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Dear Readers,

I am glad to highlight that finally in-presence activities and lectures restarted at CoESPU at full speed! Indeed between July and September, we held in this Center of Excellence several courses. Namely, the 21st “(enhanced) Comprehensive Protection of Civilians” course, the 12th “Gender Protection in Peace Operations” course, the 1st “Child Protection for UN Police” course and the 3rd “Monitoring, Mentoring, Advising & Training” course, within the European Union Police and Civilian Services Training Programme (EUPCST), for a total of over 60 students coming from 19 different Countries.

In this spirit, that allows us to believe in a complete, even if progressive, return to the normality, it is with unconcealed pride that I present you the new issue of the Magazine, which collects contributions from various qualified academics, experienced practitioners and officials belonging to international organizations. Among the many contributors, we greet: Naomi Miyashita, Policy Planning Team Leader within the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division of the United Nations Department of Peace Operations and Annika Hansen, Head of Analysis at the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Berlin, Germany, who highlighted the importance of technology as a tool to strengthen peacekeeping effectiveness, and as a factor shaping conflict environments where peacekeepers are deployed and implications for the United Nations Police; Lieutenant Colonel David Ellero, NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence Civil-Military Interaction and Gender Focal Point, who wrote a meticulously researched article highlighting International actors and actions to counter Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Human Beings; and Sofia Sutera, a researcher at the Human Rights Centre - University of Padua, intern at CoESPU, who made a thorough analysis of the obstacles that women face in peace operations and which opportunities they currently truly have.

Lastly, I am honoured to inform you that, for the first time since we welcomed interns from various Universities, we are also publishing an article written by Giulia Ramundo, Art History & International Affairs Graduate - Art & Cultural Heritage Advocate, which underscores the urgent need for international organizations to protect one of the goods dramatically most affected by war: the Cultural Heritage.

Dear readers, hoping to have provided you also in this issue, food for your thoughts, I wish you a pleasant reading.

BG Giovanni Pietro BARBANO
CoESPU Director
The CoESPU Magazine is devoted to the publication of professional concepts and issues, research and doctrinal products developed by the Carabinieri Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, in collaboration with other international research Centers. The Magazine addresses topics of professional, technical, operational and juridical nature in the field of Stability Policing within Peace Operations. Based on the core values of ethics, integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity, harmonically infused and informed by the traditions of over two hundred years of Carabinieri history, the Magazine fosters Human Rights and gender mainstreaming, while seeking to enhance current police peacekeeping doctrine and promoting international police peacekeeping interoperability, cognizant of Lessons Learned and best practices. The CoESPU Magazine is constantly committed to upholding UN standards, norms, procedures and curricula, while endorsing self-sufficiency of the participating Police Contributing Countries. Consequently, its editorial policy promotes the principles of representativeness, responsiveness, and accountability, as well as effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and accessibility, to provide the highest professional standards to build trust and legitimacy of beneficiary Law Enforcement Institutions.

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THE ADOPTION OF THE WPS MEN IN PEACE OPERATIONS?
Serious Transnational Organized Crime: International Actors and Actions to Counter Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Human Beings

by David Ellero

Introduction.
In one way or another, globalization has had an impact on our lives. The world nowadays is definitely smaller: cheap travel, a very developed transport infrastructure and an unprecedented efficiency of the communication networks, has brought a series of positive developments in the day-to-day life of people world-wide. The best example of a globalized world is probably the European Union (EU), which, along with its shared values, has created a vast array of rules which commonly apply to all its Member States, covering aspects of our day-to-day life which go, to name but a few, from Agriculture and Rural Development to the Defence industry, Economic and Financial affairs and Competition and so on: there are little or no aspects of European life which are not covered by European policies, fully or in part. The Union has been built on the principles of the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital; of equal rights for all citizens before European law; of equality among the member-states; and of significant financial transfers from richer regions to poorer ones. These pillars of EU integration, enable most EU citizens to live where they like, work where they like and commute freely, effectively carrying on with their lives as if the EU as a whole was their Country. Looking at the Schengen area, which currently includes 26 European countries totalling 420 million people, approximately 1.7 million people reside in one country while regularly working in another: this is definitely a “new normal”.

Unfortunately, as it often happens, the great benefits and opportunities offered by globalization have
also benefited – amongst others - organised crime, which however has an edge: whilst, as I explained above, in many instances the world is small and often borderless, different countries still bare different legislations, juridical cultures, languages and even organisational structures of the competent Law Enforcement (LE) authorities. This in turn has created a “water bed” effect, by which criminals tend to displace their activities over numerous different countries, exploiting national differences, favourable legislation, and the fact that LE and judicial authorities, often tied down by complex national caveats and different competing priorities, struggle to cooperate in a faster and more efficient way.

This represents a serious challenge which is cross cutting to almost all crime areas, and just by listening to the news anyone can understand the concept that, nowadays, cases with no international aspects are becoming quite rare: the opposite is true for cases involving Organised Crime Groups (OCG) which are now regularly operating across borders and in multiple jurisdictions.

Some crimes are particularly likely to develop an international dimension, Human Trafficking and Smuggling are definitely two good examples.

Human Trafficking and Human Smuggling, what is the difference?

Before looking into the actors and the actions useful to fight these serious crimes, it is important to underline the differences between the two. Too often, in fact, the two are mistakenly confused, and even in the course of high level events it is not uncommon to sit through presentations on Human Smuggling sold under the heading of Human Trafficking: this may seem as a petty mistake, but unfortunately it is not, and can bring to very dire consequences that are sometimes under to eyes of everyone, with victims of Human Trafficking mistakenly confused with migrants and returned to their country of origin, or being incarcerated without having been provided the protection foreseen in the main international legal instruments, which advocate for a “victim-centred” approach to this crime.

Delving into the legal aspects of both crime areas falls outside the scope of this article, however it is worth citing the main legal instruments which deal with the definitions. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, and entered into force on 29 September 2003, is the main international instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime. The Convention is supplemented by three Protocols, which target specific areas and manifestations of organized crime: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition. Clearly the first two protocols are topical for this article, and are particularly important for its purposes because they provide a definition of the crime areas that can then help the reader to understand the issue at stake. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs (…)”. This is the first global legally binding instrument with an agreed definition on trafficking in persons, and has paved the way for harmonizing national legislations, stepping-up international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting this serious crime, whilst protecting and assisting victims of trafficking in persons, putting their interest at the centre of any intervention.

Similarly, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, for the first time provides an agreed definition of the crime in a global international instrument, which is “(…) Procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident (…)”. In the words of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Protocol aims at preventing and combating the smuggling of migrants, as well as promoting cooperation among States parties, while protecting the rights of smuggled migrants and preventing the worst forms of their exploitation which often characterize the smuggling process. The two definitions can already provide the reader with the main differences between these two serious crimes, which can be summarized as follows:

• As for the act itself, whilst traffickers may transport and transfer people even within the same Country, without crossing a border, smugglers require the irregular crossing of an international border;
• Traffickers will use the means listed in the above mentioned definition, which normally include deception or one or more elements of coercion, whilst smugglers will have effectively been asked to provide a service, albeit illicit;
• Whilst the purpose of trafficking is always exploitative, this is not necessarily part of the smuggling process. Clearly the boundaries set by the above mentioned definitions are sometimes blurred, in the sense that often smuggled migrants are exploited to pay off their debts and end up trafficked, or are victims of human trafficking from the start, but regard themselves as migrants paying for a service, effectively not even realizing they are in fact illegally exploited. The two key learning points to keep in mind are therefore that the two crime areas are clearly distinct, and that, for this reason, they require a very different approach. For example, whilst Human Trafficking routes are important to know, but not essential (the important aspect is the exploitation phase rather than “how” the victim reached its destination), Smuggling routes are indispensable to plan any successful counter strategy.

International actors
It should not come as a surprise that trafficking and smuggling, more often than not, bare a transnational angle, and this is what really provides an edge to the criminals involved and many (unnecessary) headaches to the national competent authorities. There are so many different aspects to the fight against these two serious crimes, ranging from trafficking victims’ protection, to pre-
vention and prosecution, asylum seeking legislation, migration laws and all the human rights, safety and logistic burdens that are under the eyes of the world when masses of migrants desperately attempt to reach their country of destination. For this reason, listing them all and providing a brief explanation of their portfolio would require a book to be written rather than an article, I therefore invite all those interested to visit the websites of the main international organisations which can be easily found on the internet. Furthermore, many countries have an international cooperation cell, normally at ministerial level, which provides assistance to those in need to establish a channel of cooperation to progress an investigation, and may advise on the favourite option.

I would like, however, to provide a brief explanation of the issue at stake here: if this article is about actors and actions, I would in fact focus on the latter and then let the reader figure out, with some hints from myself, who to approach when faced with an international investigation on either of these serious crimes. Because of the target audience of the magazine, I will clearly focus on international LE cooperation, reminding the first, however, that smuggled migrants and victims of human trafficking should always be placed at the centre of any effective strategy, especially in the case of trafficking, with a clear primacy over the investigation itself, which should never harm the interest of the victim.

Actions to counter Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Human Beings

As I mentioned, the actions here are looking at the LE side of the fight against these serious crimes, but being the two very different from one another, the actions also may differ in some aspects. One essential aspect which is common between the two, however, is the need to cooperate transnationally. International organisations such as Interpol¹, Europol², Selec³, Afripol⁴, Ameripol⁵, Frontex⁶, to name but a few (and in no particular order of importance), are directly involved in supporting, each within their remit, and providing a value which is linked to their spe-
SERIOUS TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Bilateral cooperation is simply not feasible. The same goes for all those LE Liaison Officers posted throughout the world. The need to cooperate is essential, and is self-explanatory, but just for the sake of simplicity, it’s easy to imagine the case of a LE officer stumbling across a possible trafficking victim in the course of an investigation: very often the victim itself is unaware of being a victim. Thinking of a detection at a border crossing, it could well be the victim has been provided with a fake contract of employment, and when asked, is genuinely thinking of a legitimate job as a server, secretary or dancer. The victim may be accompanied, as it often happens, by a suspect involved in the case. How will the investigator be able to detect the trafficking case, if not cooperating with LE from the source and/or transit countries? Clearly this is a simplification, but assuming not all readers are trafficking experts, it should answer the question on the “business need” to cooperate. The situation however is much more complex than this, and just thinking of the investigation side (adding victim protection clearly adds complexity, and therefore will not be covered in this article), it is easy to imagine how many countries may be involved at the same time in a single case. Just by analysing the financial transactions that certain key individuals are connected to (middlemen, “passeurs” or any other offender involved in the process) may prove extremely challenging. A single individual can be connected to transactions in numerous countries (I witnessed twelve in a single case I encountered years ago), and this often causes the issue to be labelled as “too difficult to take care of” and just not investigated. Bilateral cooperation is simply not sophisticated enough, and the simple exchange of information if often obsolete. What is needed is an in-depth analysis of the data emerging from on-going cases, taken care of at international level. Agencies such as Europol are well placed in the international scene to do this, especially because all data collected across all crime areas falling within its mandate end up in the same analytical database, which can therefore be used as a unique platform to make sense of this large volume of entities.

“AGENCIES SUCH AS EUROPOL ARE WELL PLACED IN THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE TO DO THIS, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE ALL DATA COLLECTED ACROSS ALL CRIME AREAS FALLING WITHIN ITS MANDATE END UP IN THE SAME ANALYTICAL DATABASE, WHICH CAN THEREFORE BE USED AS A UNIQUE PLATFORM TO MAKE SENSE OF THIS LARGE VOLUME OF ENTITIES.”

What about NATO

Whilst organisations such as the ones listed above have the fight against serious and organised crime as a core responsibility, others have not such a primary role. Writing from the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence, I find it interesting to highlight what NATO is doing at the moment, and whether the latter should actively pursue a more prominent role. Conflict has clear linkages with both crime areas, as it constitutes a “push factor” for those who actively seek a better and secure life outside their country of origin, and fall easily for deceptive offers, but also a “pull factor” for those who are driven to areas where they are trafficked into sexual or labour exploitation. In the field of fighting Migrant Smuggling, NATO definitely plays an important role, also in cooperation with the EU, as clearly stated in the 2018 Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation. As an example, during his visit to Greece in October 2019, NATO Secretary General underlined that NATO’s presence in the Aegean helps...
counter illegal human smuggling by providing real-time information to coastguards, and by helping to address the instability and violence at the root of the migrant crisis by working with partners in the Middle East and North Africa. The contribution of NATO from this point of view, although not focussed on the investigation side of Human Smuggling, is clear and self-explanatory.

In the field of Human Trafficking, however, the role is more difficult to define. Let us not forget that trafficking is a form of modern day slavery, but very often needs to be investigated thoroughly to be detected. As an organisation, NATO is firmly committed to address Human Trafficking, and has a zero-tolerance policy in place, which was endorsed at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004. The policy, which is currently under review, commits NATO member countries and other troop-contributing nations participating in NATO-led operations to reinforce efforts to prevent and combat such serious crime. Whilst NATO is not a primary responder on Human Trafficking, its role could go two ways: the Alliance could continue “not fuelling” this serious crime, by, for example, keep thoroughly reviewing its supply chains to ensure no victim of human trafficking is exploited to provide services, and keeping forbidding its troops to engage with victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation, or the Alliance could take a more active role and “fight” against this serious crime by, for example, investigating it with the use of dedicated assets. And this however brings us to the next paragraph.

What about Stability Policing

Although the need for Stability Policing has been identified by NATO since 1998, when a Multi-national Specialized Unit (MSU) was deployed to Bosnia Herzegovina within the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR), the Alliance has defined it in a NATO Doctrine fairly recently, in 2016, with its “Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing” (AJP-3.22). This doctrinal document defines it as “police related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace the indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights”. Whether Stability Policing is employed in a reinforcement mission, which may consist in monitoring, mentoring, advising and training as well as reforming and partnering Indigenous Police Forces (IPF) to improve their performance, or in a temporary replacement mission, this capability brings a typical LE dimension in a Theatre of Operations since it implies an executive mandate, and is a precious tool in the hands of the Mission’s Commander. This is very important for the purpose of this article, because, especially in the case of replacement missions, Stability Policing may be the only asset available in theatre to investigate these serious crimes, which are both listed as tasks under annex A of the above-mentioned doctrine, and to offer an indispensable support to LE world-wide. As an example, who, in fact, would a European LE Agency contact if, debriefing a suspect, a series of contacts would lead to a Country which is lacking functioning LE, but is a theatre where NATO Troops are deployed? Stability Policing would be the obvious solution, either taking the burden on its shoulders, or acting as a “bridge” with what is left by the lo-
cal competent authorities. Given that war, civil unrest, poverty and a lack of perspectives are all clear push factors for both trafficking and smuggling, it is highly likely that the countries of origin will be subject of international assistance missions. When the situation on the ground is prohibitive, NATO would most likely be the instrument of first choice to stabilize the area, hence the important role that may be played by Stability Policing assets.

Conclusions

This article is titled “Serious Transnational Organized Crime: International actors and actions to counter Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Human Beings”, I therefore made an effort to define both, highlighting differences and similarities, identified the business need behind international cooperation as well as some of the actors that may play a role in curbing these crimes, and provided some easy-to-understand examples of what kind of challenges LE may face. I then moved on and, working out of the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence, tried to find a role, if any for the Alliance as a whole and for Stability Policing as a specific capability. The main conclusion is, therefore, that in this globalized world no single country can face these forms of crime in isolation, and must cooperate effectively to find globalized solutions to globalized challenges. This is followed by a second conclusion, which is that, thankfully, the international environment provides for a series of organisations that support investigators faced with the difficult task of progressing transnational cases, often linked to thousands of entities located in numerous jurisdictions. When these jurisdictions happen to be located in prohibitive areas of the world, it may be that a NATO Mission is in fact endowed with the task of substituting or reinforce the IPF: in this case the Alliance could prove that, not only through its “zero tolerance” policy it does not wish to fuel crime, but that it can take an active part in fighting it, also offering itself as a reliable partner for LE Agencies in the countries of destination, wishing to identify contacts in the countries of origin or transit.

Disclaimer: this paper is a product of the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence and its content does not reflect NATO policies or positions, nor represent NATO in any way, but only the NSPCoE or author(s) depending on the circumstances.
PICTURES:
-https://news.unl.edu/sites/default/files/media/20201001-humantrafficking-nt.jpg
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David Ellero
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More than two decades have passed since the adoption of the United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on the 31 of October 2000, which asserted the important role of women in peace and security processes (ranging from the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, to humanitarian response and post-conflict reconstruction). Together with the subsequent UNSCRs 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, 2242, 2467, and 2493, the last two adopted in 2019, this landmark resolution came to constitute what is known as the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda. In particular, UNSCR 1325 “urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts” as stressed by the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI)\(^1\), recognizing the importance of women’s equal participation and full involvement. It is fundamental, though, to consider that gender imbalance has always been a chronic issue in UN peacekeeping operations. Already during the UN Decade of Women (1975-1985), the UN’s recruitment procedures for peacekeeping operations were put under examination as they were considered to be biased towards men. Accordingly, the UN Mission in Namibia (1989) was characterized by the commitment to a fairer recruitment process, through which “only the most competent individuals would be enrolled” (Ghittoni, Lehouck and Watson 2018, 5). In 1995, the Secretary-General proclaimed the goal of reaching gender parity in all “field mission and mission replacements posts” and in 2000 the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)\(^2\) adopted the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action, with the purpose of increasing gender equality and gender balance in peacekeeping by means of measures targeting recruitment, training and leadership opportunities (Ghittoni, Lehouck and Watson 2018, 5-6). Further, in the same year the UN’s pledge to gender equality was marked by the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the first to look explicitly at the interconnections among women, peace and security and expressly requesting more uniformed women in peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Still, even if in 2006 member states were required by the DPKO...
to “double the number of female service uniformed peacekeepers every year for the next few years” and the UN endorsed a Policy Directive on Gender Equality in Peacekeeping Operations, in 2009, at the doorstep of the 10th anniversary of UNSCR 1325, the total number of female peacekeepers was just around 1% (Ghittoni, Lehouck and Watson 2018, 5-6). Aiming at increasing the number of female police officers in PKOs to 20% by 2014 the UN Police introduced a Global Effort initiative and in 2015 UNSCR 2242, part of the WPS Agenda, called upon “the Secretary-General to initiate, in collaboration with Member States, a revised strategy, within existing resources, to double the numbers of women in military and police contingents of UN peacekeeping operations over the next five years”. In his 2017 Report on WPS, the Secretary-General requested his “leadership group to take measures to address the structural barriers that limit women’s meaningful participation in both the uniformed and civilian components of peacekeeping” (Ghittoni, Lehouck and Watson 2018, 6) and in 2018 DPKO declared that troop and police contributing countries (T/PCCs) would lose some of their allocated places if they were not going to reach the target of 15% women deployed in the position of military observers and staff officers. It is critical to observe that the number of women in the police is higher than the one in the military. This seems to be connected to the fact that there are more women in national police forces than in the armed forces. Also, in some countries women are not allowed in combat units, so that the pool of women eligible for deployment is larger in the police than in the armed forces (Ghittoni, Lehouck and Watson 2018, 5-6). As of 2018 the percentage of deployed military women was approximately 4% and that of deployed police women approximately 10% (Ghittoni, Lehouck and Watson 2018, 7). In the last decade, overall, the proportion of female police and military peacekeepers fluctuated between 2% and 4% for military personnel and between 6% and 10% for police personnel. Whereas this can be connected to the low numbers of female military and police personnel at the national level there is a variety of challenges and barriers to uniformed women deploying to PKOs. In this sense, the global study on the implementation of UNSCR 1325, released in 2015, underlines “the key role of female peacekeepers” by identifying them as “a critical factor contributing to mission success” who broaden the range of skills and capacities among all categories of personnel, enhance the operational effectiveness of all tasks, and improve the mission’s image, accessibility and credibility vis-à-vis the local population. Women peacekeepers also improve targeted outreach to women in host communities. This is crucial for various reasons, including capitalizing on women’s familiarity with local protection strategies that affect women, and on their capacity to provide early warning, but also “drive strong civil-military coordination, and together with civilian and police counterparts, can more effectively reach out to and interact with civilians in the host country, as they appear less threatening and more accessible to affected populations”. Thus, even if this study acknowledges that “women’s professional competence extends beyond these areas”, women are actually praised for the added value that they can bring to PKOs outcomes (Coomaraswamy 2015, 141). Similar arguments are utilised in order to depict the “positive impact” of women in the police component of missions (Coomaraswamy 2015, 143). Accordingly, Member States are encouraged to consider measures such as adopting a gender balance premium or comparable benefits to increase the number of women

**“UNSCR 1325 “URGES ALL ACTORS TO INCREASE THE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN AND INCORPORATE GENDER PERSPECTIVES IN ALL UNITED NATIONS PEACE AND SECURITY EFFORTS”**

(Coomaraswamy 2015, 142). Still, the very DPO recognizes that there are structural gender norms, power dynamics, patriarchal structures and value systems posing a significant barrier to the successful implementation of WPS commitments, a situation currently aggravated by the “disruptive force of COVID-19 pandemic which is exacerbating existing gender inequalities” (DPO 2020, 8). Further, it acknowledges the criticalities connected to the very construction of this agenda, namely its framing mostly in terms of a protection lens and the fact that the security sector is male dominated (DPO 2020, 21). Indeed, the second WPS resolution, UNSCR 1888 (2009), attests that in order to arrive to the consolidation of peace it is essential to promote
the equal and full participation of women, thus the text proceeds by welcoming the inclusion of women in peacekeeping missions in civil, military and police functions, and recognizing that women and children affected by armed conflict may feel more secure working with and reporting abuse to women in peacekeeping missions, and that the presence of women peacekeepers may encourage local women to participate in the national armed and security forces, thereby helping to build a security sector that is accessible and responsive to all, especially women.

As observed, the UN has justified women’s inclusion in peacekeeping by means of different reasons mostly focused on the concept of military effectiveness, thence in terms of success for the peacekeeping mission itself. In fact, the UN stresses that:

- female peacekeepers act as role models in the local environment, inspiring women and girls in often male-dominated societies to push for their own rights and for participation in peace processes;
- the increased recruitment of women is critical for: empowering women in the host community; addressing specific needs of female ex-combatants during the process of de-mobilizing and reintegration into civilian life; helping make the peacekeeping force approachable to women in the community; interviewing survivors of gender-based violence; mentoring female cadets at police and military academies; interacting with women in societies where women are prohibited from speaking to men;
- the presence of women peacekeepers can also: help to reduce conflict and confrontation; improve access and support for local women; provide role models for women in the community; provide a greater sense of security to local populations, including women and children; and broaden the skill set available within a peacekeeping mission. 

(Karim and Beardsley 2017, 46-48; see also Karim and Henry 2018, 396 and Dufour 2020, 108).

Similar arguments have been used in 2014 in the document “Forward Looking Gender Strategy (2014-2018)” published by DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS). Overall, even if the numbers are very low in relative terms, in absolute terms, while between 1957 and 1989, only twenty uniformed women served as UN peacekeepers, in January 2020, there were 5284 uniformed women actively deployed, namely 6.4 percent of military and police personnel (Baldwin and Taylor 2020, 2). It is, thus, especially important to look at the quality of women’s participation. Looking at the continuous occurrence in the first landmark WPS resolution and in the following ones of the formula “women’s leadership and participation”, it is pivotal to understand how much this acclaimed women’s leadership and participation is concretely and effectively exercised in the context of peace operations. Indeed, this Agenda has a transformative potential directed at creating inclusive and democratic societies where gender inequality can be replaced by gender justice. If UNSCR 1325 is to be “a historic watershed political framework” for sustainable peace, it is necessary, though, that women’s agency, voice, and capacities are actually included in peace and security (WILPF undated).

First of all, it is essential to consider both quantitative and qualitative participation; seen that “women have a right to deploy in any role for which they are trained and that is commensurate with their rank and experience, including at the leadership level”, the UN Women’s Elise Initiative Fund offers a financial premium to T/PCCs for “gender-strong units.” These are military battalions and formed police units (FPUs) which include women in all roles and exceed the numerical targets set by the UN by at least 5 percent while also ensuring that all unit members receive gender-equity training and that the T/PCC has provided “adequate equipment and other materiel to ensure parity of deployment conditions for women and men peacekeepers.”
(Baldwin and Taylor 2020, 5). In this sense, on the military side, a practice which has been used in order to foster women’s integration has been that of establishing female engagement teams (FETs), namely tactical sub-sub-units directed at gathering information and gaining access to the local populations, especially addressing their gendered needs. Still, they exemplify only one possible role for women in PKOs and they are not meant to be a strategy to reach numerical targets (Baldwin and Taylor 2020, 6). On the police side, most police deployed with the UN are part of an FPU, and that are characterized by dedicated training structures and gender mainstreaming strategies and practices.5 Thanks to significant recruiting efforts, such as the aforementioned 2009 “Global Effort”, the number of women has regularly increased, especially in the police, still as with military peacekeepers, women police are usually considered and praised for their contributions that relate to other women, such as activities celebrating International Women’s Day and engagement with women and children (Baldwin and Taylor 2020, 7-8). Ghittoni, Lehouck and Watson examined all this data in their baseline study for the development of the Elsie Initiative, which is aimed at developing innovative measures in order to “move from slow, incremental progress to transformational change regarding women’s meaningful participation in peace operations”6. These scholars reported that the major arguments employed in order to support an increase in the participation of uniformed women in PKOs are: operational effectiveness, namely the possibility of reaching out to the civilians, reducing negative effects of PKOs and ensuring the legitimacy of PKOs; the capacity to support the implementation of the provisions of the WPS Agenda and women’s equal right to serve. On the other hand, they outlined different barriers concretely hampering the deployment of uniformed women in PKOs: 1) a lack of information on deployment opportunities, 2) corruption in deployment selection, 3) the fact that women are seen as needing protection rather than as potential protectors by senior leaders, 4) the years of requested experience for deployment, 5) physical fitness tests, 6) UN minimum criteria for deployment, 7) ostracism within training cohorts, 8) inadequate accommodation, facilities and equipment, 9) lack of specific medical care, 10) lack of adequate family-friendly policies, 11) sexual and gender-based harassment, 12) unequal opportunities on deployment and missed opportunities at home, 13) unreasonable expectations and 14) lack of support networks. The study, thence, identified 14 barriers to the deployment of uniformed women in PKOs, in six main categories: (1) equal access to opportunities, (2) deployment criteria, (3) the working environment, (4) family constraints, (5) equal treatment during deployment, and (6) career-advancement opportunities (Ghittoni, Lehouck and Watson 2018, 2).

Indeed, for instance, uniformed women denounced the fact of making use of equipment designed for “standard” (i.e. masculine) body types which is not safe for them, a condition hindering their participation to the mission. They also gave account of limited or unequal accommodations and access to health services. Another central concern was that the standards for their performance were perceived to be higher for them than for their male colleagues (Baldwin and Taylor 2020, 8). Still, a particularly important obstacle to women’s effective participation to PKOs is the existence of a gendered protection norm, according to which women are in need of protection. This norm is likely to impact less police officers, who are more often deployed as individuals and who are part of an institution with a quite different function than national militaries, where they interact more regularly with local populations. Still, the existence of this gendered protection norm, overall in society and specifically in the police and the military, which “puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and...
obedience” to a masculine protector (Young 2003, 2) and the recurrence of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) in PKOs (Karim and Beardsley 2016; Nordås and Rustad 2013), makes it it improbable for female peacekeepers to really have an impact within the culture of peacekeeping (Simić 2010). The most problematic aspect, indeed, is that several uniformed women revealed to be more worried about their safety within military camps and bases rather than while being on the battlefield or on patrol. In fact, according to the statistics, both men and women confront a high risk of sexual assault by their colleagues while on deployment. Additionally, many countries do not properly and comprehensively report cases of harassment and assault in their militaries (Baldwin and Taylor 2020, 9). Indeed, in their research Karim and Beardsley found out that sexual and gender-based harassment was indicated as the second most relevant factor to restrain women from deploying (Baldwin and Taylor 2020, 10). Thus, various taboos, stigmas and barriers interfere with the effective participation of women in PKOs. As observed, they extend from the “role models” perspective according to which women share common motivations and ideologies and “will place their gender identity and solidarity with other women above all other motivating factors” (Baldwin and Taylor 2020, 13), to accommodations, health resources, protection equipment and basic expectations in terms of physical and mental safety, which must actually be seen as leadership failures constituting a violation of a women’s right to deploy. Consequently, it is necessary to give priority to examining the culture within missions (Baldwin and Taylor 2020, 14), as a matter of fact, the research conducted by Vermeij (2020, 12), depicts a culture of silence, caused by the fear of negative consequences for bringing up a complaint, including retaliation, negative career repercussions, stigmatization and ostracization. Indeed, the perception that there is an absence of accountability in peace operations brings to the spread of discrimination, inappropriate behaviour and sexual harassment and assault, in an environment which is made even more complex by its peculiar characteristic as multicultural and by the tendency to put women in “traditional female” roles related to gender and protection, regardless of their qualifications (Vermeij 2020, 7). In fact, women are often appointed as gender and protection advisers, even when they are not trained to perform such tasks, whereas “being a woman does not make you a gender expert” (Vermeij 2020, 15). Further, there is a “culture of shaming mothers who deploy”, that results in a “mother’s guilt” (Vermeij 2020, 4). In this sense, the push to deploy more women to UN peace operations put them in a difficult position (Vermeij 2020, 7) and clearly shows a paradoxical framework where “some military women may be prioritized for deployment because of their sex, others are denied international deployments for the same reason” (Vermeij 2020, 8), a construction which, as mentioned above, is even worse for mothers who “face a culture of shame” where “are given the contradictory message that if they are mothers, they should stay home, but also that they need to deploy to maintain their career in the military” (Vermeij 2020, 9). According to the study of Vermeij (2020, 10-11), the conclusion is, thus, that “[a] woman in the military is either called a slut or a lesbian, no matter what she does. A military woman is never just a soldier, and she will always have a label put on her”, not only she is continuously seen as a woman, rather than a professional, but also, in the words of a female soldier, “we are not supposed to be girly, but we have to endure the fact that we are girls” (Vermeij 2020, 11). Therefore, we can reflect on the fact that: Being a minority in a military environment means that: • You have to fend for yourself; • You have to be hyper alert to stigmas and prove that you do not fit them; • It is hard to speak up, whether on general issues or on minority-specific issues or stigmas; • You have to face people who overtly discriminate on the basis of gender; and • You have to face people who say offensive things” (Vermeij 2020, 5). In addition, women’s careers opportunities are impacted by specific additional factors, such as: • Women are judged for not following gender roles. • Because of the assumption that women will follow gender roles, they are not offered deployment opportunities, which are critical to career advancement in the military. • Women who are successful in the military are accused of having used sexual influence to achieve this or are criticized by other women and men; • Women are not offered the same training opportunities as men; • Women are disincentivized
from having a military career, taking the actions required to make that career successful, and deploying; • Career opportunities are judged according to male performance standards”. (Vermeij 2020, 10). As a matter of fact, both in the military and police, women confront many obstacles: practical difficulties but also restrictions such as being confined in the base and not allowed to patrol because they are not considered for their specific professionalism but in a stereotypical fashion as in need of protection, moreover, as already stressed, sexual harassment is a major problem (Baldwin and Taylor 2020, 1). Indeed, for instance female peacekeepers in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2012 denounced that they were required to stay in the base and could not interact with personnel from other units or the host population, moreover they experienced sexual harassment and discrimination (Karim and Beardsley 2017). It is also important to consider the strong overlap between the WPS and the protection of civilians (POC) agendas, also in terms of the justifications employed to increase the number of women in peace operations. Even if the POC agenda is formulated as gender-neutral still women are typically described as victims and men as perpetrators of violence, further, together with emphasizing women’s victimhood, this agenda overstates conflict related sexual violence (CRSV), as the same WPS does (Baldwin and Taylor 2020, 10). In the same direction also goes the continuous grouping of “women and children” which brings to the homogenization of all women in one category, but also to “the reductive view that women do not have agency in their own safety and protection and thus need to be protected”. As a matter of fact, there is a fusion of the two and quite different groups of women and children, an act which “simultaneously infantilizes women and negates the complexity of children’s issues”, while completely excluding men from the analysis (Baldwin and Taylor 2020, 11). In this context, sexual harassment is often presented as “just one of those things women have to accept because they are in the military” (Vermeij 2020, 11-12) in a culture of silence which is protected by a looming fear of negative consequences in case of reporting (Vermeij 2020, 12).

Conclusions

Therefore, as already mentioned, although the WPS Agenda has been triumphantly celebrated as a feminist victory in the war against war, being seen as a “landmark resolution” representing a “new, daring, and ambitious strategy for anti-war feminists” (Cohn et al. 2004, 130) and, indeed, it has undeniably given a major contribution to the mainstreaming of gender in peace and security processes and discussions, it has also been strongly criticised for representing women as “victims to protect” rather than “agents of change”. In this framework, the WPS Agenda, which is meant to present a holistic approach to security comprehending four main pillars: Participation, Conflict Prevention, Protection and Relief and Recovery (WILPF 2013, 5), has been questioned for being primarily centred on the pillar of protection. This focus is characterized by a global rhetoric about victimhood and protection which offers an understanding of women solely in terms of victims who need the paternalistic protection offered by the international community (Ni Aolain and Valji 2019, 55). As Shepherd (2011, 506) underlines, in UNSCR 1325 women are mostly described as “fragile, passive and in need of protection”, which is especially problematic taking into consideration that “victims are rendered vulnerable through their very construction as victims” (Åse 2019, 280). Moreover, discussions about increasing the number of women in this “male-dominated peacekeeping system” focus almost only on the “added value” of women, so that the burden is always on women to prove their worth (Baldwin and Taylor 2020, 12). Thus, it is necessary to consider transformative possibilities in UN peacekeeping and the UN’s goals around women’s participation, both quantitative and qualitative, and to root them in concrete data. Even if peace operations often require quick and decisive action, empirical backing is necessary to fight “essentialist” understandings of men and women, such as the standard description of women in military and po-
lice contingents as role models for local women. As Nina Wilén affirms, it is necessary to “transform gender-biased institutions without reinforcing gender stereotypes.” (Baldwin and Taylor 2020, 13).

It is possible to consider that this very narrow construction of women can be related to the very international legal system, in fact, looking for instance at the structure of international humanitarian law, it is possible to notice that the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols represent women in terms of the “regard” or “consideration due to women on account of their sex”, representing women only for their peculiar weakness, at the physical and psychological level, and resulting peculiar need of protection, and for their sexual and reproductive capacity. Even sexual violence is addressed only in terms of the honour of the women involved, which show that women are not considered as autonomous subjects but as the property of the men they are dependent on. Still, different measures could be implemented in order to bring to an increase in women’s leadership and participation such as the use of communication strategies directly targeting military women within national security forces in order to increase awareness of deployment opportunities (Vermeij 2020, 8). Moreover, women could be supported by mentoring programs or women networks (Vermeij 2020, 22). It is, though, paramount to improve standards of behaviour and accountability within national defence structures, by means of zero-tolerance policies and accessible, reliable and confidential systems to report and deal with discriminatory and sexualized behaviour, comprising racism, sexual harassment and assault. In addition, predeployment trainings and training-of-trainers courses need to address unconscious bias and barriers (Vermeij 2020, 25).

The very DPO, cannot focus solely on the value of “employing women in roles only women can do, such as female engagement”, but it should emphasize their role in terms of the operational effectiveness of missions while making it clear that women need to be employed in terms of a “meaningful participation”, not just in quantitative terms (Vermeij 2020, 28). This, though, is primarily a fundamental task for the leadership, which should actively “promote gender equality in strategic, operational, and tactical engagements within their organization, including a focus on diversity and inclusiveness as core defence values and operational imperatives” (Vermeij 2020, 25). In this sense, for example, different national peacekeeping training centres have adopted quotas to ensure 50-50 male/female participation in their courses, such as at the UN Military Expert on Mission (UNMEM) course at the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) and the UN Staff Officers Course (UNSOC) at the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWE-DINT) (Vermeij 2020, 24).
note
1 See https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/.
2 Which was created in 1992 as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) when Boutros Boutros-Ghali became Secretary-General of the United Nations. It was renamed Department of Peace Operations (DPO) on 1 January 2019 during a reorganization of the UN’s peace and security system.
3 See https://www.peacewomen.org/why-WPS/solutions/resolutions
4 In 2007 India deployed the first ever all-female FPU to Liberia.
5 See https://wps.unwomen.org/

References
The Contribution of Stability Policing to Explosive Ordnance Disposal

by José Antonio Lorenzo Quiroz

During the last decades warfighting and conflicts have shifted into a grey area where the thresholds of conflict are blurry, the enemies are more and more difficult to distinguish, and the battles have become asymmetrically fought. An example can be seen during the more recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the strategic and effective use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by terrorists and insurgents has triggered within NATO Allies the reaction in the field in the aftermath of a conflict that have to be managed, securing the local population and own forces until EOD units render safe an area. Likewise occurs with remnants of war, small arms, and ammunition, abandoned and unexploded ordnances that may be located and which suppose a threat to the local population and that could easily find their way to the illegal market. These issues must be addresses through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) efforts ensuring that these elements will not end in the hands of criminal organisations or terrorist / insurgent networks. While establishing a safe and secure environment (SASE) NATO Stability Policing (SP) capability may effectively support the EOD capability, and contribute to NATO’s desired end state both in theatre of operations by preserving the host nation population from the EOD effects, as well as through the thorough collection and handling of evidence, which can serve in judicial procedures either locally or abroad at a later stage. The notion of stability policing within NATO has been defined by NATO as being “Police-related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace indigenous police forces in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights.” These activities are to be conducted in the course of an operation in fragile states, before, during and post conflict/crisis with the aim of establishing a SASE. In this regard and relating to the SP contribution to EOD, some SP units deployed may have the ca-
probability to perform EOD activities autonomously; however, this is a most unlikely scenario. In practice EOD will be carried out by specialised EOD units, military engineering (MILENG), and supported by force protection (FP), medical support, electronic warfare (EW), military working dogs (MWD), logistics, weapon intelligence teams (WITs), boarding teams, military search, mine clearance measures (MCM), CBRN defence, military police (MP), communications, and of course by SP? In the field, it is highly probable that SP elements at some point come across an explosive device, inter alia, either during a patrols, attending a public security incident, a search and seizure mission, surveillance activities, during the course of a criminal investigation, whilst providing security to a critical site, during a counter-terrorism or organised crime operation, or during the course of community policing duties, to mention but a few... As first responders it is critical for SP to take a series of measures to ensure the safety of the population whilst not disregarding their own personal safety. Moreover, depending whether the operational environment is permissive or not, SP can take immediate measures. These can include but are not limited to confirming the presence of the UXO or the IED, clearing and evacuating the danger area of personnel and casualties, reporting the incident through their chain of command providing as much and detailed description of the UXO/IED as possible, securing the incident area through an effective cordon and by controlling relevant entry points, preventing access to non-authorised personnel. Authorised entry should be fully identified and through a secure entry/exit corridor; indeed, it is essential that the crime scene remains untouched as possible, in order to avoid its “contamination”. While awaiting the arrival of the specialised EOD operators, the SP elements should redirect traffic and select a safe rendezvous point and inform the relevant parties. Furthermore, any witness should be identified and debriefed taking notes of the information acquired. Upon its arrival, the EOD evidence (fibres, soil, vegetation), CCTV footage, witness statements, victims identification. Sketches and photography / video footage of the crime scene should be recorded. The identification and location of evidence which is recovered should be labelled and tagged, as well as the identification of who and where each piece of evidence was recovered. By the same token, the chain of custody records should be crystal-clear and maintained for all recovered items. Types of evidence that may be found could include remains of safety fuses, remains of detonators, wires, fragments of containers, fragments of batteries, samples of explosives, just to name a few. Through biometric analysis fingerprints or DNA samples may be retrieved, a technical analysis of the structure of the explosive device may lead to identifying the bomb maker, etc... The material used to fabricate the IED may lead us to know if it was fabricated locally or not, if the support of an external supplier was necessary in order to obtain the components. In general terms, this may provide us with a wider picture of our adversaries’ criminal network and enable to pursue this network through law enforcement efforts. In the case of the appearance of an UXO it is of interest to the investigation to determine if it is attributable to our adversary, if it is considered as prohibited by the “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects\textsuperscript{9} and if there may be issues of accountability for breaches of international humanitarian law and laws of armed conflict. These should be investigated and documented for possible legal procedures. Likewise the origin of the UXO may permit NATO to discover hidden alliances, for example a state may be supplying certain weaponry to another state (or non-state armed group) in conflict in an effort of support, whilst publically it denies these actions. A discovery of this nature could justify a diplomatic intervention against the concerned state (embargo, sanctions, et similia) aimed at deterring it from supporting an opponent in an ongoing conflict. The above-mentioned actions above can be carried out by SP elements in support of EOD capabilities and are of vital importance as they ensure the admissibility of the battle-field evidence (BE)\textsuperscript{9} retrieved in future legal procedures, either within the area of operations or abroad.

Despite being amongst the oldest type of weapons, during recent conflicts the use of IEDs by terrorist or insurgents has become more and more frequent. There are many explanations of why this choice of weaponry. These reasons could range from their cost-effectiveness, accessibility, their strategic role (limits mobility of security forces), the psychological effect produced on the population, and or the diminishing of the credibility of governments / international organisations\textsuperscript{10}. However, probably the most important reason may be a combination of the above summed to the fact that their calculated use can tip the balance in an asymmetric war and requires NATO to undergo vast efforts to restore stability.

During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the use of IEDs has been so effective for terrorists and insurgents that it comes as no surprise that they have been called “weapons of strategic influence”.\textsuperscript{11} For the duration of these conflicts, IEDs have been strategically used by terrorist and insurgents to block NATO or local forces from in an area and/or preventing their advance in a determined direction during counterinsurgent operations. Terrorists and insurgents have also used these weapons to fix NATO or local forces to an area before other forms of attacks were carried out (ambushes, sniper attacks, etc…).\textsuperscript{12}

In order to counter the use of IEDs, NATO Allies have engaged and enhanced WITs for TE\textsuperscript{13} efforts to produce technical intelligence (TECHINT)\textsuperscript{14}. These WITs are defined for C-IED\textsuperscript{15} purposes as a pool of specialists who investigate IED events when tasked. Their main task is to gather, analyse, collate and distribute technical and tactical intelligence and forensic potential evidence for exploitation. To do so the WIT capabilities are structured on various levels, ranging from the scene, in theatre technical / tactical level to an out of theatre with advanced technical analysis and intrusive exploitation.\textsuperscript{16}WITs allow NATO to direct its efforts not only against the device but also against the IED network (i.e. the opponents’ capabilities).

In this regard, NATO SP can contribute with specialised assets for forensic & biometric activities within these WITs as well as further exploiting available TECHINT to develop law enforcement intelligence (LEINT).\textsuperscript{18} Through the use of forensic science techniques it is possible to identify actors that otherwise are indistinguishable from the general population. TECHINT & LEINT permit network analysis which provides information on bomb designers / makers – triggermen and also identifies techniques and
materiel. This could then lead to the identification of suppliers, financiers, trainers, leaders, and of patterns and trends, and serve as forensic evidence as it establishes the linkage between persons, places, things and events. All in all, this allows NATO decision makers to take timely resolutions and the provision of countermeasures and/or supports the targeting of these networks through law enforcement apparatuses, thus enabling the re-establishment of the rule of law by backing proceedings and consequently strengthening the overall Security Sector Reform’s efforts. However not only is this LEINT valuable in the theatre of operations but also abroad, as it is also necessary to manage at the domestic level emerging threats, which are originated by the return of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). The matter of the returning FTFs has been addressed by the United Nations Security Council in various resolutions and many nations have already adapted their domestic legislation to comply with these UNSC Resolutions. The measures that have been implemented aim at facilitating information exchange and collaboration between nations and organisations. However, the admittance of BE in national proceedings is not always a straightforward issue as it is not always available or admissible. In this sense there is a need to have a close cooperation between civilian and military authorities to secure the BE and make it available for court procedures. This was highlighted during the “workshop on the conduct of criminal trials against, and the prosecution of foreign terrorist fighters, including returnees and relocators” which was held in Madrid on 11-12 June 2019. Once again, it was pointed out that the dominant key to a successful prosecution in any jurisdiction is the availability of admissible evidence. In an attempt to secure the admissibility of BE in legal procedures, the United Nations Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee Executive Directorate has set a series of guidelines, which were published in 2019, providing military personnel deployed under a UN mandate with direction in the collection of BE. From the Alliance’s perspective, BE has become one of its current counter-terrorism priority areas of work and NATO has approved TE and a BE policy in 2020. Furthermore NATO has offered Battlefield Evidence Collection training programmes in conjunction with International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the European Union at the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence (NATO SP COE) in Vicenza (Italy), where more than a hundred Iraqi officers received this training during the period of 2019/2020. Currently, thanks to a US grant and under NATO International Staff’s aegis, four further iterations are planned to be conducted during 2021/22 to train MoD/MoI personnel from the Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and eligible G5 Sahel partner Countries. All of these multilateral efforts share the common objective of establishing a set of best practices to ensure that BE is handled in accordance with international standards in order to guarantee its admissibility in future legal proceedings. EOD incidents and their exploitation are an utmost valuable source of BE and LEINT in the area of counter-terrorism, thus the importance of emphasizing this issue throughout the whole of this paper. NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) and INTERPOL’s cooperation goes beyond, having signing of a memorandum of understanding in December 2020, by which a framework for cooperation between both organisations is set. As a consequence, this will include the sharing of information on non-military illegal activities including terrorism-related activities. An example of this information sharing could be INTERPOL’s Project “Watchmaker”, a programme which uses fingerprints retrieved from IED components, weapons and smartphones to help identify, locate and arrest terrorists. This programme will facilitate the data flow from the NATO Military/SP forces on the ground to the relevant hotspots via official police channels. The “MI-LEX” project (also led by Interpol), which aims at delivering military-police information exchange, declassifying information for investigative and prosecution purposes, whilst ensuring the
STABILITY POLICING HUB

chain of custody and respecting data protection is also of high importance as it has been pointed out in the “EUROJUST Memorandum of Battlefield Evidence.”

This report highlights that the use of BE in national jurisdictions has increased in the past years, rendering successful convictions. However, it is to be noted that, although the use of BE is not excluded under national laws, its admissibility is subject to guaranteeing the right to a fair trial, the respect of human rights in obtaining, chain of custody and continuity, just to list a few conditions that must be met. In this sense, NATO SP provides a unique capability as it counts with specially trained and experienced assets in complex investigations, which can ensure the correct handling of BE derived from EOD exploitation to secure its admissibility in both local and national legal procedures. A further area in which NATO SP can contribute to EOD efforts although in an indirect manner is through its cyber capability as it can monitor this domain to detect contacts between the network and suppliers SP elements can also carry out open source intelligence (OSINT) on social media by recognising, tracking and monitoring threat networks, tracking of cyber activity, IT communications, geolocation, media monitoring (video, audio, etc...).

SP also plays an important role in any DDR process too, by safeguarding the surrendering of weapons, their registration, weapons tracing, and dynamic surveillance of storage sites, securing destruction sites, advising and training of host nation law enforcement bodies as well as of former combatants for their reintegration. Through these activities SP can cut the supply of weaponry for home-made explosives for terrorist and insurgents, whilst at the same time preventing the arms trafficking of these remnants of war. Thus all contributing to the establishment of a SASE.

The main focus of this paper has been to the role of NATO SP in a substitution (replacement) mission with full executive powers; however, NATO SP role is not only limited to this. It has already been described above that the NATO SP COE is carrying out efforts to deliver to relevant stakeholders training in BE; this is directly linked to crime scene management and a crucial part to EOD/IED incident management.

Additionally, during a strengthening (reinforcement) mission SP can orientate its activities towards providing training to prepare the local law enforcement agencies to operate in an EOD/IED environment, whilst simultaneously providing mentoring, advising, and training in the conduct of the activities described throughout this article (crime scene management, BE collection, TE, law enforcement intelligence and exploitation), enabling local law enforcement bodies to combat the EOD/IED network through law enforcement activities. In summary, in many cases NATO SP will be the first responder, the SP element may have the capability to accomplish the handling of the EOD/IED incidents in an autonomous manner, or as more likely the case, it will contribute by handling the crime scene, preserving and securing the area to prevent further casualties, the tampering or contamination of evidence. Furthermore, SP can contribute by leading the crime scene investigation, obtaining and registering and exploiting evidence which can later be admissible in legal proceedings and serve as well for tactical / operational leads. NATO SP has the capabilities to contribute both to TE and BE collection as it counts on experts in forensic and biometrical sciences experienced in dealing with legal proceeding and with providing timely support to their chain of command during ongoing operations. These have been identified as key areas in modern day conflicts both for operational matters in the battlefield or judicial procedures in courtrooms be it domestically or abroad.

As seen, efforts carried out by SP in the area of DDR contribute to establishing a SASE and additionally prevent or pursue arms trafficking and proliferation through law enforcement instruments. Stability Policing is without a doubt an added value to EOD/IED incident management and can increase the likelihood of success in the achievement of the mission mandate by contributing to address the grey area of conflicts though law enforcement mechanisms, whilst supporting local law enforcement bodies in becoming autonomous. This in turn improves governance and alternative livelihoods, thus tremendously supporting the Alliance in winning public support and the battle of narratives as well as contributing to long-term peace and stability.

PICTURES: -NATO SP CoE

Disclaimer: this paper is a product of the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence and its content does not reflect NATO policies or positions, nor represent NATO in any way, but only the NSPCoE or author(s) depending on the circumstances.
13. NATO AIntP-10 defines Technical exploitation as: “A process using scientific methods and tools to derive data and information of potential intelligence or operational value from collected data, information, materiel and materials.”

14. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE: “Intelligence concerning foreign technological developments, and the performance and operational capabilities of foreign materiel, which have or may eventually have a practical application for military purposes.” NATO agreed term

15. C-IED: “The collective efforts to defeat an improvised explosive device system by attacking networks, defeating devices and preparing a force.” NATO agreed term

16. NATO ACIEDP-02 NATO Weapons Intelligence (WIT) Capabilities

17. NATO AJP-3.15 Allied Joint Publication for Countering Improvised Explosive Device

18. NATO ATP-103 Reinforcement and Replacement of Indigenous Police Forces, Lexicon (Draft). Law enforcement intelligence (LEINT): “The product resulting from the directed collection and processing of law enforcement information regarding the environment and the capabilities and intentions of actors, in order to identify threats and offer opportunities for exploitation by decision-makers”


20. 20 Foreign Terrorist Fighter: “individu


22. 22 Co-organised by the Council of Europe, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain

23. 23 “Guidelines to facilitate the uses and admissibility as evidence in national criminal courts of information collected, handled, preserved and shared by the military to prosecute terrorist offences”, 2019. UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001)

24. 24 AC/342-WP (2020)0001 (INV), NATO Battlefield Evidence Policy


26. 26 NATO AJP-3.15 Allied Joint Publication for Countering Improvised Explosive Device

Reference
Greetings,

It is the time of the year where the daylight hours get shorter and the weather begins to chill, it is a time I look forward to each year – the days we welcome our students, interns, and staff back to CoESPU.

I hope that everyone had a great summer holiday enjoying time with family, friends and loved ones. As we enjoyed our time to travel, I kept our esteemed Alumni, currently serving in support of international Peacekeeping missions, on my mind. I wish you continued success on your missions and a safe trip home when the time arrives.

This Academic year is full of unique educational opportunities. Academic Year 21-22, is the second year for the internship program, CoESPU will host approximately 26 interns over the course of the year covering a variety of disciplines. Additionally, CoESPU will host over 10 United Nation courses and several workshops.

Finally, I am pleased to share, due to the success of the tutor program we will continue to grow the opportunities for Alumni to return to CoESPU and contribute in building, maintaining and developing the didactic interaction among the student, while working closely with our staff.

I look forward to greeting you on the CoESPU campus during this Academic year.

COL Hazelett
Colonel Rebecca Hazelett
In August, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres launched the Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping at the UN Security Council, where he underscored that “new technologies have great potential, if managed responsibly, to enable safer, harm-free, and more effective operations.”

The Open Debate highlighted the resounding interest of UN Member States in technology, both as a tool to strengthen peacekeeping effectiveness, and as a factor shaping conflict environments where peacekeepers are deployed. But what are the implications for the United Nations Police (UNPOL)?

“The Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping: what does it mean for UN Police?”

by Annika Hansen & Naomi Miyashita

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UN POLICE NEEDS TO DEVELOP A FULLER UNDERSTANDING OF THE TECHNOLOGIES’ POTENTIAL AND APPLICATION. DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY SHOULD BE COVERED BY DOCTRINE AND TRAINING TO ENSURE THAT UN POLICE EXERCISE THE UTMOST RIGOR IN DATA MANAGEMENT.”
the use of emerging technologies in UN police peacekeeping, such as databases and platforms, automated analysis tools or mobile applications, and identifying relevant best practice. UN Police closely engage with host communities and are a central contributor to the mission’s common operational picture. Technology tools will increasingly be integral to inform planning and decision-making, notably on protection of civilians. For these tools to benefit core tasks, such as support to community-oriented policing and the protection of civilians, UN Police needs to develop a fuller understanding of the technologies’ potential and application. Data protection and privacy should be covered by doctrine and training to ensure that UN Police exercise the utmost rigor in data management. Data protection and privacy standards also apply to building the capacity of host-state police, as we know from support to the Crime Data Analysis Lab in South Sudan, fingerprint analysis in Mali, and forensics in the Central African Republic and Mali. Second, UN Police needs to prepare for the conflict theatres of tomorrow and can do so by learning and drawing from national policing doctrine and practice. Conflict settings will increasingly be characterized by new lethal and non-lethal weapons technologies, cybercrime, and online information disorder. UN Police should incorporate more specialised capacities in areas such as cyber intelligence gathering techniques, forensic cyber security capabilities, and cybersecurity. Monitoring and tracking online content, including in collaboration with host-state police, will be critical to understanding the potential for unrest and violence. Expertise in these areas would enable UN Police to deliver capacity-building support, which may include support to the digital protection of sensitive national data or infrastructure, or investigation of cyber incidents at the request of host-state authorities. For this, impartiality will be key to the credibility of UN Police work in these areas. This can be reinforced by upholding the principles outlined in the digital transformation strategy, including inclusion, transparency, and applying a do-no-harm approach. Third, an important overarching objective of the strategy is to create a level playing field between the technology “haves” and “have-nots” amongst troop and police contributors, but also between peacekeepers and host-states. The strategy encourages a multi-stakeholder, partnerships-driven approach between Member States, international organisations, civil society and the technology sector. Understanding where gaps may exist, and developing capacity-building partnerships with or between police-contributing countries will be critical in enabling a peacekeeping workforce with the requisite digital skills. Interoperability between digital technology platforms and tools will be essential for these tools to contribute to more effective mandate implementation. As the UN Secretariat embarks on the digital transformation of peacekeeping, several concrete opportunities to galvanise diverse stakeholder support lie ahead: the Peacekeeping Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea (December 2021); the United Nations Chiefs of Police Summit in New York (June 2022); and the next Partnerships for Peacekeeping Symposium in South Africa (2022). This ambitious but indispensable agenda will ensure that UN peacekeeping remains an effective and valuable peace and security tool for the 21st century. UN Police will be a central piece of the puzzle as we go forward.
Globalization, migrations and security issues are strictly connected, but if we can consider globalization and migration as “total social facts” - as we say in anthropology - because every element or representation of the economic, social, political, cultural and religious aspects are involved in this human experience, we have to underline also the “dark side” of this duo. Especially from the 90s and onwards, we have been observing a continuous increase of two criminal phenomena linked to forced and illegal migrations: smuggling of migrants and human trafficking. The Western Balkans must be considered as a net in which migrants’ fluxes can be channeled by transnational criminal groups involved in smuggling and human trafficking. All this area is a hub from routes which start in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, Turkey, South-East Asia and, especially after 2015, North Africa. The connection between organized crime and human trafficking was deeply investigated by the Italian Anti-mafia Prosecutor, Nicola Maria Pace and his team, who created the so-called “Italian model” and its application to combat this crime against humanity. This successful model is characterized by four anthropological aspects. First of all, the differentiation of every flux of migrants from the others on ethno-religious bases, which showed that every criminal group works in a different way, from the recruitment of the victims to the modalities through which they segregate them, once enslaved. But who are the victims of human trafficking? According to article 3 of the UN Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Human Trafficking, they are recruited, transported, transferred, harboured by means of the threat or use of force in different ways, so the trafficked people are in a clear position of vulnerability, or in an asymmetrical relationship, with the criminal group even...
if, at the beginning, there can be agreed a sort of consensus between the exploited and the exploiters. The second anthropological aspect is the analysis of the transnationality of the so-called “New Mafias”. Jean Ziegler, a Swiss sociologist, compares the structure of the criminal organizations to the one of transnational holdings and shows that they are characterized by a financial and capitalistic structure whose parameters are the maximization of the profit and productivity, plus a sort of military hierarchy, which means that they are based on an authoritative method in order to establish a command/obedience relationship. The third point highlights the transnationality of these “New Mafias”, by underlining the possibility to form coalitions—temporary alliances created in order to reach the country of destination, through some agreement with minor criminal groups in the countries of transit (in this case, the Balkan platform). The final socio-anthropological element is the division of the phenomenon of human trafficking into sub-phenomena, such as trafficking in women and minors for sexual exploitation; trafficking in men, women and minor for labour exploitation; temporary sell of minors (called also “minors in leasing”); human organs trade; illegal adoptions; forced marriages; begging and money laundering connected to the previous illicit activities. The Italian model worked great, through carrying on successful anti-trafficking operations in the Balkans and in Italy. A paradigmatic example is Operation “Oriente 1”, the first anti-trafficking operation which applied the Italian model. During 2000 and the years before, the investigators were able to dismantle a traffic of about 5,000 Chinese people, mainly men, in less than nine months, thanks to the discovery of a coalition between Xu Baoling, a Chinese boss living in Trieste, and Josip Loncaric, a Croatian mafioso who was in charge to let this illegal flux to pass the Balkan borders till the entry points of Gorizia and Trieste. Some of these trafficked people were called “special loads” because they were destined to the organ trade. From those years onwards, the Balkan route has evolved and it is still evolving, changing some countries of transit, some countries of origin and the number and the ethnicity of irregular migrants but the two scourges of human trafficking and smuggling of migrants remain a constant problem and it must be considered a priority in the security and political agenda.

PICTURES:

References
The Protection of Cultural Heritage in Destabilized Areas

by Giulia Ramundo

Introduction

Culture, as a broad idea, is one of the key aspects that distinguishes us from other species and, therefore, makes us human. Pushing this point forward, everyone having to do with discussions about culture, as well as everyone at least in the Western world, “have agreed to a worldview in which culture has come to be represented as and by “things” (Handler 215). Culture is intrinsic to human identity; it is a signifier of human identity – and as culture is represented by “things,” these same things, or better cultural objects are perceived as signifier of one’s identity (Ori 460). This distinctive emotional connection that links one’s identity to their cultural objects is exactly the reason why cultural heritage has a great value for people. At the same time, however, this fundamentally important aspect of cultural heritage has made it a main target during warfare – the intentional damage, destruction, or plunder of cultural heritage is, in fact, a strategy of war to prosecute and eventually wipe out a people in the long term, depriving them of their history and memory (Turku 4). After all, what is cultural heritage if not anything that is understood to make a culture what it is – “the forms of expression that consciously determine and identify it” (Shapiro 96)?

Cultural heritage has always been a target of war. In fact, there are various indications that ancient civilizations conceived the destruction of the enemy’s cultural heritage as an essential component of a successful military campaign – “Ultimately, the destruction and looting of cultural objects served to show to the defeated peoples the loss of their political, cultural, and
religious freedom and emphasized the conqueror’s might and cultural dominance” (Turku 30). Surprisingly enough, the Old Testament is one of the earliest sources indicating ancient civilization’s usage of cultural heritage in wartime. For instance, Psalm 137 recounts the enslavement of the Jewish people in Babylon as well as the destruction and pillage of the Temple of Solomon in 586 BCE – and this story inspired Giuseppe Verdi’s Nabucco as well as the renowned chorus piece of classical music Va Pensiero (Turku 35). Niccolò Machiavelli recounts a similar story in The Prince discussing the Roman conquest of Carthage, Capua and Numantia and claiming that complete annihilation of those cities was the only secure strategy to control them and avoid potential revolts (Machiavelli 42). The Italian writer explains further that, “memories of their past freedoms would help them unify and rebel against the occupying force” (Turku 30). According to Livy, after seizing valuable objects, the Romans destroyed Carthage and strewed salt on the soil to impede that flora or buildings might have risen again (Turku 33). Jumping to France in the 1790s, Napoleon Bonaparte formalized the plunder of Italian art from public and private hands with a series of treaties and the renowned Treaty of Tolentino, which “gave the French a free hand to take any artwork they wished” (Turku 34).

However, Adolf Hitler (along with Hermann Göring) surpassed Napoleon’s collecting desires plundering European cultural heritage in what is remembered as the rape of Europa – “the greatest displacement of art in history” (Turku 34). This widespread and systematic plunder was first and foremost part of a bigger plan of annihilating the Jews by depriving them of their own identity (Ori 462). As a matter of fact, the Nazis classified any work of art associated with Jewish culture as degenerate – this included much of modern art, but also works that depicted Jewish subjects, like Rembrandt’s The Jewish Bride and Klimt’s The Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I (Ori 462). The symbolic erasure of the latter’s identity peaked during the Third Reich when it became known simply as “Lady in Gold” (Kelley 112). It was exactly during World War 2 that the Monuments Men (the Allies’ Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives program) were called into life – and cultural heritage protection has become increasingly important ever since. Yet, intentional damage to cultural heritage in armed conflicts continues today with ISIS making of it a primary target of its conduct of war in Syria and Iraq, where the latter “has conducted a systemic cultural cleansing through its destruction of churches, shrines, ancient sites, and books” to ultimately erase the identity of the people in those regions (Turku 11).

The Problem

These events have heightened awareness among scholars

“CULTURAL HERITAGE HAS ALWAYS BEEN A TARGET OF WAR. IN FACT, THERE ARE VARIOUS INDICATIONS THAT ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS CONCEIVED THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY’S CULTURAL HERITAGE AS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF A SUCCESSFUL MILITARY CAMPAIGN.”

The Problem

These events have heightened awareness among scholars
and institutions like NATO, for example, that protecting cultural property during armed conflicts is a key element for mission success. This statement leads to the assumption that all personnel should have, therefore, basic capabilities to react on cultural heritage when on the ground. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case. There is an overall lack of awareness about the significance of cultural heritage (and about its potential for mission success) among UN and NATO personnel operating on the ground for the very fact that peacekeeping components are contributed from over 100 countries and have, therefore, inherently different cultural backgrounds. These differences of outlook and culture imply differences of approach, attitude, and point of view, indeed. However, the equipment, training, hierarchical structure, and internal rules of procedures of each police or armed force, are cultural expressions too. This aspect is often overlooked even though it is one that makes a substantial difference within the framework of stability policing activities. Think about how politics tactics differ around the world, or just among different democracies.

For example, the knee-on-neck restraint that caused the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis is banned in most of Europe (Berger and Noack). Exploring further the differences between the United States and European countries, while American police officers are armed, police officers in Norway, Finland, Iceland, and United Kingdom, for instance, are usually unarmed and allowed to use guns only in strictly exceptional circumstances because of their philosophy of policing by consent – believing that “police should not gain their power by instilling fear in the population but rather, should gain legitimacy and authority by maintaining the respect and approval of the public” (Godin).
Regarding the legal framework, the European Convention on Human Rights permits police forces to use deadly force only when “absolutely necessary” (Berger and Noack). On the other hand, US police forces are allowed when these have a “reasonable belief” their lives are in danger (Berger and Noack). These differing principles imply that a police shooting might be legitimate in the United States, yet not according to the stricter European standards (Berger and Noack).

Also within the European Union, some countries have firmer rules compared to others – but the aim of this discussion was to highlight how differences in mentality and internal rules of procedures inevitably affect actions. In light of this, a fundamental problem of peacekeeping operations is exactly that these people with different attitudes and expectations are to be deployed in destabilized countries with other different cultures and customs, and whose locals have different attitudes and expectations.

A Risk for Anyone
Without specific trainings, peacekeepers may have a hard time trying to identify cultural heritage, first off. Churches, mosques, synagogues, and other religious sites are relatively easy to identify for their familiar characteristics, but there is a lot of cultural heritage that is less recognizable. An example among many might graveyards in Afghanistan, which are simply made of unorganized heaps of earth with litter across the field and no fence. How could foreigners ever imagine this is something sacred for locals? Now, imagine a group of foreign soldiers unknowingly marching on this piece of land – how would Afghani react? And what consequences would these military forces face for their action? Even if accidental, damage and destruction of cultural heritage may result in a risk for anyone: for the locals and their identity as a people, first off; for the global community, since we would lose something that cannot be repaired or recovered; and, finally, for the mission itself.

Because of the emotional connection that links one’s identity to their cultural objects, cultural heritage is not only significant in itself, but also in relation to its human dimension. For this reason, in 2011, the Human Rights Council adopted a report on cultural rights stressing that “the need to preserve/safeguard cultural heritage is a human rights issue” (Human Rights Council).

As we have already seen, examples from the past as well as more recent conflicts stress that this fundamental aspect of cultural heritage often makes it a key target during war for purposes of ethnic cleansing, or better eradication of the other. In these terms, the devastating cultural loss during the war in former Yugoslavia is a representative case, since the State comprehended 9000 UNESCO-registered landmarks within its territory (Keller 2015). Many of these, particularly places of worship, were systematically damaged or destroyed with the intention to achieve an “ethnically pure” state (Turku 36). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1200 mosques, 150 churches, 4 synagogues, and more than 1000 other cultural institutions were specifically...
targeted to remove any indication of a multicultural past (Howard, Elliot, and Prohov 3). The human aspect of such phenomena is stressed by the Czech novelist Milan Kundera, who claims that “[t]he first step in liquidating a people is to erase its memory. Destroy its books, its culture, its history” (Kundera 159). Targeting cultural heritage means targeting history and memory — and this inevitably challenges group survival. These two aspects embodied in cultural heritage are the core of any identity, and are to be transmitted from one generation to the other in order to construct a social continuum that ultimately guarantees unity through the reaffirmation of a collective identity (Turku 76). Émile Durkheim introduced the idea which has become a fundamental rule in sociology, that of considering “social facts as things” (Durkheim 60). In light of this, identity may be perceived as an actual thing that can be created, transformed, and ultimately destroyed (Turku 76). Using a metaphor, the destruction of collective memories affects the collective identity of a people or nation in the same way that lobotomy alters the memory and personality of an individual (Turku 76). Cultural heritage is a signifier and identifier of these collective memories and histories — through it, a people or nation narrates its history and role in the world, effectively communicating “its shared norms, common sufferings, old glories, and authenticating experiences” (Turku 77). Having said that, since shared memories and histories guarantee the continued existence of collective identities, “at the core of a collective group identity lies the ability to transmit its historical record and experience from one generation to the other” (Turku 78). In conjunction with this discourse, cultural heritage is thought to play a role in peacebuilding processes — in fact, it may be used to “reinforce social values that facilitate understanding, empathy, tolerance, inclusion, and compassion” (Turku 187). Indeed, this invites to a reflection on the reconstruction of destroyed cultural heritage. Going back to the Yugoslav war, the Croatian Ministry of Culture noted that, “[t]he construction of the heritage is an input of the present into the past: a necessary intervention conditioned by a violent interruption of historic continuity” (Howard, Elliot, and Prohov 3). In 1998, UNESCO established an international committee of experts to oversee the reconstruction of the Old Bridge and areas of the Old City of Mostar — outstanding examples of multicultural urban settlements that today serve as “symbol[s] of reconciliation, international co-operation and of the coexistence of diverse cultural, ethnic and religious communities” (UNESCO).

(b) A risk for the global community
Case study: Babylon / Iraq 2003

Large scale destruction of cultural heritage also results as a loss for the entire world. The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May 14, 1954 (hereinafter “Hague 1954”) provides an international notion of a universal interest in “cultural heritage of all mankind” apart from any national interest. The language of the Preamble is impressive in itself:

- Being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution
to the culture of the world;

- Considering that the preservation of the cultural heritage is of great importance for all peoples of the world and that it is important that this heritage should receive international protection....

The influential Stanford law professor John Henry Merryman notices that the Preamble states also that “each people makes its contribution to the culture of the World.” Indeed, some cultural objects have little importance if none beyond their borders – the scholar, in fact, talks of the Liberty Bell as a thing whose cultural importance is entirely specific to the United States, “Would the rest of the world be culturally impoverished by [its] destruction” (Merryman 837)? Maybe not, yet it is difficult to really distinguish objects of regional from those of global interest. For instance, the Liberty Bell is an icon of a great event in Western history, the American Revolution – Can we really say it rings only for Americans (Merryman 837)? However, this discussion develops further with a reflection on the issue of saving irreplaceable cultural heritage – and on how the loss of something irreplaceable is inevitably a loss for the global community. A recurrent factor during peacekeeping missions is that of unintentionally altering or destroying cultural, historical, or scientific evidence. In 2003, US Marines set up a camp along the ancient site of Babylon, Iraq, to prevent looting of archeological remains – “Defensive barriers were filled with material from the site, containing archaeological remains like pottery sherds. To make the site suitable for accommodating troops, supplies and transport means, parts of the site were covered with gravel originating elsewhere, mixing archaeological remains” (CCOE 17). This operation, therefore, resulted in the destruction and loss of something irreplaceable: the heritage site of Babylon, Iraq.

(c) A risk for the mission itself

Highlight: Strategic considerations

Once again, the protection of cultural heritage is central for peacekeeping missions is central for a number of reasons. Among those, there are strategic considerations to be taken into account – strategically, in fact, UN and NATO personnel operating on the ground should take into consideration that their mission mandates may involve stabilization and nation-building operations, making of cultural heritage protection crucial for mission success. Apart from its human dimension, cultural heritage may be a key source of income for the host country after conflict. Another strategic consideration is that destruction of or unrespectable behavior towards cultural heritage may result in an escalation of violence caused by local resentment and public outrage (Cunliffe, Fox, and Stone). In 2003, US militaries incorporated the City of Ur into their base and, while protecting the heritage site, used the Ziggurat for ceremonies and guided tours. When the militaries denied the local archeological inspector access to the archeological site, tension inevitably grew between US forces and Iraqis (Rush 28). These developments also have a
significant impact on public opinion and, consequently, on the legitimacy of a conflict – deeply damaging the reputation of the mission and of the institution itself: UN and NATO, for instance. A shining example of the consequences of bad publicity may be the looting of the Baghdad museum, Iraq. In 2003, US militaries were active in the surroundings of the museum when local staff left – but failed to safeguard the institution. In the following days, the building was emptied of its collection, and the majority of these looted objects have not been recovered yet (CCOE 9). In this case, armed forces could prevent the looting, but they did not – inevitably causing public outrage and damage to the reputation of the mission itself. 18 years after, US army is still criticized for this failure by academic literature and news articles.

Policy Recommendations

Protection of cultural heritage is, indeed, a key aspect of peacekeeping operations – yet a challenging one. When on the ground, peacekeepers have the legal obligation to respect and safeguard the cultural heritage of the host country, but how to best safeguard cultural heritage in destabilized areas? This question inevitably refers to pre-deployment trainings, during which a spirit of respect for the cultural and cultural heritage of host countries should be promoted among, not exclusively the military personnel, but among the three components: military, civilian, and police. This educational goal can be fulfilled in various ways – yet cultural awareness programs and trainings are fundamental to understand the history and the cultural heritage of the countries of deployment. These, indeed, may take various forms. Surprisingly enough, case studies highlight that playing cards and videogames on cultural heritage protection are incredible exercises to gain specific knowledge during pre-deployment trainings. Various organizations, in fact, have been active in producing archaeology awareness playing cards for military personnel – in 2007, over 150,000 decks were distributed for missions in Iraq as well as for missions in Egypt and Afghanistan later on. Each card contains a different educational message, and the uniforms of peacekeepers were specifically designed to fit a soldier pocket card (Rush 87). 10 years later, two retired US Navy Commanders introduced "culturalrecon," a video game aimed at educating US military personnel on the basic principles of cultural heritage protection – "In an interactive format, the game requires the player to identify cultural heritage sites, stop looters and gain respect of the local population. The player has weapons, but in order to win, he/she must resist the urge to use them" (CCOE 29). Apart from that, rehearsing cultural heritage protection challenges during pre-deployment training exercises is also key. In 2018, NATO successfully introduced a cultural heritage scenario in its Trident Jaguar, an operational exercise that tests personnel’s military capacity and promptness (CCOE 30). The addition of a CP scenario to NATO exercise Trident Jaguar in 2018 was highly successful. Trident Jaguar was a joint headquarters operational exercise testing the Alliance’s military capacity and readiness. Challenges involving cultural heritage encompassed activities such as "assisting the host nation with a museum evacuation, establishing coalition command and control arrangements, and protecting a world heritage site implicated in joint combat operations. This implied a risk management exercise and combined planning of kinetic targeting and a post-combat return of full control to the host nation" (CCOE 30). This exercise highlighted that the general ability and responsiveness needed to successfully handle issues related to cultural heritage needed to be improved.

Conclusion

The protection of cultural property during armed conflicts is a key element for mission success – yet, as we have seen, there is an overall lack of awareness about the significance of cultural heritage among UN and NATO personnel operating on the ground for specific reasons concerning their diverse cultural backgrounds. These inter-
national institutions are now expending a great deal of effort on closing this gap. Indeed, the first step must be including cultural awareness programmes in pre-deployment trainings.

- Developing the abilities of recognizing, describing, and reporting cultural heritage in the area of interest relates to the trainings and education of civilian, military, and police components prior to any operation.
- Providing clear guidelines on how members of the components should behave when-countering cultural heritage in various circumstances should be taught and practiced.
- Including activities related to the protection of cultural heritage into the predeployment exercise setting to practice real-world scenarios like a situation involving a mission taking place close to an archeological site, for example.

Sources and Further Reading
- NATO SPS Programme (2017).

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HEALTH AND WELL-BEING
Sleep and Cognitive Functions

by Davide Perego

Sleep is a complex physiological process that is regulated globally, regionally, and locally by both cellular and molecular mechanisms. It occurs to some extent in all animals, although sleep expression in lower animals may be co-extensive with rest. In the human beings occupies one third of the life. Sleep regulation plays an intrinsic part in many behavioral and physiological functions. A considerable number of hypothetical functions of sleep have been proposed, but none of the hypotheses under active consideration has gained enough experimental support to convince a preponderance of sleep researchers. What we know certainly is that sleep is essential for many vital functions including development, energy conservation, brain waste clearance, modulation of immune responses, cognition, performance, vigilance, disease, and psychological state.

What is the sleep

The classic definition of sleep is generally based upon physiological characteristics observed in mammals including reduced body movement and electromyographic activity, reduced responsiveness to external stimuli, closed eyes, reduced breathing rates, and altered body position and brain wave architecture. Electrical brain activity occurs, in part, from ionic current changes within neurons and, to a lesser extent, some types of glia. Electrical brain activity is measured by a specific device able to convert electrical signals in waveforms: electroencephalogram (EEG). EEG signals are largely the product of synchronized synaptic currents generated by the apical dendrites of pyramidal neurons. Nevertheless, intrinsic membrane properties, neuronal firing, and glial activity likely also contribute to the EEG signals. EEG frequency bands provide essential information of how brain regions, cells, and molecules regulate wakefulness, sleep states, and display dysfunction due to related pathologies. Moreover these wave happen in a specific part of the sleep: in a part of the sleep there is a unique phe-
notype characterized by rapid eye fluctuation movement, muscle atonia (with the exception of muscles that control eye movements, the heart, and diaphragm), and a rapid low voltage EEG, categorized as REMS: Rapid Eyes Movement Sleep. The other state identified as NO-REM (Non Rapid Eyes Movement Sleep), which is characterized by slow and high voltage EEG, and reduced heart rate and blood pressure; it is divided into three sub states. Human sleep cycles between NREMS and REMS for approximately 90 minutes for about four to five times during the night in an ultradian cycle:\(^1\)

Typically, human sleep is deeper in the beginning of sleep and REMS encompasses a greater proportion of the sleep cycle as sleep persists. It’s important to remember that every vital function in the mammalian is regulated by cycles, and the sleep is not far behind. This is a basic rule when we need to take a care every disease. Physiological parameters, of the human circadian rhythm ("biological clock")


Cognitive Functions and Sleep

The importance of sleep for learning and memory has been abundantly documented in animals and humans, and virtually everyone can attest to that when is deprived of sleep is in difficult to learn or to remember something. In recent years the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the encoding of experience and its consolidation into long-term memory have been increasingly elucidated. In experimental task, sleep deprivation generally results in a progressive degradation of the performance during extended tasks (fatigue effect) exacerbated by sleep loss. While tasks involving higher cognitive functions have been relatively less sensitive to sleep loss, possibly due to a higher level of engagement and compensatory effort, a large body of literature describes the consequences of sleep deprivation on sustained attention and other executive functions, procedural and episodic memory formation, and consolidation, as well as insight and creativity. The effects of one night’s total sleep deprivation were examined using the Wilkinson vigilance task and four 10 min duration performance tests. A repeated measures design was used in which eight male subjects experienced one night of sleep loss, the order of sleep loss being balanced across subjects. The four short duration performance tests consisted of choice reaction time, simple reaction time, short-term memory, and a motor task, handwriting. The results confirm the effects of one night’s sleep deprivation on the vigilance task and also show that performance on the two reaction time tests was significantly impaired by the loss of sleep, but not at such a high level as for the vigilance. The short-term memory test failed to show any adverse effects of sleep loss and similarly for the han-

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**Gross physiological characteristics of Wakefulness, NREMS and REMS.**

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dwriting. The experiment shows that two portable and brief (10 min) performance tests are sensitive indices of sleep loss and should be particularly useful for assessing levels of alertness in the field. In another experiment studying reaction time over 7 days of variable degrees of sleep restriction, sleep deprivation was shown to correlate with longer reaction time on PVT testing. Longer reaction times were noted after only one night of sleep restriction (2 h of sleep reduction) compared to volunteers sleeping on average 8.5 h. Performance continued to diminish with each subsequent day and was directly correlated with the degree of sleep restriction. In the groups allowed to sleep for a maximum of 7 and 5 h, vigilance deficit stabilized after 5 nights, whereas in participants sleeping 3 h or less, vigilance continued to deteriorate in a linear fashion showing a twofold decrease compared to the control group at the end of the sleep restriction phase. After three nights with 8 h spent in bed, none of the sleep restriction groups returned to their baseline reaction times, suggesting that recovery from even mild sleep deprivation may last several days. This experiment also suggests that there may be an adaptive mechanism to mild and moderate chronic sleep deprivation (7 and 5 h groups) that may be insufficient to maintain performance levels in situations of severe chronic sleep deprivation (3 h group).

Other studies have confirmed the finding that impairment in PVT testing increases in proportion to the degree of sleep deprivation: Van Dongen, Maislin, Mullington, and Dinges studied the effects of chronic restriction of sleep periods to 4 h or 6 h per night over 14 consecutive days obtaining results in significant cumulative, dose-dependent deficits in cognitive performance on all tasks. Subjective sleepiness ratings showed an acute response to sleep restriction but only small further increases on subsequent days, and did not significantly differentiate the 6 h and 4 h conditions. Polysomnographic variables and delta power in the non-REM sleep EEG—a putative marker of sleep homeostasis—displayed an acute response to sleep restriction with negligible further changes across the 14 restricted nights. Comparison of chronic sleep restriction to total sleep deprivation showed that the latter resulted in disproportionately large waking neurobehavioral and sleep delta power responses relative to how much sleep was lost. The conclusions of this study showed that chronic restriction of sleep to 6 h or less per night produced cognitive performance deficits equivalent to up to 2 nights of total sleep deprivation, it appears that even relatively moderate sleep restriction can seriously impair waking neurobehavioral functions in healthy adults. Sleepiness ratings suggest that subjects were largely unaware of these increasing cognitive deficits, which may explain why the impact of chronic sleep restriction on waking cognitive functions is often assumed to be benign. Physiological sleep responses to chronic restriction did not mirror waking neurobehavioral responses, but cumulative wakefulness in excess of a 15.84 h predicted performance lapses across all four experimental conditions. This suggests that sleep debt is perhaps best understood as resulting in additional wakefulness that has a neurobiological “cost” which accumulates over time.

In a verbal learning task, the prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex were more activated after acute sleep deprivation. Interestingly, activation of the prefrontal cortex was positively correlated with the degree of subjective sleepiness, whereas activation in the parietal cortex was positively associated with the preservation of near-normal verbal learning. These patterns of increase and decrease
in cerebral activation most likely represent compensatory adaptations (CA). In CA, more activation in the prefrontal cortex with acute sleep deprivation indicates a compensation process in response to the increased homeostatic drive for sleep. The prefrontal cortex is involved in working memory, attention and executive function, functions known to be vulnerable to sleep deprivation. On the other hand, activation of the parietal lobe with sleep deprivation indicates an adaptive process to support the decreased function of other areas of the cortex. These patterns of CA have task-specific differences and indicate that sleep deprivation can result in a combination of dysfunction and compensatory hyperfunction in the brain. A study about the involvement not only of prefrontal cortex in this deficit has been done with 33 men (mean age, 28.6 ± 6.6 years) scheduled for 3 functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) visits: an initial screening day (screening state), after a normal night of sleep (rested state), and after 30 hours of sleep deprivation (sleep-deprivation state). Subjects performed the Sternberg working memory task alternated with a control task during an approximate 13-minute functional magnetic resonance imaging scan. Neuroimaging data revealed that, in the screening and rested states, the brain regions activated by the Sternberg working memory task were found in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, Broca’s area, supplementary motor area, right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, and the bilateral posterior parietal cortices. After 30 hours of sleep deprivation, the activations in these brain regions significantly decreased, especially in the bilateral posterior parietal cortices. Task performance also decreased. A repeated-measures analysis of variance revealed that subjects at the screening and rested states had similar activation patterns, with each having significantly more activation than during the sleep-deprivation state. These results suggest that human sleep-deprivation deficits are not caused solely or even predominantly by prefrontal cortex dysfunction and that the parietal cortex, in particular, and other brain regions involved in verbal working memory exhibit significant sleep-deprivation vulnerability. Level of difficulty modulate the cerebral response, and individual differences can contribute to the difficulty of using neuroimaging studies as a generalized parameter of sleepiness. It has been demonstrated in fMRI studies that activation of the frontoparietal region was more robust in participants found to be less vulnerable to the effects of sleep deprivation. This suggests that more activated CA may correlate with less vulnerability to sleep deprivation. As mentioned, several aspects of executive function are affected by sleep deprivation. Sleep deprivation results in difficulty determining the scope of a problem in cases of distracting information and impairs divergent thinking and originality as measured on the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking. Although much is known about the impact of sleep loss on many aspects of psychological performance, the effects on divergent (“creative”) thinking has received little attention. Twelve subjects went 32 h without sleep, and 12 others acted as normally sleeping controls. All subjects were assessed on the figural and verbal versions of the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking. As compared with the control condition, sleep loss impaired performance on all test scales (e.g., “flexibility,” the ability to change strategy, and “originality,” generation of unusual ideas) for both versions, even on an initial 5-min test component. In an attempt at further understanding of whether these findings might be explained solely by a loss of motivation, two additional short and stimulating tests were also used—a word fluency task incorporating high incentive to do well and a challenging nonverbal planning test. Performance at these tasks was still significantly impaired by sleep loss. Increased perseveration was clearly apparent. Apparently, 1 night of sleep loss can affect
divergent thinking. This contrasts with the outcome for convergent thinking tasks, which are more resilient to short-term sleep loss. It’s worth underline that Divergent thinking is a thought process or method used to generate creative ideas by exploring many possible solutions. It is often used in conjunction with its cognitive colleague, convergent thinking, which follows a particular set of logical steps to arrive at one solution, which in some cases is a ‘correct’ solution. Divergent thinking typically occurs in a spontaneous, free-flowing ‘non-linear’ manner, such that many ideas are generated in an emergent cognitive fashion. Many possible solutions are explored in a short amount of time, and unexpected connections are drawn. After the process of divergent thinking has been completed, ideas and information are organized and structured using convergent thinking. It’s important to consider that divergent thinking is very useful in many critical situations like to think and escape plan. Sleep deprivation also affects temporal memory, as shown by lower performance on tasks of recency (inability to recall the timing for recent events), even in conditions of preserved alertness with use of caffeine, and this is a very critical aspect in a military or police field where, always the use of caffeine is widespread to maintain the alert state. Working memory is very important for the soldiers, and studies report some remarkable effects of cognitive training on Working Memory span, but before looking at that let’s get a handle on what Working Memory really means. Virtually everyone has heard of it, but most people mix it up with short term memory, like the ability to remember a phone number you just heard. Working Memory is very different. Although it does involve holding transient information, it’s really more about rapidly processing and manipulating it. Working memory is a cognitive system with a limited capacity that can hold information temporarily, and is important for reasoning and the guidance of decision-making and behavior. Working memory is often used synonymously with short-term memory, but some theorists consider the two forms of memory distinct, assuming that working memory allows for the manipulation of stored information, whereas short-term memory only refers to the short-term storage of information. In a working memory task under sleep deprivation, fMRI studies demonstrated decreased activation in the parietal region, and increased activation in prefrontal and thalamic regions in more complex tasks. In a specific study about that, the neurobehavioral effects of 24 hr of total sleep deprivation (SD) on working memory in young healthy adults was studied using functional magnetic resonance imaging. In the study of Chee and Chieh Choo, two tasks, one testing maintenance and the other manipulation and maintenance, were used. After SD, response times for both tasks were significantly slower. Performance was better preserved in the more complex task. Both tasks activated a bilateral, left hemisphere-dominant frontal-parietal network of brain regions reflecting the engagement of verbal working memory. In both states, manipulation elicited more extensive and bilateral (L>R) frontal, parietal, and
thalamic activation. After SD, there was reduced blood oxygenation level-dependent signal response in the medial parietal region with both tasks. Reduced deactivation of the anterior medial frontal and posterior cingulate regions was observed with both tasks. Finally, there was disproportionately greater activation of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and bilateral thalamus when manipulation was required. This pattern of changes in activation and deactivation bears similarity to that observed when healthy elderly adults perform similar tasks. These data suggest that reduced activation and reduced deactivation could underlie cognitive impairment after SD and that increased prefrontal and thalamic activation may represent compensatory adaptations. The additional left frontal activation elicited after SD is postulated to be task dependent and contingent on task complexity. These findings provide neural correlates to explain why task performance in relatively more complex tasks is better preserved relative to simpler ones after SD⁶.

**This is another example of CA**

Another function deteriorated by sleep deprivation is the decision-making. Experiments show that acute and chronic sleep deprivation results in more rigid thinking and perseverative errors with poor appreciation of an updated situation despite intact critical reasoning, loss of focus to relevant cues, and increased risk taking, possibly due to reduced functioning of the ventro-medial PFC. Few sleep deprivation (SD) studies involve realism or high-level decision making, factors relevant to managers, military commanders, and so forth, who are undergoing prolonged work during crises. Instead, research has favored simple tasks sensitive to SD mostly because of their dull monotony. In contrast,
complex rule-based, convergent, and logical tasks are unaffected by short-term SD, seemingly because of heightened participant interest and compensatory effort. However, recent findings show that despite this effort, SD still impairs decision making involving the unexpected, innovation, revising plans, competing distraction, and effective communication. Decision-making models developed outside SD provide useful perspectives on these latter effects, as does a neuropsychological explanation of sleep function. SD presents particular difficulties for sleep-deprived decision makers who require these latter skills during emergency situations. To better understand the sometimes catastrophic effects of sleep loss on naturalistic decision making, Whitney, Hinson, Jackson, Van Dongen investigated effects of sleep deprivation on decision making in a reversal learning paradigm requiring acquisition and updating of information based on outcome feedback. Thirteen subjects were randomized to a 62-h total sleep deprivation condition. Twenty-six (22-40 y of age; 10 women) were randomized to a sleep deprivation or control condition, with performance testing at baseline, after 2 nights of total sleep deprivation (or rested control), and following 2 nights of recovery sleep. Subjects performed a decision task involving initial learning of go and no go response sets followed by unannounced reversal of contingencies, requiring use of outcome feedback for decisions. A working memory scanning task and psychomotor vigilance test were also administered. Sleep deprived subjects, and not controls, had difficulty with initial learning of go and no go stimuli and had profound impairment adapting to reversal. Skin conductance responses to outcome feedback were diminished, indicating blunted affective reactions to feedback accompanying sleep deprivation. Working memory scanning performance was not significantly affected by sleep deprivation. And although sleep deprived subjects showed expected attentional lapses, these could not account for impairments in reversal learning decision making. This study shows that sleep deprivation is particularly problematic for decision making involving uncertainty and unexpected change. Blunted reactions to feedback while sleep deprived underlie failures to adapt to uncertainty and changing contingencies. Thus, an error may register, but with diminished effect because of reduced affective valence of the feedback or because the feedback is not cognitively bound with the choice. This has important implications for understanding and managing sleep loss-induced cognitive impairment in emergency response, disaster management, military operations, and other dynamic real-world settings with uncertain outcomes and imperfect information.

Conclusions
Although we have not considered, in this article, critical function in endocrine, metabolic, and immune regulation (that probably they will be object of the another piece), sleep appears to play an active and important role in maintaining neurocognitive performance during wakefulness. Lifestyle changes many times are responsible of sleep deprivation, but also pathological situation (example insomnia). We have to be aware that attention and working memory, but it also other cognitive functions such as long-term memory and decision-making are compromised and always these function are responsible of our behavior and choices, but above all are critical requirement in the high risk employment.
1 In chronobiology, an ultradian rhythm is a recurrent period or cycle repeated throughout a 24-hour day. In contrast, circadian rhythms complete one cycle daily, while infradian rhythms such as the human menstrual cycle have periods longer than a day. The Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of Ultradian specifies that it refers to cycles with a period shorter than a day but longer than an hour (Oxford English Dictionary).

2 Effects of sleep deprivation on short duration performance measures compared to the Wilkinson auditory vigilance task.

M Glenville, R Broughton, A M Wing, R T Wilkinson. PMID: 756060 DOI: 10.1093/sleep/1.2.169

3 The Functions of Sleep and the Effects of Sleep Deprivation E. H. During, M. Kawai

The cumulative cost of additional wakefulness: dose-response effects on neurobehavioural functions and sleep physiology from chronic sleep restriction and total sleep deprivation. Hans P. A. Van Dongen, Greg Maislin, Janet M Mullington, David F Dinges. PMID: 12683469 DOI: 10.1093/sleep/26.2.117

5 The Functions of Sleep and the Effects of Sleep Deprivation E. H. During, M. Kawai

6 Decreased Cortical Response to Verbal Working Memory Following Sleep Deprivation Qiwen Mu, MD, PhD, Ziad Nahas, MD, Kevin A. Johnson, K. Yamanaka, MD, Alexander Mishory, MD, Jejo Koola, Sarah Hill, Michael D. Horner, PhD, Daryl E. Bohning, PhD, Mark S. George, MD - Sleep, Volume 28, Issue 1, January 2005, Pages 55–67, https://doi.org/10.1093/sleep/28.1.55

“Effects of sleep deprivation on short duration performance measures compared to the Wilkinson auditory vigilance task” - M Glenville, R Broughton, A M Wing, R T Wilkinson

“Functional imaging of working memory after 24 hr of total sleep deprivation” - Michael W L Chee, Wei Chieh Choo


“Sleep Homeostasis and the Function of Sleep” - Joel H. Benington www.researchgate.net/publication/12243399_Sleep_Homeostasis_and_the_Function_of_Sleep


“The cumulative cost of additional wakefulness: dose-response effects on neurobehavioural functions and sleep physiology from chronic sleep restriction and total sleep deprivation” - Hans P A Van Dongen, Greg Maislin, Janet M Mullington, David F Dinges -PMID: 12683469 DOI: 10.1093/sleep/26.2.117

“The Functions of Sleep and the Effects of Sleep Deprivation” - E. H. During, M. Kawai

“The Function(s) of Sleep” - Marcos G. Frank, H. Craig Heller - Chapter in Handbook ofExperimental Pharmacology - January 2018


The Oxford English Dictionary

PICTURES:


-https://www.m3india.in/contents/news/77474/irregular-sleep-may-deplete-cognitive-functions

-https://csuglobal.edu/blog/increasing-cognitive-function-with-binaural-beats

CoESPU training
21st Enhanced Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Course, with students coming from Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, plus two internees from SIOI, the Italian Society for International Organization, in the context of student internship projects at CoESPU. The new CoESPU Enhanced Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Course (ECPOC) has been designed with the aim of providing experienced Police Officers with a comprehensive preparation that combines aspects of POC, Child Protection and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence for police peacekeepers in UN Peace Operations. ECPOC represents a significant revision and update of the previous CoESPU POC course offered since 2012 and, based on the recently released UN CPOC for Police Training Materials (2020), it encompasses all the most relevant UN policies, standards and manuals in order to promote an effective knowledge and support the development of the necessary skills to effectively implement POC in UN Peace Operations.

During the sober Graduation ceremony, closing speeches were delivered by the CoESPU Director, BG Giovanni Pietro Barbano, and by the US Consul General in Milan, Mr. Robert Needham (through a video-message). You can find a more detailed description of this course in the CoESPU Magazine no. 2-2021, page 73.
12TH “GENDER PROTECTION IN PEACE OPERATION COURSE” COURSE AND 1ST “CHILD PROTECTION FOR UN POLICE”

**SEPTEMBER 1 – SEPTEMBER 15, 2021** 12th edition of the Gender Protection in Peace Operations Course (GP12) and 1st edition of the Child Protection for United Nations Police Course (CP01). International students from Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Ukraine, all of them experienced Police Officers selected to be deployed in UN Peace Operations’ key positions, faced two separate 5-day training programs, focusing their attention on Gender equality, Gender Mainstreaming, respect for diversity, assistance to victims, in the wider framework of the UNSC Resolution 1325 (also known as “Women, Peace and Security Agenda”) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, among other topics. More in detail, the attendees had the opportunity to deepen the knowledge of possible threats that women and children face in destabilized areas, where they still represent the weakest part of the population – thus needing special care and protection by the Law Enforcement. Both activities were carried out also through the collaboration of a Tutor, Mr. Abdul Razak Osman, Assistant Commissioner from Ghana Police, and of a Facilitator, Ms. Sofia Sutera, Human Rights Researcher at Padua University.
3rd course on “Monitoring, Mentoring, Advising & Training” (MMA&T), organized by CoESPU within the European Union Police and Civilian Services Training programme (EUPCST). The main goal of the 5-day activity was to increase knowledge and skills of those working as Monitors, Mentors, Advisers or Trainers, employed in civilian crisis management missions, permitting a deeper and clearer understanding of their role and functions among police and civil services. The audience was composed of 16 participants, coming from Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Moldova, The Netherlands, Romania and Spain, both police officers and civilians. During his welcome speech, BG Giovanni Pietro Barbano, CoESPU Director, thanked the Royal Netherlands Koninklijke Marechaussee, which presently holds the EUPCST Presidency, highlighting the CoESPU leading role in the initiative since the very first edition of the programme (at that time EUPFT) in 2008.
JULY 26 – SEPTEMBER 17, 2021

Organized by the UN Police Division, in collaboration with the CoESPU, the Turkish National Police, Turkish National Police Academy, the United States, through its International Police Peacekeeping Operations Support Program (IPPOS) of the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), and the Integrated Training Service of the Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training of the UN Department of Peace Operations, the 6th ToT course for FPU coordinators and trainers took place in Ankara (Turkey). Its main objective was to further strengthen the overall performance of United Nations policing. Overseen by the Police Division’s Selection and Recruitment Section, this 8-week intensive training course was expected to enhance police-contributing countries’ pre-deployment training capabilities and improve the performance of deployed FPUs to deliver more effectively by reinforcing their operational capacities and establishing Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) for future deployment to four high-risk peace operations. The training activity was attended by 47 participants, including five women, from 30 police-contributing countries.

At the Police Academy, during the opening ceremony, UN PolAd Luis Carrilho emphasized the importance of this activity, stating that “the size and scope of FPUs and their responsibilities have substantially grown and have become increasingly complex.” Furthermore he extended the UN Police’s appreciation to all the Bodies contributing to the activity, including CoESPU and its four trainers expressly sent to Ankara.
COESPU ONSITE VISITS
SEPTEMBER 1, 2021
Courtesy visit from Col. Miroslaw Labecki and Lt. Col. Adrian Bolz, respectively NATO Military Police Centre of Excellence Director and Deputy Director, accompanied by Col. Giuseppe De Magistris, NATO Stability Policing COE Director, to Brig. Gen Giovanni Pietro Barbano, CoESPU Director.

SEPTEMBER 29, 2021
A delegation of the Framework Nations Concept visited both the CoESPU and the NATO SP CoE, exploring new horizons in terms of future, professional collaboration. The FNC initiative was launched by NATO in 2014 and it is aimed at promoting cooperation between European countries, what will allow them to improve current military capabilities and develop new ones.
The Commander of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment, Brigadier General Niave Knell, granted the prestigious “Friend of the Regiment” Award to Brigadier General Giovanni Pietro Barbano, CoESPU Director. The Military Police Regimental Association’s (MPRA) Friend of the Regiment Award was officially established in 2018 to recognize individuals who voluntarily make significant contributions to the morale, welfare, and spirit of Soldiers and Family Members in various facets of the Military Police Corps Regiment. BG Barbano, in particular, was awarded for his considerable contributions, of over 10 years, to the professional development of U.S. Army Military Police Corps Soldiers assigned in Europe and to the strategic partnership between the Carabinieri and the SETAF-AF. The Award was delivered to BG Barbano by Col. Rebecca D. Hazelett, CoESPU Deputy Director, the most Senior Officer from US Army Military Police in Italy.

“Combating Human Trafficking along Mediterranean Migration Routes”, 7th edition of OSCE / CoESPU live exercise in Vicenza, a joint effort to promote respect for human rights in the world through a better coordination at international level. More info and photos on the next issue of the CoESPU Magazine.
We welcome your contributions!
Should you wish to collaborate with our Magazine, please send your articles, tales or pictures from the field to coespurivista@carabinieri.it

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