The CoESPU Magazine

The online quarterly journal of Stability Policing

Training and Learning Architecture
Capacity Building in POS
- Stability Policing in Collective Defence
- Eurogendfor: the origins

Join Training and Cooperation for the Maintenance of Peace and Security
- Elevating the role of training
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Carabinieri abroad: lessons from experience
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THE CoESPU COMPOUND MEMORIAL
Dear CoESPU Magazine readers, with great effort and a sense of deep sorrow for all the victims caused by Coronavirus, we have left behind the 2020. A year made of limitations, deprivations of freedom of movement and pain that has pushed us into a reality that no one, in memory of a living man, has ever lived, if not in times of war. Besides this feeling of sadness for all the suffering caused by this devious and dark evil, my personal thought can only be characterized by a deep nostalgia. The nostalgia of colors. It was very hard for me not to see here, at the Center of Excellence, for most of the past year, the multitudes of differently colored uniforms belonging to students from all over the world. That situation filled my heart with melancholy, reflecting on the many activities and courses the pandemic forced us to postpone.

Despite all the hardships and difficulties caused by the disease, that has also affected many of our colleagues, the CoESPU has not stopped its activities. We have a number of projects in the pipeline which, trusting in the help of science that we hope will soon defeat the Covid-19, we intend to carry out during the 2021. Waiting to reveal what they will be, I have the honour to provide, for your reading, the new issue of the Magazine, mainly focused on Training and Capacity Building in POs, collecting features from various qualified academics, and practitioners with relevant experience. Among the other contributors, Colonel Giuseppe De Magistris, NATO SP CoE Director, analyses the importance of Stability Policing in collective defence. Moving towards another subject, Alexandra Martin, Head of Brussels office of GLOBSEC and Jordan Sweeney, Policy Assistant, provide a very interesting article on the role of emerging technologies in enhancing joint training and cooperation for peace and conflict prevention. Francesca Del Mese, in her article concerning the UN Performance Evaluation, emphasizes the challenges independent evaluators have to overcome in order to carry out their duties properly. Filippo Tancon Lutteri provides an insight on the EGF, the European Gendarmerie Force, making an excursus from its foundation to the present day.

Finally, the “Health and well-being” section features an interesting article where the author, the psychiatrist Davide Perego, analyses different ways to manage some forms of depression. I wish you all a pleasant reading, with a wish for all of us: that the colors may soon return to fill again our lives and the CoESPU parade ground!

BG Giovanni Pietro BARBANO
CoESPU Director
The CoESPU Magazine is devoted to the publication of professional concepts and issues, research and doctrinal products developed by the Carabinieri Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, in collaboration with other international research Centers. The Magazine addresses topics of professional, technical, operational and juridical nature in the field of Stability Policing within Peace Operations. Based on the core values of ethics, integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity, harmonically inflected and informed by the traditions of over two hundred years of Carabinieri history, the Magazine fosters Human Rights and gender mainstreaming, while seeking to enhance current police peacekeeping doctrine and promoting international police peacekeeping interoperability, cognizant of Lessons Learned and best practices. The CoESPU Magazine is constantly committed to upholding UN standards, norms, procedures and curricula, while endorsing self-sufficiency of the participating Police Contributing Countries. Consequently, its editorial policy promotes the principles of representativeness, responsiveness, and accountability, as well as effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and accessibility, to provide the highest professional standards to build trust and legitimacy of beneficiary Law Enforcement Institutions.

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TRAINING AND LEARNING ARCHITECTURE

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-JOIN TRAINING AND COOPERATION FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY

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JOIN TRAINING AND COOPERATION FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY
UN PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Introduction

NATO’s essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Therefore, Collective Defence is at the heart of the Alliance, protecting its members from all kind of potential globally emerging threats, which might come from a wide range of diverse actors. Since 2010, as outlined in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, NATO focuses on countering these threats by utilizing collective defence, managing crisis situations and encouraging cooperative security. In Afghanistan, the only instance when the Alliance called for an Art. 5 operation, NATO promptly activated its resources, Member States responded to the call and the enemy was fairly quickly militarily defeated. However, unfortunately, after 20 years of military commitment, the Taliban, which were pointed out as the main actors responsible for favouring, hosting and assisting the terrorists, are still steadily operational. One, if not the main, of the elements which contributed to this outcome could be attributed to having used mainly a military instrument, to solve security issues and challenges that should have required a different, more police-oriented, approach, by enforcing the law and protecting the population, therefore gaining its support. Indeed, bridging the so-called “policing gap” requires an innovative military response aimed at reinforcing or temporarily replacing the local Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, the rule of law and the protection of human rights. This is the NATO Stability Policing’s mission. By the same token, in 2014, Rus-
Russia was successful to annex Crimea while an escalation of violence and war-like actions were taking place in the Donbass, East Ukraine. As acknowledged by the Ukrainian Military Law and Order Service (MLOS), the Ukrainian authorities and security forces were then unable to foresee and properly react to the invasion of Crimea. Indeed, faced with an unexpected hybrid war scenario which included cyberwarfare, sabotage, subversion, indoctrination of the local population with mass demonstrations and rallies, in parallel with military engagement of undercover Russian Special Forces in the field, the MLOS and the Ukrainian army were taken aback, overwhelmed by events, and their military manoeuvre capabilities were severely affected. As a result, the end state of the Russian hybrid strategy was the complete paralysis and subsequent collapse of the Ukrainian Law Enforcement and Defence capabilities in Crimea with the practical impossibility for Kiev to timely activate any sort of self-defence response. Since then, as a first step, the Alliance has constituted the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) inside the NATO Response Force (NRF). The VJTF, also known as Spearhead Force, is intended to deter any aggression by virtue of its strength (5,000 pax) and from two-to-five-day rapid deployability. The second step of the NATO strategy has been the deployment of Battlegroups based in Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. However, apart from the successful experiences in Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo, the Alliance’s response so far is still very conventional military, being focused only on a potential military crisis at the Eastern border but overlooking the “police” dimension, which is the best suited to face the features of an hybrid scenario and the possible threat coming from an “internal front”, fuelled, in Crimea, by undercover Russian Special Forces mingled with the supportive local population. Undisturbed, they successfully targeted institutional buildings, barracks and headquarters, making a conventional military response inadequate. In such a critical situation, one of NATO’s first big concerns should be means for achieving political and strategic goals has grown and, in many cases, the latter has exceeded the power of weapons in their effectiveness. Modern conflicts and crises present complex challenges, including asymmetric (and unrestricted) warfare, hybrid threats, insurgency, threats to human security, lawfare, war-crime overlap, use of ambiguity, unconventional means, covert activities by state and non-state actors, adversary Strategic Communications (media, Info Ops, PsyOps, battle of the narratives etc.) and cyber threats. Asymmetrical actions have come into widespread use, enabling the nullification of military advantages in an armed conflict. These current and future security challenges are significant and likely to become even more relevant in the future. Their confrontation requires new approaches since such challenges lay in grey zones’ shadows looming at the horizon that are very difficult to identify with the traditional military means, whilst they are more easily “detectable” and “visible” through the eyes of “policemen in soldiers’ bodies”. In general, the partakers of these new generation conflicts can be multiple and adopt the most disparate forms: powerful economic-financial groups, mafias, drug traffickers, political lobbies, religious groups, millennial groups, clubs and groups of thought, deviant services, local and international terrorism. In modern conflicts, it has become increasingly important to defend population’s rights and freedom,
the economy and the effective functioning of democratic institutions; therefore, a multifaceted, innovative and forward-looking methodology is needed. This would require a new, redesigned military approach that focuses also on providing basic security to local communities and on supporting the local population, which are too often preyed upon by criminals and insurgents. Indeed, by filling the public security gap and by refocusing relevant efforts, governance improves, and alternative, legal livelihoods thrive. Nevertheless, in traditional conflicts these tasks were handled exclusively by the armed forces, which are not properly equipped and fit for the purpose to bring the police dimension in military operations and to focus on the local populace’s primary needs. Countering diversionary actions and terrorists can only be effective when they are properly trained and equipped, however, any of NATO’s military capabilities may be tasked to carry out some of the relevant police-related activities concerning the Stability Policing function. Inde-

STABILITY POLICING IN COLLECTIVE DEFENCE.

Fighting a non-linear war requires non-linear measures. In this perspective and in such a multi-layered and complex context, Stability Policing is an innovative response that contributes to, and complements, a traditional, purely-military and combat-only approach. It expands the reach of the military instrument into the remit of policing and contributes, within a comprehensive approach, to capitalize on combat success while aiming at building peace, when not preventing combat through Projecting Stability and Crisis Management. Stability Policing aims at establishing a safe and secure environment, restoring public order and security, and setting the conditions for meeting longer term needs with respect to governance and development. Stability Policing activities can and should be conducted throughout the full spectrum of conflict, from peacetime military engagement to warfighting; this makes Stability Policing a very appropriate function that provides the Alliance with a wide range of solutions that can be used in a large number of situations. Like for any of NATO military capabilities, the deployment and intervention of Stability Policing Elements takes place exclusively under a North Atlantic Council decision following an article 5 request from a NATO Nation, a UN Security Council Resolution and/or with the consent and at the request of the Host Nation. Stability
Policing Elements therefore operate within the limits of agreements, understandings and protocols that define their range of action, tasks and powers. This allows Stability Policing Elements to operate with full legitimacy within the limits of the applicable legal framework of the Nation that requested or accepted the intervention. Stability Policing can contribute to collective defence, by deterring, identifying, locating and engaging adversaries also through “legal targeting”. This is a pioneering approach, which requires an innovative, reshaped and civilian-oriented policing mind-set within the military strategy. It aims at creating effects on adversaries by enforcing HN legislation through Stability Policing activities (i.e. investigation, arrest, limiting/restricting mobility, seizure of assets and financial means, dismantling of networks and structures, prosecution, etc.). Legal targeting in the context of an affirmative lawfare would mean that Stability Policing “fights the enemy with other means”, addressing the overlap between war and crime, and complementing the “traditional” war-fighting instrument. Furthermore, it calls for a mentality that engages in the local security issues, focusing on providing basic security to local communities whose everyday life is hampered, while addressing the new crisis environment with a new, non-kinetic and non-/less than lethal, approach. Stability Policing focuses on the police-related needs of the local population, thus improving governance and supporting the prospering of alternative and legal livelihoods. This tremendously contributes to win public support and the battle of narratives. As a consequence, the cooperation with local authorities and the populace improves and allows to counter more effectively the so-called spoiler threats, significantly enhancing the outlook of the Host Nation and the Alliance’s success.

WHAT STABILITY POLICING MAY LEGALLY TARGET AND COUNTER

A non-linear war is fought when a State employs both conventional and irregular military forces in conjunction with psychological, economic, political, and cyber-attacks, to incorporate a broad range of different modes of warfare, including terrorist acts, indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. Confusion and disorder may in fact ensue, when weaponized information exacerbates the perception of insecurity in the populace as political, social, and cultural identities are pitted against one another. In the relevant effort of undoing the enemy’s determinations, Stability Policing contributes with its police-oriented approach to Human Security and to a wide array of cross-cutting topics ranging from Protection of Ci-
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Cultural Property and violent crimes against the collective memory and community identity. Stability Policing contributes to win hearts and minds of the local population, which leads to victory and to long-term peace and development.

CONCLUSION

In all the above-mentioned scenarios, where the actors of the non-linear and non-conventional wars find breeding ground for practicing their techniques of internal destabilization of a sovereign State, Stability Policing can play a pivotal role in contributing to the fight against those irregular or disguised enemies, who threaten a Nation’s internal stability and integrity. In fact, by discharging its full set of “robust” policing tools across the full spectrum of the conflict, Stability Policing prevents countries-at-war from slipping further into turmoil and social and economic instability. The added benefit of this approach lies, among others, in furthering the reduction in the use of force and in decreasing collateral damage. Furthermore, Stability Policing responds to the security needs of the local population. Therefore, it contributes to improved acceptance and legitimacy within audiences from the local to the international level and enhancing mission sustainability. Moreover, Stability Policing iden-
A safe and secure environment is one in which the population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of politically motivated, persistent, or large-scale violence. This fosters stability and peace, as well as strengthens and empowers governments and the rule of law, bringing out the primacy of the nation both in all stages of the conflict and in the battle of narratives.

1. As per article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Collective Defence is the cornerstone of NATO. This means that an attack against one of its members is considered as an attack against all Allies. So far, throughout its history, NATO only invoked Article 5 once, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 against the United States. The action was called to fight terrorism and to dismantle terrorist networks, based and hosted in Afghanistan, starting what went down in history as the “Global War on Terror”.

2. See the International Conference “Military Police in Hybrid War” report released on July 9, 2019, and lectures from the online webinar co-hosted by MLOs and the NATO MP COE, on October 15, 2020

3. If the Alliance territorial integrity is threatened by an enemy force

4. Indeed, NATO successfully deployed a Multinational Specialized Unit, the forerunner of a Stability Policing Element, both in Bosnia Herzegovina (under SFOR) and Kosovo (under KFOR), tasked to discharge the full spectrum of police duties with the aim to fill the existing void between the local population needs and the actual capacities of the local Police (the so called public security gap) by (temporarily) replacing and then supporting the local LEAs

5. The “golden hour” is the period of time following a traumatic injury during which there is the highest likelihood that prompt medical and surgical treatment will prevent death [American College of Surgeons (2008)]. See “Criminalized Power Structures: the overlooked enemies of Peace”, edited by Michael Dziedzic, Rowman & Littlefield - 2016

6. Gerasimov’s (and/or Primakov) doctrine (https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/05/primakov-not-gerasimov-doctrine-in-action-pub-79254)

7. The use of the law in warfare

8. Adversary: “a party whose intentions or interests are opposed to those of friendly parties and against which the legal use of armed force may be envisaged”. NATO Agreed


10. Civilian-oriented policing mind-set may be defined as the habitual way of thinking of law enforcement officers (regardless of their military or civilian status) serving the civilian populace through a flexible approach aimed at building respect, trust and compliance and avoiding, as much as possible, the use of force

11. “Spoilers are individuals that have the power to negatively impact the peace process both willingly or unwillingly. Spoiling behaviours may include violent and non-violent methods” (working definition from the Assessment of Spoiler Threats Report Published 15 June 2020 by NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence)

12. A safe and secure environment is one in which the population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of politically motivated, persistent, or large-scale violence

Disclaimer: this paper is a product of the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence and its content does not reflect NATO policies or positions, nor represent NATO in any way, but only the NSPCoE or author(s) depending on the circumstances.
The present article aims at providing a contribution in understanding the origins and role of gendarmeries (with a focus on the European ones), as well as the European Gendarmerie Force’s mission and potential. The opportunity for such an article stemmed from the lack of proper knowledge about gendarmerie forces as raised by some scholarly essays, especially in the field of Stability Policing, mainly in countries without a gendarmerie tradition. A following article will further develop this area of knowledge into the analysis of the added value of these forces for capacity building engagements. Gendarmeries were – unequivocally – established as police forces called to provide robust, professional solutions to increased requests for public security. Their personnel were mainly taken from the best elements of the armed forces, therefore offering discipline, professionalism and dedication. Since their establishment, gendarmeries continue to operate for and within the populace, offering an all-encompassing set of capacities, rooted in their military background. Such an approach proved to be easily applicable to deployments abroad, where populations are threatened before, during and after conflicts or crises.

The common grounds, traditions and experiences of European gendarmeries were then gathered together with the establishment of the European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR). This initiative offers a police force with military status capable of performing all police (policing) tasks in conflict prevention, peace and humanitarian missions and in crisis management operations outside of the borders of the European Union, under any chain of command (either military or civilian). EUROGENDFOR has two main functions: temporary substitution of the local police, when this is no longer existing or critically ineffective, and strengthening and restoration of law enforcement bodies, with monitoring, tutoring, training, advising and mentoring functions. In this second function,
it places itself as a relevant actor in capacity building engagements.

Origins of European Gendarmeries

Gendarmeries are police forces with a “military status”, mostly the ones following the model of the French Gendarmerie. The French Gendarmerie Nationale, the first gendarmerie force, was set up in 1791, so two years after the French Revolution of 1789, even though its roots can be traced back to the XIII Century.

At that time, the Maréchaussée de France was tasked with what today would be called “military police” duties, namely policing of the mobilized armies in times of war. The French National Gendarmerie stemmed from the reorganization of previously existing units, some of which were municipal guards in local communities, while others were tasked with specialized duties, like escorting the king on the battlefield as mounted units. Through the centuries this model evolved into the “Police of the King”, whose personnel usually served in places and towns different from the ones they came from, responding for their duties to a hierarchy going up to the King himself. The founding of such a force was part of a much wider process of centralization and extension of state’s powers, progressively eroding the influence and authority from local nobles. It’s worth mentioning how one of the most important consequences of this process was the development of the principle of the monopoly of the use of force by the state, which nowadays is taken for granted, but before the dawning of the industrialization period, it was not.

A different police model was the “Police of the Community”, whose members were drawn from the same communities they were meant to serve. This second model served as a basis for locally-organized Anglo-Saxon or Nordic police forces of nowadays. The French Revolution, with the centralization of powers into the National Assembly (hence, the Parliament, in place of the King) paved the way for an institution better suited to enforce laws all over the country, including to the far peripheries or most isolated areas. One of the most important features of this force, which had a military status, was its nation-wide structure, going up to a single, centralized command.

In 1814 the Royal Netherlands Mærechaussee was founded as part of the army and tasked with maintaining public order, law enforcement and safeguarding the main roads. In the same year, the Carabinieri Corps was established in the Kingdom of “Piemonte and Sardegna” (Italy). The performance and efficiency of previous local municipal guards was considered as insufficient, so that this new police corps was manned by members with a military background, who had to distinguish among peers for “good conduct and wisdom”. Moreover, literacy skill...
were also required, thus enabling the same personnel to write reports. This may be seen as a basic requirement for a police force, but was a quite uncommon ability at the beginning of the XIX century. Due to the perceived need of extending the state’s authority and enforcing national laws all over the country, an important feature of gendarmeries, as police with military status, was their ability to operate in rural and austere environments, far from bases in urban areas. This was one of the reasons for establishing the Spanish Guardia Civil in 1844, to contrast the bandoleros, road brigands acting far from towns. Rural organized banditry was common also to other European countries at that time, including Italy, mainly in the south with the name of “brigantaggio”. The southern Italian situation was, using contemporary terms, mixed of both organized crime and insurgency, as it occurred after the political unification of the Italian peninsula and, therefore, the annexation of the southern “Kingdom of two Sicilies”. This entailed, among other issues, the enforcement of unpopular laws (like the imposition of the conscription) and the dissolution of the southern Kingdom’s army (in contemporary terms, wrong evaluations about the “Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration” process) 7.

The Romanian Gendarmerie was founded in 1850, with a decision of the People’s Assembly and was approved and “the Rule for Reform of the Servants in Gendarmeries” promulgated. This conferred the Gendarmerie its legal status, establishing the principles of its organization and functioning as well as its assigned missions: guaranteeing public safety, maintaining good order and enforcing the laws. The Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana was founded in 1911, as the successor of the Royal Police Guard, whose foundation year dates back to 1801. The Polish Military Gendarmerie, founded in 1812 within the Polish Army in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw by a Napoleon’s order8, was, after some historical occurrences, re-formed as an independent part of the Polish Armed Forces in 1990. Contrary to what is a widespread but erroneous perception, especially in countries not having a gendarmerie tradition, the fact of being military forces was always coupled with an ethic of service to the civilian population. For instance, “Since the establishment of the Corps, on July 13th 1814, specific behavioural norms were set up for the Carabinieri who were called upon...
to perform the dual function of military and police operators and to work beside the population even in the smaller centres, in which they represent the symbol of the State. Nowadays gendarmeries, operating in more than fifty countries around the world (including, so, many non-European ones), normally perform the full spectrum of police functions. Preventative tasks, community policing and judicial police, including the capability to handle investigations and fight against organized crime, are the Ministry of Interior. Some of the EUROGENDFOR gendarmerie forces are a standalone armed force, like the traditional ones, under the Ministry of Defence and the Defence General Staff, while others only respond to the Ministry of Interior. Whatever their hierarchical affiliation, when exerting civilian police duties, all of them fall under the functional authority of the Ministry of Interior. As a matter of fact, all the countries with a gendarmerie also have civilian police forces, being them national, local, or both. Nation-wide civilian police forces are, in the large majority of cases, in charge of policing only in urban areas, while gendarmeries mainly operate in ru-

Cavalry of the Royal Police Guard of Lisbon, 1812. Drawn by Denis Dighton.
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ral areas or in both rural areas and cities. Many gendarmeries also express border control functions. The criteria for establishing the territorial partition between civilian state police and gendarmerie vary among states, and are functional to the tailoring of a force structure being more responsive to the security needs of the populations. Policing of rural areas entail responsibility on extended areas, which demand for a rationalization of the means at disposal on diverse territories and is led by the need of mobility, so as to be able to be where the citizen needs, with the adequate capacity, and at the right time.

It’s worth recalling how the gendarmeries’ ethical background remains, after two centuries or more, to “Serve and protect: this is the common way for every police force and in any nation, this is what our countries expect from us.”

Establishment of the European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR)

During the peace-keeping missions in the 1990s, mainly in the Balkans, the concept of “security gap” emerged. This is a situation where the local police forces are unable or unwilling to provide security to the population, or even are inexistent. In the same time, military forces are ill-equipped and trained to perform this job, as their main focus are combat operations. In these circumstances the need for a deployable police force, able to provide policing to the local population (“substitution” mission), and/or reinforce the local police (“strengthening” mission) became clear. The first unit aimed at bridging this gap was the NATO Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1998. The forces participating in the MSU were, mainly, gendarmeries, both in Bosnia and in Kosovo (as well as, later on, in Iraq). Due to common ethos, organization and institutional culture of European gendarmeries, the potential of working together in peacekeeping and crisis management operations in a more stable, permanent and structured way emerged.

The ethics of police forces with military status in the home countries proved to be effective in peacekeeping endeavours where, differently from “traditional conflicts”, the relationship with the local population is of paramount importance for the success of the mission. In September 2003, the French Defence Minister proposed the setting up of a multinational Gendarmerie-type force. The original idea was to offer an operational, pre-organized, robust, and rapidly deployable police force, able to perform all police tasks within the scope of crisis management operations, not only for the European Union, but also for the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and other international organizations or ad hoc coalitions. The first formal step towards the setting up of the European Gendarmerie Force (hereinafter EUROGENDFOR) was taken with the Declaration of Intent, agreed by France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, at the meeting of Ministers of Defence on 17 September 2004 in Noordwijk (Netherlands). The Declaration indicates the rationale of the initiative: to provide Europe with the capability to conduct all police missions in crisis management operations, through substitution and/or strengthening of local police, contributing to the implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy, also through the development of an area (external to the European Union) of freedom, security, and justice. On 18 October 2007, the Treaty establishing EUROGENDFOR was signed in Velsen (the Netherlands). The five founding Countries were joined by Romania and, later, by Poland. Turkey and Lithuania are also part of the organization, respectively with Observer and Partner status. The founding document deals with EUROGENDFOR objectives and principles, missions, engagements and deployments, organizational aspects, Permanent Headquarters facilities; protection of information; personnel provisions, privileges...
and immunities, jurisdictional and disciplinary terms, legal and financial provisions as well as membership and accession modalities. As stated in article 1, EUROGENDFOR is exclusively composed of police forces with military status, capable of performing all police tasks, through substitution or strengthening of local police forces, during all phases of a crisis management operation (article 4). EUROGENDFOR members are represented in all the bodies and structures of the initiative, namely the High Level Interdepartmental Committee, the Working Group and the Financial Board. The High Level Interdepartmental Committee (CIMIN) embodies the political-strategic level of the European Gendarmerie Force. Consisting of representatives of the appropriate ministries and structures governing the participating forces, the Committee provides guidance to the initiative, adopting decisions unanimously. Representing the EUROGENDFOR operational planning and conduct capacity, the Permanent Headquarters, the only permanent EUROGENDFOR structure, consists of 38 personnel, with the possibility, in case of need, to be augmented to 50. The main Headquarters tasks are: to develop the EUROGENDFOR doctrine, implementing it, taking into account lessons learned; to plan and execute all necessary measures to ensure the EUROGENDFOR rapid deployability; to plan and run up to two operations at the same time; to provide the capacities of rapidly planning all operations from the activation and development of Fact Finding Missions to the production of the Operation Plans; to facilitate the deployment of the mission(s) by preparing all the arrangements, including i.e. specific training requirements and packages, the force generation, the definition of the Use of Force and Rules of Engagement (RoE), and the co-ordination of strategic transportation; to ensure the link between the political strategic level, the participating countries and the relevant International Organisations, reporting to the CIMIN; to support and backup the Force deployed in the field, once the mission is ongoing, in co-ordinating logistics, intelligence, information and operations; to monitor the areas of possible operational intervention and to prepare prudent planning for those areas. The EUROGENDFOR Force is defi-
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EUROGENDFOR mission
EUROGENDFOR, is one of the most recently established instruments dedicated to the maintenance of an area of freedom, security, and justice in crisis-affected locations with an impact in Europe. It brings together police forces with military status from seven EU countries, able to perform all police tasks within the scope of crisis management operations. The gendarmerie-model military status provides gendarmerie corps with a double dependency from the Ministries of Interior and Defence, enabling them to work under a military or a civilian chain of command, as needed. The dual nature of the Gendarmerie forces composing EUROGENDFOR provides it with an added value to participate in stability operations: such a special status allows the fulfillment of all policing functions, grounded on capabilities stemming from a police approach and mind-set, and embedded in a military background. The Declaration of Intent clearly emphasizes that EUROGENDFOR shall be able to manage every aspect of the various phases of the crisis response operations: 1. During the initial stage, carrying out stabilization operations, ensuring order and security, and substituting or strengthening weak or non-existent local police forces; 2. During the transition phase, continuing to fulfill its mission as part of a military expeditionary force, facilitating the coordination and co-operation with local or international police units; 3. During disengagement, facilitating a smooth transfer of responsibilities from the military to the civilian chain of command. Assumed the above-mentioned situations, EUROGENDFOR faces three possible intervention scenarios: substitution; strengthening; and other scenarios, such as humanitarian aid or planning support.

EUROGENDFOR is, ultimately, capable of performing all police tasks in conflict prevention, peace-making, peace-enforcing, peacekeeping, peace building, humanitarian and rescue missions, in any crisis management operations.
1. M. Dziedzic, “NATO Should Promptly Implement Stability Policing: Why and How”, in “Militaire Spectator”, 2-2020: “GTF are often perceived as paramilitary forces like militias, which indicates an object ignorance of the civilian policing role they perform in their own countries.”

2. H. Hovens “Stability Policing: Why is it taking root so slowly?”, in “Militaire Spectator”, 20 April 2020 https://www.militairespectator.nl/thema/operaties/artikel/stability-policing-why-it-tak ing-root-so-slowly/ “it cannot be ignored that GTFs have less support within the UN when it comes to peace building, peace sustainment and police reform because they are more associated with state-centric coercion rather than with community service. To put things bluntly, GTFs seem to have proved to be unsuccessful, or insufficiently successful, to adequately refute objections concerning the military status of the forces.”


6. Ernesto Bonelli, BG (rel) IT Army, “L’ESECITO ITALIANO NEL CONTRASTO AL BRIGANTAGGIO” in “Rivista Militare”, 2012/2: “What did southern “bandi-try” represent in the years immediately following the unification of Italy? Was it a patriotic revolt? Were their actions carried out by criminals? Even today, historians are divided and, depending on their beliefs, they express different judgments. Looking at what has happened and at the words that were said and written, we can say that, at least in the first two years, it was a fratrici-dal struggle among Italians who were fighting to achieve different objectives and who hated one another to the point of committing heinous crimes. It was a real war waged by an Army which was being re-organized against well-organi-zed armed gangs.”


10. On the Italian situation, Nicola Conforti “The Italian Carabinieri Corps: old traditions for a modern version”, in “GENDARMERIES AND THE SECURITY CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY”, J.L. Hovens, G.A.G. van Elk (Eds.), by FIEP and Koninklijke Marechaussee, 2011. In his article Conforti describes the presence of the Italian public security system, which for his peculiarity is worth mentioning: “The Italian public security system is based on two police forces with a general competence: the Carabinieri Corps and the State Police. The Carabinieri, as already emphasised, is a widespread territorial organisation, the State Police, with a civil status, is present in the 103 Italian provincial cities and in the major towns. The other three Police Forces have specific tasks: the Penitentiaries’ Police, the State Forestry Corps (merged in 2016 in the Carabinieri Corps, Ed.) and Guardia di Finanza (tributary police, also with military status). The presence of different law enforcement agencies represents a democratic guarantee for correct and fair behaviour in the exercise of police duties, but, at the same time, requires coordination and planning activity to minimise the risks of possible overlapping and/ or conflicting interests. An ad hoc law ensures the smooth co-ordination amongst all the Italian Police Forces. Italy is the sole nation in Europe that avails itself of such legislation. This system constitutes a comprehensive framework made up of several bodies, both individual and collective, at the national, regional and provincial levels”. The Sta- te Forestry Corps was recently included into the Carabinieri, adding in this way further capabilities to this force.


13. Michael Dziedzic, Col, US Air Force (Ret.), in “Militaire Spectator”, 2020-2: “After publishing Policing the New World Disorder, Ambassador Oakley and I were invited by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to discuss our recommendation to deploy ‘constabulary forces’ to address the pub-líc security gap. This led to the deployment of Multinational Specialized Units (MSUs) to Bosnia in 1998, the precursor to NATO’s current SP concept.”

14. Cornelius Friesendorf, “The Military and the Fight Against Serious Crime: Lessons from the Balkans” in Connections Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer 2010): “International police forces are generally unable to prevent or punish serious criminal acts such as interethnic violence and organized crime. Domestic security forces are either absent or are themselves sources of insecurity. The onus of filling public security gaps and of fighting serious crime therefore falls on international military forces. However, the military are reluctant to take on the responsibility for fighting crime, and are also not particularly good at it.”

15. Vincenzo Coppola, Carabinieri Lt.Gen., “Carabinieri and peace operations ethics”, in CoESPU Magazine 2017-4 “I renewed this belief years after, in a different environment, when I was deployed abroad in a Peace support operation: it was in the former Yugoslavia, a land violated by a destructive war with a death toll of thousands of victims, the action of Carabinieri and other Peacekeepers - police officers and soldiers - was accepted and supported by the local population exactly for the same sense of respect and humanity”.

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ELEVATING THE ROLE OF TRAINING

“Elevating the role of training and how we prepare peacekeeping trainers”

by Terbish Tsendsuren

Training is an important element of effective performance. That is why it matters. That is why training is strategically important for any Organization striving to remain relevant and competent.

However, for far too long, training has been an after-thought. It is only when we start implementing and rolling out policies and strategies that we think of training amongst other “activities”. Partly, this is due to the traditional way of conducting training where the primary focus is on learning produced in a controlled environment disjointed from the world of work and measuring training success as a completed activity in itself, rather than its impact on performance. Today, ensuring learning is still paramount but simply no longer sufficient. Instead, training and development professionals have started challenging the old habits we all grew comfortable with and positioning training to produce something more valuable to the Organization – performance and results. This shift in focus was the guiding principle when the Integrated Training Service of the Department of Peace Operations (ITS-DPO) designed and developed specialized training materials for Training of Trainers (TOT STM) for all peacekeeping trainers, including national military and police trainers.

Both the UN and Member States are part of the peacekeeping training architecture with shared as well as distinct roles and responsibilities. The ITS-DPO supports national peacekeeping training institutions and peacekeeping trainers of troop and police contributing countries by providing specialized training services and capacity-building activities, deploying mobile training teams and undertaking training recognitions amongst other services. ITS also develops and disseminates core pre-deployment and standardized training materials. The overall goal of the new TOT STM is to upgrade training teams and undertaking training recognitions amongst other services.
ners’ skills through cultivating an impact-oriented vision and mindset. It will also support the United Nations Police Training Architecture Programme, which aims to ensure that UNPOL are able to effectively implement mandated tasks based on the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Policing (SGF), international human rights norms, gender and environmental standards. Upon completing the training of trainers in conjunction with one of the six police-specific training such as on community-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing, Member State trainers will be certified as a ‘UN-certified Police Trainer’ to support the co-ordinated roll-out of the Police Training Architecture Programme, meeting the pre-deployment training needs of police contributing countries.

The five-day TOT STM takes the Training Cycle – analysis, design, development, delivery, evaluation and reporting – as a core thread, while focusing on areas that traditionally lacked collective attention. One such area is front-end analysis, otherwise known as performance analysis. This step broadly examines the problem or opportunity at hand and determines probable underlying causes for non-performance and under-performance. In order to design an effective training intervention, trainers must first understand human performance which may be a new domain for many. Effective performance can be hindered due to systemic issues, organizational culture and a lack of leadership. The ‘analysis’ part of the Training Cycle is strengthened in the TOT STM and the linkage between training and performance is discussed throughout the modules.

Module 1 of the TOT course starts with the front-end analysis to help training professionals to come to terms with the fact that training is not a cure-all. By carefully examining the root cause of underperformance and investing the limited training resources where they are likely to make the most impact, the training managers will learn to become more strategic and focused. After establishing that training can be one of the tools for performance improvement, Module 1 lays out the stages of training needs analysis and target audience analysis. ITS-DPO regularly conducts peacekeeping training needs assessments (TNA) to inform the development of peacekeeping training policies and standardized materials. The methodologies, processes and findings of these TNAs are examined and discussed in a case study during the course to provide trainers an overall view of peacekeeping training architecture.

To train a peacekeeper, you have to know the peacekeeper! Yet, the general tendency is that a trainer drops by and rushes through a topic, without thorough considerations for his or her audience’s cognitive abilities, baseline competencies, learning preferences, motivations and performance needs. The reason that this scenario happens is that most trainers are not adequately trained on customized lesson design and therefore overly rely on generic off-the-shelf training materials. Module 2 on Theories of Learning and Lesson Design addresses this gap and puts emphasis on designing lessons tailored to the audience.

Module 2 also guides trainers on how to write learning objectives, which shape the core learning content, at appropriate levels of complexity. The knowledge, skills and behavioral pyramids, referred to as the Bloom’s Taxonomy, Psychomotor and Affective Domain Taxonomy, are important to be aware of when designing a lesson that is appropriate to the level and experience of its intended reci-

[Image]
pients. Learning objectives of child protection training for battalion or formed police unit commanders would need to be at a higher cognitive level, enabling them to critically analyze challenges on the ground and make informed and prompt decisions. However, the same training for personnel new to peacekeeping would have lower or application level learning objectives, such as focusing on the concepts and definitions and how they are applied in practice.

Module 3 of the TOT course focuses on training evaluation which has two primary purposes: to improve training effectiveness and demonstrate its results. The theoretical basis for training evaluations, including Kirkpatrick’s four levels of evaluation methodology, is widely discussed among training professionals, however not effectively used. The reaction and learning evaluations occur during the training, making them the easiest and subsequently the most popular forms of evaluation to conduct. Evaluating learning is also quite straightforward and it is within the trainers’ sphere of control. However, the TOT STM aims to raise the bar higher - towards establishing behavioral and results-based evaluation practices in peacekeeping training, which represents the level 3 and 4 evaluations. Shifts from learning to performance occur on the job and this is where the training has the highest potential to influence key performance indicators and operational results. It is therefore important for trainers to understand and integrate this linkage early on in the training design and development. The module also teaches the trainers how to develop and use evaluation instruments and understand and process first-hand training data collected during training needs assessments and root cause analysis.

The last two modules of the cour-
maybe not, but in any case you heard that definition before. Besides, there are a few dominant participants in the class, so you’d rather let them take centre stage. Instead, you start thinking about the work emails you have to respond to and wonder if you can peek at them during the class without being noticed”. Does this sound familiar to you? This is one of the scenarios that needs to be prevented from occurring and the TOT course teaches the future trainers how. More specifically, the delivery modules aim to increase trainers’ ability to stimulate learning, communicate effectively, manage classroom dynamics and deliver content confidently. The TOT STM is completed by a certification process upon submissions of individual assignments, demonstration of facilitation skills and satisfactory peer reviews and facilitator assessments. The next steps of the TOT STM development project include pilot testing in collaboration with national training centers, incorporating feedback from peacekeeping trainers, including police trainers, and officially launching the STM through the Peacekeeping Resource Hub by early 2021. Thereafter, regional training of trainers’ courses will be conducted in English and French. In the age of knowledge, we as an Organization invest a consider-
The spotlight shone on a myriad of consequences posed by new, destabilizing threats in the past years revealed crucial weaknesses in our global security and conflict prevention landscape. Amplified by the corona virus pandemic and subsequent challenges in 2020, the global trends look rather pessimistic despite local, regional and international efforts to curb human suffering. It is estimated that about 508,000 people died annually as a result of violence in the period 2007-2012, while for every direct war victim, between 3 and 15 people die indirectly without ever appearing in conflict death statistics¹. Ethnic tensions, access to critical resources, increased social inequality, poverty and climate change remain just few of the triggers that continue to feed old and new conflicts around the world. Thus, the need for effective conflict prevention has never been greater. In achieving this objective, the role of UN forces, including Stabiliy Police Units, come to the frontline. This article aims to outline the opportunities and challenges brought by emerging technologies in peace operations. Decision-makers within our global security and defense architecture should adopt a strategy of pre-emptive preparedness and invest in training that harnesses the positive capabilities of emerging technology in order to increase efficiency, effectiveness, and interoperability in peace support operations.

Evolution of conflict prevention

The field of conflict prevention has evolved in the last few decades since its initial conceptualization by the UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld in the 60s to be seen today as an anchor of collective security efforts. Boutros Boutros Gali’s shifting focus from “keeping regional conflicts from going global” to “prevent them from starting...”

EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES IN ENHANCING JOINT TRAINING

by Alexandra Martin
Jordan Sweeney
in the first place” (An Agenda for Peace, 2012) is today still considered a game changing moment for the evolution of the concept. This ‘early on momentum’ has become central in both the academic literature and policy prescriptions, because while “active conflict is natural and inherent in all areas of activities [...] prevention is desirable to keep it from escalating out of hand, beyond its useful benefits” (Zartman, 2015). Thus over time, early warning instruments have become the linchpin of contemporary conflict prevention framework at the international level, providing capabilities that “promptly identify risks of emergence, re-emergence or escalation of violence, and swiftly adapting policy responses so as to mitigate conflict risks” (Faleg and Gaub, 2020). However, there is “no crystal ball to precisely forecast the outbreak of violent domestic conflicts”, while the actual capacity to effectively respond in protracted situations or highly disenfranchised communities is severely limited (Stedman, 1995). This ‘precise forecast’ or accuracy of prediction remains to date a subject of debate due to its difficult nature and probability of a specific event. But the renewed international attention on prevention is creating a new window of opportunity to revisit our understanding of peace operations and associated toobox, to make it more effective, relevant and adaptable to the current reality of an ever more insecure global landscape. As the Secretary General of the United Nations Antonio Guterres pointed out in 2017: “We spend far more time and resources responding to crises rather than preventing them. People are paying too high a price [...] We need a whole new approach”. The emerging digital realm is increasingly seen as a new frontier of opportunities, sprouting from local to transnational or supranational levels, able to enhance the understanding and connection between forms of violence and expectations for peace. Research on information and communication technologies (ICTs) has exposed their potential in the context of humanitarian relief (International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2005), pre and post electoral monitoring of violence (Bani & Sgueo, 2014) or the use of ‘big data’ for peacekeeping (Mac Ginty, 2017). More recently, we have seen the use of more advanced intelligent technologies such as drones and other unmanned vehicles for surveillance and monitoring purposes (such as the UN Mission in DRC or the OSCE SMM in Ukraine), for humanitarian and disaster intervention, or for delivering supplies in remote or inaccessible areas.

The case for emerging technologies

Today’s emerging technologies, both in the military and civilian realms, are fundamentally changing the way we live, interact, take decisions, shape world views or engage in conflict. Technological progress has expanded the boundaries of human knowledge, information and capabilities, thus showing potential to overcome more analogue and traditional challenges, such as geography and access, mobility or communication flows. One of these families of technologies is Artificial Intelligence (AI), recognized for its transformative nature and transboundary reach. While a single definition of AI is yet to be agreed upon, generally AI is thought to refer to “machines that respond to stimulation consistent with traditional responses from humans, given the human capacity for contemplation, judgment, and intention (Brookings, 2018).” Real-life applications include enhanced satellite imaging, image and speech processing capabilities, surveillance and facial recognition. They are all driven by algorithms trained through machine and deep learning, and derive computer-driven intelligence (AI) used for taking decisions. They collect and use ‘big data’ in order to build very large data sets at high speed from multiple sources, which “may be useful at times of crises and disasters” (Imran, Meier, & Boersma, 2018). These new technologies are already part of future of warfare capabilities development around the world. AI is here to stay and will continue to evolve and improve its functions and range of applications exponentially, as showcased by progress in the last decade. The technology is showing an enormous potential to drive growth, fight poverty and climate change, intervene in disasters, contribute to social development, stability and peace, as presented in the UNCTAD report of 2018.

Shortcomings, Opportunities and Challenges

UN-led or regional-led peace operations have been under public scrutiny for their mixed achievements, in particular in protecting civilians, preventing high number of casualties and avoiding a re-escalate into war and violence. Experts across the board call for peace support operations to be better designed to respond to a more com-
plex conflict environment, including by a) agreeing on more robust political mandates and larger troops deployment, and by b) making use of support technologies that could lower the human loss risk and increase efficiency of the operations. In this regard, the embedding of emerging technologies such as AI in the joint training of stability police units presents a new kind of opportunity, with potential to offer a better understanding of the realities and dynamics on the ground for troops ready to be deployed. Furthermore, such new ‘human-machine teaming’ approach could then be spilled over in training national forces in countries of deployment, to equip them to respond to rising violence before it transforms into full-fledged conflict. The number of opportunities presented by AI could represent a game-changing moment in the design of peace infrastructure globally. The use of AI could lead to diminishing direct and indirect civilian deaths, and reduce the number of refugees and internally displaced population, which saw a five-fold increase between 2010 and 2016.

1. Through the use of AI in joint training and peace operations, international and local stakeholders could have a better understanding of descriptive, predictive and pattern diagnoses featuring a conflict, in order avoid an outbreak of violence or re-escalation in a fragile conflict setting. These features could lead to better coordination between civilian, police and military forces on the ground, including through shared information and intelligence gathering, pattern recognition and more robust, 360 early warning system.

2. The use of AI in synthetic conflict analysis could enable enhanced early warning and response mechanisms available for UN military or police forces deployed on the ground, thus leading to closing the gap between early signs of conflict and political action. This has the potential to improve practices of prevention and better explain the linkage between operational and structural prevention.

3. The use of AI in joint training could lead to diminishing the asymmetry in capabilities and technical capacity within multinational forces and with the host countries’ apparatus, by encouraging knowledge and expertise sharing, joint initiatives for the development of new technologies, and the convergence of norms, practices and standards in line with the UN commitment to a “human-centered and rights-based approach”.

While the opportunities presented by the use of AI in peace support operations could lead to a new thinking at the international level, improved knowledge and awareness on the potential misuse of this dual-edge technology is critical to prevent its hijacking for nefarious purposes. The constantly evolving digital landscape raises critical questions about privacy and human rights, restriction of freedoms, responsibility and attribution, accountability, ethics and trustworthiness. Challenges faced by the international organizations and national governments include: 1. AI and other emerging technologies develop faster than existing legal norms and standards.

The “digital technologies have intensified the tensions between security and law” (Aradu, 2017) as the international treaties and agreements lag behind the speed of capabilities development by private, state or non-state actors. A joint ICRC-SIPRI publication on “Limits on Autonomy” also emphasizes that existing legal framework does not align with the advancement of new tech, and fails to address the potential “foreseeable humanitarian impact”. In the context of law enforcement and stability police units, the use of AI in a norm vacuum “may infringe fundamental human rights, such as the right to privacy, equality and non-discrimination, as well as undermine principles of law, such as the presumption of innocence, privilege against self-incrimination and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”

2. Ethical boundaries, privacy, human rights and transfer of biases

The ethical questions around the use of AI are linked to the ownership, collection, protection and the use of data in line with human rights provisions. Without a globally agreed set of norms and practices, the reliance on highly sensitive data exposed associated risks such as biometric data sensitivity, data integrity, data bias. Facial recognition technology (FRT) in particular remains highly problematic in conflict settings because of its potential use in discriminate targeting, mass surveillance, retaliation, harming and non-proportional response. It is estimated that the FRT market value will reach $7bn by 2024. Without a regulated environment that guarantees the protection of privacy and freedoms, misuse of private data could lead to invasive actions and policies, that would re-enact the cycle of violence in conflict-affected environments.
The humanitarian aid domain has also revealed weaknesses that may persist or even be amplified following the adoption of new technologies. In a webinar this past June, ICRC Digital Transformation and Data Director, Balthasar Staehelin, noted that humanitarian organizations’ recent reliance on the collection and processing of highly sensitive data renders them “vulnerable to adverse cyber operations that could impact the people that need [them] most.”

References:
• Aradau, C (2017). ‘Assembling (non) knowledge: Security, law and surveillance in a digital world’. International Political Sociology

Conclusion
As our world is undergoing a massive technological transformation, we are yet to fully capture and understand its long term impact on societal, political and economic dimensions. The potential of AI and related technologies for peace operations, military and police activity in conflict and post-conflict settings, joint training and capabilities development is only in an incipient stage. Undeniably, tech advancement will push our creativity and innovation beyond traditional limits, while opening new avenues for impact driven operations. To ensure as international community we stand a chance at winning this race, it is the right moment to start encouraging investment in AI opportunities, develop practices and training capabilities for both civilian, military and police personnel involved in peace support missions. This will foster a global community of practitioners and security sector actors that have a clear understanding of the potential and inherent limitations of AI technology, could identify the best areas where human-machine teaming will prove efficient on the ground, and develop good practices in line with human rights provisions that could eventually become global norms in the peace support operations field.
In October 2019, the UN Secretary-General presented the UN’s first annual budget in over 45 years to the Committee of the General Assembly that has responsibilities for administrative matters. The programme budget for 2020 totalled $2.87 billion. To put this in perspective, this equates approximately to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Timor-Leste, or the GDP for the Seychelles and The Gambia combined. By some accounts there are 28 countries that have a lower GDP that the UN’s 2020 annual budget; some significantly lower. However, whilst most countries implement some semblance of a centralised accountability system consisting of, for example, parliamentary committees, treasury reporting, elections etc, the UN has yet to formalise a robust, coherent mechanism that accounts for its spending. Individual States have largely centralised systems and are confined to specific geographical remits, thus making spending easier to monitor and distribute. Conversely, the challenges for evaluating performance in the UN are obvious; the UN system is comprised of multiple agencies and missions working to different mandates, in numerous countries, with many donors (bi-laterals and multi-laterals) that in turn each have their own budgetary requirements and obligations they often impose when disbursing funds. This means it is much easier to evaluate micro-performance in boundaried geographical areas or thematic remits, but less so when assessing large-scale strategic direction and impact.

A vast machinery of monitoring and evaluation processes have been created and implemented across the entire UN system. Monitoring the impact of programmes closely relates to decisions regarding whether or not those programmes represent money well spent, or whether more money should be thrown in the same direction. Effective monitoring inevitably necessitates examination by technical specialists, many of whom have forged careers entirely based upon conducting independent assessments. Aside from external assessors, UN entities also employ their own internal M&E specialists as UN staff. Needless to say, this all has significant cost implications, and is also not an entirely watertight mechanism, as reflected by entities such as the UK’s Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), which was created despite the pervasive presence of M&E activity across the UN, and humanitarian
sector as a whole. ICAI undertakes focused investigations into aspects of UK global aid spending, reporting to the parliamentary Select Committee responsible for monitoring international development, and setting out its own scores relating to whether or not aid spending is achieving desired programmatic aims. The existence of mechanisms outside the UN such as ICAI adds another layer to the M&E process, but also invites the question of how efficient UN performance evaluation actually is, and whether it needs to be re-thought.

As someone who specialises in independent enquiries and evaluations, and a former Commissioner of the UK’s ICAI, I have undertaken numerous independent assessments, including for UN entities on large-scale, multi-million-dollar projects in peace-keeping environments. The purpose of these assessments included summarising activities and determining whether or not the relevant programmatic activities achieved their aims, and / or assessing the level of impact those programmes had. What follows here is a brief summary of the inherent practical challenges and issues that conducting these types of evaluations poses for the UN.

The minefields for conducting UN performance evaluations are many; some of which are unavoidable and should not invite blame, and others which reflect poor planning and lack of professionalism on the part of the UN. Challenges that are unavoidable and should not necessarily invite negative assessments mostly relate to programme delivery in conflict or post-conflict settings. Examples include lack of relevant infrastructure in-country, fragile supply chains, inconsistent access to relevant sites and beneficiaries, and a high level of risk to UN staff and contractors resulting in slow delivery or cessation of work. None of these things should negatively affect UN performance evaluation, as long as the relevant entity has engaged in appropriate budget-friendly risk mitigation strategies, and has taken a realistic approach to ensuring flexibility in programmatic design. In many of these contexts, implementing programmes involves a high degree of creativity and risk, and can often be praised, even if the impact is disproportionately low related to the impact that might be achieved in non-affected contexts.

However, the vast majority of issues that are often encountered by independent assessors are often not related to the substantive nature of the programmes themselves, but rather the framework of how the independent performance evaluation itself is conducted. Poor time management and pacing of activities within programmes is a perennial issue. Evaluations are often badly planned and not properly understood by programme managers, subsequently meaning they are crammed within an unreasonably short time-frame that often flies in the face of logistical considerations. This can result in the evaluator being forced to take a ‘high level’ approach and making findings that are generic, as opposed to having the time to focus on granular details that might invite justified critical examination.

Another challenge to assessing UN performance is the attitude sometimes displayed by UN personnel towards the evaluation process. Evaluations are often seen as a necessary evil, a ‘tick box exercise’ (as it was once described to me), a threat, or a procedure that deliberately aims to disable or hinder the good work of those on the ground who obviously ‘know best’. It can also lead to further challenges, including senior staff expressing strong disapproval towards an assessor setting out a full and frank analysis based on evidence gathered, or misunderstanding the function of an evaluation. The defensiveness of some UN personnel undermines effective evaluations, and is ultimately counterproductive. Short-sighted behaviour includes the inherent bias of senior staff, who can prefer to steer the assessor towards ‘good’ or positive outcomes and evidence, with
the mindset that any criticism will act as a slight on the relevant staff member(s), and possibly undermine personal career progression.

Perhaps the most serious issue faced by independent assessors is the lack of independence afforded to them whilst carrying out their duties. Entities (including UNDP) set out the ideal mechanism by which evaluators should be employed and managed, which creates a kind of fire-wall between them and the programme manager responsible for the projects being evaluated. Unfortunately, this doesn’t always happen; evaluators are often employed and managed by the same person who also manages the relevant programme. It also means the assessor has to submit the evaluation for approval by that programme manager, who in turn has the power to accept or send back the evaluation for amendments, as well as leaving the possibility open to withhold payments owed to the assessor as long as the evaluation is not deemed as being satisfactory. One example of how problems can manifest in this context was when a Programme Manager requested her name replace that of the evaluator on the front page, so it would appear as though the independent evaluation was her own report. This is a clear conflict of interest that renders the whole process expensive and pointless, reflecting a fundamental lack of understanding about the purpose of undertaking evaluations.

The benefits of evaluations are often overlooked by staff members and need to be much better framed. Positive aspects of evaluations include how they can show-case good examples of performance, and make suggestions about how existing work can further improve the lives of beneficiaries, which is of course the sole reason why UN programmes exist at all. Evaluations can also invite further funding, thereby opening the door to an expansion of existing projects. This can have many positive ramifications on the wider community, ranging from an increase in job creation, to stimulation of the economy, stabilisation of the security situation and increased gender parity.

UN Member States need to be more alert to how performance evaluations are currently being carried out by the UN, both at the micro / country level, and at the higher strategic central level. Whilst UN rhetoric can be sound in theory, its practical implementation is often far from flawless. Focusing on the output only, i.e. the evaluation report itself, may hide a host of insurmountable issues that contributes to a report’s ultimate findings, such as the time-scale of the report, and the lack of independence afforded to the evaluator. Findings can have huge ramifications on how programmes are subsequently phased and developed, including whether they ultimately fail or succeed. The most senior UN personnel in mission environments should take charge of evaluations, ensuring that each contract modality has an independent employment framework that gives appropriate freedom to evaluators to investigate and properly analyse evidence, within reasonable time frames. Donors should also insist on the positive aspects of evaluations being consistently and vigorously communicated across all UN entities to staff at all levels, in order that the culture and mindset towards evaluations is open-minded and welcoming. Not doing so is a mistake too expensive to make, both for funders and for beneficiaries.
NEWS FROM THE CoESPU CAMPUS

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ALUMNI
I would like to take this opportunity to wish everyone a very Happy New Year. I hope that this message finds you and your loved ones healthy. My hopefulness remains high as I look forward to welcoming the many friendly faces of our stability police counterparts back to Vicenza Italy, when the travel situation permits.

The past year certainly presented a fair number of challenges around the globe, specifically within an educational and collaborative environment, such as the CoESPU campus. However, like so many sayings go – every challenge presents an opportunity. As we start this new year, I am optimistic about the many virtual opportunities, currently under development, to expand our virtual collaboration and networking capabilities.

As you have worked to navigate the challenges of the pandemic I ask: What are some of the new techniques and resources you are using to conduct daily missions – both in your home country and in support of Peacekeeping operations? What virtual platforms have you had the best experience with as you maintained your professional networks? I would like to hear about the opportunities you discovered, please share them with us at coespu-rivista@carabinieri.it

I want to thank our valued Alumni who continue to provide details of their experiences in the world of stability policing, strategic advising, and peacekeeping. This month I am very happy to share with you the first part of a two-part interview with LTC Giorgio Romano, a returning member of the CoESPU staff. In this first part of his interview, he details his personal experiences in the Balkans, Middle East and at NATO, highlighting the roles of the Carabinieri abroad, training and mission preparation, and importance of communication techniques. Next month, LTC Romano’s interview will conclude with his experience as an advisor in Somalia.

We wish you continued success and good health. We look forward to welcoming our friends back to the CoEPSU campus.

Rebecca D. Hazelett
Col. - US Army MP
CoESPU Deputy Director
The increasing importance of the Carabinieri abroad. Lessons from experience. Interview to LTC Giorgio Romano

by Giorgio Romano
Lucio De Angelis

Introduction: the training issue

Q: you have served several years as seconded in international positions. What is your thought on the role of the Carabinieri abroad?
A: The Carabinieri operate around the world in missions where Italy participates for the support of peace. The Carabinieri perform a wide range of specialized tasks, from security and protection of the Embassies, to operational functions, individually or as formed units, under the aegis of International Organizations (UN, NATO, OSCE), international coalitions or bilateral agreements. In particular, the Carabinieri play a leading role along the spectrum of stability police activities in peace operations, often in non-permissive environments or destabilized transitional contexts within weak, collapsed or failed States emerging from conflicts. Additionally, senior officers with a longer and diversified professional background can apply to vacancies for senior positions in operations, or advisory roles as subject matter experts in International Organizations, covering different areas like strategic planning, Rule of Law, SSR and Counter Terrorism. The senior advisory functions are relatively new, as they emerged in the current millennium following the evolution of the international foreign assistance dynamics and related peace operations, increasingly connoted by expeditionary diplomacy and characterized by a more political and multidimensional identity. Such evolution has determined, among others, the requirement for new professional figures with police background, capable to operate under a strategic and political direction in long-term activities like institutional reform processes.

Q: have you had a role in that
new and developing global scenario?
A: I witnessed the beginning of that process, at the start of the new millennium, around the middle of my career which was already marked by a decent previous international experience initiated with “old style” civilian police monitoring and assistance missions in the Balkans and Middle East, followed by an assignment to a NATO command in Italy. In 2005, I joined the Carabinieri/US initial planning team in charge of establishing the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Vicenza, where I served until 2008. Now I am here again, after twelve-year secondment to the European Union. Concisely, my career abroad developed through a progressive increase in the complexity of functions and level of responsibilities.

Q: could you further elaborate on this?
A: I would like first to make a point on the training issue. Before the establishment of CoESPU as international training center and doctrinal hub addressed to both national and international peacekeepers, practitioners, advisors and operators, no specific structures of this kind within the Carabinieri national assets existed for the formation of officers selected for deployment abroad. The situation improved after the Carabinieri in 1998 launched the idea of a Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU), which became reality with first units initially deployed in the Balkans. The Mobile Organization with the 7th and 13th Regiment provides tactical training for units and individuals operating in targeted conflict areas where the Carabinieri ensure constant presence on a rotation basis. The MSU concept is worth mentioning, as it was a revolutionary idea and became a worldwide reference for inspiration in the definition of new roles and tasks for Police in PSOs. Concepts like stability police and security gap, representing the MSU rationale, generated a process that is still under analysis, elaboration and development within the main International Organizations. One objective of the newly established CoESPU was to elevate the MSU concept from the field level, where it was initially devised, to the strategic level. That occurrence from the candidate were the pre-requisites for deployment, especially for those who could not even count on any experience. That was also my case, back in 1995, when the Carabinieri HQ asked me if I volunteered for six months to join the WEUPOL monitoring and assistance mission in Mostar, my first mission abroad.

CHAPTER 1 – Baptism of the fire. The “civilian police” phase

Q: would you like to share some words about this first experience?
A: I was a company commander in Italy when I joined the Carabinieri team formed for first deployment to Mostar. Prior to that, in December 1994 the Carabinieri HQ conducted a fact-finding mission to assess the adequacy of security conditions for the personnel. Then, from 13th to 18th February 1995, the selected personnel were sent to the Carabinieri NCO School near Rome for the organizational phase, integrated by a briefing on the war in the Balkans. Being the first Carabinieri unit to deploy and join the mission that was already operating since July 1994, we had to carry all national “contingent-owned-equipment” (vehicles, unit and personnel equipment, logistic and office stuff) to the mission area. After that, the Carabinieri unit of the WEU Police assistance mission, with its 20 individuals, led by a Lieutenant Colonel supported by 2 junior officers including myself, joined the
city of Mostar on 6th March 1995. That was the lighthearted part. At the arrival on the spot, a series of questions and doubts suddenly knocked at the door. What are we supposed doing in that assistance mission to the dysfunctional and divided Mostar Police? What is the political context within the terms of the peace agreement? How is the security situation developing? What are those Petersberg tasks and what is that MoU between EU and the warring factions? Everything about the defunct WEU is now on the web, but at that time, in a not yet connected world, it was not easy to understand what WEU was doing in the middle of its “revival phase”. Concerning Mostar, the EU was there to re-create conditions for B-Croats and B-Muslims to reconcile, and the reunification of the divided Police as mandate conferred to the WEUPOL mission was part of the overall project. In order to implement the activities, supporting tools for us like policies and geo-political analysis documents offering a better insight of the mission were scarcely available, mainly secured in the offices of the bosses. Moreover, looking at the reality, a MoU co-signed by political leaders does not always reflect what may later happen in the field, where implementation hurdles highlight limits and shortfalls of a political agreement. Along these lines, some challenges emerged among the international teams of the different European police forces in the mission. It was not about unwillingness to cooperate, or national parochialisms, because the working relations were always fair and positive. The problems were brought by the efforts of standardization of procedures that was underway, resulting sometimes in difficulties to organize and coordinate the activities. On my side I understood that before engaging in any nugatory action “outwards”, like going on random patrol watching the landscape or staring at the broken bridge speculating about the horrors of war, I needed to make sense of what to do “inwards”. First, I thought I should acquire situational awareness by collecting, studying and analyzing available documents pertinent to the mission’s objectives, as well as listening and reading available media and talking with all sort of actors, including local staff as far as language could allow. All this seems implicit now, with hindsight, but it was not 25 years ago. Second, pushed by the emotional belief that being all police officers was the real cohesive factor, I engaged the foreign colleagues promoting teamwork and exchanges. Work was finally learned and regularly conducted, within that constantly uncertain political and security framework, exacerbated by the reluctance of the local police to accept external interferences before considering a peaceful settlement and think about restarting joint patrols as the main objective of the mission. That actually happened later, in April 1997. The acquired knowledge on the history of the conflict,
its underlying and structural causes, current dynamics and generated effects allowed to understand the local reality and facilitated the creation of a good rapport with the counterparts during patrols and meetings. Finally, effective cooperation among the representatives of the national contingents was a winning asset in a problematic overall context. The blend and combination of different competencies and efforts put together was beneficial for the individuals and more widely for the mission.

Q: how was the daily communication within the mission and outside?

A: On communication side, I realized that familiarity and fluency with the working language is always an enabling factor to work internationally within a mission. It creates a sort of psychological comfort zone, favorable and conducive to build good working relationship, establish network, exchange with people and better understand the surrounding reality. A solid notional knowledge of facts and figures is not enough, as it could be frustrated by the lack of capacity to communicate it effectively. Difficulty in the use of working language can generate uncomfortable situations, as sometimes I saw competent officials in the mission going off topic during meetings, or misunderstanding plans and terms of discussions at the end. Language barriers were also a concern and a challenge with the counterparts. English normally works at the high political level, but at the field level it is another story. Besides the internal dynamics among colleagues of different nationalities, the common challenge of dealing with counterparts was hard as well, as only very few high-ranking police officers from Mostar West and East could speak English and barely anyone of us could speak local language. We learned some words on the spot, by exchanging with locals, and that helped. In general, most of our communication and concrete assistance work, that is the most important “human” part besides papers and procedures, was in the hands of official interpreters, who luckily happened to be professional and impartial, thus revealing themselves as crucial and sensitive contributors to the effectiveness of the mission.

Q: any lessons learned you brought home you want to share?

A: At the end of the day, from the professional standpoint I acquired a good knowledge in terms of mission management, even if I was supposed to be there to train and mentor rather than learn. From that enthusiastic experience, working with people from other countries and cultures in a context in need of peace I realized that hard skills, knowledge acquired through training, formation, study and self-learning are so important, as they form the backbone of the working competence. They should be possessed as much as possible before joining the mission, because when on the spot other needs and wild cards come into play, primarily the above-mentioned “human factor”, that goes beyond the “paper factor”. That human factor evidenced that hard skills are of little use if not complemented by soft skills, encompassing personal and character qualities like communication, teamwork, networking, time management, creative thinking, motivation, work ethic, active listening, empathic attitude. That acquired awareness pushed me to focus and nurture soft skills, which I tried to express relentlessly at the best of my possibilities. Finally, that “baptism of fire” was an invaluable learning experience, a prerequisite and enabler to the missions I performed later on.
Q: You were also deployed to the Middle East, for another “old generation” civilian mission.
A: In the beginning of 1997, less than one year and a half after the previous mission, while back in the national reality the HQ called me again for another six-month mission to join after few days, that time in Hebron, a place I heard for the very first time during that call. Just as every informed citizen normally interested in what happens around the world I was generically aware about the long-lasting conflict between Israel and Palestine, but not about specific instances and processes like UNSCR 904 and everything that went with it. Besides that, I discovered that my work at TIPH II was going to be “press and information officer, relations with the media, analyst in the Research and Analysis cell and responsible for a small-scale humanitarian project funded by the mission”. The task in the new mission was quite different to what I learned in Mostar. Moreover, I joined the mission during the handover between the Italian contingent commanders, both Colonels. The successor, in charge during almost the whole of my mandate, was highly experienced in international affairs, something still rare to find in the Carabinieri with that high rank at that time. His culture and knowledge plus his speaking fluency were above and beyond. One day the Italian contingent was at the Italian Embassy to Israel for a celebration. The contingent commander entertained the Ambassador with a spectacular geo-political analysis of the conflict, surprising and overwhelming him with his deep knowledge. The contingent commander navigated on another dimension, becoming intellectually unreachable for us workforce of the field. So, I started a full immersion focusing on my new job exploiting the Norwegian predecessor, a PIO expert, as much as I could during hand over, integrated by intense paper exploitation and establishing open and active working relationship with the
colleagues. The new job was generally less complicated than in Mostar, routinely rolled out, organized and systematic, rather internal, mission-related and less projected towards the counterparts, as that was a preserve of the higher staff positions. At the end, it was again an extremely fruitful and unique experience, which also allowed me to learn and better understand the dynamics of a still unresolved historical conflict, within a complex political scenario in a region rich in sites of historic, cultural and religious interest worldwide. I regrettfully left the mission at the end of my mandate in 1998. TIPH was then progressively scaled down, remaining in place until 2019.

CHAPTER 2 – The planning phase. NATO and first CoESPU experience.

Q: would you like to share some thoughts about the experience at NATO?
A: At the end of the ‘90s, an officer in the Carabinieri with less than 15 years of active service but two expeditionary missions already on his account was not very common, so I started focusing on the idea of looking for other opportunities. Nothing particular was in the horizon, until in late 1999 the Carabinieri HQ announced a vacancy for a national quota position in a NATO HQ in Italy, to be filled by an OF2 or OF3 in the J2 (Intel) Division, in charge of the security policy and force protection of HQ populated by personnel representing many NATO member states. Situational awareness was essential to acquire the fundamentals of the job in the shortest possible time; it was even more stringent as I was an Italian representative with a high visibility role in an international operational HQ commanded by a 4-star General to whom I reported directly for the most sensitive issues. I sacrificed leave days when I needed to study without being involved in working dynamics I had not yet absorbed. I dedicated the first months to research and exploitation of documents and policies, starting from the strategic papers and down to the number of standardized operating procedures on overall security of personnel and installations. INFO-SEC was at an embryonic stage in terms of external connectivity, but already complicated enough, let alone dealing with tools like clas-
sified material and intranet. The major achievements during my five years assignment were the learning of NATO security policy and especially the US-inherited NATO strategic planning process, a reference for the modern worldwide military planning, adopted also by the main International Organizations (UN, EU, AU) and further developed according to the respective needs and structures. In 2000 and 2003 I was deployed to SFOR operation in Sarajevo in the J2 cell, in charge of overall security policy Theater-wide (covering SFOR HQ in Sarajevo, plus Mostar, Tuzla and Banja Luka HQ), adding the field experience which made my overall experience at NATO even more gratifying.

Q: now you work at CoESPU, but it is not the first time.
A: After the closure of the NATO command in Verona in 2004, in 2005 I joined the project team in charge of developing the newly established CoESPU, headed by Colonel Pietro Barbano, now General and current CoESPU Director, the one who brought CoESPU to the level of excellence it has reached now. At that time, few years after the release of the Brahimi report, the evolution of international cooperation and foreign assistance for peace and security was under hectic development with new vision, strategies and policies. That evolution process was marked as well by an exponentially increasing and better-defined identity and role of the international police component, finally sanctioned formally and unequivocally with the change of UN denomination, from the obsolete and reductive UNCI-VPOL to the more appropriate UN POLICE. Police officers around the world could perform more significant, organized and robust tasks in operations, but also specialized individual tasks up to the most sensitive role of police advisor in multinational projects, International Organizations or political and diplomatic missions. Within that scenario, in 2008 the EU asked member states to identify candidates with police background to select and take part in an ambitious European project with the African Union. Italy was interested in covering that position and I was the selected candidate, finally appointed after an interview successfully passed in Brussels.

Q: what happened then?
A: It was an ambitious and unprecedented capacity building project at the European level, following a proposal submitted by France based on their previous national initiatives to enhance the operational readiness of some African countries up to the regional level, mainly ECOWAS and ECCAS, in conducting peace operations. These French initiatives were called RECAMP (REnforcement des Capacités Africaines dans le domaine du Maintien de la Paix). The French proposal was discussed and approved at the EU top organs and framed within the newly established EU-Africa Partnership on Peace and Security (2007), re-baptized EU-RORECAMP to be “Europeanized” maintaining the original French trademark, and upgraded at the African Union level. As a result, a new capacity building and planning cycle was then established (2008-2011), as a collaborative effort between the AU and EU in the implementation of the partnership, later handed over to the Afri-
can Union for ownership, and finally denominated AMANI AFRICA (= Africa Peace) cycle. The initiative was addressed to the AU political and strategic decision-making structures within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA, which includes AU Peace and Security Council, P&S Department, Peace Support Ops Division, Continental Early Warning System, African Stand-by Force and Africa Peace Fund). The aim was to conceptualize, develop, exercise and validate the planning processes for deployment of the African Standby Force in the continent, within AU-mandated crisis management and multidimensional peace operations involving all actors, military, police, civilians, under “regional arrangements” Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In the France-based EU planning team established to mentor and assist the AU counterparts, France and UK oversaw the military side, I was in charge of the police component, and an expert seconded from Finland for civilian/political affairs. The activities during the cycle run through regular missions to Addis Ababa. I was responsible for assisting the AU PSOD police component in getting familiar with the planning processes. My previous work at NATO, where I was involved in planning processes and exercises, allowed me to get acquainted to the job, although the cycle planning rather followed the UN standards under development on multidimensional IMPP (Integrated Mission Planning Process) to be adapted to AU structures. It was not easy to manage the activities in the beginning, as the non-military actors felt the overall process as military-dominant and they were not familiar with such type of exercises. It took some time to effectively take the police colleagues on board, but finally it worked well as they concurred on the didactic importance of such joint effort, virtual in nature but with direct impact on possible real-life occurrences. Consider that one year before the launch of the cycle, the African Union had already deployed AMISOM, with a strategic planning cell not yet structured and heavily supported by external advisors, therefore the need for a strategic exercise in those terms was even more important. AMANI AFRICA cycle was structured around a simulated crisis in one fictitious “African lookalike” State, based on the now famous and exploited worldwide Carana scenario. The Carana scenario to support the planning design was conceived, drafted, elaborated and inaugurated at that time during the cycle, together with the Pearson Peacekeeping Center that was taken on board by EU for the purpose. The cycle culminated in a CPX-Computer-based exercise, enabling the AU to draw lessons at political and strategic level with inputs from the single components, military, police, civilian. Once again, it was a great and unique experience, both cognitive and emotional, especially from the human standpoint, thanks to a fair understanding and working synergy established within the European small team of advisors coming from different countries and background, military, police and civilian. More than that, it was extremely interesting working with counterparts, authorities, experts and colleagues from different Countries in Africa. The professional exchanges on cycle-related views on planning and operational aspects were great, but the more personal aspect was invaluable. Through daily interaction we could learn and understand situations, nuances and peculiarities of the respective security, social, and cultural environments of different African realities where people operate and manage daily life. That was the end of my planning phase, which served as the springboard, which served as the springboard to raise the bar towards the following advisory phase (to be continued on the next issue).
IN DEPTH

GENDARMERIES IN CAPACITY BUILDING

RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE

Gendarmeries in Capacity Building - Rule of Law Assistance

by Davide Galliolo

Introduction

This article’s purpose is to provide a contribution in defining the added value of gendarmeries in capacity building engagements, with a focus on the European ones and on the European Gendarmerie Force, EUROGENDFOR. As also pointed out by Lt. Col. Filippo Tancon Lutteri in his essay, the occasion to make an article like this arose because of the issue brought up by some academic essays, reporting a lack of awareness and knowledge about “where” the added value of gendarmeries lies. The analysis is carried out by means of literature review, coupled with the practitioner’s experience of the author in field and staff assignments, national and international. The methodology is predominantly qualitative, as a quantitative one already proved to be hard to be done, mainly due to the scarcity of available data. The issue of “measuring success” will also be addressed. The main argument of the analysis is that gendarmeries possess a set of capabilities that, when properly understood and exploited, can provide comparative – to other police and/or military forces – advantages in contributing to capacity building efforts, especially in destabilised areas. Such an argument does not deny or exclude the ability of other police or military forces to provide valuable contributions to these efforts, as gendarmeries’ contribution can be ultimately effective only when being part of broader endeavours. A better understanding of gendarmeries added values can nevertheless support other actors in peace and crisis management operations. “Capacity building” is here meant as the set of efforts and actions aiming to support the development of more effective, accountable and legitimate law enforcement institutions of a state, here referred to as “host nation”. These efforts are carried out by other states’ forces, usually coordinated via internatio-
national organizations, during peace or crisis management operations, but also following bi- or multi-lateral agreements. These developments shall be part of broader “rule of law”\textsuperscript{3}, contributing then to a more overarching human security, mainly by improving personal and community security\textsuperscript{4}. In the final part of the article, departing from proposals and observations of other authors, the potential of gendarmeries in Rule of Law assistance will be further inquired, proposing venues to better exploit their potential. The term “strengthening”, as a role for police and gendarmeries in international engagements different from the one of “substitution” of the host nation’s forces, is intended as equivalent to the one of “capacity building”. Missions entrusted with executive powers can carry out both substitution and strengthening roles, depending on the needs on the ground. To be pointed out since the beginning the fact that gendarmeries, being police forces – although with a peculiar set of capabilities – are law enforcement agencies. For the purposes of this article, the terms “police force” or “police service” and “law enforcement agency” are considered as synonyms\textsuperscript{5}; anyhow, “police force” or “service” can be perceived to be a force offering “general police services” country-wide, including several specialized ones\textsuperscript{6}, “law enforcement agencies” or “services” can be perceived as police forces having less general competences (manly being local, or not nation-wide) and/or more specialized ones (focus on some aspects of policing/law enforcement, like counter-narcotics, or border control). The definitions in any case refer more to a matter of perception by the general public in a given country, than of substance, so that are all to be considered as equivalent.

### Versatility of Gendarmeries in the use of force

As a preliminary consideration, it is useful to highlight how the term “force” can be easily misconstrued or misunderstood. Most probably a police officer, or even a common person, would understand it as “any verbal command or physical action to gain subject control”. This is reported to be the definition of “force” according to the UN Department of Peace Operations in training packages for peacekeepers. The paradigm of reference is the International Human Rights Law (IHRL), which “relies on the concept that lethal force may be used only as last resort in order to protect life, when other available means remain ineffective”. This is plainly the framework into which police forces use force in home countries and to which mostly refer any country’s laws and regulations. A military professional could intend the word “force” as “as an exercise of armed violence against the enemy, limited only by principles of military necessity, distinction and proportionality”. Such a declination of the concept finds its place into the framework of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also known as Law of Armed Conflicts (LOAC), applicable to wars (or situations where the use of force reaches the threshold of an armed conflict)\textsuperscript{9} into which the use of force is considered as legitimate to defeat an enemy. In addition, use of force under IHRL usually entails ex-post evaluation by a judicial authority, although there might be differences in internal law. As clearly stated into the article by Lt. Col. Filippo Tancon Lutteri, who delved into the origins and tasks of gendarmeries and EUROGENDFOR, gendarmeries are forces tasked primarily with civilian policing duties and with some military tasks. In theoretical and juridical terms, there are some national differences and the boundaries between a definition and another can be blurred and debatable\textsuperscript{10}. In any case, in their being military, the focus of these forces is always civilian policing. Following the French\textsuperscript{11} wording, gendarmeries can be defined as armed forces established to ensure the execution of laws; hence, law enforcement, police, forces. For the purposes of this article, this implies that the first definition of “force” is taken into account, falling then under the IHRL framework. Scholars considered how the wide range of situations to be handled by security forces (military and police) both in the home country and in external engagements require, by these forces, to be prepared for a versatility in the use of force\textsuperscript{12}. The opportunity for this versatility, with a focus on international interventions, was spotted by Cornelius Friesendorf, when writing “The problem is that many democracies lack intermediate force options such as gendarmeries.” Much has been written\textsuperscript{13} on the process of constabularization, or police-ization of the armed forces (especially the army) and the militarization of the police forces. It seems anyhow still valid one of the very first observations about this phenomenon\textsuperscript{14}: “No one should suffer the illusion that military forces could ever execute the laws with the same sensitivity to civil liberties as regular police forces. To do so is at odds with the cen-
tral imperatives of military service. Moreover, a successful policization of the armed forces may well render it incapable of defeating authentic external military threats. In the same vein, studies addressed the process of militarization of police forces. Among them, gained prominence Kraska’s figure “Assessing Police Militarization Using Continuums”, a tool to analyse police force’s militarization via material, cultural, organizational and operational indicators. Therefore, “any broad-based academic analysis that relies heavily on these traditional demarcations [between military and police] will soon seem misplaced and obsolete”. Far from denying this trend and without pretending this article being a “broad-based academic analysis”, it seems important to remark the difference in the use of force between police and military forces which, in very basic terms, can be summarized by the possibility to use lethal force in extreme, life-threatening situations (IHRL paradigm), or to achieve a legitimate military objective (IHL/LOAC paradigm). Moreover, IHL/LOAC is considered to have the character of lex specialis against IHRL, a “state of exception”, as also the armed forces are, of course, legitimated to use force under IHL/LOAC only during armed conflicts (international, but also internal in some cases). Generally speaking, training of police forces personnel is based, from the very first day, on the IHRL paradigm to conduct law enforcement operations, while training of the armed forces is based on the IHL/LOAC one, to carry out combat operations. Also the use of information in police and military operations usually differs, as police personnel is called to collect information in order to gather evidence that will be used in a trial, according to national law. Moreover, police intelligence strives for crime prevention. Military personnel, on the other hand, is usually called to collect information for military intelligence purposes. There is of course a broad range of possibilities, but the foundational difference stays there, as the same person cannot, at least at the same point in time, be a community police officer and an efficient war fighter. The issue of the same point in time seems to be quite overlooked in literature, but it could be considered as relevant because, senior ranks aside, generally speaking the armed forces, especially the army, rely on short-term contracted or temporary personnel (when not conscripts), while police forces mostly rely on long-term contracted or permanent personnel. This is reflected into the fact police forces personnel is, in average, quite older than the armed forces’ personnel, especially the army’s one. For instance, French data report that 34% of military personnel are career ones, while 66% are contracted, with an average age of 33 in 2018. Gendarmerie average age was 37 in 2016. For the U.S. military, is reported an average age in 2015 of 34.5 years for officers and 27 for enlisted personnel. For U.S. police officers, the average age is reported to be 39.5 years. For UK Armed Forces, in April 2020, the overall average age was 31. For UK police, 47% of all personnel was aged 26 to 40, 44% was aged 41 to 55. Without elaborating more on that, is quite intuitive to understand how it is easier (and more cost-effective in terms of return on investment) to specifically train for high-end SWAT operations, or to a lesser extent for crowd and riot control operations, a permanent police officer, who already served in community policing, instead of a 3-years contracted one. In the same vein, it would be unwise to retrain for community policing duties a
3-years contracted army soldier, close to military discharge (this is perhaps done, but indirectly, as in many countries police officers have a previous military experience). Moreover, it is also commonly known that working as a police officer is also a physical thing, but it entails a much higher degree of social and communication skills, as well as broader competences (law, administration) than a conscript. Applying Kraska’s framework, Friesendorf observes how, “the Italian Arma dei Carabinieri is a force that can cover almost the entire spectrum between civilian policing and military combat”, pointing out as “Culturally, this organization comprises a variety of subcultures. A crime forensics expert of the force is likely to employ different professional language and to hold different beliefs than a member of a SWAT team, a paratrooper, or a military police officer. But intra-organizational cultural diversity notwithstanding, all Carabinieri share an esprit de corps”. Such a point can of course be applied also to other gendarmeries. To some extent, also to civilian police forces, but it’s worth highlighting how the use of force in “military combat” entails (or could entail) in legal terms that the paradigm of definition of “force” could switch from IHRL to IHL, so the one applicable to war or armed conflict situations. This is – in general terms, there could be exceptions – above the framework of reference for civilian police forces in legal and material, cultural, operational, organizational terms (referring again to Kraska) The main conclusion of this preliminary analysis is that, being in a police force with military status for long-term contracts or even permanent (until the retirement age) ones, gendarmes can be trained and retrained for being ready to properly apply the required levels of force to different situations, during their work life, according to the needs. This applies also to civilian police forces, of course, but the military status entails that some degree of training with military weapons and procedures is part of gendarmes since the basic training, making smoother a transition in later phases (or in case of international deployments or crisis management operations) to higher degrees of use of force, or vice versa. It can happen for a gendarme (an Italian Carabinieri, in this example) to begin his career in the 1st Carabinieri Paratrooper Regiment “Tuscania”, being then
selected to serve in the Special Intervention Group (so, to the higher end of the use of force spectrum, an airborne unit and then a special forces one, “GIS”, specialised in hijacking, release of hostages and terrorist activities); to move then to an investigation unit (dealing mainly with murders, drug dealing and criminal gangs), a local station (community policing), a mobile patrol unit (the ones supporting community policing in more problematic situations), a Special Operations Group (ROS, dealing with organized crime and terrorism), a regional command staff, then, to the 7th Carabinieri Regiment (mobile unit specialised in military police, crowd and riot control, close protection to diplomatic staff and stability policing, twin unit of the 13th Carabinieri Regiment), serving in multiple deployments over the years, including capacity building ones. Moreover, the age factor for military and police personnel is a matter of concern for operational reasons in every country, but for capacity building efforts (training, advising, mentoring, monitoring), which is the purpose of this article, it offers perhaps more pros than cons. In fact, more age provides for more experience, in diversified fields of police tasks, coupled with a military one. In this way, the knowledge which can be put at the service of capacity building efforts is very wide and deep. By a matter of fact, also enterprises on the civilian job market are asking more and more to their most experienced workers to provide inspiration and counselling.

Facets of Gendarmeries in peacekeeping and crisis management

The article by Lt. Col. Filippo Tandon Lutteri offers, for the purposes of this one, some main conclusions about European gendarmeries to be taken into account, so that:

- are police forces of the state with a military status, meaning they carry out civilian policing tasks nation-wide, not being locally organised police forces and have some military capabilities;
- conduct civilian policing in their home countries, also in peripheral environments, far and rural places, austere scenarios;
- have around a two-centuries long history in doing this, meaning that such features are deeply rooted in gendarmeries’ organizational culture, forging their forma mentis (mindset) and modus operandi (employment policies and way of doing things) at both individual and organizational levels. This organizational culture is granted by a “combination of instruction, mentorship, and experience.”

Moreover, summarizing the previous section, gendarmeries offer (taking into account Kraska’s framework of analysis, as considered by Friesendorf), especially in international interventions and crisis management operations, a peculiar versatility in the use of force. There is already relevant and consistent available literature describing gendarmeries’ peculiarities, of which a good summary was offered by Willy Bruggeman, under the question “What makes gendarmeries different from police?”. The following points are quoted verbatim, as specific arguments making gendarmeries different from police:

- the police are citizen-oriented;
- gendarmerie forces are state-oriented;
- normal police and light infantry missions;
- permanent availability and readily deployable police units;
- better suited to work in teams;
- more prepared to serve as part of a chain of command (top-down approach);
- units able and willing to carry arms and to operate in a more robust way;
- capable of operating in three scenarios: military, constabulary, and hybrid;
- capable of operating in a broad range of security needs (public order and rule of law) and types of assistance;
- more readily lends itself to being placed under military command;
- less conditioned deployment;
- multi-task training (violent and non-violent situations);
- cultural differences (hierarchy, discipline, cohesion, leadership);
- no right to strike;
- connected with the military and with the police;
- expertise in international policing;
- the European Gendarmerie Force is a new and strong player.

It is not a purpose of this article to comment every point of this list as, in general terms, all of them are related to what already described with regard to the military status of gendarmeries and their versatility in the use of force. Moreover, some points of this list can be applicable also to some civilian police forces. The first point, however, needs to be addressed, “the police are citizen-oriented; gendarmerie forces are state-oriented”. As it was recently observed, “it cannot be ignored that GTFs [gendarme-
rie-type forces, the definition of gendarmeries within NATO] have less support within the UN when it comes to peace building, peace sustainment and police reform because they are more associated with state-centric coercion rather than with community service.”. As said, gendarmeries are primarily police forces, with some military capabilities. The fact of being state-centric, sticking to Bruggeman’s definition, means that they are country-wide police forces, with their employment policies and chain of command defined at national level. This, like many civilian police forces, in many countries of the world, while others (like the United Kingdom and the United States) rely mainly on locally-organized police forces and some national agencies. But the fact of being “state-oriented” in this sense, to have a country-wide organization, does not mean that they are not “citizen-oriented”, as their “core business” is to deliver civilian policing services to communities. The main difference with locally-organized police forces is that the latter’s organizational policies are defined at local level. Moreover, local police chiefs are appointed by the local political leaders or elected by the local communities, in place of being appointed by a nation-wide chain of command. Both systems have pros and cons, but in any case, the chain of command of nation-wide police forces, either civilian or with military status, provides for the adaptation of national policies to the local needs (this applies also to prosecutors and judges, according to the national law provisions). This is a gendarmeries emerged as relevant in international interventions, peacekeeping missions and crisis management operations, given their ability to address the “public security gap”, defined as the “inability of the international community to establish law and order in peacekeeping and other post-conflict or post intervention situations”, a conceptual framework introduced by Michael Dziedzic. As recalled by Hovens, “he divides the public security gap into three gaps: the deployment gap, the enforcement gap, and the institutional gap.” The deployment gap is defined as “the time between the (possible) retreat of armed forces and arrival of police units creates a deployment gap”. The Enforcement gap presents itself when “a peace mission is confronted with the need to perform functions that fall between the inner layers (basic maintenance of law and order) and outer layers (area security and non-compliance with the peace agreement) of public security”. The last gap, the institutional one, tends to be more long-term, as it refers to “the incapacity of a local government to provide public order, especially when measured against international standards for policing and human rights”. As Marina Caparini wrote, “[UN] police can play a critical role in conflict prevention through: “… (a) direct operational actions aimed at mediating and defusing tensions and deterring violence; (b) structural prevention linked to capacity-building activities of mentoring, training and advising host state police, as well as supporting the development of more effective, accountable and legitimate law enforcement institutions; and (c) systemic prevention through support for
international and regional norms and mechanisms to combat transnational organized crime, illicit arms flows and human trafficking”. The first role, “direct operational actions”, is carried out through substitution interventions, mainly with an executive mandate, and addresses the “enforcement gap”. The second one, structural prevention, is discharged by strengthening interventions, hence capacity building, mainly with non-executive mandates and addresses the “institutional gap”. The deployment gap is valid for both. “Capacity building” refers, so, to the actions carried out to strengthen host nation’s police or, in a broader sense, security forces, including in this way also armed forces tasked with internal security duties in support to local police forces. The historical development of gendarmeries’ substitution role in peacekeeping and crisis management saw an extensive employment under military chains of command, mainly within NATO (MSU Bosnia and Kosovo), but also within EU (EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and EUFOR CAR in Central African Republic) or ad-hoc coalitions (MSU Iraq), plus a number of strengthening engagements (inter alia NTM-Afghanistan and Iraq, RSM). These engagements were enabled by the military capabilities of gendarmeries, due to their characteristics described above. This, without prejudice to their civilian policing role in home countries and usually with ad-hoc training of the personnel involved it these peacekeeping roles, under military chains of command. Due to that, the discourse on Stability Policing (SP), ongoing within NATO, deals with the exploitation of gendarmeries’ capabilities by this international organization. The capabilities of these forces are nevertheless available for other engagements, both under military or civilian chains of command and under the aegis of other international organizations depending on the needs and, of course, following the decisions of the respective nations and considering the capacity restraints (like limited logistic autonomy and limited numbers, as one more police officer abroad, is one less police officer home40).

Evaluating gendarmeries’ capacity building efforts, into wider frameworks

The issue of measuring the success (or lack of it) of international engagements, including police capacity building ones, emerged as a quite pressing matter, as the quest for a tool to check whether efforts of the international community are really improving the situation or not. Despite the focus on elaborating useful tools, the goal of establishing a working measurement system, clearly showing success or not, does not seem to have achieved satisfactory results, up to now41. As stated in the introduction, law enforcement is a component of
The broader rule of law (RoL), which can be defined “a broad and systemic concept which encompasses: constitutional and legislative reform; the development of law enforcement, prosecutorial, judicial and corrections institutions, as well as civil and commercial dispute mechanisms; and the promotion of good governance.” The “Guidance note of the Secretary General” on “UN Approach to Rule of Law Assistance”43, issued in April 2008, defines six fundamental elements in the framework for strengthening the rule of law: 1) a constitution or equivalent; 2) a legal framework and the implementation thereof; 3) an electoral system; 4) institutions of justice, governance, security and human rights; 5) transitional justice processes and mechanisms; 6) a public and civil society that contributes to strengthening the rule of law and holds public officials and institutions accountable. Among the 40 points in the list of “fundamental RoL elements”, are considered “Laws, guidelines and directives that govern the conduct of police and other security Forces”; “State institutional capacities to make policy for and manage the effective administration of justice, the provision of security, crime prevention, and to investigate and prosecute violations of the law;” and “Police and other law enforcement agencies that protect individuals and communities, enforce the law without discrimination and take appropriate action against alleged violations of the law, including appropriate oversight mechanisms;”. Mentioning long lists of objectives and “to be done” issues, seems useful not to confuse a reader or to make things fuzzier, but just to remind how police forces are “small pieces” within much wider frameworks of state’s governance. Governance which shall provide a population with sustainable “human security” conditions. Police forces are, in any case, quite different by many other “items on the list”, because “police work is performed 24/7, close to society. Because of this, the police is perhaps the most manifest expression of rule of law or – more in general – the government”44. The first and foremost aspect to consider in evaluating police forces, including so gendarmeries, is that of course while supporting the populations they are called to enforce laws, which are by definition not set by gendarmeries, nor by any other law enforcement agency. In a capacity building effort the consequence is that, when building the capacity of police forces, the first pre-condition for success is the appropriateness of the institutional and legal framework into which the supported forces are called to act. Framework which has to somehow tailor internationally agreed standards and norms to the national – and in many cases local – social and cultural landscapes, in order to build the capacity of forces/agencies better able to “serve and protect” the population. In this sense, an ongoing debate on what could be the best model for a police force can’t be a generalized one, as every situation needs a tailored solution45. By a matter of fact, all police forces and police models find their legitimation in state’s laws46, although there could be alternative policing or security models or systems, originating from extra or pre-state’s powers (like the Afghan “Arba-kaï”47), but these are not to be considered as police forces or law enforcement agencies strictu sensu. Several tools have been developed to measure performance and evaluating progresses or their lack thereof over time48, of police reform, security sector reform and rule of law assistance. Concern was raised about the performance of gendarmeries “in multinational operations”, including both substitution and strengthening roles, due to the lack of public, reliable data: “If assessing output and outcome is difficult, we know even less about impact”49. By a matter of fact, normally state’s institutions answer, and provide data, to the state itself, not to the general public. This is valid not only in multinational or crisis management operations, but also in home countries, also for civilian and/or local police forces. Usually, information to the general public is provided through “press and public information” (PPIO) policies, although there could be differences from country to country. In countries where chief attorneys and/or police commissioners or equivalent positions are elective, PPIO policies would most probably be different from those countries where these positions are appointed by authorities. In the same vein, there could be differences when the appointment comes from a local or national political authority, or through a national chain of command (where only the top national positions are politically appointed). Other differences could be caused by the relationships between the police and the judiciary and the degree of autonomy of the first from the latter, or by a stricter control thereof. In any case, security and judicial institutions mostly share information according to a “need to know” principle,
due to the sensitivity of the issues they deal with so that, even considering differences among countries and organizational models, information will mostly never be entirely “public” or “transparent”. Measurement of output and outcome of police activities, or the attempt of doing so, would moreover risk to ultimately be a waste of time and resources, at least when not part of a wider and more comprehensive tool, as “those indicators reveal more about what officers do with time and resources than whether they are adequately serving the needs of all citizens and whether citizens, particularly those who are poor and otherwise disadvantaged, trust and value the police”.

“Building state functions per se is not a tool, as of a wider and more comprehensive tool, to really solve such a problem goes beyond the scope of this article, but it’s worth mentioning how state’s power, authority, institutions and law could potentially either compete with local, customary powers (which could easily foster conflicts), or support them, causing as a side effect to perpetuate already existing social fractures and escalate long-lasting tensions, causing in this way harsher conflicts.”

For the purposes of this article, a role for gendarmeries in capacity building for addressing these issues will be proposed in the last section, taking into account the just mentioned findings and considerations. For the “evaluation of capacity building”, the main point is that every kind of “technical” tool for evaluating capacity building, security sector reform (SSR), or rule of law assistance, could be in some cases flawed. This, when a host state’s institutional framework is ill-suited for addressing the grievances and justice needs of the society it is meant to serve, as well as to provide good governance and human security to the populations. Any and every measurement will produce flawed results when the performance indicators are not designed to really reflect the situation on the ground. This could be the case not only in international engagements and capacity building efforts in host nations, but also in the home territory of so-called “established democracies”, due to a misinterpretation and lack of hindsight in setting the performance targets: potentially, “Targets distort operational reality”. Tools on how to better assess populations’ needs with regard to justice have been proposed and could be potentially beneficial for better designing SSR and RoL assistance policies, including also capacity building efforts. SSR and RoL assistance processes entail, of course, law drafting, which is not carried out (as already written) by police forces or law enforcement agencies, but it has a direct impact on them, as in discharging their mandates they are called to enforce laws. When these laws are not drafted by the host nation, these will, most probably, not be properly implemented. As noticed for Afghanistan, “foreigners cannot properly draft and revise Afghan laws by themselves, and thus even if Afghan authorities ask the foreigners to do so, any such exercise is doomed to fail.” As a direct consequence, when law drafting is doomed to fail, it’s easy to imagine how any enforcement of these laws will be doomed to the same fate. Anyhow, an international support can bring to an improvement of the situation, when properly implemented. Considering what above described, collecting best practices and building indicators shall be of
course done, but always assuming how their validity can be confirmed only into the reality they come from, when a properly working framework is set. This because a solution that worked somewhere, will probably not work somewhere else or even worsen other situations\textsuperscript{64}. It can so be argued as the temptation to “determine what constitutes ‘good’ or ‘successful’ (international) policing”, could prove to be equivalent to trying to determine what could be the best police system, in absolute terms\textsuperscript{65}. It simply can’t be done. As a minimum common standard, to work on, a baseline could be seen in the full adherence to the IHRL paradigm in any situation not strictly requiring the implementation of the IHL/LOAC one. But there could be differing interpretations in the practical application of this principle\textsuperscript{66}. The main argument is, concluding this part of the article, that every evaluation system or tool can be valid only when being part of wider strategies tailored “to the ground” and a mismatch between the state’s architecture and laws and the populations’ needs will, most probably, lead to negative outcomes of any capacity building effort, regardless of the forces conducting the said efforts. The setting of objectives and performance indicators stemming from flawed institutional and legislative frameworks could lead to “ticked boxes”, but in parallel to worsened situations on the ground. In short, any supported host nation’s police force when properly capacitated, but enforcing “wrong laws”, will produce unwanted “bad outcomes”, probably sparking more protests and revolts then before\textsuperscript{67}. This considering how in any case, any change, in any society, finds resistance by at least some parts of the society, but a fair employment of properly trained police forces, serving populations of states aiming to discharge their obligations with regard to human security, is conductive to sustainable peace. In his study on Gendarmeries, Friesendorf recalls how “During the Cold War, the Carabinieri focused on domestic security tasks, some of which resembled low-intensity warfare. This was the case with counter-crime operations in Italy’s restive South as well as the fight against separatists in South Tyrolia”. Referring to the case of South Tyrol, the situation begun with the absorption of the Germanophone province of Bolzano/Bozen into Italy after the 1\textsuperscript{st} and, afterwards, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} world war. Peace agreements of 1946 stipulated for the protection of the German-speaking minority (embedded in this way into an international agreement, the De Gasperi – Gruber\textsuperscript{68}), but a mismatch between by this population’s expectations and the implementation of the agreements\textsuperscript{69} led to a situation “which resembled low-intensity warfare”\textsuperscript{70}. The settlement of such circumstances was not achieved manu militari, but via political agreement, both internally to Italy with the Autonomy Statute\textsuperscript{71}, and internationally with a “Declaration of the end of dispute” released by Austria in 1992. Why to recall this situation, related to Italy, in this article? Because capacity building includes advising at tactical, operational and strategic levels. And the history of South Tyrol includes that of a Police officer\textsuperscript{72}, Renato Mazzoni, the Questore (Commissioner) of Bolzano, who sent his advice\textsuperscript{73} on how the regional and national government shall have better addressed the situation in the province under different layers, including the proper implementation of both the international agreement and the internal laws. Unfortunately, his advice went to deaf ears and this contributed to the worsening of the situation and the following wave of human and...
material losses. To better convey advice from police to political authorities is a potential “lesson identified”, also in the implementation of more effective capacity building efforts, as will be proposed in the last section of the article.

The role of Gendarmeries in capacity building

In their article on CoESPU magazine 2020-3, Col. Volpi and Capt. Fontana Barberis deal with the “Evolution of police international engagement”, recalling Dziedzic’s concept of “Public Security Gap”, already mentioned in section two of this article. They elaborate more, anyhow, in outlining the added value of Gendarmeries in addressing this gap, highlighting a threefold gap which originated the “stability policing” concept. The following lines are quoted verbatim from their article:

• “Deployment gap” substantial incapacity of a typical Civilian Police Component to deploy quickly along with – or, at least, close to – the deployment of the Military Forces.
• “time-efficiency gap”, which is the consequence of the considerable amount of time necessary for the typical Civilian Police Components before they can reach an – albeit minimal – operational capability, if compared to the military forces deployed;
• the “capability gap” emerged as the difference between the capabilities expressed by a typical Civilian Police Component, generally unarmed and with no executive powers, and those possessed by the Military Components, basically responsible for ensuring the areal security and which are mainly intended to perform “combat” tasks. Gendarmeries’ ability in addressing these gaps, at least to some extent and with some units, is enabled by their characteristics, already listed by Bruggeman, quoted and partly commented in section two of this article following the question “What makes gendarmeries different from police?”. This finding was highlighted also by Lutterbeck. It seems worth mentioning how gendarmeries, being nation-wide police forces, are able to have some “reserve” forces (mainly from mobile units) maybe not to the extent of a regular army, but usually more than locally organized police forces. These reserve forces of mobile units (typically dealing in the home territory with public order and security, also in the form of crowd and riot control) can be easily complemented in international engagements, le cas échéant, by personnel coming from other units of the same gendarmerie force (or even from other security units), including inter alia investigation, forensics, community policing, EOD, close protection, SWAT, environmental or cultural heritage protection and strengthening – or capacity building – elements. This modular approach, first experimented by the NATO Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) in the Balkans, evolved into the current – although still in fieri – “stability policing” (SP) concept. This concept is being developed mainly within NATO, placing police assets under a military chain of command, but it’s implemented also within EU, with the names of Integrated Police Unit (IPU, more robust, that could temporarily be placed under a military command) and Formed Police Units (FPU, only under civilian direction), and
efforts of the Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), also reported on the pages of this magazine, are widely recognized. It seems important to underline how MSU, IPU and FPU, across the different organizations, were established considering primarily substitution tasks. Strengthening was of course envisioned, but as a complementary task and with differences across the organizations. To better cope with capacity building needs exceeding the capabilities of Individual Police Officers (IPO), NATO established the Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLT) which later evolved into Police Advisor Team (PAT). It took some years for the concept of “Specialized Team” (ST) to gain traction also within UN and EU (as “commitment 6” of the EU CSDP Compact). By a matter of fact, the contribution of gendarmeries was – and is being – of the utmost relevance in developing both the substitution (MSU, IPU, FPU, SPU) tools and some of the strengthening, hence the capacity building (ST) ones. How to explain that? Volpi and Fontana Barberis’ article points then out the emphasis placed by the “HIPPO Report” on the “need to promote system-wide coherence and to develop further standards” in international police engagements. Within the UN system, such a need paved the way to renewed efforts seeking for consistency in international policing. As police culture and tradition are inherently intertwined with the populations and cultures they come from, the “consistency issue” became evident in international policing and especially in capacity building efforts. In this sense gendarmeries and especially European ones, could offer an added value, when compared against the wide variety of police forces around the world. This because they share quite close organizational cultures, as this was one of the main conclusions taken from the article of Lt. Col. Tancon Lutteri, mentioned in section two of this article. Consistency in training and, more in general, capacity building, proved to be a valuable asset (like in Timor Leste), or a desirable one, (like in Mali, for military engagements). As observed by Lt. Col. Duque Martinho in CoESPU Magazine 2020-2, “To reform or rebuild the security sector of a country the selection of particular police organization from one single country, or a multinational organization but with strong common identity and standardized procedures like EUROGENDFOR, appears to be a coherent and productive decision.” For the purposes of this article, such an observation does not necessarily mean that a host nation’s police force must, shall or should follow a gendarmerie organizational model, but could suggest that the closeness of European gendarmeries, in terms of organizational culture, could provide them an added value in terms of consistency in offering capacity building efforts to a host nation’s police forces. Due to this reason, SPU and ST manned by European gendarmeries are most of times multinational, instead of having personnel coming from just one nation, as the homogenous cultural background is a great interoperability facilitator further enhanced, when the case, by the EUROGENDFOR standing planning capabilities enabled by this organization’s Permanent Headquarters. All of that, does not mean that exclusively gendarmeries are able to carry out the tasks entrusted to SPUs or STs, as NATO stability policing concept strives to be an “inclusive” one and EU civilian CSDP is broader than policing tasks alone. Setting commonly agreed policing standards, as is being done within UN, could greatly enhance interoperability of different police forces, services and agencies and increase the consistency of their efforts. Nevertheless, gendarmeries can be considered as the “centre of gravity” of stability policing, as their “status allows the fulfillment of all policing functions, grounded on capabilities stemming from a police approach and mind-set, and embedded in a military background”. Moreover, gendarmeries capabilities and especially their military status, can grant them with a further added value, the one of engaging with the other armed forces, primarily the army, in providing them with the ability to better operate within an IHRL framework. As already pointed out in section one of this article, dealing with the “use of force”, police forces focus on law enforcement, mainly having IHRL as a reference, while the armed forces focus on combat, the context within which IHL/LOAC stemmed from. In many international, but also internal, engagements, the armed forces especially the army are tasked with police – or police support – functions, being in this way called to operate under IHRL, instead of IHL/LOAC (of course, internal law is of the utmost importance, but these are only the very basic terms of reference; when actual combat ceases, or is suspended, IHL/LOAC is no longer applicable, leaving ground to the application of IHRL).
The employment of the armed forces in internal security operations entails how these shall be better prepared for the use of “minimum force”, at least for the time of their actual internal engagement, where IHRL (and internal law) applies. In this frame, gendarmeries could better convey the training, as well as the policies or procedures, needed by military personnel in discharging internal police, or police support roles\(^99\), mainly in the public security domain (while judiciary police tasks are usually entrusted only to police forces). Such an opportunity is viable also for international engagements, as host nation’s populations might be unaware of, or unable to distinguish, between foreign police or military contingents\(^100\). By a matter of fact, often police and military forces are grouped together under the common name of “security forces”\(^101\). In any case, as mentioned earlier, there is a limited capacity of gendarmeries in providing the needed personnel to multiple engagements, meaning that it’s simply not feasible to deploy gendarmes everywhere they could be needed. In this sense, cooperation with other armed forces’ structures and units, in some cases already ongoing\(^102\), could support them in better preparing themselves with the tools and capabilities needed to cope with security needs in low intensity conflicts where IHL/LOAC is not (or only marginally) applicable. For external interventions, an armed forces’ role in “Transitional Public Security”\(^103\) has been defined and a judiciary police capability, although not usually entrusted to military units, can be provided by stability policing assets enabling a military mission to carry out “legal targeting”, as well explained by Col. Giuseppe De Magistris\(^104\) and C.W.O. Stefano Bergonzini. Such a support could be twofold, either direct, by assisting the armed forces of the same nation, or allied ones\(^105\), in delivering policing capabilities; or indirect, by conveying these capabilities into the training curriculum of armed forces tasked to provide capacity building to the armed forces of other nations. This, especially when the latter forces could probably be called to discharge police or police support roles in their own nations. As it was considered by Michael Burgoyne\(^106\), “the military lacks expertise in policing and law enforcement which can create a counterproductive outcome when training foreign police forces. Even military police lack the community policing knowledge resident in European SPF’s [Stability Police Forces]”. It’s worth mentioning how NATO’s Security Force Assistance (SFA) Concept, on the capacity building of host nation’s military forces, can nurture a conceptual evolution in the capacity building efforts also of police forces. As pointed out by C.W.O. Stefano Bergonzini\(^107\), “There is a connection between SP and SFA, since both are addressing capacity building of local security forces. Therefore, they should be conducted concurrently and in coordination, while adopting the same framework intends to facilitate a common approach.” Moreover, by a homeland security point of view, gendarmeries’ experience as military forces operating under the ministry of interior (European gendarmeries have a hierarchical subordination from the ministry of defence or interior, depending on country’s legislation; nevertheless, for civilian policing duties, they depend on the ministry of interior\(^108\), liaising with local authorities, could be of use for the “Joint Military–Industry Greyzone Exercises”, recently proposed by Ms Elisabeth Braw for the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies\(^109\). Due to what above recalled, an added value of gendarmeries can be seen in supporting the other armed forces in discharging some non-combat and non-combat-support functions, hence, police or police support roles mainly under an IHRL framework. As Ms. Elisabeth Braw summarized, “While not many other countries want to launch a Gendarmerie, all would benefit from mastering the Gendarmes’ core skill of keeping order in the gray zone, both at home and in international hotspots”\(^110\). To be pointed out is that not only gendarmeries could do that, as the armed forces could develop by themselves feasible tactics, policies and procedures; but it’s for sure always good to take advantage from the experience of others. Moreover, also civilian police forces would for sure be able to support the armed forces in such an effort; but as described in section one of this article, the features of gendarmeries in the versatility of the use of force\(^111\) and their military status could give them a competitive edge when compared to some civilian police forces\(^112\). Supporting the armed forces in achieving more versatility in the use of force, could provide for the “security sector reforms not just in states emerging from conflict but in those intervening states that seek to support them”\(^113\), argued by Friesendorf.

Gendarmes’ potential for Rule of Law Assistance

Again Volpi and Fontana Barberis
recall in their article the position of David Bayley, considering how “the Police cannot be made democratic through policies that focus exclusively on the Police.”. They cite the “Strategic Guidance Framework” for UN Police114, which states explicitly how “establishing or restoring policing and other Law Enforcement is fundamentally political – as it involves shifting power and access to key state institutions”. These findings can be supported by what considered in section three of this article, the fact that police forces (as a cunning Carabinieri Provincial Commander once observed) are called to the privileged position of applying laws and observe what impact they produce, while the burdens of their making and interpretation is on others. The meaning is that operating for changes in a police force could be an effort without success, when not being part of much wider ones. In such a context, Volpi and Fontana Barberis investigate the mutual relationships between political advisers and the police component, in a UN setting. They ask, in what way can political advisers enhance the actions of the police component by providing a clearer political picture, “considering both the internal and the external or international balances at stake”, while “Police Components represent an invaluable antenna to monitor the development of the local situation. In this view, benefiting from the scattered distribution of the various Police assets and from their proximity to local communities, Political Advisers can adjust their assessments in accordance with the information and feedbacks gathered from the Police personnel”. They advocate so how “two complementary actors work side by side towards the most effective implementation of the respective mandates”. Having in mind how NATO, EU and UN setting of missions and objectives can be quite different, it’s worth introducing a paramount issue put forward by Dziedzic: “Missing, however, is any discussion of how to transform illegitimate police, criminal justice systems, and regimes that are spoilers into legitimate authorities. Future missions will require guidelines or doctrine for overcoming this most vexing of stabilization challenges”115.

As described in section 3 of this article, some state’s institutional frameworks can be ill-suited to empower the same states to well carry out their functions, hence providing human security to their populations (without further enquiring on whether the state’s institutional setting was pushed from an external intervention, maybe manu militari, or not). The establishment of a mission, anyhow, works in the planning phase of some assumptions. One of these assumptions is, in many cases, that signed peace agreements will work and will be properly implemented. This can be the case also for some internal situations, as it was for the Italian South Tyrol/Alto Adige. But often the assumptions prove to be wrong. Due to that, the mission implementation becomes simply not possible, as it was based on wrong planning assumptions.

Under this light, a stability policing component in a mission, being “an invaluable antenna to monitor the development of the local situation” is in a position to provide advice to other components, bodies or entities, to “adjust their assessments in accordance with the information and feedbacks gathered from the Police personnel”, as suggested by Volpi and Fontana Barberis. But, as a point of this article, such and advice could be provided not only to political advisers in UN
missions, but also to a wider range of other advisers and decision makers. As argued in section 3 of this article, measurement of performance sometimes can be flawed, for sure when this measurement is set according to wrong planning assumptions. In that case, information and feedback from stability policing, being naturally called for “applying laws and observe what impact they produce” can – or should – be conveyed to the operational and strategic levels, both in theatre and to the sending nations and/or organization, to provide for a more informed planning. Especially when stability policing is tasked to provide capacity building, is in an even more privileged position, as it can directly observe the effects of the application of the host nation’s laws, by the host nation’s forces, meaning in conditions where “local ownership” is already well established and is just being supported by external partners. In such a case, advice on institutional and legislation reform can be much more informed. As already mentioned in section 3, Rule of Law is a broad and systemic concept, which has at its very basis constitutional and legislative reform. Rule of Law assistance shall focus primarily on a constitution or equivalent and the legislation and its implementation. Having this in mind, Robert Pulver argued how peace operations should support more host nation’s constitutional reform processes, as the latter are paramount in a sustainable peace process. Dziedzic considered the need for “Institutionalizing more attractive peaceful alternatives for pursuit of wealth and power”, to transform violent opponents (opponents to peace processes are referred to as “spoilers”) with negotiable interests into supporters of the peace process, by sustaining a more “legal” process and focussing less on mere capacity building (a point partly overlapping with the mentioned “legal targeting”). He also highlights how “capacity building efforts are often conducted under the assumption that host State government is committed to the objective of good and democratic governance, including the establishment of a responsive, representative and accountable police service”, pointing out how “This best case assumption is most often fallacious and can doom a mission to frozen conflicts at best and collapse at worst”.

Taking into account the opinions and observations above, it might be envisioned a renewed role for capacity building engagements, upsaling efforts to a “more sophisticated approach than merely building domestic capacity and then turning ownership”. Taking for granted the value of established capacity building efforts, intended as training, mentoring and advising to the host nation’s police forces, advice from stability policing shall be conveyed in a threefold way, to provide aid in the following processes: 1- Institutional reform of the police forces. This is already being done, more or less directly, mainly by strategic advising, but it can be improved, as already argued. 2- Reforms of the host nation’s legal framework, with a focus on police or public security-related laws, primarily criminal/penal laws and procedures. To provide counselling for legal reforms to the host nation’s partners should be a responsibility entrusted to other actors different from stability policing. 2- Nevertheless, as within Host Nation’s police forces duties, there is the one of being called to enforce the laws, supporting international partners can directly observe how this is done, as they have to train, mentor and advise them in doing so. Therefore, their advice and feedback shall be requested and provided. 3- Reforms of the host nation’s constitutional setting, when needed. As observed and repor-
ted in various parts of this article, building capacity of states not well responsive to populations’ needs, can not only improve, but even worsen the situation. In some cases, the state’s framework is functional to exclude parts of the population from resources or power, or to oppress or neglect them. In such situations, stability policing components are well situated to observe the reality on the ground, and to provide advice for a change. This can be done following two channels: the first in theatre, for instance to the political advisers, as suggested by Volpi and Fontana Barberis. The second to the sending organizations and states, to trigger diplomatic and political synergies functional to provide leverage to such efforts, providing so qualified inputs to strategic analysis. Which are, of course, the qualified inputs to strategic analysis. The proposed processes, far from being easy to implement, would be functional to “transforming violent opponents with negotiable interests into supporters of the peace process”, at least in some cases. It’s worth citing part of the conclusions of the NATO SP COE Lessons Learned Conference 2020 “Assessment of spoiler threats”: “spoiler assessment tools should reflect a multi-agency continuum of effort in information-sharing and analysis, from early crisis intervention at political and strategic levels, through the crisis response phases to stability operations and normalization at the tactical and civilian law enforcement levels.” Advice from stability policing supporting Host Nation’s forces shall be of paramount importance in providing informed inputs for both spoiler assessment and for Rule of Law assistance in the Host Nation’s reform process. It needs to be underlined how, of course, such a broad assistance shall be led by other institutions or agencies, as police forces and stability policing are not called to write laws, don’t have the ability to do it and should not do it. But in any case, having to enforce them, they are in the best position to observe their effects and, therefore, to provide advice and feedback for informed planning. Moreover, being in constant touch with the populations, they can keep a finger on the pulse of their grievances, whether these are being addressed or not, or even worsened, by the – at least planned – transition process towards stability. Stability policing could, at the end of the day, provide advice and feedback de iure condendo, “Of the law being established. With respect to law in a transitional stage or in the process of being established”, to the relevant bodies and fora entrusted with the responsibility to elaborate, pass and implement these laws, and/or to the ones in a position to support these processes. In this light, as already happened for substitution/executive first, and strengthening/capacity building interventions later, gendarmeries could provide their potential to the benefit of a renewed Rule of Law assistance. Why? Once again, due to their inner characteristics of police forces with military status. As previously recalled, international assistance is mainly conveyed to and through states. As recognized for police assistance, “In certain stages after conflict, an initial state-centric approach might be useful or necessary.” And gendarmeries are, as said, nation-wide police forces, not local ones. This applies also to civilian, nation-wide police forces of course. But gendarmeries conduct civilian policing, in their home countries, also in peripheries, far and rural places, austere environments and/or at borders while, generally speaking, civilian nation-wide police forces are more focussed on the urban centres. This, always under a centralized chain of command reporting to the central state. Due to that, they could better understand the mechanisms and policies of a host nation’s police force reporting to the central government, while at the same time advising for the adoption of national policies to the local needs. At the same time, in a post-conflict situation, the involvement of the armed forces and especially the army in internal security tasks, mainly police and police support ones, would probably be massive. This entails that gendarmeries could, once again, provide benefits from their “bridging capability” between military and police needs, assessing and giving advice on the employment of the host nation’s armed forces in internal security tasks. Advice addressed to the host nation’s police and armed forces, as well as to the international assistance and capacity building components (like SFA) supporting the latter. Moreover, this assessment and advice could be provided – and possibly requested – from the strategic level of the sending organization and nations to better coordinate planning and employment of the overall capacity building efforts, military, police and civilian. Keeping in mind how, being gendarmeries police forces, their advice will always have an IHRL paradigm
as reference and background. It’s worth underlining how such undertakings are inherently complicated by the fact that Host Nation’s and supporting forces (namely stability policing personnel), coming from different nations, by a matter of fact usually don’t share the same cultural backgrounds. In this sense, it’s even more paramount the “importance of anthropological training in the pre-deployment phase”\textsuperscript{124} for stability policing personnel, or at least some “cherry picked” among the already most experienced and/or talented ones. Such training would enable “data collection and reports done from an emic perspective”, enhancing in this way the informed advice that stability policing personnel can convey both in theatre and to the sending organizations and nations, taking into account “details of practices and beliefs [...] that may otherwise be ignored”. In addition, the last point of the Rule of Law assistance guidelines, states the need of “a public and civil society that contributes to strengthening the rule of law and holds public officials and institutions accountable”. Police forces are not the best tools to promote changes in civil society; other instruments have been developed to better interact with host nation’s civil society like the German Ziviler Friedensdienst\textsuperscript{125} or the Italian Corpi Civili di pace\textsuperscript{126}. Nevertheless, as pointed out in the conclusions of the NATO SP COE conference on Assessment of spoiler threats, information-sharing with humanitarian organizations could be problematic\textsuperscript{127}. Bearing this in mind, stability policing could be well-positioned to gather relevant information on the feelings of local civil society towards the state apparatus, in a wide meaning, including so grievances stemming from unfair power sharing, consolidated in the host nation’s institutional arrangements. This because, as already mentioned, “police work is performed 24/7, close to society. Because of this, the police is perhaps the most manifest expression of rule of law or – more in general – the government”. In order to succeed in such endeavours, an evolution in mind-set could be pursued at all levels, to promote an evaluation of the performance of missions and their personnel based of course still on “Key Performance Indicators”, but also on “Innovation and change”. Such an evolution could be sought first in the international assistance, promoted by the senior-most leadership and could be seen as paramount for the evaluation of new and better ways to cope with host nation’s problems and reduce the rate of “return to conflict”, analysed by Dziedzic. In short, if I know that the problem lies elsewhere and it was not considered by anybody, but my mission implementation plan asks me to focus on this other issue, which is less important but it’s my task for accomplishing my mission… Well I’ll do that. This can happen also in the home land, at all levels\textsuperscript{128}: “Targets distort operational reality”. Such a change could spark an evolution also in the host nation, which may have a system even more prone to put down personal initiative and stifle frankness and innovation\textsuperscript{129}. In this sense, it’s worth recalling how gendarmeries have the tendency to rotate quite often personnel among assignments, so that “regular transfers between duties instilled a culture among officers of constant learning\textsuperscript{130} and this could be an additional valuable asset in such a discourse. In any case, gendarmeries can offer their added values and put them into profit only when being part of wider efforts, pushed forward with shared objectives. Conclusions This Article provided a contribution in defining the added values that gendarmeries can bring to stabilization endeavours, considering the stability policing concept and with a focus on capacity building efforts. Among the most important issues, the versatility in the use of force that gendarmeries can field, both internally and in external engagements. Gendarmeries are, formal definitions aside, forces with a primary focus on civilian policing, with a law enforcement mind-set, with IHRL as a paradigm of reference. Moreover, are forces with some military capabilities, enabling them to fill to some extent the “public security gap”. Gendarmeries are police forces of the state, not locally organised ones, policing also in peripheries, far and rural places, austere environments and/or at borders, with a two-centuries long organizational culture. This can be considered as particularly relevant, when international assistance is delivered to and through states (the “Host Nation”), to support the re-establishment and the extension of their authority to peripheries and far places. This organizational culture is common to the European gendarmeries, and this facilitated their interoperability in the common experiences of the last two and more decades of international engagements. These led, among other achievements, to the development of the stability policing concept – led in NATO by the Stability Policing Centre of Excellence,
NATO SP CoE – and the establishment of the CoESPU and of EUROGENDFOR. All the three entities are based in the Chinotto Barracks in Vicenza, Italy. Another mark of gendarmeries is the career longevity of the staff, who in this way can accumulate a considerably valuable experience in different employments, which can be conveyed into capacity building efforts. Also important is the possibility for gendarmeries to support military forces in developing public security capabilities, the lack of which can be counterproductive when training Host Nation’s police forces or armed forces which will later be tasked with public security duties. This “bridging capability” between military and civilian forces can be of use also in supporting the coordination of military forces under the ministry of interior in the home nation, if needed. In the same vein, gendarmeries can assist civilian police forces in building capabilities for tougher situations, as it’s the case for CoESPU in UN FPU development, periodically reported on the pages of this magazine. Stability policing in general and gendarmeries in particular, due to their inner characteristics described above, may play an additional role in rule of law assistance, by providing advice and feedback to several other actors and entities entrusted with responsibilities in these fields. These include the reform of police institutions; some legislative reforms, as police is called to support populations, enforce laws and to see the effects of their application; when the case, constitutional reforms, as these may provide for better institutional arrangements in the Host Nation, conductive to address social, economic and cultural grievances. Especially the latter reforms, could be useful to address some spoiler threats. These de iure condendo feedbacks and advices could be requested by, and conveyed to, both theatre (to political advisers and missions) and sending nations and organizations (to provide for political and other leverages, to trigger the more appropriate reform instruments). Gendarmeries, due to their expertise in civilian policing and closeness to populations also in austere, rural and peripheral environments, coupled with their experience in external engagements, can be well-placed to provide informed advices, always when being part of wider, coordinated efforts. As a final remark, a better understanding by the relevant counterparts of gendarmeries’ capabilities and added values can improve their employment in peace and crisis management operations, taking advantage of already existing and perhaps not fully exploited capacities.
CAPACITY BUILDING CHART (by the author of the article)

On the X Axis are the security situations, from all-out war at the far left, to peaceful community policing at the far right. It’s divided into four columns: Warfighting, Counter Insurgency/Stability Operations, Civil Unrest/Crowd and Riot Control, and Law Enforcement.

On the Y Axis are the Security Forces, divided into 7 main lines, from the bottom with forces using minimum force, to the top with forces using maximum force: local police, nationwide police, gendarmeries (also in military police roles), military police, armed forces and Special Forces.

The blue arrows with the letters “GCB” show where lies the added value of gendarmeries in capacity building in favour of friendly/coalition forces.

Areas with full-color lines, show how the force of that line is capable to cope with the security situation of the respective column: national police can cope with Civilian unrest/CRC; armed forces can cope with warfighting, in the IHL/LOAC area.

Areas with diagonal stripes show the capacity and capability gaps, as the force in that line might cope with the security situation of the column, but it may need support: local police could need support during severe civil unrest or hard CRC operations; could need assistance in building capacities to face COIN or stability operations, especially when IHL/LOAC is applicable.

In the same vein, armed forces might be ill-suited to discharge some public security roles when only IHRL is applicable, even in war times, COIN/stability operations and civil unrest times.

Areas with black dots show more severe gaps, as fields where security forces are not designed to carry out some tasks: like police forces in warfighting, when only IHL/LOAC is applicable, and armed forces in pure law enforcement/community policing.

The ellipse in the centre shows the area of “Stability Policing in substitution roles”: SP is an inclusive concept, where different forces can provide their respective capabilities to generate a capacity able to cope with the requested security needs: provide policing services to populations in unstable areas, when armed conflict is ongoing or close, while complying with IHRL provisions. Gendarmeries, as the only forces capable to discharge functions along the full spectrum of security situations, are the core capacity in SP.

The blue arrows with the letters “GCB” show where lies the added value of gendarmeries in capacity building in favour of friendly/allied forces:

1- Towards civilian police forces, either local or national, to make them more effective in COIN/Stability operations, when IHL/LOAC could be applicable (e.g., CoESPU efforts with UN FPUs);
2- Towards the armed forces, to build capacities, capabilities and doctrines for supporting public security needs in TPS (Transitional Public Security), COIN/Stability or Civil Unrest/CRC situations.

On top of the chart are shown the Host Nation’s Armed and Law Enforcement forces. Two big arrows show the capacity building efforts, under the SFA (Security Force Assistance) and SP concepts.

A green arrow labelled “GCB” pointing to a semi-circle with diagonal stripes show how also HN Armed Forces could be called to provide for military support to public security needs, under an IHRL framework: therefore, capacity building efforts should take this into account and gendarmeries could be of use.

On the right of the chart, is recalled the difference in approach with regard to the management of information: police forces aim to carry out policing intelligence, leading to judicial authorities (basically, to convict criminals), while armed forces tend to military intelligence leading to targeting (neutralization of the enemy). Gendarmeries can contribute to both, enabling in this way the so called “legal targeting”, when the case.

DISCLAIMER: This article and the chart are products of the author; their contents do not reflect policies or positions, nor represent in any way, EURO-GENDFOR, the Arma dei Carabinieri, or any other organization.
1. H. Hovens “Stability Policing: Why is it taking root so slowly?” on “Militaire Spectator”, 20 April 2020 https://www.militairespectator.nl/thema/operatives/artikel/stability-policing-why-it-taking-root-so-slowly/ “The hybrid character of GTFs makes them fit to operate both in the military and in the civil world. At the same time, it appears that their hybrid character seems to prevent GTFs from showing where their added value lies. As a possible consequence, they are regarded as ‘outsiders’ within the military as well as the civil domain. The unfamiliarity with the gendarmerie concept as such and the justified pride in who they may have led to a ‘closed stronghold’ that leaves little room for an opinion in which it is fully accepted that certain skills and experiences for stability can also be gained outside GTFs. A related remark is that although GTFs are often praised for their efforts, little evidence can be found in the scientific literature of the results they have achieved. In addition, GTFs could benefit if they increase awareness and knowledge of the added value of the hybrid forces. […] by doing so, they keep their hybrid character, but make clearer how and when to be deployed.”

2. Cornelius Friesendorf, “Gendarmeries in Multinational Operations”, “Journal of international peacekeeping 21 (2017)”: “If data and information on output is sketchy, this is even more the case with outcomes, such as the number of persons arrested or weapons confiscated, although available evidence suggests that some outcomes are underwhelming. If assessing output and outcome is difficult, we know even less about impact.”

3. Stéphane Jean, “SUPPORT FOR THE ROLE BY UNITED NATIONS POS”, in CoESPU Magazine 2019-3, footnote 11: “For the purpose of this paper, “gendarmerie” is intended as “a military force performing civilian law enforcement/policing civilians”; such a definition is totally correct, of course. For the purpose of this article, anyway, putting the terms in the opposite way could be more helpful to convey the concept to a reader with a civilian mindset. In any case, both expressions can be seen as commutative, due to the fact that changing the order of the operands does not change the result. The proposed definition is moreover preferred for this article, at this will deal later with armed forces tasked with (some) policing duties. This is sound and consistent with the stability policing concept, but does not make them “police forces” with general competence, as gendarmeries are.”


5. Col. Giuseppe De Magistris, “NATO STABILITY POLICING: A NEW MODEL OF PEACEKEEPING” in CoESPU magazine 2020-3, footnote 4: “IPF, “Local police”, “Host Nation Police Forces” and “Law Enforcement Agency” are all understood as having the same meaning”

6. E.g. “ensure that EU regulations in the agricultural and food sectors are respected”, https://polis.osce.org/countryprofiles/italy


8. Ibidem


10. Col. Giuseppe De Magistris, “NATO STABILITY POLICING: A NEW MODEL OF PEACEKEEPING” in CoESPU magazine 2020-3, footnote 1: “For the purpose of this paper, “gendarmerie” is intended as “a military force performing civilian law enforcement/policing civilians”; such a definition is totally correct, of course. For the purpose of this article, anyway, putting the terms in the opposite way could be more helpful to convey the concept to a reader with a civilian mindset. In any case, both expressions can be seen as commutative, due to the fact that changing the order of the operands does not change the result. The proposed definition is moreover preferred for this article, at this will deal later with armed forces tasked with (some) policing duties. This is sound and consistent with the stability policing concept, but does not make them “police forces” with general competence, as gendarmeries are.”


12. Cornelius Friesendorf, 2012. International Intervention and the Use of Force: Military and Police Roles. London: Ubiquity Press. Available at https://www.ubiquitypress.com/site/books/m/10.5334/bbo/ “Ideally, the same person can be a community police officer and a warfighter, and seamlessly switch between these roles. But the political and practical challenges are enormous, and so are the cultural and psychological challenges; inculcating both a civilian police and a warrior spirit in security forces is tantamount to creating split personalities.”


18. Cornelius Friesendorf, 2012. International Intervention and the Use of Force: Military and Police Roles. London: Ubiquity Press. Available at https://www.ubiquitypress.com/site/books/m/10.5334/bbo/ “Ideally, the same person can be a community police officer and a warfighter, and seamlessly switch between these roles. But the political and practical challenges are enormous, and so are the cultural and psychological challenges; inculcating both a civilian police and a warrior spirit in security forces is tantamount to creating split personalities.”

19. This issue was mentioned by Michael Burgoyne, ‘Building Better Gendarmeries in Mexico and the Northern Triangle,’ Wilson Institute (May 2019), who also provides among other arguments a “Comparison of European SPF Units” https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/burgoyne_building_better_gendarmeries.pdf


22. Data USA – Police Officers https://datausa.io/profile/soc/police-officers#:~:text=The%20median%20age%20of%20Police,than%20His%2020%20Female%20counterparts.


26. “It’s worth pointing out how the military capabilities of gendarmeries are comparable, and for some units only, to the ones of “light infantry” units, not heavier ones.

27. Such an extremely diversified career profile is not so common, but mixed profiles are nevertheless the standard across gendarmeries. The profile in the example is the one of Chief Warrant Officer Yanda Bonazza, who was recently awarded the Military Order of Italy for fi rst time they can draw suitable courses and making choices. Both at the national and the international context.”

28. Li.Col. Roberto Gonella “Strategic Advising in Police Capacity Building”, in CoESPU Magazine 2020-1: “Experience cannot be taught, it must be made going through many and different situations over a long stretch of time. Strategic advisers must have consolidated international experience, so that even when they are covering that delicate position for the first time they can draw suitable courses of action from situations, practices and decisions occurred in other missions in which they participated.”

29. Gianni Rusconi, “Dall’home working allo smart working: ecco cosa devono fare i leader” in “Il Sole 24 ore” https://ansa.it/IlSole24Ore.com/ansa/AD1QFw

30. Général d’armée François Gieré: “La militarité de la Gendarmerie: l’opportunité piqure de rappel du général Gieré, inspecteur général des armées-Gendarmerie”, in “La voix du Gendarmerie”, 30 novembre 2020 “Prisée de son statut militaire, la Gendarmerie ne pourrait se maintenir durablement dans certaines zones désertées et ne pourrait par conséquent plus assurer la sécurité des 95% du territoire dont elle a la responsabilité avec la même efficacité”


35. Derek Lutterbeck “The Paradox of Gendarmeries: Between Expansion, Demilitarization and Dissolution”, DCAS 2013: https://issat.dcaf.ch/cgi/sqi/download/34418/497173/SSR_8_EN.pdf “Finally, how serious is the critique sometimes advanced against gendarmeries, namely that with their military status they represent a threat to civil liberties and human rights? While this question would require further research as well, at least prima facie evidence suggests that gendarmeries are not necessarily more likely than civilian police forces to commit abuses, and therefore do not as such represent a greater threat to individual freedoms”

36. Elisabeth Dziedzic, Col, US Air Force Ret., in “Military Spectator”, 2020-2: “After publishing Policing the New World Disorder, Ambassador Oakley and I were invited by NATO Secretary General to recommend to deploy ‘constabulary forces’ to address the pub-lic security gap. This led to the deployment of Multinational Specialized Units (MSUs) to Bosnia in 1998, the precursor to NATO’s current SP concept.”


38. Marina Caparini (2018), UN Police and Conflict Prevention, SIPRI discussion paper, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

39. J.L. Havens, in “Transnational and robust proximity policing: complementary and adaptive – Gendarmerie-like forces in future international missions”, by FIEP and Koninklijke Marechaussee, 2019, Introduction, “setting the scene”: “The demands placed on the police force by politicians and citizens seem to be increasing. At the same time, it is a myth that the police force can be everywhere and do everything regardless of its capacity. Capacity that may come under further pressure as a result of budgetary constraints. Therefore, deploying or involving police, or more specific gendarmerie-like forces, is a matter of prioritizing and making choices. Both at the national and the international context.”

40. J.L. Havens, in “Transnational and robust proximity policing: complementary and adaptive – Gendarmerie-like forces in future international missions”, by FIEP and Koninklijke Marechaussee, 2019, Part 2.5 “Measuring success in terms of output and outcome”: “The experts gathered in the meetings found it difficult to define success, due to their idea that success depends on the type of mission being evaluated”.

41. Elisabeth Dziedzic, “SUPPORT FOR THE ROLE BY UNITED NATIONS POS”, in CoESPU Magazine 2020-3

42. Elisabeth Dziedzic, “SUPPORT FOR THE ROLE BY UNITED NATIONS POS”, in CoESPU Magazine 2020-3


44. J.L. Havens, in “Transnational and ro-
45. “Introduction – setting the scene” ibidem, Part 3 “Short refrect on the outcome”. The police systems and their functions are laid down in national laws and regulations. Underlying police philosophies or models often dictate or indicate how police should act and are related to the national or local cultural context and often tempt to define the police system or policing as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. It is exactly this ‘mechanism’, that can give rise to a feeling of superiority for the own national police system or the concept of gendarmerie, instead of taking in a self-confident position. This mechanism can also make the difference when gendarmerie-like forces and police need to know the local context in order to be successful in a sustainable rebuilding or reform of the indigenous police. One of the prime questions in this regard is whether the police is legitimised by the consent of the people (mainly Anglo-Saxon) or to uphold the rules and powers of the state.

46. Colin James Delahay Richards and Phill Pyke, “COMMUNITY BASED POLICING AND FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM”, in CoESPU Magazine, 2016-1: “The theory of the “modern” police in the UK dates back to 1829 when the then Home Secretary, Sir Robert Peel led a number of initiatives to modernise the ad hoc models of policing existing in the the UK. Peel designed the first “fit for purpose” police force that employed salaried and trained police constables. Today UK constables are often referred to as “Bobbies” or “Peelers”. with reference to Sir Robert Peels work. The foundations of the new service were based on constables being locally appointed citizens with authority to uphold the law. This concept is linked to the belief that all law abiding citizens have a responsibility to participate in maintaining the peace.”

47. Mohammed Osman Tariq, “Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan”, in Crisis States Research Centre, 2008: “In Afghanistan however, the institution of the Arbakai is based on the customary tribal code of the Pashtuns (Pashtunwali) though this is rarely discussed in related texts” https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b9c40f0b652d0d00e2/OP7.pdf

48. Stéphane Jean, “SUPPORT FOR THE ROLE BY UNITED NATIONS POS”, in CoESPU Magazine 2020-3 “The most comprehensive of such tools is the “United Nations Rule of Law Indicators Implementation Guide and Project Tool”, which was issued in 2011 and endorsed by all major United Nations entities involved in rule of law assistance. This particular instrument comprises 135 indicators for assessing the capacity, performance, integrity, transparency and accountability of these institutions and how they treat vulnerable social groups. It is based on multiple data sources including public opinion surveys, documentation reviews, administrative data and field observations data. “J.L. Hovens, in “Transnational and robust proximity policing: complementary and adaptive – Gendarmerie-like forces in future international missions”, by FIEP and Koninklijke Marechaussee, 2019; mentions the Bajraktari et al (2006) PRIME system: measuring the success of post-conflict police reform, Princeton University (Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation) http://www.dmaf期盼. org/sites/default/files/Princeton%20University-%20Tier%20Prime%20System%20Measuring%20The%20Success%20of%20Police%20Reform.pdf Connelius Friesendorf, “Gendarmeries in Multinational Operations”, “Journal of international peacekeeping 21 (2017)” “Unfortunately, at least from a research perspective much data and information is classified. While the Carabinieri tend to grant access to researchers in mission areas, they are reluctant to disclose tactical procedures, the number, types, and sites of operations, or policy documents such as manuals; the force, as any other security organization, also does not readily share lessons-learned studies with institutional outsiders”


51. Ibidem, “stabilisation mechanisms focus on extending the reach of the executive power and are thus a deeply political process, not only a technical one. This dynamic is often insufficiently taken into account.”

52. Captain Nicola Carrera “FROM PEACEKEEPING TO NATION-BUILDING THROUGH INSTITUTION-BUILDING”, in CoESPU magazine, 2020-2 “Where is the consensus? One seems that consensus effective if I have, on the one hand, a mission foreseen by a mandate countersigned by the beneficiary country in crisis and on the other hand, on the ground, I clash with the local authorities at a lower level”.

53. Anna Schmauder “DECENTRALISATION AMIDST HYBRID GOVERNANCE: CASE OF NORTHERN MALI”, Clingendael 2020 “The prevailing logic of decentralisation is more one of particular interests based on the logic of kinship and tribal fractions, than of representation of community interests. The institutional position of member of parliament reproduces the political and social inequalities that exist

54. Captain Nicola Carrera “POS: FROM COMPETITION TO COORDINATION”, CoESPU magazine 2020-3: “The causes of this situation are several and of different origins, but perhaps the main one concerns the effects of colonization on the entire territory. In fact, during the phase of European domination, Africa was subdivided in a superficial way, “at the table”, without in any way taking into account the ethnic, tribal, cultural and linguistic differences of the population. This erroneous division led, once the colonization ended, to the outbreak of numerous conflicts between the various African tribes, each tried to assert their sovereignty.”


56. Commissioner Luis Miguel Carrilha, UN Police Adviser, “PEACE OPERATIONS: THE ROLE OF UN POLICE IN IDP”, in CoESPU Magazine, 2020-3: “MINUSCA Police have supported the international community’s assistance efforts to redeploy and restore state authority.”


58. Mohammed Osman Tariq, “Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan”, in Crisis States Research Centre, 2008 “Since customary law as a legal system for the Arbakai clashes in many ways with the civil law and Islamic regulations used in the state judiciary system, reform would be needed on both sides to harmonise the systems. However, the more practical issue to be addressed is how to reconcile the successful practices of customary law with the failed judiciary of the state.”

59. Anna Schmauder “DECENTRALISATION AMIDST HYBRID GOVERNANCE: CASE OF NORTHERN MALI”, Clingendael 2020 “The prevailing logic of decentralisation is more one of particular interests based on the logic of kinship and tribal fractions, than of representation of community interests. The institutional position of member of parliament reproduces the political and social inequalities that exist
among tribal fractions. As a consequence, customary elites have skillfully been able to capture electoral office across the territory, where their fractions are administrators of territory since pre-colonial times, customary elites have remained pivotal in the absence of absent state capacity, especially in northern Mali. Customary governance actors play key roles in local conflict resolution and land management. The title of the highest echelon of customary authority – amnokal – signifies him as ‘owner of the land’, highlighting the combined political most powerful. At both local level as mayors and district level as members of parliament, they have in many instances successfully cemented their influence.”


60. ibidem


63. Michael E. Hartmann, Agnieszka Kloniewka-Milart, Edited by Whit Mason “The Rule of Law in Afghanistan Missing in Inaction – Chapter 14 - Last in translation”, Cambridge University Press 2011. In addition, however, foreigners can, in partnership with Afghan authorities and experts, contribute to the creation of good law, provided the procedures for drafting and review are viable and transparent, allow full representation of different expert groups, and are adhered to consistently; only such a technical and quasi-political law reform process, which engenders consensus, may result in laws that will be considered legitimate, and thus internalised and applied by Afghans.

64. J.L. Hovens, in “Transnational and robust proximity policing: complementary and adaptive – Gendarmy-like forces in future international missions”, by FIEP and Koninklijke Marechaussee, 2019. “Before collecting data, a necessary and first step is to determine what constitutes ‘good’ or ‘successful’ (international) policing. A second step is to develop appropriate indicators enabling us to measure the degree of success”

65. ibidem: “A second observation refers to the employment of the national police system of the deployed forces abroad. This implies prejudice regarding what is considered a good or the best police system; a system that may not necessarily meet locale needs or fit into the local context.”


During one surveillance operation a shepherd accidentally spotted KSK soldiers, who consequently had to abort the operation; when the Germans returned to camp, the US commanding officer scolded them for not killing the shepherd. Also, during joint German-US operations the Germans would leave the arrest of suspects to their US comrades. Such reservations reflected different rules of engagement and definitions of military necessity.”

67. ibidem: “Academic literature on the subject shows that three particular outcomes of policing activities are important: improvement of safety and security, the public’s confidence in the police organisation, and police responsiveness to the victims of crimes”


25 giugno 1967, Cima Vallona di San Nicolo di Comelico (BL), Notiziario Storico dell’Arma dei Carabinieri. Among the victims of the attack, Carabinieri, Captain Francesco Gentile, commander of the Carabinieri Special Unit for Alto Adige, predecessor of the Carabinieri 7th Regiment, into which the article’s author served for more than a decade, Regiment heavily involved in all Italian Carabinieri employment abroad. To the fallen for peace, both in the homeland and abroad, we mourn. https://www.carabinieri.it/Internet/ImageStore/Magazine/NotiziarioStorico/Speciale%20%20maggio/mobile/index.html#p=11

71. ibidem


77. H. Havens “Stability Policing: Why is it taking root so slowly?” on “Military Spectator”, 20 April 2020. In his report, the Secretary General also points out the necessary revision of the strategic guidelines for international police peacekeeping and concepts such as the Formed Police Unit (FPU). Although this may be
a cold comfort, it appears that both the UN and NATO are slightly struggling with a policing concept for less benign environments and the associated resources” https://www.militairespectator.nl/theme/expertises/article/stability-policing-why-it-taking-root-so-slowly “

H. Hovens “Stability Policing: Why is it taking root so slowly?” on “Militaire Spectator”, 20 April 2020 “In his report, the Secretary General also points out the necessary revision of the strategic guidelines for international police peacekeeping and concepts such as the Formed Police Unit (FPU). Although this may be a cold comfort, it appears that both the UN and NATO are slightly struggling with a policing concept for less benign environments and the associated resources” https://www.militairespectator.nl/theme/expertises/article/stability-policing-why-it-taking-root-so-slowly


81. Ibidem, Les matériaux, les entraînements, les règles d’emploi étant standardisées selon des critères définis par les nations unies, chaque FPU se voit engagée, à un moment ou à un autre, en zone de conflit et parfois sous le feu comme lors de la bataille de KIDAL, en mai 2014. Durant ces cinq journées extrêmes, trois FPU, dont deux issues de polices civiles, ont été envoyées en mission à KIDAL au milieu des combats, pour escorter des négociateurs, pour défendre des positions face à des foules hostiles, pour évacuer des blessés bloqués par les combats ou pour protéger des libérations de prisonniers. »

82. DPO “Guidelines on Specialised Police Teams on Assignment with United Nations Peace Operations” “Under the Policy, capacity-building is not considered a core task of FPUs, including specialised capacities within FPUs. Only in exceptional cases shall an FPU support capacity-building programs, together with relevant mission components, for the benefit of host-state law enforcement services” https://police.un.org/sites/default/files/2019.34_guidelines_on_specialized_police_teams.pdf

83. Lt. Col. Roberto Genolla “Strategic Advising in Police Capacity Building”, in CoE-SPU Magazine 2020-1: “police advising, as it usually deals with extremely diverse situations, created by a combination of countless contingent factors that render the principle of uniqueness a real challenge.”


88. “Building a CPC in Timor-Leste”, in CoE-SPU Magazine 2020-1: “Police advising, as it usually deals with extremely diverse situations, created by a combination of countless contingent factors that render the principle of uniqueness a real challenge.”

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100. Cornelius Friesendorf, “Gendar-


102. NATO Security Force Assistance CoE “Committee-and-stability.pdf?sfvrsn=2” https://www.espu.org/docs/default-source/CoESPU Magazine 2019-3 “peace operations should increase their engagement in support of government efforts to develop the ultimate rule of law document in any country – the national constitution. When the opportunity presents itself, peace operations should use all the tools at their disposal to support the host-country to enter into a social contract with the population defining the rights, roles and responsibilities of citizens and government institutions. Where a constitutional process is broad-based, consultative and genuine, it can have a lasting impact on sustaining peace in the post-conflict environment”

112. Elisabeth Braw in “Foreign Policy”, “Forget U.N. Peacekeepers: Send in the Gendarmes”, 11 November 2020 “There is a challenge, however: In countries whose policing wasn’t influenced by Napoleon two centuries ago, blue-and-green forces are anathema. The police maintain order at home; the armed forces fight hostile countries. Many Nordic, Baltic, and Central and Eastern European countries, meanwhile, have Home Guards that function as a citizen reserve for all manner of contingencies. But while Home Guards are useful, they lack the expertise of Gendarmes”

113. Cornelius Friesendorf, 2012. International Intervention and the Use of Force: Military and Police Roles. London: Ubiquity Press: “International actors wanting to change the characteristics of host-state security forces must understand their clients. But it is at least as important that they understand themselves. Perhaps the most revealing insight flowing from this paper is that challenges in achieving versatility point to the requirement for security sector reforms not just in states emerging from conflict but in those intervening states that seek to support them.”

114. See note 62

115. Michael Dziezic, Col, US Air Force (Ret.), in “Militaire Spectator”, 2020-2 “Among the salient issues to be addressed are: • Who should the mission regard as the rightful owners of the legal system: the prevailing authorities? All the parties to the conflict? Civil society? Are all equally legitimate or should the mission only support those who support the peace/stabilization process and oppose those who oppose it? How can coordination between the international community and indigenous stakeholders be accomplished when some are spoilers? • How can civil society and the media be mobilized for the purpose of establishing accountability for the police, security sector and legal system that is essential for legitimacy?”

116. Robert A. Pulver, “THE EVOLVING RULE OF LAW IN UN POS”, in CoESPU Magazine 2019-3 “peace operations should increase their engagement in support of government efforts to develop the ultimate rule of law document in any country – the national constitution. When the opportunity presents itself, peace operations should use all the tools at their disposal to support the host-country to enter into a social contract with the population defining the rights, roles and responsibilities of citizens and government institutions. Where a constitutional process is broad-based, consultative and genuine, it can have a lasting impact on sustaining peace in the post-conflict environment”
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128. Alan Travis for “The Guardian”, 20 May 2015, “Stop scaremongering and prepare for further cuts, Theresa May tells police” https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/20/stop-scaremongering-and-prepare-for-further-cuts-theresa-may-tells-police “They remove independent discretion from police officers. And undue focus on one target can lead to crimes that are not measured being neglected altogether.” [...] such perverse targets had led to officers focusing on burglary and car theft while ignoring the abuse of hundreds of young girls”

129. Jonathan M. Sears, Centre Franco-Paix en résolution des conflits et missions de paix “Urgent Hope to Govern Mali’s persistent Crisis” “Administrative structures and institutional cultures afford even relatively senior staff insufficient responsibility to be effective. “CEO-itis,” rigidly top-down management, discourages dissent, and stifles frankness and innovation. Inculcating responsibility in decision-makers (“responsabiliser les responsables”) faces significant obstacles in the existing context of institutional structures, cultures, and behaviours. Minimal decision-making power thwarts taking responsibility, and combines with lacks in oversight or monitoring, and few if any consequences for poor performance or non-action. https://dandurand.uqam.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Sears-Report-English.pdf

HEALTH AND WELL-BEING
A suggestive way to manage mental functions
by Davide Perego

Normally we perceive the food as a means to provide energy and building material to our body, but it is not only these, it is a first step to prevent or to protect ourself of many chronic disease. Typical example are foods rich of omega-3 fatty acids that are effective to support cognitive processes in humans. In opposite way diets that are high in saturated fat are notorious to increase the risk of cardiovascular problem, the risk of neurological dysfunction, and also to reduce molecular substrates that support cognitive processing and so cognitive performances.

Over thousands of years, diet and physical exercise, has had a crucial role in manage the health and in shaping cognitive capacity and brain evolution. Many studies in molecular biology have revealed the ability of food-derived signals to influence energy metabolism and synaptic plasticity and, thus, mediate the effects of food on cognitive function, which is likely to have been crucial for the evolution of the modern brain. So diet and exercise have to be considered as part of therapies to reduce depression, schizophrenia and bipolar disorders.

Gastrointestinal tract is connected in afferent and efferent way (send signals and receive signals) with the brain. One path is represented by vagal nerve or vagus nerve, also called X cranial nerve or 10th cranial nerve. The vagus nerve runs from the brain through the face and thorax to the abdomen. It is a mixed nerve that contains parasympathetic fibers. The vagus nerve has two sensory ganglia (masses of nerve tissue that transmit sensory impulses): the superior and the inferior ganglia. The branches of the superior ganglion innervate the skin in the concha of the ear. The inferior ganglion gives off two branches: the pharyngeal nerve and the superior laryngeal nerve. The recurrent laryngeal nerve branches from the vagus in the lower neck and upper thorax to innervate the muscles of the larynx (voice box). The vagus also gives off cardiac, esophageal, and pulmonary branches. In the abdomen the vagus innervates the greater part of the digestive
tract and other abdominal viscera. **Effects of vagal nerve stimulation on cognition**

The vagal afferents from the gastrointestinal tract are very important not only to monitor various aspects of digestion, such as the release of enzymes and food absorption. In fact, the use of a specific type of treatment where involvement vagal nerve stimulation, has become a routinely approved procedure for the treatment of refractory partial-onset seizures. Vagus nerve stimulation (VNS) involves delivering electrical impulses through a small device that can be implanted under the skin on chest, and a wire is threaded under the skin connecting the device to the left vagus nerve. The right vagus nerve isn’t used because it’s more likely to carry fibers that supply nerves to the heart. There is also e noninvasive transcutaneous vagus nerve stimulation (tVNS) that can elicit therapeutic effects that are similar to those produced by its invasive counterpart that but the mechanism of action of the last is not clear, and the robustness of the results is yet to be proven. When activated, the device sends electrical signals along the left vagus nerve to your brainstem, which then sends signals to certain areas in your brain. Based on observations that the application of VNS to patients with epilepsy was associated with improved mood, VNS was perceived as a potential treatment for depression.

Rush A et al. in a randomized, controlled acute phase trial showed a fail to produce improvements in depression patients in a short-term (lasting 10 weeks) but Nahas et al. in a longer-term study (lasting 12 months), showed that VNS produced beneficial effects that were sustained after 2 years. Specifically, patients treated with VNS doubled their improvement per month in the Inventory of Depressive Symptoms self report relative to patients receiving treatment as usual by itself. Treatment as usual consisted of managing treatment-resistant depression with medication or with another therapy that was deemed appropriate by the treating physician. Based on the results of the long-term studies,
the US Food and Drug Administration recently approved the use of VNS for the treatment of chronic (not acute) resistant depression. In the underlying image, brain scans also revealed the positive effects of TVNS on several key regions that have been linked with emotional regulation. The connectivity between the DMN and the right anterior insula and parahippocampus was reduced significantly, while the opposite effect occurred between the DMN and precuneus and orbital prefrontal cortex. The researchers believed such adjustments in connectivity between key brain regions could explain the improvement in depression score.

Although the mechanisms that underlie the effects of VNS on depression are not well-understood, a recent study demonstrated that VNS increases the levels of the mRNAs for brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) and fibroblast growth factor 2 (FGF2) in the rat hippocampus and cerebral cortex, as well as the level of noradrenaline in the prefrontal cortex. As elevations of BDNF and noradrenaline have been associated with the effects of antidepressant treatments, these findings provide insights into how signals derived from the gut can affect mood. Furthermore, on the basis that neurons of the dorsal motor nucleus of the vagus nerve retrogradely transport BDNF and other neurotrophins, it is likely that neurotrophins are involved in sensory and motor signalling from the viscera. Interestingly, a separate line of investigations indicated that the application of VNS to humans or rodents enhanced memory performance, suggesting that the information that is signaled to the brain by the vagus nerve might serve to influence higher order cognitive processing.

Gut hormones associated with cognition
In addition to the capacity of the gut to directly stimulate molecular systems that are associated with synaptic plasticity and learning, several gut hormones or peptides, such as leptin, ghrelin, glucagon-like peptide 1 (GLP1) and insulin have been found to influence emotions and cognitive processes. Leptin is a hormone predominantly synthesized by adipose cells and enterocytes in the small intestine that helps to regulate energy balance by inhibiting hunger, which in turn diminishes fat storage in adipocytes. Leptin acts on cell receptors in the arcuate and ventromedial nuclei, as well as other parts of the hypothalamus and dopaminergic neurons of the ventral tegmental area, consequently mediating feeding. But another important effect of the leptin is that it elevates BDNF expression in the hypothalamus; this event suggests that BDNF might mediate the effects of leptin on food intake and energy homeostasis. Brain Derived Neurotrophic Factor (BDNF) is a key molecule involved in plastic changes related to learning and memory. It belongs to a family of neurotrophins that have a crucial role in survival and differentiation of neuronal populations during development and in the adult brain, maintains high expres-
sion levels and regulates both excitatory and inhibitory synaptic transmission and activity-dependent plasticity. Leptin, like BDNF, shows capacity to induce synaptic plasticity in the hippocampus. New studies showing that leptin promotes rapid changes in hippocampal dendritic morphology suggest that leptin exerts a direct action on hippocampal plasticity. Another molecule is Ghrelin, an hormone produced by enteroendocrine cells of the gastrointestinal tract, especially the stomach. It is often called a “hunger hormone” since it increases food intake (it works in opposite way respect Leptin). Its blood levels are highest before meals when hungry, and it return to lower levels after meal-times. In the stomach the function of ghrelin is to increase gastric motility and gastric acid secretion. In the brain ghrelin activates cells in the anterior pituitary gland and hypothalamic arcuate nucleus, and the release of neuropeptide Y neurons that initiate appetite. Ghrelin also participates in regulation of reward cognition, learning and memory, the sleep-wake cycle, taste sensation, reward behavior, and glucose metabolism. But the very interesting effect of ghrelin in the brain, is to promote rapid reorganization of synaptic terminals in the hypothalamus, and in the hippocampus it promotes synapse formation in dendritic spines and LTP, which are paralleled by enhanced spatial learning and memory formation. Glucagon-like peptide 1 belongs to a family of hormones called the incretins, so-called because they enhance the secretion of insulin. It is synthesized by intestinal cells, and it regulates energy metabolism through the stimulation of pancreatic insulin secretion and subsequent glucose uptake by muscle cells, and by suppressing food intake through actions on the hypothalamus. The receptors of GLP1 are expressed in neurons, and the infusion of GLP1 has showed to improve associative and spatial memory in rats. The last but not the least insulin, which has classically been regarded as a gut hormone that is produced in by beta cells in the pancreas, but has also been found to alter synaptic activity and cognitive processing. Insulin secretion is normally stimulated by the mental anticipation to meals and continues during digestion and the absorption of foods into the bloodstream. Insulin is able to pass the blood brain barrier, so it enter the brain and interact with specific signal-transduction receptors located in discrete brain regions, such as the hippocampus. The studies in the field seem to indicate that the act of feeding can itself modulate cognitive processes on two levels, through neural circuits that connect the gut and the brain and through the release of gut peptides into the bloodstream. From this evidence we can say that the gut is able to influence the mole-

Image 3. The flow of VNS
cular mechanisms that determine the capacity for acquiring new memories and that control emotions, as well as overall mental function. This permit to consider that visceral signals are very important for the mental health and that they are essential factors for the treatment of psychiatric disorders.

But another “trigger point” in the understanding the cognition and its relationship with feeding is the energy metabolism. In fact we have to consider that the brain consumes an immense amount of energy relative to the rest of the body, so the the physiological mechanisms that are involved in the transfer energy from foods to neurons are fundamental to the control of brain function. Processes that are associated with the management of energy in neurons can affect synaptic plasticity, which could explain how metabolic disorders can affect cognitive processes. Analogously the synaptic function can, alter metabolic functions, allowing mental processes to influence somatic function at the molecular level. BDNF is an excellent example of a signalling molecule that is strictly connected to both energy metabolism and synaptic plasticity: it can push metabolic signals to have an effect on cognitive function. BDNF is most abundant in brain areas that are associated with cognitive and metabolic regulation: the hippocampus and the hypothalamus, respectively. Learning to perform a task increases BDNF-mediated synaptic plasticity in the hippocampus, and genetic deletion of the BDNF gene impairs memory formation. So as so BDNF has also been shown to influence multiple parameters of energy metabolism, such as appetite suppression, insulin sensitivity and glucose and lipid metabolism. In addition, the hypothalamic melanocortin 4 receptor, which is crucial for the control of energy balance, regulates the expression of BDNF in the ventral medial hypothalamus, supporting an association between energy metabolism and synaptic plasticity. The mechanism through which BDNF affects metabolism and synaptic plasticity seems to involve insulin-like growth factor 1 (IGF1). IGF1 also called somatomedin C, is a hormone similar in a molecular structure to insulin, and it plays a relevant role in fetal development, growth during childhood and adolescence, and adult tissue homeostasis. In addition, IGF-1 seems to have atheroprotective actions, neural protective, and insulin-like effects (at high concentrations) and to regulate skeletal metabolism and muscle regeneration. Nevertheless, IGF-1 is a main risk factor in several tumors due to its potent proliferative activity, mainly through the modulation of cell cycle, apoptosis, and cell survival. This hormone is synthesized in the liver, in skeletal muscle and throughout the brain, whereas brain IGF1 receptors are expressed mainly in the hippocampus. A reduction of IGF1 signalling (in rodents) results in hyperglycaemia and insulin resistance, and infusion of IGF1 into the brain decreases plasma insulin levels and
increases insulin sensitivity. IGF1 also supports nerve growth and differentiation, neurotransmitter synthesis and release and synaptic plasticity, and might contribute to sustaining cognitive function after brain insults, diabetes and aging. IGF-1 system has several pleiotropic effects on biological aging. The alterations in energy functions have been linked to the pathobiology of several mental diseases, and so a right diet is becoming a realistic way to treat psychiatric disorders. Many studies have found that there could be a link between altered metabolism that is revealed by many type of disease as diabetes type II, obesity and metabolic syndrome, and psychiatric disorders. In a large study by Lilliker SL. of patients with manic depression or schizophrenia, the rate of diabetes was found to be higher than in the general population (1.2% of people aged 18–44 years and 6.3% of people aged 45–64 years). The overall prevalence of diabetes in a group of 95 patients with schizophrenia was 15.8%, and this increased to 18.9% with age, whereas diabetes in 203 patients with manic depression ranged from 2.9% in patients of approximately 30 years of age to 25% in patients of 75–79 years of age. In spite of these informations it is difficult to be sure of cause–effect relationship between diabetes and psychiatric disorders in these studies given that schizophrenia, manic depression and other psychiatric disorders are associated with poor quality of life and the side effects of anti-psychotic medication. On the basis of its effects on synaptic plasticity and energy metabolism, BDNF has been the focus of research into current hypotheses of schizophrenia and depression. Low levels of BDNF in the plasma are associated with impaired glucose metabolism and type II diabetes, and BDNF is reduced in the hippocampus, in various cortical areas and in the serum of patients with schizophrenia. Furthermore, BDNF levels are reduced in the plasma of patients with major depression, and chronic administration of antidepressants elevates hippocampal BDNF levels. Form many studies we know that during exercise, proteins and their metabolic derivatives secreted from peripheral muscles, such as cathepsin B and FNDC5/irisin, also cross the blood brain barrier to mediate BDNF expression in the hippocampus and subsequent neurogenesis and memory improvement. Also the metabolite β-hydroxybutyrate, which increases after prolonged exercise, induces the activities of Bdnf promoters, particularly promoter I, which is activity-dependent. It has been discovered that the action of β-hydroxybutyrate is specifically upon HDAC2 and HDAC3, which act upon selective Bdnf promoters. Moreover, the effects upon hippocampal Bdnf expression were observed after direct ventricular application of β-hydroxybutyrate. Electrophysiological measurements indicate that β-hydroxybutyrate causes an increase in neurotransmitter release, which is dependent upon the TrkB receptor. These results reveal an endogenous mechanism to explain how physical exercise leads to the induction of BDNF. Not only, Beta-hydroxybutyrate is the principal nutrient produced by our body in response to the low-carb ketogenic diet. So once again the diet can be the first drug to manage every disease.

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PICTURES:
- Davide Perego

Davide Perego
Neuroscientist, Psycho-Neuro Physiologist, expert in Psychopathology and neuropsychology
In Vicenza for an official meeting at the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence, Lt. Gen. (US Army) Roger L. Cloutier, Commander of the NATO’S Allied Land Command, seated in Izmir (Turkey), met Brig. Gen. Giovanni Pietro Barbano, Col. (US Army MP) Rebecca D. Hazelett and a delegation of CoESPU’s Senior Officers. Lt. Gen. Cloutier was delivered a brief presentation on the origins, the activities and the way ahead of the Center of Excellence for the Stability Police Units.
Assessment of Spoiler Threats
Report Published 15 June 2020

Project Overview
Global developments and the ever-changing security environment require NATO and the entire International Community to continuously transform and adapt. Under the auspices of NATO Supreme Allied Transformation HQs and with the involvement of the main international organisations (United Nations, European Union and African Union), US SIGAR and Academia, the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence hosted an one-day conference and a three-day workshop intended to identify the requirements for developing a sharable methodology for the assessment of Spoiler Threats.

Main Recommendations
✓ International Organisations should improve their capacity to strategically assess the implementation environment, particularly the motives, intentions, and capabilities of parties to a peace agreement and spoilers, by conducting a proper assessment prior to any decision to intervene and by including the results of the assessment in the mission mandate
✓ There is a need for the International Community to develop a methodology to assess spoiler threats bearing in mind that the lack of this capability may undermine the peace process
✓ The methodology for assessing spoiler threats, as a living instrument, should start during the planning process and continue during and after the so-called “golden hour” throughout the full spectrum of activities, which range from reaching a peace agreement to its implementation
✓ Stability Policing can play an important role in the early assessment and identification of spoilers, by virtue of its intelligence-led policing capabilities.

Spoilers are individuals that have the power to negatively impact the peace process both willingly or unwillingly. Spoiling behaviours may include violent and non-violent methods – working definition.

Vicenza (Italy), 8 October 2019

The term “golden hour” is derived from medical science and is defined as “the hour immediately following traumatic injury in which medical treatment to prevent irreversible internal damage and optimize the chance of survival is most effective (Merriam Webster).”
Stability Policing Centre of Excellence
NATO’s recognized focal point and hub of expertise for a Community of Interest in the field of Stability Policing

Way a-head
The NATO SP CoE will host a Subject Matter Experts’ Forum in 2021 (as soon as COVID-19 pandemic subsides) aiming to:
✓ Develop an ad-hoc tool to assess Spoiler Threats
✓ Provide the foundation to develop a procedure for its use by analysts and planners, prior to any deployment in crisis response operations and unstable scenarios
✓ Develop a doctrinal framework, relevant terminology and consequent training curricula

Desired Strategic Outcomes
✓ Increase the likelihood of success of the Alliance’s Efforts
✓ Pave the way for sustainable peace and long-term security
✓ Encouragement of decision makers to implement a Spoiler Assessment Methodology to set an effective and sustainable End State, ensuring long-term peace and development

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