missions. In which way is that an added value, in your opinion? Having more women in peacekeeping increases the performance and effectiveness of our operations. This holds true for UN policing as well. Women enhance our ability to build confidence and trust among local communities in which we serve. We see this time and again. They act as mentors and role models, including to women and girls, and they build bridges with vulnerable populations. Often among host populations, whether because of religious or cultural factors or because of the nature of their conflict-related trauma, women are more comfortable reporting crimes and providing information to female police officers. We have now reached 14 percent female police officers deployed, which is at an all-time high! We reached this milestone through advocacy with Member States, innovative campaigns and initiatives, including the establishment of a female officer talent pool to be able to quickly fill professional and leadership positions when they become available. We are on track to achieve the ambitious targets set forth in the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy. We continue to engage with our police contributing countries, in line with the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, to increase the role of women in peacekeeping and to create an enabling environment for women personnel at both HQs and in the field.

5. Are Member States properly supporting the UN Policing, or do you expect more from them? UN Peacekeeping continues to take steps and measures to improve its cost-effectiveness, performance, efficiency and impact. UN peacekeepers are the second-largest deployed force in the world – about 100,000 uniformed personnel – but cost just half of 1 percent of global military expenditures. Yet, the UN is consistently under pressure to cut peacekeeping budgets. I would like to see clear and achievable policing mandates that are properly resourced. We get great support from our Member States, but there is always a need for more female and French-speaking officers. I also hope that more Member States contribute police officers. Currently, the top 10 police contributors account for two-thirds of all UN police personnel. The Action for Peacekeeping initiative launched last year by the Secretary-General has, at its core, the notion of shared responsibility – for the UN Secretariat, legisla-
tives bodies, police and financial contributors and host states. And I agree, we all have a stake in the success of UN peacekeeping.

6. You have a varied experience all over the world, for example in Central African Republic, in Haiti and in Timor-Leste, where you met different local populations. Could you draw a common line among them? Aims, worries, hopes?

Indeed, I served in each of those countries at different points of the conflict spectrum. Timor-Leste was a young state struggling during its transition to independence and concurrent political, humanitarian and security crises. I was the UN police commissioner in Haiti after the devastating earthquake in 2010, and in the Central African Republic at the start of the UN peacekeeping operation mandated to protect civilians after armed groups overthrew the president and carried out mass killings. A common thread is the resilience of the people that I witnessed every day. The people we were there to protect and serve had suffered tremendously at the whims of competing interests and circumstances far beyond their control, but they remained hopeful of light following the darkest days. Police are the most visible representatives of the state and are essential for reaching an end state of peacekeeping, for preventing conflict and sustaining peace. Our communities expect a lot from us, and we are always proud when we are able to deliver.

7. Do you think the “Cruz Report” had a real impact in the future of international peace activities?

Peacekeeping is risky business. In response to a growing number of casualties and attacks against our Peacekeepers, the Secretary-General appointed General Alberto dos Santos Cruz to lead a high-level review and submit recommendations to reduce the number of fatalities and injuries. This followed an Action Plan, developed by the UN Secretariat and field missions, outlining concrete actions to improve the security – and therefore also performance – of peacekeepers. The UN Police, in this regard, has taken a number of important steps and measures in the areas of operational readiness, performance and accountability, addressing impunity, improving mindset, reviewing footprint, and identifying and resolving contingent-owned equipment (COE) shortfalls. Already we are seeing at the field level, contingency planning has been enhanced for Formed Police Units (FPU), with all deployments being undertaken based on operational needs and priority zones. Monthly evaluations of FPUs are identified, reported and followed up with police-contributing countries. Therefore, remedial action, including repatriation, is initiated on contingents/units/officials with significant performance issues. The Comprehensive Performance and Accountability System (CPAS) enables us to assess the performance of civilian and uniformed components, staff and leadership through data collection and analysis. We are also strengthening the capacities of police-contributing countries through training and partnerships among Member States. The Cruz Report and other reports shined a light on very serious issues involving the safety and security of peacekeepers, so I believe it will impact how future activities are designed and implemented. Our overarching aim will always be to enhance the UN’s credibility in the countries where we serve and to make a positive impact on the lives of the people.
The Guidelines “Operational Readiness Preparation for troop contributing countries in Peacekeeping Missions” entered into force in December 2018 address as a “minimum individual requirement” inter alia the subject of “Environment and Natural resources”. The inclusion of the subject related to “UN policies and guidelines regarding good environmental management in daily operations” highlights the attention posed by UN to environmental protection. The current multidimensional model, adopted for modern Peace Operations, includes a particular attention to sensitive aspects, not well considered in the past, and works in order to take care of environmental issues as well as of cultural heritage. The environmental aspect, particularly in Africa, where several countries nowadays are still facing internal crisis posing a severe threat not only to local populations, becomes a significant, relevant point linked with the concept of stability. Addressing natural resources as a part of post-conflict peacebuilding is thus mandatory in order to avoid the creation of new forms of grievance and thus to achieve a peace that is more stable, robust and resilient to conflict relapse. It is necessary to adopt strategies of

Wildlife management and biodiversity as part of New Challenges in current and future multidimensional POs”

By Marina Bizzotto

What kind of risk are submitted wildlife and biodiversity in a collapsed country where local population still suffer famine and malnutrition?
Can wildlife and biodiversity become an economic source of benefit for local population?
management of natural resources that allow to create employment, sustain livelihoods and contribute to economic recovery and reconciliation.

It has become part not only of the international concern but also the need to re-establish a safe and secure environment, the need to protect civilians and, last but not least, the necessity to rebuild an acceptable level of life for local populations connected with respect of human rights.

In the light of this new approach to respect of environment at any level (from the UN headquarters’ strategy to the peacekeepers’ operability) an immediate question arises: what kind of risk are submitted wildlife and biodiversity in a collapsed country where local population still suffer famine and malnutrition? And, as consequence, the second problem is: can wildlife and biodiversity become an economic source of benefit for local population?

Wildlife management as well as protection of biodiversity are two fundamental points intimately linked with economics. But environment and economics require the necessary support of legal background to define properly the framework of the problem.

Exploitation of wildlife in a collapsed country is not only related to illegal smuggling, poaching or destruction of flora and fauna but also it is connected with a dangerous loss of biodiversity, extinction of rare animals and proliferation of opportunistic species that are completely unchecked. A simple example is given by aban-
Dwandoed dogs that grow wild, group in packs and apply the predatory strategies of their wild cousins, the wolves, becoming a severe threat not only for animals but also for human being. Therefore an adequate control of populations, in a close link with protection of wild life and recognition of biodiversity could become also a measure of development in the country with positive effects and economic setback. IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature) - the global authority on the status of the natural world and the measures needed to safeguard it -highlights the evidence: this aspect of biology is a source of knowledge that attracts “hearts and minds” but also huge economic investments. Some countries in Africa are fully aware of this potential source of richness and make any effort in training properly not only their ranger forces but also all the other actors that can mark the difference between a simple environmental approach and a higher level of involvement in this sensitive matter. Therefore the further effort should be oriented to link tactical activities on the terrain conducted by rangers with legal specialists as well as biologists expert of biodiversity. The recent involvement of CoESPU’s specialists in training rangers in Rwanda is an evidence of interest showed by African countries with an acceptable level of capability (and self-sufficiency). The perception of environmental protection as a source of benefit could be better oriented in a field where the Carabinieri organization can mark the difference. CoESPU Campus is the only national institution which mission, in the field of stability policing, is worldwide recognized and appreciated. But CoESPU is also a doctrinal hub involved in a continuous effort to expand and reinforce, at international level, its competence in the environmental protection. This recognized competence could be the basis for promoting a new challenge, an Observatory for Wildlife and Biodiversity which mission should be the collection, analysis, interpretation and discussion of data as well as their distribution to insiders and stakeholders. Consequences are twofold: CoESPU could become a point of reference for national and international issues related to stability, enlarging the concept to “wildlife and biodiversity stability” linked with its economic, political and legal implications; CoESPU would gain a unique visibility in a field of expertise not adequately considered by other similar organizations because of lack of human resources and culture.
This framework could integrate the concept of stability moving from the niche of biology and reaching a “multidimensional” approach including, as stated above, law and economics specialists. To reduce risk of pauperization of wildlife in collapsed or emerging countries through projects aimed at supporting local population development, would be in tuning with UN Mission “to pursue acceptable conditions of life”.

CoESPU initiative would be unquestionably of added value; wildlife and biodiversity protection could become another tool of international policy, conducted by Carabinieri in Africa. The amount of resources that is recalled by Wildlife and Biodiversity protection is amazing. Coespu Campus could easily enlarge its area of responsibility exploiting and coordinating properly the relevant resources available among the specialists of environmental and agricultural protection.

At UN level there is a number of initiatives related to environment which is going to become one of most relevant aspects either in peace operations. Establishing a stable Observatory on Wildlife and Biodiversity at CoESPU, where high level national as well as international professionals could confront each other (attending workshops and related courses and creating practical projects) could become one of the new challenges in the field of Peace Operations and stability. It could become a great opportunity to share contents and information with environmental stakeholders.

The Carabinieri style in Peace Operations is well known and appreciated all over the world. Sustaining this new challenge means to establish an absolute primacy among the similar centers, fixing an exclusive cornerstone that can be founded exclusively on Carabinieri capabilities.

Maj. Marina Bizzotto
CoESPU “Police for Environmental, Forestry and Agricultural Protection” Chair.

Pictures by Vito Franchini
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By Alessio Re

The need to implement specific rules aimed at protecting and preserving cultural heritage, for its universal values, and its capacity to address recovery and peace making process, is an increasingly evident issue, posed by the continuous intensification of threats brought by conflicts and disasters in various areas of the world. In 1945, at the end of World War II, UNESCO, the United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture, was established, with the precise purpose to spread the culture of peace. And, a few years later, in 1954, a milestone in the field of international law was approved: the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (also known as the Hague Convention), aimed at addressing the problem of the devastation of cultural heritage from armed conflicts. The theme of protecting cultural heritage has therefore gradually taken on an increasingly importance within the international community’s agenda in the 1960s, thanks to a number of international campaigns for aid mobilization. The first of them was the one for the saving of the temples of Abu Simbel and Philae in Egypt, at risk of being lost as a result of the construction of the Aswan dam: 50 different countries contributed for the dismantling and moving of the temples. Other very famous cases were the ones of Borubdur in Indonesia and Mohenjo-daro in Pakistan. Campaigns that in Italy found certainly the most significant situations in the rescue operations of Florence and Venice, both hit by the floods in November 1966. All these experiences have progressively led, in

THE WORLD MOBILIZATION FOR PROTECTING OUR HERITAGE
1972, to the adoption of the UNESCO Convention for the protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage and to the consequent creation of the World Heritage List, which still today is the most effective tool for addressing, globally, the correct conservation and management of cultural heritage.

In more recent times, the intentional destruction of cultural heritage (Dubrovnik, Sarajevo, Mostar among the others), during the war in the Balkans, the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan, bombarded by the Taliban in 2001, and then the destructions of Aleppo, Baghdad, Timbuktu, to mention the most known cases, constitute a further fundamental step in the debate on these issues, with the United Nations once again committed, through UNESCO, to the response against the destruction and loss of cultural heritage.

Recent years developments: the Unite for Heritage campaign and the so-called ‘Blue Helmets of Culture’, an emergency intervention group with highly specialized personnel composed by a mix of police officers, scholars and restorers, whose function is to assess the risks and quantify the damages and losses to the cultural heritage, drafting action plans for intervention, and providing capacity building, assisting on the security measures, and strengthening the fight against illicit trafficking of cultural heritage.

The United Nations once again committed, through UNESCO, to the response against the destruction and loss of cultural heritage.

The current political instability of many countries in the world, together with the intensification of natural disasters and their social effects, pose the need to build specialized capacities to effectively intervene in crisis scenarios, to favor the prevention of damages and to guide the processes of recovery and reconstruction of the affected sites. It is in this context that the international Master course in “Cultural Property Protection in Crisis Response” was planned, with the aim of training both civilians and armed forces personnel to intervene on cultural heritage in crisis areas, to organize the first security operations, to stabilize the conditions of intervention, and to draw...
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Mr Alessio Re
“Santagata Foundation” Secretary General.
(www.fondazionesantagata.it)

up recovery and development plans for the areas affected by the crisis. “Italy is one of the countries that has the most cultural and artistic assets in the world. This puts us in the position of having to be more responsible than others on this issue” - says Prof. Edoardo Greppi, Scientific Director of the Master. We need to globally defend the works of art and architecture of all countries and the birth of this master goes exactly in this direction”. The course, based in Turin, was born thanks to a synergy between the Interdepartmental School of Strategic Sciences (SUISS) of the University of Turin, the Italian Army Education and Training Command and School of Applied Military Studies and the Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Cultural Heritage. The master also benefits from the collaboration with the Conservation and Restoration Center La Venaria Reale, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, the UNESCO Chair of the University of Turin, the contributions from UNESCO and ICCROM, and the technical-scientific support of the Santagata Foundation for the Economics of Culture.

NOTE:
1. www.unite4heritage.org
2. For more information: www.culturalpro.it

PICTURES:
1. The opening ceremony of the 1st edition of the Master at the IT-Army Education and Training Command and school of Applied Military Studies in Turin
2. Group picture of the class
3. Group works during the classes

COVER PAGE: Discussions during the study visit at the Moncalieri Castle World Heritage site, headquarter of the 1º Reggimento Carabinieri “Piemonte”
NEW CHALLENGES IN FUTURE POs

THE CHALLENGE OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES


By Marco SUTTO

The above sentence of the UN Secretary-General opens the preface of the IED Threat Mitigation Military and Police Handbook released in December 2017 which represents part of the recent efforts to implement a new course of action of UN Peace Operations after that two milestones resolutions of the General Assembly highlighted the serious threat posed by IEDs to the international peace and security. It was on the 7th December 2015 that the General Assembly adopted the first resolution on countering the Threat Posed by IEDs whereby States expressed concern over IED attacks on UN peace operations personnel and the impact these attacks have on freedom of movement, and the ability to deliver mandates. The following 9 December 2015, it was adopted the further resolution on Assistance in Mine Action, which recognized the humanitarian threat posed by IEDs in post-conflict situations. Because of the statements and requests of taking action in these two resolutions, new guidelines were released by DPO and DFS to mitigate the IED threat in POs creating the ground for other initiatives to improve the capabilities of peacekeepers to fulfil their mandate despite IEDs presence.

The General Assembly, eventually, recognized that the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) is a serious global problem not only limited to Peace Operations. IEDs impact POs and humanitarian activities and furthermore the security, safety, stability and su-

“Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are killing and injuring thousands of civilians annually... These pernicious devices are hidden in homes and schools, terrorizing local populations.”
António Guterres (UN Secretary-General)
sustainable development in communities around the world. IEDs are truly a global phenomenon—no region has been spared. IEDs have played a significant role in nearly every insurgency, civil conflict, and terrorist attack in the past decades, from the well-known situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, to those in Nigeria, Nepal and India, to Chechnya, Colombia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and more.

Addressing IEDs is a multifaceted challenge—with both security and humanitarian dimensions. States and the UN have a common interest to seek effective responses. Most of all the international response to IEDs requires the attention and commitment of a variety of stakeholders—from governments and militaries, to humanitarian, operational and other specialized agencies, to industry and to research organizations and advocacy groups.

Given the improvised nature of IEDs, a great number of types and varieties of IEDs have been manufactured and used in the past and will be developed and used in the future in different regional and strategic settings. They are something different from conventional Mines and other military explosive weapons. By internationally accepted definition an IED is an explosive device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner and incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals. It is designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may, of course, incorporate military stores or be devised wholly from non-military components. Due to their characteristics, IEDs are an increasingly common feature of conflicts around the world. They have become a weapon of choice for aggressors across the globe. Insurgents (or Non State Actors) use IEDs on account of both the lack of sufficient conventional weapons and the abundant supply of materials for making IEDs. IEDs can be made both from explosive remnants of war (ERW) quickly via the internet.

We could even say that IEDs pose a more serious danger to POs and civilians than factory-made mines. IEDs can be easily hidden on roadsides, within vehicles, or on individual persons. Diverse forms and components of an IED make prediction and detection difficult, not mentioning the difficulties in rendering it safe without knowing the functioning of the activating mechanism and potential lethal effects. In a peace mission context this inhibits the secure movement of personnel and equipment by road, as well as efforts by peacekeeping personnel to engage effectively with local communities as part of broader stabilization effort. There is no manual that says how to safely approach and dispose IEDs, just few golden rules, guidelines and best practices, which sometimes are even exploited by insurgent to trick the victims or the specialized personnel. IED makers strive continuously to alter the characteristics, functioning or emplacement context of their device to render it more effective. Legally it is clear that the use of
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IEDs is always prohibited, both in situations of armed conflicts or peace. In War their use violates the core principles of the International Humanitarian Law and many relevant legal instruments among which the Convention on Certain conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II that explicitly prohibits them. Interna-tional Human Rights Law and domestic criminal laws complete the legal provisions condemning their use in all the other peaceful situations. Unfortunately, a robust legal framework was not sufficient to limit their use as weapon or tactic to hit security forces and spread terror among civilian populations as demonstrated by the fact that, only in 2017, around the globe, were recorded 14,724 deaths+ and injuries from IEDs, among which civilians represents 80% of all casualties (11,791). The year before the victims were even more, 19,246 deaths and injuries as a result of improvised explosive devices, of which 14,301 were civilians (74%). Because of the widespread in use of IEDs globally, UN Peace Operations have been badly threatened. The IED Threat is now considered common as the UN is increasingly called upon to intervene in violent environment with no formal peace agreement or even a peace to keep. As a matter of fact IEDs are now a bigger threat to peacekeeping missions than landmines. In dangerous theaters like Mali and Somalia the number of attacks perpetrated against peacekeepers with IEDs has shown an increasing trend in the recent past and more UN peacekeepers casualties have been due to IEDs than mines or other ordinary weapons. In Mali we had a number of 33 IED attacks against peacekeepers in 2013 that escalated to more than 120 in 2016. Early UN efforts to mitigate the IED threat were modelled on approaches taken to address mines and other remnants of war. Peace Operations generally had specialized units for de-mining purposes and to disarm and demobilize devices of concern but these assets alone were not efficient to stem the casualties resulting from IEDs. Counter-IED efforts had to become more comprehensive and focus on a holistic approach. The UN has therefore developed the recent policies and doctrines to mitigate the threat of IEDs through activities designed to enhance the safety and security of personnel, assets and facilities and to enhance mobility of UN personnel, each of which, support the implementation of the mandate and are within the UN’s right to self-defence. NATO and its allies were the firsts that faced the seriousness of this threat when in early 2000 started the missions in IRAQ and Afghanistan. Those conflicts have been characterized by significant levels of military and civilian casualties from IEDs. Since the launch of military operations in Afghanistan in 2001, more than 60% of US casualties that occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan were the result of IED attacks. For countries serving in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the lessons learned from operating in these asymmetric threat environments had a game-changing effect on conventional military thinking. Consequently, NATO countries and allies adopted new approaches to prepare, train and equip their forces to address this constantly evolving threat. As said UN started to face the problem many years after and addressed it in part following the path already traced by the North Atlantic Alliance, perhaps with some added difficulties due by the heterogeneity of its assets.

While NATO identified three operational lines of effort to counter the IED threat: prepare the force, defeat the device and attack the network, in line with the UN mandate of peacekeeping and ensuring the creation of an overarching secure environment for UN peacekeepers as well as civilians, UN has decided to approach the problem elaborating its own IED Threat Mitigation (IED TM) doctrine which objectives are: the Force protection, the IED threat reduction
and the Protection of Civilians. Not focusing on the kinetic, offensive tactics associated with attacking IED networks that are considered as the hallmark of military strategies UN wants to realize a more comprehensive approach that focuses on the physical, procedural and training responses that can collectively be applied to mitigate the threats posed by IEDs.

UN stressed the importance of addressing this challenge not only to protect the force but to enhance the Protection of Civilians. The impact on security and stability in affected States and regions is profound. IED attacks undermine the ability to perform the tasks of security forces. Used to reduce the freedom of movement and action of security forces IEDs make interaction with the local population more difficult. The ability to acquire useful intelligence is reduced and security forces are seen as unable to protect civilians gradually eroding confidence and support in POs and governmental structures. The humanitarian impact is equally significant. IEDs spread fear and insecurity in the population. The use of IEDs can disrupt humanitarian relief, impede trade, affect livelihoods, and destroy infrastructure and developmental gains. All of this turn into social unrest, further destabilization and risks for the security of the civilian population.

A visible example is the situation in Somalia which, beside the other destabilizing factors, in the last five years (2014-2018), experienced 2638 civilians victims of IEDs (53% of the entire casualties), while “only” 221 remained victims of Explosive Remnants of War/Mines, increasing the cost of delivering “peace”, hampering stabilization and state authority and, consequently, affecting UN and other international organizations credibility and the capacity to deliver on their mandates.

However, it is essential not to focus the attention only on the devices. IEDs, beside their dangerous effects, are the expression of a common effort made by multiple organized actors. An IED attack to be executed needs a large number of activities supported by personnel and resources that requires an organization. These organizations, despite their official purposes (criminal, terrorist etc.), are commonly defined as IED Systems. IED Systems are vulnerable to systematic attack across the system, they contain nodes and the linkages among personnel, resources and actions that represents critical vulnerabilities to disrupt them. This involve a combination of diplomatic, socio-economic, commercial and military actions.

Based on this premise the IED System must be understood in its entirety to conduct activities across it and this clearly requires a multidimensional approach.

With is strong commitment the UN has an important role to play in addressing both the security and humanitarian impacts of IEDs and of course not only whe-

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Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and POs

By Gian Luca Beruto

Introduction

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes have the main purpose of contributing to security and stability in post-conflict environments providing social and economic recovery. To fulfil this goal, post-conflict societies have to tackle issues caused by isolated combatants who have lost their social position, as well as their one and only source of income, because of the cessation of hostilities. The importance of DDR programmes thus emerges directly from the awareness that the gradual transition from a context of conflicts and generalized violence to a peaceful one is usually even harder than the reverse process in modern societies, and that the concrete reintegration of former combatants cannot be disregarded.

From a legal perspective, it is important to underline that the launch of a DDR programme does not necessarily have to be institutionalised in formal peace agreements to be implemented or developed. In fact, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration could be part of larger national or international approaches to peace-building and peacekeeping, conducted both during and after the end of an armed conflict. Given the recognized value of the DDR mechanism in the construction of a solid peace, it is then not unusual to track and analyse such a mechanism led by national governments rather than one that is internationally coordinated by external organisations (e.g. UN bodies) or military alliances (e.g. NATO). Actually, it is the national ownership of the DDR that is considered by many professionals as a crucial factor for its success, as it could confer both autonomy and legitimacy to the process. Nevertheless, considering their heavy financial weight and the huge obstacles they have faced, internationally-driven DDR programmes are usually considered the most effective ones.

On 2 March 2006, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, developed a new approach to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration...
processes within UN peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping operations. This reformulation of the DDR mechanism differed especially from the older ones for its integrated orientation. However, prior to discussing the contemporary approach to the subject, it is crucial to better define the meaning of the DDR concept. This paper will try to address what DDR is in conceptual terms to gradually move on towards practice and experience by providing some remarks about the implementation of DDR in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during one of the most complex peace operations ever.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

In the path towards the reinteg-ration of ex-combatants, it seems more than intuitive that disarmament plays a primary role. From the UN perspective, disarmament is defined as “the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often of the civilian population. […]”2. Disarmament thus targets a wide range of weapons, from the smallest ones (small arms and light weapons) to the most sophisticated war instruments, following the obvious idea that the fewer the weapons available in the society, the higher the chances to establish an effective peacebuilding mechanism in a country recently affected by an armed conflict.

Disarmament could be accomplished either voluntarily or forcefully – the latter implies specific legal basis with regard to the use of force.3 When disarmament is based on consensus, namely when conflicting parties agree to hand over their weapons, a fundamental initial phase for peacebuilding is assured and serves as a boost for the parties involved in the several programmes, DDR included, which enable the overall peacebuilding process. Unfortunately, since it is usually hard to reach a global peaceful consensus among warring parties over disarmament, this process is sometimes implemented in a coercive way. In this case, one or more parties are essentially forced to hand over their weapons.

Historically DDR programmes do not make such a clear distinction between forced and consensual disarmament, as the complex situations in which they act force DDR directors and planners in the field to adapt their approach to several factors (e.g. typology of armed groups, violence of the conflict, the population’s perception of peacekeepers and operators, degree of political will by local institutions etc.). Consequently, from a more realistic point of view, all approaches to disarmament programmes are generally mixed in with the development of peace support operations (PSOs), from compulsory handing over of war devices to their exchange with goods and/or money, to the negotiation of a voluntary delivery of the weapons by the parties.4

The second phase is demobilisation. Prior to defining this second “D”, however, it seems important to stress that, even if phases are usually referred to in a chronolog-ical way, in practice they are not always executed consecutively. In the eyes of many experts, the particular necessity to implement DDR “phases” simultaneously is tightly linked to an array of timing and organisational issues. For instance, disarmed ex-combatants often found themselves forced to live in temporary camps (mostly without a source of income) while waiting for the beginning of the demobilisation phase instead of being re-inserted in their original community. This malfunction has clear and inevitable consequences on the effectiveness of the whole DDR programme, being a factor of increasing costs as former combatants are prevented from taking on job offers and thus from becoming financially independent.5

In the 2006 Report to the United Nations General Assembly, the UN Secretary-General formally defined demobilization as “[…] the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups […]”6. This second stepping-stone in the transition towards reintegration is based on different activities related to the analysis of former members of armed groups as individuals. Its development includes activities such as registration and documentation, health screening, a pre-discharge orientation mechanism, and the effective discharge, which lead the person to the next phase of reininsertion.7

Although reininsertion is conceptually considered part of the demobilisation process, it is usually distinguished from it, since it forms a transitional period in which assistance to cover the basic needs of former combatants and their families is provided. Reinsertion consists in supplying individuals with food, clothes, shelter, medical support, basic education, training tools and sometimes even employment.8 Reinsertion must be considered, therefore, as the first context-sensitive and community-oriented stage of the DDR process, always keeping an eye on the labour market scenario when it comes to involving the former combatants in working activities. No-
netheless, one peculiar difference keeps reinsertion far away from proper reintegration, namely, the time framework in which it is developed. In fact, while reinsertion is conceived by UN Secretary-General as a short-term period in which “[…] material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs […]” is provided, reintegration is planned as a long-lasting final step for DDR programmes.

Through reintegration DDR should lead former combatants to the acquisition of an institutionally recognised civilian status, to support them in getting access to the national labour market. By finding an autonomous source of income, reintegration would substantially overcome reinsertion, completing the transformation of armed individuals in economically and socially active members of the society. This final stage is undoubtedly the hardest one to accomplish. Not only security risks are inevitable in reintegration, but also economic and financial issues are obstacles in its implementation. Decorated former combatants threatened to use weapons still in their possession if they did not receive the benefits which had been promised or were otherwise expected. Setting aside for now the question on whether or not these claims were founded, the problems deriving from expectations are indissolubly tied with the success of the programme in regenerating a healthy economic and social environment able to provide adequate employment opportunities. Furthermore, not only support for employment is necessary, but also huge attention must be paid to the opportunities made available for ex-combatants. In many cases, former members of armed groups are more than aware of how some kind of natural resources (e.g. oil, minerals) could represent a very fruitful source of income and political power. In these events, especially when the authority of the legitimate national institutions is not so strong on resources, countries could suffer insurrections and loss of control over important infrastructures at the hands of allegedly “disarmed” former combatants. Moreover, even when governments are strong enough to exercise their jurisdiction over those installations, (former) combatants often tend to refuse job that are too labour-intensive, not considering these activities as being better than being employed by militias or other armed groups. On the other hand, barriers to reintegration are represented by the risk of potential revenge attacks and escalation of violence against demobilised individuals, for example because of atrocities that they might have committed during the conflict, or to different ethnicity, condition of disability, different religion, etc.11

To cut or just to loosen the many knots related to the social aspects of reintegration, DDR needs to develop both an individual and a community-sensitive approach to it. This mixed strategy was officially “validated” by UN Department of Peace Operations in 2010, with the launch of the so-called “second generation DDR”. In the report, the UN has indeed institutionalised the idea that a community-based perspective should at least integrate the traditional implementation of the different DDR stages that are more focused on armed members.
of military structures, with a more comprehensive perspective, covering the post-conflict society as a whole. Issues such as the role of transitional justice, post-conflict prosecution of human rights violations and crimes occurred during armed conflicts in a country, social reconciliation, the post-conflict political environment, and the general social and demographic structure of the country, are indeed crucial and thus cannot be disregarded when facilitating peacebuilding.

DDR(RR): two more “R”, two more challenges
The concept of DDR previously offered, when implemented on the ground, has often proved to be inadequate and not sufficient in covering particularly complex situations emerging in the contexts of contemporary armed conflicts. Nowadays, armed conflicts that have grown up in a domestic framework often generate side effects in neighbouring countries, especially when they nestle in already fragile geopolitical contexts such as Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa, South-East Asia or the Middle East. These “collateral damages”, far from being rare in the last decades, force DDR to assume an international projection evolving in a more articulated process, which include two additional steps: resettlement and repatriation. From a peacebuilding perspective, resettlement basically consists of a controlled displacement of ex-combatants (and their dependents) from one region to another, both nationally and/or crossing an international border. Resettlement was conceived as a way to address the thorny issue of the presence of foreign armed groups in non-international conflicts. A recent example of such situation has been the case of the long-lasting armed conflict that began in 1996 in former Zaire, the current Democratic Republic of Congo. Without focusing now on the dramatic history of the war, which will be object of the next paragraph, it is enough to say that among several other armed groups the Rwanda-supported ones, in particular, were the objective of major disarmament, demobilisation, resettlement (and repatriation) activities conducted by the UN mission in DRC. When trying to illustrate a more evident difference between the resettlement and repatriation concepts, many experts underline that while the former substantially refers to “the transfer and the repatriation of the demobilized combatant into his usual familiar surroundings or to a place of his choice”, the latter should be used with particular regard to “combatants involved in a conflict who are from another country and are being transferred to their home country after having been demobilized”. Since this distinction does not appear to definitely remove any doubt on the issue, it seems that the approach highlighted in some documentation of the DDR practice, again concerning the UN experience in DRC, is more exhaustive.

In May 2003, International Crisis Group, when reporting on the DDR programme conducted by the UN Mission in Congo, MONUC (Mission des Nations Unies au Congo), particularly in the eastern regions, stated that “[…] The combatants will be disarmed, registered and subjected to military tests in order to distinguish them from their dependents. Weapons will be destroyed and the combatants will receive a certificate of demobilization. They will then be offered voluntary and rapid repatriation to Rwanda […]”. This positively reports the repatriation as a
movement of people towards the country of origin from another State, both voluntarily or involuntarily. On the contrary, when it comes to resettlement it is argued that “[…] If combatants refuse to be repatriated to their country of origin, MONUC […] will propose resettlement in a third country that has previously agreed to take in combatants […].” Contrary to what happens with repatriation, resettlement is not necessarily implemented in the country of origin and sets a crucial distinction, as well as complementarity, between these two different phases of DDR.

The increasing complexity and trans-nationalization of armed conflicts are among the reasons why DDR is stretched towards the acquisition of two additional “R”. The impact on peace support operations of the involvement of foreign armed groups in armed conflicts set repatriation and resettlement as two fundamental stages in order to make DDR more effective and, hopefully, successful in trans-national instable environments.

DDRRR and UN peace operations
Since its establishment in 1945, the UN has deployed about 70 peacekeeping operations all over the world. Approximately 75% of these missions were deployed after 1990. The earliest missions were actually very much limited to the implementation (monitoring and guarding) of ceasefire agreements and the stabilisation of the situation with the main objective of supporting the early steps of institutional buildings: “Unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops” were deployed on the ground with the main aim of “[…] monitoring, reporting and [enhancing] confidence-building […].”

Over the years, the ever-changing nature of armed conflicts led the UN to play a more proactive role in the overall approach to implement missions’ mandates and expanded their field of action by including also the support in the reconstruction of military and police forces (Security Sector Reform) in order to contribute to the building of solid democracies in post-conflict societies. For approximately 40 years, until the last decade of the 19th century, disarmament was mainly addressed to regular armed forces and DDR operations targeting irregular armed groups were not considered.

A first DDR programme integrated in a UN peacekeeping operation was launched within ONUCA (United Nations Observer Group in Central America) with the advent of the later post-Cold War era. UN established ONUCA in 1989, after the Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua requested the UN assistance in the implementation of the Esquipulas II Agreement. An International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV) was created to coordinate the United Nations mission with the support of the Organisation of the America States (OAS). Its mandate was to assist the voluntary demobilisation of the combatants involved in violence and military actions in all the countries of the region. First efforts of ONUCA in this field were the demobilisation and repatriation of combatants in Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador to then include at a later stage also the Nicaraguan Resistance. A total of 19,614 combatants of the Nicaraguan Resistance and 2,759 combatants from Honduras were disarmed and demobilised, about 15,000 weapons were collected. The ONUCA represented a fundamental key fact in the evolution and consolidation of DDR within peace operations in the following years. The success of ONUCA’s DDR programme became the vanguard for its firm inclusion in UN peace operations later deployed all over the world. Since 1999, DDR has been part of UN peace operations regularly and contributed greatly to prevent (ex)combatants from threatening the peace development processes in the aftermath of the conflicts.

Furthermore the renowned “Brahimi Report” stressed the importance of enabling institutional
reconstruction processes and recommended the consolidation of the DDR programmes in the first phase of complex peace operations, in consideration of the essential role they play in the success of such operations. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes have grown in such a way that they constitute one of the fundamental parts of peacebuilding processes.

If conducted in the absence of peace agreements or negotiations among the belligerent parties, DDR has to deal with many further challenges. Beyond the self-evident security issues, DDR officers operating in conflicts also bear the burden of distinguishing disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration from a request of desertion. It is, in fact, crucial for operators to ensure that DDR is perceived by belligerents as a high-level choice of the commanders, completely opposite to an attempt to stir up a low-level “betrayal”. Substantially, while desertion occurs with fighters fleeing the battle or when they leave the armed group without the permission of superior officers, DDR is differently authorised and accepted, if not supported, by senior armed group members. In this way, despite increasing difficulty to negotiate with leaders, a military legitimacy as well as a social one could facilitate the reintegration of armed individuals and downsize the entire conflict or situation of generalized violence.

It is important to underline that DDR is often merged within military offensives. In this instance, enemies are provided with the opportunity to “jump” from being hostiles actors to being DDR targets. In other words, this approach to disarmament aims at taking advantage of the military pressure over armed groups to force them into a voluntary demobilisation, which is implemented directly on the ground. However, this “tightening noose” strategy is inevitably ambivalent, since the military emphasis could, indifferently and negatively, influence the means of warfare (e.g. stimulating terrorist acts) on strongly ideologically armed groups, for example, or positively lead to a progressive undermining of their willingness to persist in the fighting.

DDR(RR) in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The Great African War (better known as Second Congo War), which since 1998 affected the Democratic Republic of Congo, represents the bloodiest example of the internationalisation of a non-international armed conflict. And it is one of the most complex challenges for the United Nations peacekeeping to this day. Many experts identify this conflict as the most brutal since World War II, in terms of impact on the population and in consideration of the fact that it followed the First Congo War which broke out in the country two years earlier, in 1996. Nonetheless, in order to fully understand the criticalities and the complexities of this country, we certainly cannot limit the focus on the last 20 years of history.

The DRC gained independence from Belgium in June 1960. Suddenly after the independence the country fell into a crisis (the Congo crisis) mainly due to the secessionist claims of Katanga, one of the most prosperous regions rich in mineral resources. The earliest stages of Congo’s independence had been characterised by insurrections and secessionist movements which brought the country to be the first newly independent African State to request assistance from the UN. With the establishment of ONUC (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo) almost 20,000 UN troops were deployed on the ground between 1960 and 1964, with the main objective of restoring stability in the country after the conflicts and disorders following independence. Only after the end of the Katanga secession – which between June 1960 and January 1963 it was de facto independent under the name of State of Katanga – the UN military troops start to withdraw leaving minor insurgency hotspots all around the country. As a consequence, the fragile stability achieved by the country ended in 1965 already, when General Mobutu, through a western-supported military coup d’état, launched a thirty-year dictatorship period and changed the name of the country to Zaire in 1971.

With the end of the cold war, Zaire definitely lost its value in the eyes of the western international com-
munity previously interested in the preservation of Mobutu’s power as a trusted western-oriented leader. In this scenario, in 1996, in the wake of ethnic tensions generated by the Rwandan genocide – which brought hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees to the eastern region of Zaire – the First Congolese War exploded in the shape of a revolution led by Laurent-Désirée Kabila, a revolutionary and military leader from Katanga, who took control over the whole country in 1997. He became President on 17 May 1997 and changed the name of the country to Democratic Republic of Congo. However, being successful over a dictator proved negative for Congo. In order to prevail, Kabila decided to take advantage of the Rwandan and Ugandan interests in eastern Zaire and asked for support to succeed in the revolution. Kabila, however, did not understand that such interests – directly connected with the transboundary outcomes of the Rwandan genocide and with the support that Mobutu was providing to Hutu Rwandan refugees in the eastern part of the country – were stronger than expected.

After Mobutu’s fall, an increasing presence all over the country of Rwandan (but also Ugandan) regular troops and combatants started to undermine the legitimacy of the new President in the eyes of the Congolese population. Kabila thus began to struggle to get an independent political base by taking a series of missteps that would have constituted the beginning of the Great African War. Probably nobody at that time imagined how much this conflict would have escalated internationally. Rwandan and Ugandan governments faced the Kabila issue exactly in the same way they had previously dealt with the Mobutu’s one. However, other countries of the region were interested in keeping stability in the Great Lakes Region. Angola and Zimbabwe thus decided not to support the overthrow of Kabila, however in 1998 the situation in DRC degenerated into the Second Congo War, which turned out to be a regional conflict involving the DRC and the regional neighbouring countries (Angola, Namibia, Chad, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda) along with irregular militias, which made the country an incredible diversified and fragmented patchwork of armed groups, active in different provinces and backed by different foreign countries involved in the hostilities.

Contrary to what had happened in 1996, the destructive potential of a possible international armed conflict in the whole African continent pushed the international community towards an immediate commitment in establishing a dialogue among belligerent parties. Peace negotiations began and in 1999 the Southern African Development Community (SADC) negotiated the Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement. A few months later, the UN Security Council thus authorised the creation of MONUC to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire in the country. Security Council Resolutions 1279 (30 November 1999) and 1291 (24 February 2000) established
MONUC, an operation of “pure” peacekeeping originally conceived as a limited mission, with a possible expansion of forces of up to 5,537 military personnel. Since its very beginning, many analysts and experts thought that MONUC force was actually too small, both in proportion with the size of the country and for its legitimacy in the eyes of the local institutions. The most important challenge to security and stability of the countries remained the impressive and fragmented number of armed groups involved in hostilities all over the country which led the start of internal negotiations with the DRC government.

After the assassination of Kabila, in January 2001, his son Joseph succeeded as the 4th DRC President of the DRC. The progressive opening of Joseph Kabila to negotiate with irregular armed groups never seemed to be at risk during the early years of the second millennium. From the Sun City Agreement (April 2002) and the Pretoria Accord (July 2002) to the Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in DRC (December 2002), Kabila’s policies actually offered a real opportunity to implement a DDR(RR) programme in the country, which was established with UN Resolution 1355 (2001). During the early phase of DDR main efforts focused on the (re)integration of members of Congolese irregular armed groups into a new national army. Since 2004, DDR started focusing on different issues including political efforts for the total withdrawal of foreign troops present on the territory of DRC; a DDR programme run by the DRC government, financially supported by international institutions (e.g. the World Bank), aimed at rebuilding the national army; a DDR programme to demobilise child soldiers. In order to address the main problems affecting the reconstruction of a national army from the disbanded Congolese militias, a National Commission for Disarmament was established. Albeit a series of structural weaknesses and beside the fact that DDR operations were conducted in a very challenging post-conflict environment, the Commission processed around 186,000 combatants (out of 300,000 foreseen at a preliminary stage), demobilised around 132,000 (including 30,000 children and 2,670 women) while some 50,000 were reintegrated in the new army. Nevertheless, figures were far from reached expectations and many issues at security, political, humanitarian levels emerged during these early phases of DDR. In the following two years DDR was somehow slowed down and international donors claimed to reform the whole programme with particular regard to the management of funds.

The Goma Agreement, signed in 2008, represented a further step towards a more effective DDR which addresses all the military actors affecting the security and stability of the country. This document required all signatories (40 representatives from as many armed groups) to apply a MONUC-handled ceasefire in the East, as well as the firm enforcement of disarmament and demobilisation of combatants in that region. Renewed clashes among different factions and weak DDR effectiveness in the area, however, forced this agreement to breakdown and substantially downsized its success.

The UN Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010) turned MONUC into MONUSCO, the UN Stabilization mission in the DRC. The complex situation of the DRC largely derives from the (military) actions of foreign armed groups in the eastern regions. Despite the several agreements stipulated between DRC and Rwanda and the UN Security Council resolutions that always consider the disarmament and repatriation issue as a very crucial one, coordinated efforts in the demobilisation of Rwandan armed groups in the has never been either conclusive or resolutive. The continued perpetuation of violence in the eastern part of DRC, nevertheless, has consolidated the tendency to see DDR(RR) as the one and only solution to definitely silence weapons.

In recent years, especially after the establishment of the UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within MONUSCO, the DDR programme was additionally sided by the possibility of forced disarmament of combatants. The increasing vio-
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 Violence in the eastern regions had indeed raised doubts concerning the possibility to reduce hostilities without an ad hoc empowerment of DRC’s military capacities. Moreover, the expansion of irregular armed groups, along with the recurrence of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, were exacerbated by the mutiny of part of the regular to surrender or disarm. Since its inception MONUSCO DDR(RR) has demobilised 124,965 combatants. However DRC, particularly the eastern region, is currently highly permeated by violent acts against unarmed civilians committed by armed and criminal groups which are gradually spreading all over the country. There has been a paradigm shift in the typology of armed conflict all across DRC which involved the nature of the actors, the perpetrators of violence and the modalities under which armed violence is applied. The protection of civilians became the priority and the MONUSCO, including DDR(RR) evolved according the reality on the ground trying to fulfill its protection of civilians and stabilization mandate. Within this context, since “traditional” DDR does not turned out to be a proper and effective tool to reduce arms and combatants, a second generation of DDR, based on the Community Violence Reduction (CVR) strategy – a community-based approach to reduce the high levels of violence wi-

DRC’s army in the eastern province of North Kivu, which took the name of Mouvement du 23 mars (M23). For these reasons the Security Council decided to establish the FIB to support the DRC army and the defeat of the M23, as well as to plan operations in the area against all armed groups unwilling in its experience, CVR basically tries...
to distinguish between foreign and national armed groups from the non-traditional armed "gangs", dealing with the latter by "reinforcing the internal capacity of the population to address the marginalisation that often result in recourse to armed violence". In this way, the DRC could work as a positive booster for the renewal of a DDR(RR) concept which is often too much oriented towards the past. Furthermore, CVR was also applied in the reintegration phase, allowing the DRC government to draw on a community-based approach regarding financial investment in local communities which turn out to be a success. The development of a proper employer strategy for former combatants, the study of community needs, the delivery of micro-loans to families and support reintegration systems at a local level, are all innovative policies which are reducing significantly violence and crime speed. However, if on the one hand, DDR programmes have offered thousands of ex-combatants a second chance to get to a future life, new experts highlighted that, on the other hand, the "re are grave risks of inspiring and indirectly "feeding" the birth of new armed groups through pouring money in an the unstable socio-political context of DRC's. As a result of the DDR(RR) programme in DRC, more than 32,000 foreign ex-combatants and their dependents, mainly ex-FDLR (Forces Démocratique de Libération de Rwanda), members have been repatriated to Rwanda since 2002. However, this number, in general terms, is neither considered adequate nor acceptable, since it has been estimated that today, in the eastern DRC there are more than 13 active armed groups.
The issue of the use of force in a peace operation context is quite a broad topic and, in its intent, this short essay would like to introduce a synthetic picture of the subject, with an emphasis on the relevant aspects that characterize the duties of the police component in the current multidimensional missions. To start, it is worthwhile to mention the international legal framework that usually characterizes the establishment of POs, that is strictly linked with the possibility to use the force. Indeed, the use (or the threat) of force among States is normally not allowed and is considered as unlawful. However, the UN Security Council (SC), consistently with the purposes of maintaining or restoring international peace and security, can authorize, with its resolutions the application of the necessary measures, which also implicate the use of force, against or within the jurisdiction of a State. Peace Operations, when authorized to use the force, fall within this context, taking their authorities, through the UN Security Council resolutions, directly from the UN Charter. In order to accomplish their mandate, with the necessity to safeguard civilian lives and protect the human rights, the peace missions, in applying the force, ground their legitimacy in the detailed framework of the International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), plus, when applicable, in the host country domestic laws. The principles of the most relevant international instruments, which provide important guidelines applicable when using the force and are fully promoted by the SC mandates (such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), are completely embedded in specific mission documents regulating the use of force, such as ‘Rules of Engagement’ (RoE) or ‘Directives of Use of Force’ (DUF).

UN military and police personnel must be very clear on the rules on use of force and must be aware of how such force should be applied in the field. They need to know the RoE and DUF as the use of force is specific to the mission and its mandate and they are usually robust enough to retain credibility and have freedom of action to implement the required tasks.

To have a better understanding with what we are dealing with, it is necessary, at this point, to define the concept of “Force”, clarifying...
that there is no internationally agreed definition of it. Dictionaries usually refer to a variety of terms to define “Force” such as “strength”, “power”, “violence”. UN DPO, in its training packages for peacekeepers, refers to “Force” as “any verbal command or physical action to gain subject control". This definition is clearly inspired to a Law Enforcement Paradigm strictly derived from the International Human Rights Law while IHL refers to the “use of force” as an exercise of armed violence against the enemy, limited only by principles of military necessity, distinction and proportionality.

Peacekeepers, however, must be aware of a possible double approach with the concept of Force and its use. Indeed, despite the fact that Peace Operations must always comply with Human Rights Law, in particular when taking action that interferes with individual rights, the Law of Armed Conflict (or IHL) becomes applicable as soon and as long as there is a resort to the use of force that reaches the threshold of an armed conflict or in peace enforcement missions.

Human Rights’ approach to the use of force is based on the assumptions conceived to protect individuals from abuse by their State. Its rules on the use of force in law enforcement essentially provide guidance on how force can be used by State agents when it is absolutely necessary for legitimate purposes.

On the other side, the IHL basic rules governing the conduct of hostilities were crafted to reflect the reality of armed conflicts. They are based on the postulate that the use of force is inherent to waging war and that the ultimate aim of military operations is to defeat the enemy’s armed forces. The Law Enforcement paradigm is normally associated with situations other than armed conflict (albeit applicable also in situation of armed conflict), as in peace operations contexts, where the use of force or firearms is seen as an extreme measure. Human Rights Law allows the resort to force by State authorities in order to maintain or restore public security, law and order.

Therefore, the use of force is strictly dependent on the State obligations to respect and protect the human rights. For instance, the essence of the principles governing the use of force under human rights relies on the concept that lethal force may be used only as last resort in order to protect life, when other available means remain ineffective. Furthermore, many international soft law instruments such as the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials have also clarified that a “strict” or “absolute” necessity standard is attached to any use of force, meaning that force may not exceed what is strictly or absolutely necessary to protect life.

The situation in armed conflict is significantly different. The principles,
on which the use of force under IHL is grounded, such as those of military necessity and proportionality, are intended in a completely different way than in Law Enforcement/IHRL view. Military necessity entails that the use of force against legitimate targets is always possible and then, with lawful means, combatants can be attacked at all times, whereas civilians only are protected against direct attack. Even the IHL principle of proportionality protects, during an attack, only surrounding civilians and civilian objects from damage that would be “excessive” in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. So to say, the Peace Operations standards in the use of force are, by nature, closer to the Law Enforcement paradigm than the IHL one. The UN use the acronym PLAN to refer to the four guiding principles in the use of force: Proportionality, Legality, Accountability and Necessity. Proportionality entails a use of force only when is unavoidable and, in all cases, proportional to lawful objectives, with damage and injury always minimized through the recourse of a differentiated range of available means. Among the available means to exercise the force I’d like to mention the typical “violent” measures like the Physical human force, Handcuffs, Baton/Gas/Water, Less than Lethal Firearms up to Lethal Firearms, but also the “nonviolent” measures as the simple Presence (of authority), the use of verbal Commands, the “show of force”. According to this standard when applying force, every peacekeeper or commander must constantly observe the development of the situation whether it is stable, it escalates or deescalates and graduate the means of
force accordingly. **Legality and Necessity** standards require the Force to be used only for lawful purposes, when strictly necessary, with the minimum level required and only for the time necessary. No exceptions or excuses are allowed. Security Council resolutions and their mandates set the boundaries of a lawful exercise of the force by Peace Operations, and only with “executive” tasks peacekeepers have comparable authorities and powers to the national officials.

**Accountability** requires to take responsibility for inappropriate use of force. Any unlawful use of force must be identified, investigated and adjudicated. Both an operational review and individual oversight mechanism must be implemented to ensure that the rules on the use of force are clearly defined and enforced.

Having a clear understanding of the aforementioned use of force standards is nowadays essential for United Nations peacekeepers, to be able to fully comply with them in exercising the force and moreover to implement the more frequent capacity building mandates.

UN Police, for instance, is often required to assist in the reforming, restructuring and rebuilding process of the security sector. Police services, very frequently, have been directly involved in hostilities or associated with gross human rights violations and, therefore, the population generally has little or no confidence in the capacity of the State to provide for their individual safety and security. The establishment of a Safe and Secure environment and an efficient security sector able to use the appropriate means and, when needed, able to apply the necessary force in order to protect the civilians and promote Human Rights, not only restores public law and order but contributes in rebuilding the confidence of the population in the capacity of the State to govern. UN Police, through its mentoring, advising and training tasks has a great responsibility to ensure that law enforcement is exercised lawfully and effectively by the host nation police services. A full compliance in the use of force within Human Rights international standards re-establishes confidence in the rule of law and definitely fosters a sustainable stabilization.

Conversely, as seen in the past, problems related to misuse of force and failure to follow international standards by peacekeepers and host country security institutions could easily turn into social unrest, further destabilization and risks for the security of the civilian population, jeopardizing the very existence of peace processes.

References:
1. Art.2 UN Charter
2. Art.39,41,42 UN Charter
3. Art. 1-1999 SG BULLETIN- The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set out in the present bulletin are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement. They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-defence.
4. UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the Eight UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 18 December 1990, Principle 9 “...in self-defence; to prevent crime, to effect or assist in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders; to prevent the escape of offenders or suspected offenders and in quelling a riot…”
5. PDT-STM for POLICE

**Maj. Marco Sutto EOD S/O**
CoESPU IHR/IHRL Chair
INTRODUCTION

The two decades of the 21st century have seen enormous losses of cultural heritage in some conflict areas. On 1st March 2001 the ancient (dating back to the 6th-7th century AD) monumental Buddhas of the Bamiyan valley, symbol of the Afghan community identity, were blown up by the Taliban with explosive charges and targeted with heavy weapons.

More recently, in 2015, the international community witnessed the destruction by the Islamic State of monuments, sculptures and artefacts in Syrian and Iraqi land, in particular at Mosul, Nimrud, Hatra and Palmyra (here the temples of Baal and Baalshamin and the monumental arch on the colonnaded street were blown up and the senior archaeologist Khaled al-Asaad executed).

To these devastations, which the chronicle of recent years has brought to the attention of the vast public, other cultural heritage losses have been added, less known but not less serious, such as those recorded in Libya. In this short paper I shall describe some of the most remarkable losses concerning the cultural heritage of Tripolitania since the last years of Jamāhīriyya to our troubled days, focussing, among others, on some examples of which I had direct archaeological or historical knowledge.

THE LAST DECADE OF JA-MĀHĪRIYYA.
BRIDGE OF THE VIA IN MEDITERRANEUM AND AGGER OF MONTICELLI AT LEPIS MAGNA (2007-2009)

Serious disturbances to the archaeological heritage in the suburb and territory of the ancient city of Lepcis Magna were caused by the growing building activities, particularly intense in the very last years of Jamāhīriyya. Here I want to focus on the Roman bridge located a few hundred meters south from Lepcis, which served the ancient road going south from the city (the via in Mediterraneum, as it was called in an inscription of the time of Tiberius). The bridge was built over the canal created in the 2nd century AD to divert the wadi Lebda and prevent flood and silting damages. This opus caementicium structure, still clearly visible in 2007 (Fig. 1), appeared as destroyed in 2009 and the area surrounding it levelled to favour the residential buildings and commercial activities. The same fate befell large portions of the nearby and related earthen bank (agger) of Monticelli, which flanked the canal, levelled to permit...
the construction of new buildings, as well the remains of the Italian fort Lebda, built in the 1910s.

“ALBERGO AGLI SCAVI DI LEPTIS” MAGNA IN KHOMS (2007-2008)

In the same years, between summer 2007 and February 2008, the Albergo agli Scavi di Leptis Magna was demolished, a primary example of Italian rational architecture and crucial element of Khoms city’s cultural heritage, which has been – and still is – considered as an architectural icon of Italian colonialism (Fig. 2). The hotel was conceived and built in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In the spring of 1928 two young architects active in Milan, Carlo Enrico Rava (Cernobbio 1903 - Milan 1986) and Sebastiano Larco Silva (Valparaíso 1901) presented at the First Italian Exposition of Rational Architecture (Prima Esposizione Italiana di Architettura Razionale), held in Rome, the project of the new hotel which should be realized in the Libyan town, not far from the seashore and at only 2 km ca. from the ancient Lepcis. Rava, son of a high ranking official of the Ministry of Colonies named in 1927 general secretary of Tripolitania, participated in the avant-garde of Italian rationalism and became one of the most influential figures in Italian colonial architecture. In the early 1930s Rava and Larco distanced themselves from the intransigent positions of the rationalist movement, to become advocates of a theoretical line based on the continuity within the Italian architectural tradition and on the recovery of the true Mediterranean and Latin spirit, conserved, according to them, in the vernacular constructions spread on the Italian and North African coasts. After few months of work, at the beginning of March 1931 the new large municipal hotel, significantly called “at the Excavations of Lepcis Magna” (agli Scavi di Leptis Magna) was completed. The official opening took place on March 5, 1931, in a deliberate coincidence with the inauguration of the Lepctitanian Museum. The building represents the prototype of the atypical rationalism
of Rava and Larco, for the harmonization and acclimatization of the new Italic style to the local color through the creation of a rational Mediterranean architecture. Very soon considered among the best achievements of the new Italian architecture, the Khoms hotel was widely echoed in Italian architecture magazines and appreciated by international tourists. On the threshold of the 21st century, nothing remained of the ancient luxury, which had attracted the praise of Carlo Emilio Gadda and Louis Bertrand. This fundamental cultural document of Khoms’ urban history finally had to leave room for new buildings, more suitable for the new season of mass tourism that appeared to begin in the last years of Jamāhiriyya but shortly thereafter interrupted by the outbreak of the Libyan uprising in February 2011.

THE NEW LIBYA
TRIPOLITANIAN MARABOUTS
(2012-2013)
In Tripolitania the cultural heritage losses have increased significantly since 2011, due to the unstable political situation. Once again, most of the damages are the consequence of the uncontrolled overbuilding, now favoured by a substantial decrease or even absence of government control. Indeed the territory of Leptis Magna is suffering the lack of surveillance to monitor the construction of new private buildings and activities that are spreading both around Khoms and in the rural areas. But devastations of other type also appeared, those caused by religious fundamentalists: the ancient marabouts were systematically destroyed with the consequence that most the rural religious architecture of the Ottoman-Karamanli age went lost. The phenomenon, caused by the Salafi opposition to African Sufism, far from being limited to Tripolitania, spread across the whole North Africa. In Tripolitania the demolition of marabouts occurred in the years 2012-2013. Focusing the analysis to the territory and suburbs of Leptis Magna, surveyed by a team of Rome Tre University and Department of Antiquity of Libya in 2013 led by the author, in particular the loss of the mosque on the Ras el-Hammam hill and the Sidi Zaid el-Garib marabout stand out. The 18th - 19th century Ras el-Hammam mosque, known also with the name of al-Saba or Sidi Ahmed el-Gandur has been almost completely demolished in 2012-2013 using an excavator. This destruction revealed that the mosque had reused as part of its main walls the original external enclosure of a late Roman gasr (fort): also these ancient walls in limestone ashlar blocks were heavily damaged by the excavator. The Sidi Zaid el-Garib marabout was completely erased including its external cemetery in 2012. This monument was built near the village of Leggata (now part the southern outskirt of Khoms) and mentioned by Scexh Abdussalam
el-Alem el-Tagiuri in the 17th century. Its original squared plan, with the ribbed gubba (dome) set upon an octagonal drum, is probably dated to the 16th century and it constituted one of the most ancient and well preserved marabout of the area (Fig. 3). Unfortunately, the destruction of the marabouts by the Salafists goes beyond the Lepcis’ survey areal: for instance, the seventeenth century Sidi Azzaz marabout in the Silin area and the 18th century Sidi Hassen marabout and Coranic school at Suk el-Juma (c. 25 km south-east from Lepcis Magna) were completely destroyed (Fig. 4).

• FONTANA DELLA GAZZELLA IN TRIPOLI (2014)
The artistic and architectural heritage in Tripoli has likewise seriously suffered. Enlightening in this regard is the vandalisation of the Fountain of the Gazelle (Fig. 5), created by Angiolo Vannetti (Livorno 1881 – Florence 1962). The Italian sculptor Vannetti since 1908 participated in several national and international expositions (Bruxelles 1912, Grand Salon des Beaux Arts di Parigi 1913 and 1914, Gand, Milano). With the end of the Great War, in which he fought as an officer, he resumed his artistic activity during the 1920s, realising the War Memorials in Dicomano and Florence (Parco della Rimembranza), then working extensively in the Far East (Shanghai, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Canton, Saigon e Singapore) and Latin America (Cuba; Panama after the Second World War). In the 1930s he participated in the modernization of Tripoli and other Libyan centers at the request of the Italian colonial government: noteworthy in this context are the bronze group constituted by a sitting young woman caressing a gazelle for a circular fountain in the seafront promenade of Tripoli, then called Fontana della Gazzella, and the monumental fountain with Giuseppe Garibaldi’s marble reliefs in the Villaggio Garibaldi (now ad-Dafniyah), realized respectively in 1932 and in 1939-1940. The fate of these two fountains is somehow comparable, but in the same time significantly divergent regarding the preservation of the artworks. The fountain of the Villaggio Garibaldi was dismantled...
after the Revolution of September 1969, like many other monuments realised during the Italian period. The marble reliefs, representing scene of Italian Risorgimento centered on the figure of Garibaldi, were however carefully dismantled and transported to a store of the Department of Antiquities of Lepcis Magna, where they are still preserved today (Fig. 6). The fountain of the Gazelle in Tripoli survived quietly and without any danger during the long years of the Jamāhīriyya. Immediately after the end of the regime, in late 2011, someone covered the figure of the half-naked woman who embraces the Gazelle with a piece of cloth. The situation worsened with the resumption of the civil conflict in 2014. In August of that year the female figure was damaged by an anti-tank bullet or a mortar shell during heavy clashes between rival militias. Finally in the night between 2nd and 3rd November 2014, Vannetti’s bronze statue was wrenched off its pedestal and disappeared from the fountain, unbeknownst to the Department of Antiquities of Libya, responsible for the protection of the artistic and archaeological heritage. To date it is not known whether the bronze statue has been destroyed or hidden somewhere. Concluding these notes I cannot fail to point out that this country remains in a state of extreme instability, which has recently seen the resumption of armed clashes in the suburbs of Tripoli, and that only the return to a shared solution of peace could guarantee the retrieval of adequate protection of the cultural heritage at risk. I am referring in particular to the archaeological and historical monuments spread beyond the perimeters of the UNESCO sites, in their suburbs and countryside, but also to the modern and contemporary monuments and architecture still present - but until when? - in the Libyan towns.

1. Fig. 1. Lepcis Magna, the bridge of the Monticelli agger (photo M. Munzi, 2007)
2. Fig. 2. Khoms, Albergo agli Scavi di Lepcis Magna (photo M. Munzi, June 2007)
3. Fig. 3. Sidi Zaid el-Garib marabout (photo M. Munzi, 2007)
4. Fig. 4. Sidi Hassen marabout and Ceramic school at Sok el-Juma (photo M. Munzi, 2009)
5. Fig. 5. The Fountain of the Gazelle in Tripoli (postcard, 1960s; archive M. Munzi)

Bibliography

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The marble reliefs, representing Giuseppe Garibaldi’s defence Roman Republic, from ad-Dafniyah (photo M. Munzi, 2007)
The activities of the Carabinieri EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) Teams, in Italy as well as abroad serving in Peace Missions, are fairly different from the EOD activities of the other International Armed Forces. Despite these similar “Bomb Disposal Training”, the Carabinieri EOD Teams have a Police background and the legal proceeding authority expertise to investigate in case of Criminal and Terroristic attacks. Those capabilities allow the Teams to have a comprehensive approach to the matter, being able to interact at all levels without intermediaries. Thanks to their peculiarities, the Carabinieri EOD teams carry out daily: EOD and Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) activities, Post Blast Investigation, Collection and Exploitation, “Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear” (CBRN) Activities, Counter Terrorism investigations, Special Operations and SWAT support, Court and Forensic activities with appraisals and training, “Counter Improvised Explosive Device” (C-IED) awareness and training activities. The Carabinieri EOD Teams have been deployed abroad, offering their peculiarities not only within the national units, but also to the Police Forces of Foreign and European Nations. An outstanding work has been carried out by the Carabinieri EOD teams during the ISAF mission in Afghanistan joining the Combined Explosive eXploitation Cell.
From 2009 to 2013, this cell dealt with investigations on the attacks against the International Forces occurred through Improvised Explosive Devices, better known by the acronym IEDs. The Carabinieri EOD Teams covered a wide range of engagements, from the disarming of the ordnances through their collection and exploitation, to activities in the field, and laboratory analysis. A great outcome came from the training activity on the ground, accounted both to field and legal operators. Those efforts allowed to support Investigations and Operations based not only on the intelligence, but on solid Evidence, allowing to identify and prosecute terrorists. Those brilliant results are obtained thanks to the Police approach during the extremely dangerous EOD activities, managing them not only to guarantee the public and the Operators safety, but using proper Police Technics, Tactics and Procedures to safeguard the sources of evidence for the Legal Proceeding and the investigations. For more info on the mission: http://www.cybernaua.it/photo/reportage/reportage.php?id-news=4308

Since 2004, the Carabinieri EOD Teams have been serving in Iraq with missions of mentoring, advising and training for the Iraqi Police Forces. They standardized new courses in the Anti-Sabotage activities for the Iraqi Federal Police to allow them to face the threat of IEDs, to carry out a safety Bomb Scene Investigation, safely collecting and exploiting the hazard material, being able to produce evidence useful for the investigations and the Legal Proceeding. For the outstanding field results achieved, the Carabinieri Corps has received the praise of the European Union (EU) that financed the "PO-TRAI" project for the training in the delicate sector. The Carabinieri EOD Teams, deployed all over Italy within the Provincial Commands, have been collaborating with CoESPU since a long time. The CoESPU Campus, with its outdoor "Longare Training Area", as a matter of fact, have been chosen by the General HQ as their primary training field for periodical compulsory professional refresh and updates. One of the units took part in the 2014 EUPST training activities, arranging a IED scenarios.
During the last EOD professional update (May 2019), the Magazine Staff had the opportunity to get in contact with Warrant Officer Sabina Davighi, first female component of a national EOD Team, specialized as a bomb disposal expert in 2016 and currently assigned to Firenze Carabinieri Provincial Command, addressing her some questions:

1) Please introduce yourself:
   I am NCO Sabina Davighi, enrolled in the Carabinieri in 2010. I obtained the IEDD habilitation in 2017, and I currently hold the position of IEDD operator at the Firenze Carabinieri Provincial Command.

2) What inspired you to choose this particular kind of professional field?:
   I have a scientific studies background, and I have always been keen on chemistry and electronics. Furthermore, I approached the “explosive world” in the early years of my military career, serving in the Army 2nd “Genio Guastatori” Regiment in Trento.

3) Are there any material limits (for equipment and type of commitment) to the employment of female personnel in this particular sector?:
   No limits at all, in my opinion. As a matter of fact, from a physical point of view, the specific task requires personnel with skills (strength and resistance) to be considered common to all Police Force members. From the psycho-attitudinal side, requirements are carefully assessed by a technical commission, with no gender differences at all. It is worth recalling that the explosion-proof coveralls weighs 34.5 kg, meaning body compression and difficulties in breathing and moving with consequent reduction of cerebral oxygenation. In the abilities training
and tasting phase to become an IEDD operator, those difficulties are taken in due account.

4) Would you recommend your choice to other colleagues?:
Many people ask me if I am not afraid of dangers I could be called to face with this job. Actually, being well prepared on Anti-sabotage techniques and able to handle possible stress, allow us to minimize risks, for ourselves and for citizens. Therefore, I would certainly recommend this kind of specialization, that I consider very inspiring and challenging. You simply need to love this job and to be ready for sacrifices.

WO Davide CUTRINO
(Carabinieri Bologna – EOD Team) & Magazine Staff

Pictures by D. Cutrino & Magazine Staff
Throughout the last decades the concept of peace operation has evolved to encompass a much broader spectrum of aspects, ranging from mere defence efforts to the de facto protection and recognition of the rights and needs of those directly and indirectly affected by conflict. This evolution is due to various reasons, including but not limited to the changing nature of conflict over time. One of the aspects of this change is the increase in the number of women joining insurgent groups. Between 1950 and 2017, women actively took part in 45 percent of the insurgencies in Africa, showing an increase in comparison with the trends in the previous decades.1

In the year 2000, the United Nations Security Council adopted the landmark resolution 1325 on “Women, Peace and Security”, addressing the two issues of women’s protection and women’s integration in peace processes with a new holistic approach. Albeit not being the first attempt of the Council to consider the more specific field of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), resolution 1325 indirectly acknowledged the role of women as possible combatants, reshaping the system’s reintegration strategies to better fit their specific needs.

Social reintegration of ex-combatants often tends to be overlooked as it may appear less urgent, especially when conflict resolution is an immediate priority. However, formulating an effective reintegration strategy in the framework of multidimensional operations is fundamental to address some of the structural collateral effects of war, whose impact can lead to further malfunction in post-conflict scenarios. The process of readjustment to the texture of civil society is an essential step in conflict’s recurrence prevention and in guaranteeing the development of a safe society. Aspects that may appear banal, such as the financial difficulties deriving from the arduousness in finding a job due to stigma surrounding the position of an ex-combatant, are at the core of reintegration efforts. A good strategy in that sense can only be effective when tailored to the specific needs of male and women ex-combatants, as their roles in the society have deeply different variations.

Both in occurrence and in the aftermath of conflict, women have different needs: from protection from direct forms of violence – in particular gender-based sexual
violence – to readjustment. In many cultures, women can have extreme difficulties in their family contexts in case their husband perishes in battle because men provide financially for the family. When women are ex-combatants their conditions in post-conflict resettlement can be even worse as they have to readapt to the society after the traumatic direct experience of conflict. In fact, programming social reintegration strategies without taking into account the changes in the perception that these women have of their role cannot lead to positive outcomes. In fact, “as female combatants challenge traditional gender norms, failing to account for transformed norms of behaviour may lead to further stigmatization during reintegration” (Onyinyechukwu).

For all these reasons, and for many unmentioned ones, peace-building strategies can only be successful if reintegration plans are included and are developed with a transversal and holistic approach. One first step might be providing training to the communities where ex-combatants are being reintegrated, including also civilians. Social reintegration, in fact, is a process that involves the society as a whole. In this sense, trainings should be adapted to different sections of the society in order to address their specific issues and needs in order to rebuild trust and promote reconciliation.

Trainings, however, are not sufficient as women ex-combatants need long-term support, especially for their economic stability and healthcare. Including women ex-combatants in the institutional apparatus in post-conflict reconstruction can be an effective method to ensure that the needs of that section of the society are taken into account. This provision would also enforce Security Council resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, as one of the core principles of this mandate is the increase in participation of women in decision-making roles, both in peacekeeping and peace-building processes. However, the role of women as active fighters in non-state armed groups must firstly be acknowledged in peace negotiations in order to guarantee that DDR strategies contained in the outcome of peace agreement take their specific needs and rights into account. Again, including these women in peace talks increases the chances to have a comprehensive peace agreement, as in the case of the Havana agreement ending the conflict between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government.

Eventually, national authorities are the primary actors entitled to guarantee this support though the development of comprehensive plans. Many of the National Action Plans (NAPs) on Women, Peace and Security adopted by UN Member States include provisions of DDR, but only a few make specific reference to gender-sensitive strategies. Nonetheless, the international community proves to be moving forward in the development of comprehensive and fully multidimensional operations. Indeed, conflict does not end when weapons are laid down.


2. United Nations INSTRAW, Virtual Discussion on Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration, n.d.
This article traces the institutional phenomenon of hybrid or dual-use military-police forces throughout the vast geographic area of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ranging from ‘Vancouver to Vladivostok’. The data used for the assessment were essentially retrieved from the yearly information exchange of the OSCE participating States on their implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (hereafter referred to as the ‘Code’) according to the technically updated Questionnaire of 2009. The Code is the latest generation of Confidence- and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) that the OSCE’s politico-military dimension has developed after the end of the Cold War, striking an implicit link to the OSCE’s human dimension of security. It’s merit and main added value is that it introduces innovative, if not revolutionary norms and provisions on how states manage their security and defence sectors, safeguarding i.a. the democratic political control of armed forces considered as an indispensable requirement for security and stability. Occasionally, hybrid police/military forces are also called ‘Gendarmerie’-type or constabulary forces. More specifically, however, we...
have been tracing what paragraph 20 of the Code of Conduct refers to as paramilitary and internal security forces (hereafter abbreviated as ‘PSFs’). Evaluating participating States’ national reports from 2009-2018 reveals that there is actually a wide spectrum of forces and services that may allow us to further differentiate PSFs beyond the Gendarmerie. Concretely, our assessment tentatively identifies no less than 8 distinct categories or typologies across the OSCE area:

1. Gendarmerie and ‘Mounted Police’
2. Border & Coast Guards, Customs Services, and Immigration Agencies
3. Militia, and other local territorial defence forces
4. National Guard and Military Reserve Forces
5. Special Law Enforcement Services and Intervention Units in the Police
6. Military Police
7. Financial Guards
8. Regional Cooperation Units

This phenomenon may reflect a gradual process of ‘institutional differentiation’ within the security sector in response to a dynamically changing security environment in the context of which neither conventional military defence forces nor the ordinary civilian police services offer adequate and effective responses. Accordingly, PSFs are needed where inter-state ‘wars’ are gradually replaced by new forms of intra-state instability and low-intensity conflicts, in response to which constabulary missions and peace operations replace the waging of war by conventional regular armed forces.

There remains some controversy regarding the use of the term ‘paramilitary’ forces for any sort of statutory state actors, given that the majority of states tends to associate them with non-state-, if not irregular actors. The OSCE thus far hasn’t provided for any specific guidelines regarding the possible definition of PSFs nor general guidelines regarding the definition of the security sector as a whole. Anyway, further evaluation and cross-comparison of PSFs, and either in distinction from or connection with conventional military forces, civilian police, and intelligence services, and while taking into account new non-statutory actors such as Private Military- and Security Companies (PMSCs), suggest that there are at least three types of ‘institutional overlaps’ within the security sector: Two of these overlaps may refer to ‘traditional overlaps’ (see items 1 and 2 as listed below), while the third one represents an ‘emerging overlap’ (the remaining item 3), including armed forces services outsourced by states to private sector actors:

I. Overlaps between conventional military defence forces and non-conventional paramilitary security structures
II. Overlaps between paramilitary and/or internal security forces and security and intelligence services
III. The emerging overlap between regular, statutory armed and security forces (either conscripted or voluntary) and non-statutory outsourced/contracted/privatized security and military actor

These overlaps within the security sector...
sector may further highlight the above-mentioned institutional differentiation in the security sector, reflecting forces and services with ‘convergent’ military and police roles and missions. In conclusion, statutory PSFs, whatever their national manifestations, conceptualizations, and legal definitions, can be considered a corollary to the perceived ‘blurring’ of military and police roles in that they are the logic derivate of a changing strategic environment at the crossroad of the corresponding trends of the ‘civilization’ of international security missions and the militarization of homeland security, and since they can be used for operations both on the homeland and in international theatres.

1) OSCE official document: DECISION No. 2/09; TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE CODE OF CONDUCT, 575th Plenary Meeting, FSC Journal No. 581, Agenda item 3, FSC.DEC/2/09, 1 April 2009. All national reports have been made publicly available since 2008 at the OSCE’s official website: https://www.osce.org/forum-for-security-cooperation/86841.

2) The OSCE Code of Conduct was negotiated by the participating States in the Forum for Security Cooperation (the steering body of the OSCE’s politico-military dimension of security), in 1992-1994 and was included in the Budapest Summit Final Document (1994). It is available in all 6 official languages of the OSCE and has been translated in 5 other national languages from the OSCE region, as well as into Arabic: https://www.osce.org/fsc/41355.

3) § 20 of the Code stipulates: “The participating States consider the democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces as well as of intelligence services and the police to be an indispensable element of stability and security. They will further the integration of their armed forces with civil society as an important expression of democracy.” (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Code herewith provides for a 5-partite structure of states’ statutory security forces, and while distinguishing PSFs from military forces, intelligences services, and the police.

4) Such as for instance Europol or even the European Gendarmerie Forces (EGF).


1) OSCE official document: DECISION No. 2/09; TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE CODE OF CONDUCT, 575th Plenary Meeting, FSC Journal No. 581, Agenda item 3, FSC.DEC/2/09, 1 April 2009. All national reports have been made publicly available since 2008 at the OSCE’s official website: https://www.osce.org/forum-for-security-cooperation/86841.

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When we are abroad, especially in Peace Operations, is very important to maintain our health conditions in the best way possible. So it is important to sleep adequately, train ourselves, eat in balance ways, and drink water or use water to basic hygienic conditions.

It’s clear that use contaminated water to drink is very dangerous, but also to use dirty water to other purposes increase the risk of infection and, also, our life and the life of our colleagues and every people that we meet. Said that it is important to consider how water that we use, for every purpose, is stored. It’s clear also, that when we are abroad and in some specific countries, we have not the opportunity to use purifying system that we are use in our normal normal life and that guarantee us sterilized water. It could be happens that we are not in a structured compound and we have not to disposal purifying system, or we are in emergency situation and we need to purity drinking water. These advices consider that we have not to disposal bottled or other sources of disinfected water.

First of all we have to consider that disinfection does not work as well when water is cloudy or colored. If water is cloudy, let it settle. Then filter the water through a clean cloth, paper towel, or coffee filter. Store the settled and filtered water in clean containers with covers.

But the filtration of the water is not enough to guarantee our health.

By Davide Perego
In fact many contaminants come from micro-organisms and they are small and invisible so their size is measured in microns. One micron is equivalent to one millionth of a meter in size. So to have an idea of which type of micro-organisms are so little, this is a simple list: Campylobacter jejuni, Escherichia coli, Leptospira, Salmonella Yersinia enterocolitica. In added to bacterial there are the viruses, like Norwalk, Norovirus, Enterovirus, Rotavirus, and Hepatitis A, etc. etc. Water filters are incapable of filtering out viruses from water.

For that, it is a must bring water to a rolling boil for at least one minute. Altitudes above 1.000 meters, boil water for three minutes. Later, let water cool naturally and store it in clean containers with covers. To improve the flat taste of boiled water, add one pinch of salt to each quart or liter of water, or pour the water from one clean container to another several times. The oxygenation of the water restores the taste unchanging the sterilization.

Consider that if the water we are going to purify contains rust, salts or other chemicals, boiling it will not do anything to them. The only thing boiling does is kill bacteria and other living organisms. If we have not the opportunity to boil water, the simplest way is use water disinfection tablets. We can disinfect water with tablets that contain chlorine, iodine, chlorine dioxide, or other disinfecting agents. These tablets are available online or at pharmacies and sporting goods stores. Follow the instructions on the product label as each product may have a different strength.

If we have not with us the water disinfection tablets, we can use household bleach, only use regular, unscented chlorine bleach products that are suitable for disinfection and sanitization as indicated on the label. The label may say that the active ingredient contains 6 or 8.25% of sodium hypochlorite. Do not use scented, color safe, or bleaches with added cleaners.

For this reason could be useful to have a clean dropper in our medicine cabinet or emergency supply kit. Locate a fresh liquid chlorine bleach or liquid chlorine bleach that is stored at room temperatures for less than one year. Ever use clean water and add about 2 drops of 6% bleach or 1 drop of 8.25% to each liter of water. Double the amount of bleach if the water is cloudy, colored, or very cold. Stir and let stand for 30 minutes. The water should have a slight chlorine odor. If it doesn’t, repeat the dosage and let stand for another 15 minutes before use.

If the chlorine taste is too strong, pour the water from one clean container to another and let it stand for a few hours before use.

If we have iodine tincture we can add from 5 to 10 drops to each liter of water, and like bleach stir and let for 30 minutes. If the water is cloudy or colored, add 10 drops of iodine, not less. Also Betadine works: from 8 to 16 drops for 1 liter of water, and after ever stir and let stand for 30 mi-
Another option is to use Granular Calcium Hypochlorite. The first step is to make a chlorine solution that we will use to disinfect our water. For our safety, do it in a ventilated area and wear eye protection. Add one heaping teaspoon (approximately 7 grams) of high-test granular calcium hypochlorite (HTH) to 6 liters of water and stir until the particles have dissolved. The mixture will produce a chlorine solution of approximately 500 milligrams per liter. To disinfect water, add one part of the chlorine solution to each 100 parts of water you are treating. If the chlorine taste is too strong, pour the water from one clean container to another and let it stand for a few hours before use.

If we have iodine tincture we can add from 5 to 10 drops to each liter of water, and like bleach stir and let for 30 minutes.

But easiest and cheapest way to disinfect water in small quantities is to expose transparent water bags or bottles to the sun. The Photo Sodis was taken up again in a 1984 UNICEF publication, then during the ’90s by researchers at the American University of Beirut and other Canadian (CRDI) and Swiss (EAWAG, then SODIS) organizations so as to perform numerous tests and lab experiments so as to precisely understand this phenomena of disinfecting water by irradiating it with sunlight and especially to measure and prove its efficiency.

Everyone can use this process so long as they live in a sunny region and it only requires limited amounts of drinking water, but it is however especially useful in countries where water is scarce, of mediocre quality or not very safe and where other treatment systems either do not exist or are inadequate. This is the case in many villages, some outlying urban areas or in isolated regions. This is a way to guarantee our healthy in a cheaper and also to bring help to people or emergency workers arriving in an area where they do not yet know whether the water available is drinkable or not.

This process of “sanification” is most often known as SODIS (Solar water Disinfection), from the name of a department of the Swiss aquatic research institute (EAWAG) that has perfected the system and distributed it in some 20 countries, organizing actions there to raise the population’s awareness of hygiene and health matters, and it is used by some two million people. By exposing transparent plastic bottles to bright sunlight for at least six hours, the combined effect of the UV-A ultra violet rays and the increase in temperature in excess of 45° destroys the pathogens (microbes, bacteria, parasites - Giardia and cryptosporidia - or micro-organisms likely to cause illnesses and especially severe cases of diarrhoea) thereby making the water safe to drink.

Sunlight is actually made up of a number of elements with differing wavelengths (the spectrum), including ultraviolet rays (with wavelengths of between 315 and 400 nanometres) and these are the most effective for destroying pathogens. As they penetrate the water, the ultra violet rays react with the oxygen dissolved in the water (hence the usefulness of shaking the bottle before filling it completely, to increase this reaction) and it produces highly reactive oxygen molecules with free radicals that attack, inhibit or destroy pathogen germs. These radiations along with the ambient heat progressively raise the water temperature, which has a pasteurising effect, accelerating the process and already eliminating some of the pathogens that are unable to resist high temperatures. If the temperature reaches or exceeds 55°C, the disinfection time may even be halved.
Transparent plastic (quality PET - Polyethylene terephthalate, as is the case most often for water or soda bottles) is the material that best lets ultra violet light and sun rays through. This, together with its light weight is why it is recommended. For greater effectiveness, use plastic 1 to 2 litres bottles (3 litres max.) and with a maximum diameter of 10 cm. It is preferable, but not essential, to choose PET plastic bottles for they are lighter, easier for UV rays to penetrate and they can easily be found almost everywhere. Transparent plastic pouches can also be used, even if they are less handy.

The bottles must be colourless and transparent. Bottles made from PET often have a bluish reflection, but this is not an issue.

Storing the cleaned water (and serving it) from these same bottles is strongly recommended to avoid all contamination and the bottles should only be used for this purpose. If one of the bottles becomes scratched or deteriorates, it should be replaced. Whatever the case, bottles should be changed every four to six months.

As the chemical methods, just seen above, the water has to be not dirty. In fact turbid water is not suitable as turbidity considerably restricts the penetration of ultra violet rays. If the available water is turbid, then it needs to be filtered first, at least using a fine, clean, cloth. A simple way to estimate turbidity without having a turbidity metre, is to place the PET bottle full of water, upright on a newspaper headline and look through the water from the bottle opening, from top to bottom.

If the headline letters cannot be read through the water, then it requires filtering. If there is no sun, or if cloud cover persists for more than half of the day, exposing the water for longer is recommended so that it receives at least six hours of sunlight.

If the lack of sun persists for more than half of the day, then the bottles must be exposed for another day, and the same applies in case of rain.

Now, in details, the procedures:

1) First of all, obtain plastic bottles, or plastic bags, made from PET. (it is recommended at least two 1.5 litre bottles per person, per day, and the same amount in reserve for the next day.)

2) Carefully wash the bottles when they are used for the first time (we can use one of the methods above).

3) Fill the bottles to the three-quarter mark.

4) Shake the bottle for some twenty seconds to oxygenate the water.

5) Then finish completely filling the bottles.

6) Expose the bottles to the sun, e.g. by placing them on a roof or any other suitable surface (a reflective surface, or for example, one covered with a sheet of aluminium foil makes the process even more effective and fast).

7) Leave the bottles in the sun from morning till evening, and as a precaution for at least six hours. (even if disinfection proves faster in intense sunlight).

8) Then wait for the bottles to cool before consuming the water safely.

Also we have to consider that glass bottles must not be used since it is hard for UV rays to penetrate the glass.

These are a simple advices to purify the water when we are in hostile conditions and we can’t to have the opportunity to have professional water filtration and purification systems.

M.D. Davide Perego
Neuroscientist, Psyco-Neuro Physiologist, expert in Psychopathology and neuropsychology.
January 27 - April 10, 2019
10th edition of the Italian Training Mission (MIADIT) for Palestinian Security Forces, in the framework of the bilateral relations between Italy and the Palestinian National Authority. For twelve weeks, approximately thirty qualified instructors from the Carabinieri Corps – including a CoESPU trainer - supervised the training of several units belonging to the Palestinian military and police forces. The project was fulfilled through various missions outside the area, in order to support the development of local police forces. During the activity of the MIADIT 10 Palestine, the Carabinieri trained and specialized a total of 325 members of the Palestinian Security Forces. The training included police courses, protection activities, defense activities, investigation techniques in environmental crimes and illegal art works trafficking.
Furthermore, during the 12 training weeks, in Jericho, Carabinieri specialized teams delivered lessons on weapons, logistics, cultural heritage protection and environmental protection.
In the framework of the 11th Italian Training Mission (MIA-DIT) in Djibouti, some training on crowd control and management techniques activities were carried out by the Carabinieri in favor of some USA Army Units belonging to the “Apache Company”. The Company is part of the “East African Responce Force”, which mainly deals with the Security of the US Embassies in the Horn of Africa, facing daily needs and possible emergencies. The courses, delivered by a Team of Instructors from the Carabinieri Corps with proven experience – including a trainer provided by CoESPU - have gained great interest among US soldiers, who had the opportunity to refine their preparation by deepening a theme that is not purely military, but concerning the police activity on Security and Public Order Protection. The first course was aimed at deepening crowd control and crowd management techniques (Crowd & Riot Control). The activity was focused on the progressive use of force (action index), psychology and crowd management, the use of “Public Order Devices”, fire-fighting techniques and non-lethal options. The theory was followed by numerous practical exercises. The High Command of the Department of the Army, at the end of the training activity, acknowledged the professional skills of the Carabinieri Corps.

Final Planning Event (FPE) of the “Shared Accord 2019” Exercise in Gabiro (Rwanda Defence Force - Combat Training Center), Gako (Rwanda Military Academy), Kigali (Hotel Ubumwe), at the presence of a CoESPU Officer (Police Subject Matter Expert and Senior Police Mentor).

The event, in partnership among Italy, USA, Netherlands, Belgium and Canada, involving UN, ICRC, AU, UNOCHA and USAID, is scheduled to take place in Rwanda, involving a total amount of about 1200 (from police, military and civilian agencies) coming from several Nations such as: Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, DRC - Brazzaville, Costa D’Avorio, Egitto, Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Marocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tunisia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia.
11th June, Brindisi - Italy, UN GSC Compound.
The CoESPU, Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, represented by its Director and relevant Subject Matter Experts, participated in a workshop on the “United Nations Police Training Architecture”, organized by the United Nations Police Division / Integrated Training Service and hosted by the UN Global Service Center and the Standing Police Capacity in Brindisi.
Thanks to the financial support of the German Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 79 participants from 29 Member States and representatives from OHCHR, UNITAR, ICITAP, COESPU, EU and AU have converged to Brindisi for the 4-day event.
The main purpose of the Workshop was to streamline UN Police Training Architecture and refine and develop Standard Training Modules (STMs), online course on the Strategic Guidance Framework (SGF) and job-specific training modules based on SGF.
During the welcome session, opening speeches were delivered by Mr Luis Carrilho (UN Police Adviser), Mr Mark Pedersen (Chief, Integrated Training Service / DPET), Mr Christoph Buik (Director - SPC) and Brigadier General Giovanni Pietro Barbano (Director, CoESPU), who took the floor to explore the crucial role of Police in modern Peace Operations, no longer limited to performing mere monitoring duties, but now embracing a wide spectrum of functions, which ranges from operational tasks to high qualified capacity building activities. These are undoubtedly indispensable ingredients to achieve a long-lasting and sustainable peace. On the other hand, everybody now widely recognizes the need to develop a comprehensive and integrated performance policy framework, in order to identify performance standards for evaluating all UN Peace personnel, both civilian and uniformed, facilitating the full implementation of mandates.
CoESPU Onsite Visits
April 2, 2019
Ambassador Francesco Maria Talò, former Cyber Security Coordinator for Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAECI), recently named for Permanent Representative of Italy to NATO HQ in Bruxelles, visited the CoESPU Campus, being briefed about on the Center’s Activities & Capabilities and signing the Book of Honor.
Accompanied by Mr Nicola Iorio, Mrs Adriana Lori (MAECI Legation Secretaries) and Col. Gianluca Feroce (Carabinieri General HQ), the Ambassador extended the visit to the European Gendarmerie Force Permanent HQ and the NATO SP COE, for a complete overview on the whole Vicenza Stability Policing Compound.

April 10, 2019
Brigadier General Eric Folkestad, Deputy Commanding General of US Army Africa (USARAF) and Southern Europe Task Force (SE-TAF) in Vicenza, visited the CoESPU. Following an office call with the CoESPU Director, the guest and his staff visited the compound and the training facilities, receiving a briefing about the Center’s activities and Capabilities.
The meeting was successful, encouraging point for future possible collaborations and to enhance a long lasting partnership. The high rank Officer has received a copy of the CoESPU Magazine and of the Carabinieri historical Calendar.
April 11, 2019
UK Royal Marines Major General Matt Holmes, Director of the Resolute Support Mission Ministerial Advisory Group – Interior (MAG-I), whose primary task is to provide support to the Afghan Ministry of Interior in the challenging process of reconstruction and stabilization of the Country, accompanied by his staff, paid a visit to the three Institutions forming the Vicenza Stability Policing Community: the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units - where he had a fruitful office call with the CoESPU Director - the European Gendarmerie Force Permanent Headquarters and the NATO Stability Police Centre of Excellence. The main topic was a mutual exchange of professional information aimed at possible, future, cooperation.

May 7, 2019
Chief Constable Andy Marsh and Mr Andrew Goldston from the UK National Police Chief’s Council and Mrs Kathryn Holloway from the UK Police and Crime Commissioners, paid a visit to the CoESPU being welcomed by the Director. The UK Police delegation was briefed about the CoESPU’s origins, mission, values, principles, capacities, organization and its activities as a Center for Advanced Studies, Think Tank and Doctrinal Hub. After the visit the participants outlined the key elements for future cooperation, especially in the field of Capacity Building.
May 24, 2019
The Italian Military Representative to the NATO and EU Military Committees, Lieutenant General Roberto Nordio (IT Air Force), welcomed by Lieutenant General Riccardo Amato, Commanding General of the “Palidoro” Carabinieri Mobile and Specialized Units Command in Rome, visited the Vicenza Stability Policing Hub.
Following a meeting with the Nato SP CoE Staff, Lt. Gen. Nordio had an office call with the CoESPU Director, then he was briefed about the current and future activities of the Center of Excellence. Furthermore he could visit the CoESPU’s Modeling and Gaming Simulation Training Area (MaGiSTrA).
The aim of the visit was to give Lt. Gen. Nordio a panoramic view on the activities of the CoESPU and the Nato SP CoE in view of the first Informal Military Committee Working Group, which took place on last June and whose main topic was the Stability Policing Concept.

25 June 2019
BG Cengiz YILDIZ, Head of Strategy and Foreign Affairs Division of the Turkish Gendarmerie, accompanied by his staff, visited the CoESPU Campus.
After a quick tour of the Compound and a briefing on its main training activities, he was received by the CoESPU Director for a formal gifts exchange and a talk on past and future collaborations.

General YILDIZ got in touch with the CoESPU activities in the recent past, being present on the occasion of the closing ceremony of the “EU-Twinning Project” between the Turkish Jandarma and the Carabinieri, in Ankara, February 2019.
June 12–14, 2019
CS Luis Carrilho (UN Police Adviser) and Mr Mark Pedersen (ITS Chief) visited CoE-SPU, meeting the attendees of the 5th FPU Coordinators Course, accompanied by the Director.
The UN Police Adviser got in direct touch with the High Level Course attendees, talking about the crucial role of Police activity in modern and future Peace Missions. In the second day of the visit, before joining the Graduation Ceremony of the 5th FPU Coordinators Course, Chief Superintendent Carrilho met BG Giovanni Barbano in his office, together with Mr Ata Yenigun (Chief of Selection and Recruitment Section of the Police Division) to schedule collaboration programs and to draw the future edges of the strategic partnership between CoESPU and UNPOL.
CoESPU training
March 27 – April 16, 2019
March 27 – April 16, 2019. Ninth edition of the “Training Building” Course (TB09), with the main goal to develop trainees’ capacity in planning and conducting Police peacekeeping training programs. The final aim is to prepare UN Police Officers and Formed Police Units for field deployment.

As a consequence of lessons learned stemming from previous editions and in consideration of recent developments in the UN doctrine and core directives, the Course curriculum has been further improved, in line with the CoESPU commitment to support participating countries in achieving self-sufficiency in pre-deployment training. In this context, the 3-week course - realized with the strategic partnership of the United States Department of State in the framework of its Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) - aimed at increasing the knowledge of the attendees on sensitive topics and included other cross-cutting issues, such as the implementation of the zero-tolerance policy against sexual exploitation and abuse, the protection of civilians, as well as the protection and respect of local cultural and environmental heritage. The 25 students came from different Countries, and namely: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Chile, Gabon, Ghana, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Nepal, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo and Ukraine.

April 15 – 19, 2019, and May 27 – 31, 2019
The CoESPU hosted two courses (2nd NATO phase) aimed at training Police Advisor Teams (PATs) composed of a total of 55 Italian Carabinieri, which will be deployed in Afghanistan in the framework of the NATO Resolute Support Mission (RSM). Resolute Support is a NATO-led, non-combat mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The main purpose of the Resolute Support Mission is to help the Afghan Security Forces to develop the capacity to defend the Nation and protect its citizens in a sustainable manner. The RSM was launched on 1 January 2015, following the conclusion of the previous NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, and the assumption of full security responsibility by the ANDSF. The Resolute Support Mission works closely with different elements of the Afghan Army, Police and Air Force. The RSM currently comprises around 17,000 personnel from 39 NATO Allies and partners countries. It operates with one ‘hub’ (Kabul/Bagram) and four ‘spokes’ (Mazar-e-Sharif in the north, Herat in the west, Kandahar in the south, and Laghman in the east).

The Course, planned in cooperation with the UN DPO Police Division and organized with the support of the US Department of State in the framework of its Global Peace Operations Initiative, was devoted to Senior Police Officers currently deployed in different UN missions as FPU Coordinators, to improve their capability to plan and conduct operations at tactical level, in accordance with the most updated UN Guidelines, Procedures, Standards and Norms, with specific attention to sensitive cross-cutting issues and strategic priorities such as upholding of Human Rights, Protection of Civilians, Gender Issues, and implementation of the Secretary General Zero Tolerance Policy against serious misconducts and Sexual Exploitation & Abuse.

The 31 students came from the UN Missions in Congo (MONUSCO), Darfur (UNAMID), South Sudan (UNMISS), Mali (MINUSMA), Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and Abey (UNISFA) and from the Nato Stability Policing Centers of Excellence. Their Countries of origin were Benin, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, Guinea, Italy, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sweden, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia and Zimbabwe.

During the Graduation ceremony, before the delivery of the completion certificates to the attendees, the UN Police Adviser, Chief Superintendent Luis Carrilho, and the CoESPU Director, took the floor and addressed words of congratulations to the participants and stressed the importance of this kind of course.

Mr Mark Pedersen, Chief of the UN Integrated Training Service, meet the attendees in the last week too, being present for the Course picture.
NEWS FROM THE CoESPU CAMPUS

Change of Command Ceremony at the European Gendarmerie Force Permanent Headquarters: at the end of his 2-year tour of duty, Col. Lucian Gavrila (Romanian Gendarmerie) handed over the Command to Col. Giuseppe Zirone (Italian Carabinieri). The Hand-over Ceremony took place on the 26th of June, 2019, on the Parade Ground of the Chinotto compound in the presence of several International and Italian Authorities: among them, the Italian Carabinieri Lieutenant General Riccardo AMATO, Commander of the Mobile and Specialized Units “Palidora”, and Brigadier General Laurent HENDRICKX, from the Dutch Koninklijke Marechaussee, representing the President of the High-Level Interdepartmental Committee (CIMIN).

The whole Vicenza Stability Policing Community wishes Col. Gavrila all the best for his personal and professional future and Col. Zirone a very fruitful experience in his capacity of new EGF Commander!

FPU Command Staff Training Course

The new training module, starting in July 2019 in the CoESPU Campus, is the result of the effort of the Integrated Training Service – ITS (part of the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division of the Department of Peace Operations – DPO) together with the UN Department of Field Support – DFS and CoESPU. It is specifically built for the Command Staff of Formed Police Units - FPU.

The aim of the FPU Command Staff Course is to ensure that appointed or potential UN FPU commanders and key staff possess the core competencies, skills and necessary knowledge to lead and support their Units at tactical level (including training abilities and “Train the Trainers” methodologies) in accordance with international human rights standards and humanitarian law, UN standards, realizing the principles, objectives, and methodology of UN Policing.
COMING SOON

On next November 4, 2019, the CoESPU will host the 1st International Conference on “Strategic Advising in Police Capacity Building and Development (CB&D) - Lessons Learned and Best Practices”. The outcomes of the conference will be shared to International Organizations and Allied Countries, aimed at future, doctrinal elaborations. More info to come in the next number of the CoESPU Magazine, on our website and Social Media Pages. Stay tuned!
Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units

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